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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is essentially a study of how intellectual property, transfer of 
technology and competition rules can be interfaced properly in Iran to facilitate the 
flow of technology into the country. The law governing the transfer and development 
of technology is a relatively new and non-traditional discipline. The thesis is intended 
to make a significant contribution to the limited number of publications available on 
the subject especially in examining within one volume the principles of three branches 
of law of great significance to economic development. 
The focus of this thesis is Iran. Iran is a country with a rich culture and a 
history that goes back to thousands of years. She has abundant natural resources 
including oil and a large domestic market and enjoys a strategic position in 
international trade and politics. Seven decades have passed since Iran attempted to 
acquire foreign technology to industrialise important sectors of her economy but the 
country continues to be dependent heavily on foreign technology and her economy 
remains an oil driven one. Part of the problem is the absence of a strong legal and 
institutional framework within which secure investments both local and foreign can 
take place on an enduring basis. 
The thesis shows that the international community has failed to provide an 
international legal framework responsive to the special needs of developing countries 
which are, therefore, constrained to rely on their own domestic institutions to tap into 
the technology available across the world. Given that international Conventions - such 
as the Paris Convention and the GATUTRIPS Agreement provided developing 
countries with space within which they can fashion their national laws and institutions 
regarding the transfer and promotion of technology, how should Iran reconstruct its 
local laws to secure indigenous development of its industrial and technological 
infrastructure? The thesis proposes a package of legal reforms and institutional 
changes which are intended to encourage the flow of technology into the country by 
guaranteeing the protection of acquired rights and assuring mutual benefits to both 
technology suppliers and recipients. 
The thesis is divided into four sections: Section I provides a historical 
background to Iran's attempts to industrialise, Section 11 is an analysis of the 
interfacing between intellectual property laws, competition laws, transfer of technology 
laws and international law to uncover the legal problems relating to the transfer of 
technology to the developing countries, Section III examines the existing national legal 
framework within which the flow of technology takes place in Iran and Section IV 
devises an optimum legal and institutional regime to maximise the transfer of foreign 
technology and promotion and development of domestic innovative activities with 
particular reference to Iran. 
In this thesis, the proposed Development of Technology Law of Iran lays down 
rules for patent grants, transfer of technology agreements and protection of 
competition and, for the first time, will bring the three areas of law under the 
supervision of a single independent agency of the government whose central purpose 
will be to develop a technological base in the country and advance industrial progress. 
ii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Pages 
Abstract 
Table of Contents 
Table of Statutes xi 
Table of Cases xii 
Abbreviations xiii 
Preface and Acknowledgments xvi 
SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
Chapter One: INTRODUCTION AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT I 
Introduction 2 
The Objectives of Thesis 3 
1. Iran and Foreign Technology 4 
The Qajars (1796-1925) 5 
(a) Training as a Key to Development 6 
(b) Power Struggle over Iran 8 
The Pahlavi Regime (1925 - 1979) 12 
(a) Introduction 12 
(b) Reza Shah (1925 - 1941) 13 
(c) Mohammed Reza Shah (1941 - 1978) 15 
(i) Industrial Licensing 16 
(d) Progress of Industrialisation under the Pahlavi Regime 19 
IV. The Revolution of 1979 21 
(a) New Constitution 21 
(b) Economic System 22 
V. Economic and Industrial Policy after the Revolution 24 
(a) First Experience 24 
(b) Second Experience 26 
iii 
Chapter Two: THE CAUSES OF IRAN'S FAILURE TO ACQUIRE 
FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY 29 
Economic Development Strategy and Transfer of Technology 29 
(a) Import Substitution Policy 30 
(b) The Failure of the Import Substitution Policy 31 
Lack of Technological Planning and Policies 34 
Lack of Promotion and Encouragement of Technological Innovation 36 
(a) Technological Level of Iranian Industries 37 
IV. Inadequate Legal Framework for the Transfer, Development and 
Diffusion of Technology 40 
(a) Transfer of Technology Law 40 
(b) Industrial Property Law 42 
(c) Restrictive Business Practices Law 44 
SECTION 11. INTERFACING BETWEEN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS, 
COMPETITION LAWS, TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY LAWS, GENERAL 
COMMERCIAL LAWS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Chapter Three: PATENT RIGHTS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY 47 
Introduction 48 
National Patent Rules 50 
(a) Historical Survey 50 
(b) The Emergence of Patent's Specification Doctrine 54 
Contemporary Justifications for Patent Protection 57 
(a) Natural Law Thesis 58 
(b) Incentive to Disclose new Knowledge 59 
(c) Incentive to Promote Investments for 
Research and Development 62 
IV. Facilitation of Transfer of Technology 65 
(a) Insufficiency of Patent Laws for Transfer of 
Technology 66 
(b) Incentives to Innovation 68 
V. Iranian and Islamic Jurists and Justification of Patent Rights 70 
iv 
(a) Iranian and Islamic Concept of Patent Rights 70 
(b) Justification of Patent Rights in Islamic law 73 
VI. Conclusion 76 
Chapter Four: INTERNATIONAL ACCORDS FOR THE PROTECTION 
OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 79 
1. International Convention for Protection of Industrial Property 
(Paris Convention) 80 
(a) The Minimum Standards of Protection 81 
(b) The Principle of National Treatment 81 
(c) Right of priority 84 
(d) Independence of Patents 85 
(e) Importation: Production Monopoly or Market Monopoly? 86 
(f) Importation of Patented Processes 89 
(e) Remedies Against Patent Abuse 90 
(f) Rights of the States to Control Abuse 
of the Monopoly 91 
(g) Permission to Legislate 94 
II. The New International Economic Order And 
Revision of the Paris Convention 97 
The Revision of the Paris Convention 99 
III. International Trade and Intellectual Property Rights 107 
(a) The Reasons for Addressing Intellectual Property 
Issues in GATT 108 
(b) Developing Countries and Intellectual Property 
Issues in GATT III 
(c) New Changes 112 
(d) Mechanism to Check Abuse of Power Within the TRIPS 116 
(e) Mechanism to Check Abuse of Power Outside the TRIPS 118 
(f) Adopting Hybrid Legal Regimes 119 
IV. Conc lusion 120 
V 
Chapter Five: NATIONAL COMPETITION LAW AND 
TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY 123 
1. Overview 123 
Ii. Intellectual Property Rights and Restrictive 
Business Practices 123 
(a) Restrictive Business Practices 125 
(b) Dominant Power of Technology Suppliers 127 
(c) Law and restrictive Business Practices 129 
III. Action by Developed Market-Economy Countries 130 
(a) Antitrust v. Intellectual Property Rights 133 
IV. Controlling Restrictive Business Practices in Technology 
Transfer Transactions - Non-Industrial Countries, Approach 137 
IV. The Validity of Restrictive Business Practices 
under Competition and Transfer of Technology Laws 139 
(a) Grant Back Provisions 149 
(b) Field of Use Restrictions 141 
(c) Tying Agreements 142 
V. Challenges to the Validity of Industrial Property Rights 145 
(a) Conceptual Differences 145 
(b) No Competition Clause 149 
(c) Restrictions After Expiration of Industrial 
Property Rights 150 
(d) Export Restrictions 151 
(e) Parent-subsidiary Relations 152 
(f) Restrictions on Adaptations 154 
(g) Patent Pool or Cross-Licensing 155 
IV. Conclusion 157 
Chapter Six: INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION LAW AND 
TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY 160 
1. The Havana Charter 161 
(a) History of the Charter 161 
(b) Irreconcilable Differences 163 
Efforts to Control Restrictive Business Practices in 
International Forums 165 
(a) The Work of the United Nations 165 
(b) UNCTAD Restrictive Business Practices (RB, Ps Code) 
and Technology Transfer Transactions 167 
vi 
(d) The Failure of the RBPs Code 170 
International Regulation of Transfer of Technology 172 
(a) Code of Conduct for Transfer of Technology 172 
(b) Chapter 4 of the TOT Code 174 
IV. Conclusion 179 
Chapter Seven: CONTRACT LAW AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY 180 
1. Overview 180 
Iranian Contract Law and Transfer of Technology Transactions 185 
(a) Protection of Secret Know-how 187 
(b) Iranian Penal Code and Disclosure of Trade Secrets 190 
Other General Provisions 194 
(a) Proper Law 194 
(b) Settlement of Disputes 197 
(c) Guarantees 198 
(d) Duration of Technology Licensing Agreements 200 
(e) Legal Validity of Patents Involved 201 
(f) Non-infringement of a Third Party Patent 202 
(g) Most-Favoured Licensee Clause 202 
111. Conclusion 204 
SECTION III: LAWS AND REGULATIONS ON WHICH TECHNOLOGY IS 
TRANSFERRED AND DEVELOPED IN IRAN 
Chapter Eight: FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAW OF IRAN AND 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 206 
Law Concerning the Attraction and Protection of 
Foreign Investment in Iran 207 
(a) Multinational Corporations and the Transfer 
of Technology to Iran 209 
(b) Joint Ventures and the Transfer of Technology 
to Iran 212 
(c) Monopolisation of Iran's Market 214 
(d) Foreign Investment After the 1979 Revolution 216 
vii 
The new Constitution and Foreign Companies in Iran 216 
(a) First Interpretation 217 
(b) Second Interpretation 218 
(c) Third Interpretation 219 
(d) Analysis of the Interpretations 219 
111. Conclusion 229 
Chapter Nine: IRANIAN PATENT LAW: A NEGATIVE INSTRUMENT 
FOR TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND DEVELOPMENT 
AND ATTRACTION OF INVESTMENT 230 
1. Introduction 230 
(a) The Historical Development of the Iranian 230 
Patent System 
The Iranian Patent System and Transfer of Technology: The Law 232 
(a) Absolute and Relative Novelty 238 
(b) Absolute Novelty and Competition Policy 239 
(c) Technology Transfer and Absolute Novelty 241 
(d) Lessons from Other Developing Countries 246 
Unconventional Patents 244 
(a) Inventors' Certificates 244 
(b) Utility Models 245 
(c) Patents of Improvement or Addition 246 
(d) Patents of Importation or Introduction 247 
(e) Transfer of Technology Patent 250 
(f) Direct protection of Innovations 251 
(g) Innovation Warrant and Innovation Patent 254 
(h) Innovation Certificates and Developing Countries 256 
IV. Examination of Patent Application 257 
(a) Registration 257 
(b) Substantive Examination of Inventions 260 
(c) Disclosure Requirement 261 
V. Working Requirement 264 
(a) Patents in Technology Transfer 264 
(b) Moltilan Co. v. Iran Rehabilitation Industries Co. 268 
VI. Compulsory Licensing 269 
VII. Restriction on Subject Matter 270 
viii 
VIII. Rights of Patentee 273 
(a) Assignment of Patent Rights 273 
(b) Patent licences 274 
(c) Enforcement of the Iranian Patent Act 275 
Ix. Conclusion 276 
SECTION IV: PROPOSALS FOR AN OPTIMUM LEGAL AND 
INSTITUTIONAL REGIME TO MAXIMISE THE TRANSFER OF FOREIGN 
TECHNOLOGY AND PROMOTE AND DEVELOP DOMESTIC INNOVATIVE 
ACTIVITIES 
CHAPTER TEN: CONCLUSION: PROPOSED DEVELOPMENT OF 
TECHNOLOGY LAW OF IRAN 278 
1. Part One: Administration of the Development of Technology Law 280 
11. The Iranian Board for Transfer and Promotion of Technology (IBTPT) 284 
(a) Governing Body for the IBTPT 284 
(b) Nature of the IBTPT 286 
(c) Main Functions of the IBTPT 284 
(d) Authority of the IBTPT 288 
(e) Organization of the IBDT 289 
(i) Patent Office 289 
(ii) Transfer of Technology Office 291 
(iii) Protection of Competition Office 291 
(iv) Tecno-economic Information Centre 292 
(v) IBTPT Tribunal 292 
(vi) Industrial Property Documentation Unit 293 
(vii) Registers 294 
11. Further Practical Issues for the IBTPT 294 
A. Technology and Investment Priorities 294 
B. Effective Integration of the Offices 295 
C. Settlement of Conflicts Between the Offices 397 
111. Foreign Investment and the IBTPT 399 
Part Two: Patent Grants 303 
(a) Criteria of Patentability 303 
(b) Restriction on Subject Matter 305 
(c) Contents of the Description and Claims 305 
(d) Examination of Application 306 
(e) Contents of the Exclusive Right in an Invention 307 
(f) Licensing and the Transfer of Rights 309 
(g) Non-voluntary Licences 309 
(h) Working of Patented Technology 310 
(i) Utility Model Certificate 310 
ix 
Certification of Local Innovations 311 
Part Three: Registration and Monitoring of Transfer of Technology 
Contracts 314 
(a) Registering, Recording and Monitoring of Technology and 
Industrial Property Licensing Agreements 314 
(b) Registrable Agreements 315 
(c) Evaluation Criteria 315 
(d) Parties to Transactions 316 
(e) Rights and Responsibilities of the Parties 316 
Part Four: Competition Rules 319 
A. Elimination/ Control of Restrictive Clauses 
of Technology Transfer Agreements 319 
(i) A general Provision 319 
(ii) Unacceptable Clauses 319 
(iii) Catch-all Provision 322 
(iv) Exceptional Cases 322 
B. Control of Agreements Between Competitors 324 
C. Control of Abuse of Dominant Position 326 
D. Enforcement Mechanisms 327 
Appendix One 330 
Appendix Two 333 
Appendix Three 363 
Appendix Four 366 
Selected Bibliography 367 
x 
TABLE OF STATUTES AND INTERNATIONAL CODES 
Act Concerning Monopolies and Dispensations with Penal Laws, and the Forfeitures Thereof, 
Statutes at Large, vol. 2, U. K., (1623). 
Amendment Act for Improvement of Regulation of Registration of Companies, Iran. 
C 
rl .. 
ommission Regulation (EEC) no 2349/84 of 23 July 1984 on the application of article 85 
(3) of the treaty to certain categories of patent licensing agreements. 
First Five Year Development Plan, Iran, (1989-1994). 
Foreign Trade Monopoly Law, Iran, (1932). 
French Patent Act, July 1884. 
International Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of 1883 known as the Paris 
Convention, of March 20,1883, WIPO Pub. No. 201 (E). 
Islamic Punishment Law of Iran, November (1983). 
Law Concerning the Attraction and Protection of Foreign Investment, November 28, (1955). 
Mexico, Law on the Control and Registration of the Transfer of Technology and the Use and 
Exploitation of Patents and Trade Marks, (1981). 
Registration of Trademarks and Inventions Act of Iran, (1931). 
Regulations for Execution of Trademarks and Patents of Iran, (1931). 
Regulations Implementing the Law on the Attraction and Protection of Foreign Investments, 
(1956). 
Revised Regulations for the Execution of the Law of lst Tir 1310 (1931) Relative to the 
Registration of Trade Marks and Patents, Iran, (1958). 
The Permission Act for the Ratification of the Iranian Government to the International General 
Union Known as Paris for Protection of Industrial, Commercial and Agricultural Property, 
February (1958). 
The U. K. Patent Act of (1977). 
The U. S. Sherman Act, (1890). 
U. N., The Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of 
Restrictive Business Practices, (1980). 
U. N., Draft International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology, (1985). 
xi 
TABLE OF CASES 
Abastra Co. Ltd. v. Industrial Patent Office of Iran, Branch 24, Supreme Court, (1995), 
Teheran. 
Boulton v. Bull (1795) 2 H. Bi. 463 
Case 192/73, Van Zuylen Freres v. HAG AG (1974) E. C. R., 73. 
Case 262/81, Coditel SA v. Cine-Vog Films (1982), E. C. R 3381,1 C. M. L. R. 49 (1983). 
Copley v. Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co., 295 F. Supp. 93,96-97 (S. D. W. Va. 
1968). 
Edgebury v. Stephens (1693) 1 W. P. C. 35. 
EEC, Commission Decision in Raymond-Nagoya, (OJ No. L. 143/39 of 23 June 1972) 
General Talking Pictures Grop. v. Western Electric Company, 305 US 124 (1938) 
Lear v. Adkins, 395 U. S. 653 (1969). 
Liardet v. Johnson, IY and CCC 527, (1780) 
Moltilan Co. v. Iran Rehabilitation Industries Co., Branch 24 of Supreme Court, classified as 
671n3, (1995), Teheran. 
Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 522 F. 2d 612 (8th Cir. 1975). 
Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India et al, F. 2d, 76-749,11 January (1978). 
Quinine Cartel case, Re (69/240) (1969), OJ L192/5 (1969), CMLR D23, D41; (1970) ECR 
661. 
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U. S. 163, (1931). 
Standard Sanitary Mfg. v. United States, 226 U. S. 20, (1912). 
Technograph Printed Circuits Ltd. v. Mills and Rockley (Electronics) Ltd, (1972) RPC 355. 
Times Picayune Publishing Co. v. U. S., 345 U. S. 594, (1953). 
Transparent-Wrap Machine Corp. v. Stockes & Smith Co., 329 U. S. 637, (1947). 
United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E. D. Pa. 1960). 
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148, F. 2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). 
Westinghouse Electric & MFG. CO. v. Metropolitan Electric MFG. Co., 290 F. 661,644(2d 
Cir. 1923). 
xii 
ABBREVIATIONS 
Am. U. L. Rev. American University Law Review 
Am. J. Comp. L. American Journal of Comparative Law 
Am. J. Int'l L. American Journal of International Law 
Am. U. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y American University Journal of 
International Law & Policy 
Antitrust L. J. Antitrust Law Journal 
Antitrust Bull. Antitrust Bulletin 
BIRPI Unite International Bureaux for the Protection of 
Intellectual property 
Boston U. Int'l L. J. Boston University International Law Journal 
Brit. Y. 1. L. British Yearbook of International Law 
Brooklyn J. Int'l. L. Brooklyn Journal of International Law 
Calif. Western Int'l. L. J. California Western International Law Journal 
Canad. Y. Int'l. L. Canadian Yearbook of International Law 
Canada- US. L. J. Canada-United States Law Journal 
Cant. L. Rev. Canterbury Law Review 
Case W. Res. J. Int'l. L. Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 
Colum. J. Trans. L. Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 
Cornell Int'l. L. J. Cornell International Law Journal 
CTC Reporter Centre of Transnational Corporation Reporter 
Duke L. J. Duke Law Journal 
ECR European Court Report 
ECLR European Community Law Review 
E. D. Pa. Eastern District (Court) of Pensilvania 
EEC European Economic Community 
EIPR European Intellectual Property Review 
F. 2d Federal Reporter, Second Series 
Fordham Int'l. L. J. Fordham International Law Journal 
Fordham L. Rev. Fordham Law Review 
Harv. Int'l L. J. Harvard International Law Journal 
Harv. L. Rev. Harvard Law Review 
Houston L. Rev. Houston Law Review 
Int'l. L. M. International Legal Materials 
I. L. 0 International Labour Organization 
ICC International Review of Industrial 
Copyright Law (Ger. ) 
IDEA The Journal of Law and Technology 
Indus. Prop. Industrial Property 
Property and 
xiii 
Int'l. Compu. L. Adv. 
Int'l. Buss. Lawyer 
Int'l. & Comp. L. Q. 
Int'l. Lawyer 
Int'l. J. M. E. Stud. 
Int'l. Bus. L. 
Iranian Stud. 
ITO 
J. Int'l. L. & Econ. 
J. Contemp. L. 
J. L. H. 
J. M. African Stud. 
J. Prop. R. 
J. Devel. Stu. 
J. Dev. Areas 
J. L. & Comm. 
J. Bus. L. 
J. Pat. Off. Soc 
J. Eco. His. 
J. Int'l. Aff. 
J. W. T. L. 
International Computer Law Adviser 
International Business Lawyer 
International & Comparative Law Quarterly 
International Lawyer 
International Journal of Middle East Study 
International Business Lawyer 
Iranian Studies 
International Trade Organization 
Journal of International Law & Economy 
Journal of Contemporary Law 
Journal of Legal History 
Journal of Modern African Studies 
Journal of Proprietary Rights 
Journal of Development Study 
Journal of Developing Areas 
Journal of Law and Commerce 
Journal of Business Law 
Journal of Patent Office Society 
Journal of Economic History 
Journal of International Affair 
Journal of World Trade Law 
L. & Bus. Lic. Law and Business of Licensing 
L. Q. Rev. Law Quarterly Review 
L. Soc. Gaz. Law Society's Gazette 
L. & Tech. Law and Technology 
L. & St. Law and State 
L. & Pol. Int'l. Bus Law and Policy in International Business 
Mcgill L. J. Mcgill Law Journal 
MD. J. Int'l. L&T. Maryland Journal of International Law and Trade 
N. L. J. New Law Journal 
N. Y. U. L. Rev. New York University Law Review 
Pol. Eco. M. J. Political -Economy Monthly Journal 
R. P. C. Restrictive Practices Court 
Rut. Compu. & Tech. L. J. Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal 
RBPs Restrictive Business Practices 
Scand. Stud. L. Scandinavian Studies in Law 
Sci. & R. J. U. Sharif Scientific and Research Journal of University of Sharif 
Scot. J. Pol. Eco. Scottish Journal Political Economy 
S. D. W. Va. United States District Court for the Southern 
District of West Virginia 
Stan. L. Rev. Stanford law Review 
xiv 
Stan. J. Int'l L. Stanford Journal of International Law 
TOT Transfer of Technology 
UNCTAD United Nations Commission on Trade and Development 
UNCTC United Nation Centre on Transnational Corporations 
U. S. United States Supreme Court Reports 
Vand. J. Trans. L. Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational. Law 
Virginia J. Int'l. L. Virginia Journal of International Law 
W. Comp. World Competition 
W. Eco. World Economy 
W. Dev. World Development 
WIPO World Intellectual Property Organization 
xv 
Preface and Acknowledgments 
Iran is unlike any other developing country. It is rich and has all the vegetable, 
mineral and animal resources to be able to do without the rest of the world except for one 
commodity - technology. For decades, Iranian leaders gave away Iran's oil wealth for the 
glitter of Western goods and services and those who came to trade did not stay. They went 
away with the household silver back to their secure societies and comfortable homes. Many 
Iranians too left for the US and Europe taking with them their wealth to invest in the already 
developed world and some of them, the Iranian elite, even flitted between the developed world 
and Iran. They were allies of the multinationals and friends of contractors and consultants who 
could not or would not pass some of their technology to the Iranians. My work was to 
ascertain why this was so. As a lawyer, my concern was whether the law can do something 
about it. And my conclusion is that the law can. 
My greatest intellectual debt is due to Professor John Adams, University of Sheffield 
and Director, Intellectual Property Law Institute, for introducing me to the subject and whose 
thoughts, studies and discussions inspired me to undertake this research. I am also indebted 
to Dr Jeremy Phillips who was my first supervisor before he left QMW. His writings on 
intellectual property and transfer of technology influenced my work. He read drafts of this 
thesis and sought to advise me in the midst of a busy public and scholarly career of his own. 
I owe my special thanks to my supervisor Dr. Noel J. Byrne whose special attention, 
comments and criticism changed my work from a general and broad study to a thesis focusing 
on the essence of the subject. His guidance and insightful comments were invaluable for the 
accomplishment of this work. I should not forget my friend and colleague Dr. K. V. S. K. 
Nathan, Barrister of Mestrino (Italy), for supplying me with World Bank development 
materials and for reading the proofs of the thesis. 
When I began my research, the interaction between intellectual property rights, 
technology transfer and competition laws was shrouded with mystery in Iran and no 
publications are available on the subject. During my two visits to Iran for the purpose of my 
research, many people at all levels of the Iranian government gave generously their time and 
offered me access to documents. I am most grateful to these people, who are too numerous 
to mention. I also wish to express my gratitude to Dr Assad Ommar of UNCTAD, Geneva and 
the staff of the Centre of Intellectual Property Unit of Queen Mary & Westfield College, 
particularly Mrs Ellen Gredley for her excellent service in the small but valuable library of the 
Centre. I would like to thank those who in one way or another provided feedback on my 
language use in the final writing-up of this thesis. 
It was a difficult time for my wife who suffered most during my undertaking but her 
patience and encouragement reassured me particularly after my meetings with my supervisor. 
I cannot express in words the gratitude I owe to her. 
Seyed Mohammed Fasih Marnani 
Queen Mary & Westfield College 
London 
xvi 
SECTION 1: 
INTRODUCTION AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
2 
Chapter One 
INTRODUCTION 
The developing countries face major problems in their attempts to 
acquire foreign technology to industrialise important sectors of their economies. The 
problems are the consequences of a combination of factors such as the adoption of 
poor economic and monetary policies, the prevalence of political instability, the 
indifference to corrupt practices and the lack of respect for basic civil and human 
rights which encourage the flight of local capital abroad. Most developing countries 
recognize these problems but even if they are successful in overcoming them they will 
not succeed in the acquisition of needed technology in the absence of a strong legal 
framework which facilitates the transfer of foreign technology, protects the rights of 
owners of intellectual property, ensures a free and competitive market in goods and 
services without privilege or favour and promotes a healthy legal environment for all 
economic and commercial activities. Such a framework will also provide the necessary 
incentives for the development and application of local expertise and skills to invent 
new and competitive local technology. 
To varying degrees every developing country has laws on its statute books to 
cover economic and commercial activities within its boundaries but not all these laws 
are comprehensive and effective in critical aspects particularly in regard to transfer of 
technology matters. Nearly all laws which have some bearing on transfer, 
development, and diffusion of technology are enforced in an uncoordinated and 
haphazard manner. In some countries, the laws are hardly enforced at all chiefly 
because of the lack of strong institutions with the powers, procedures and expertise 
to monitor market activities including the flow of technology and to take legal and 
other action as necessary. Without the appeal of an efficient monitoring and 
enforcement capability it would be unrealistic to expect an unimpeded flow of 
technology from the developed countries to the developing countries. 
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Iran is typical of a less industrially developed country which has experienced 
several stages and circumstances in the process of acquiring foreign technology. The 
case of Iran can be very important for other developing countries since Iran despite 
its scientific and industrial history, rich natural resources including abundant oil, 
sufficient foreign earnings, liberal foreign investment law and relatively strong 
protection of foreign industrial property rights has not yet succeeded in building a 
reasonable technological base and achieve her economic and industrial objectives. In 
comparison, South Korea, Brazil, India and China with less resources than Iran are 
now exporting technology in significant areas to other developing and even some 
developed countries. 
The objectives of this thesis 
Given that international Conventions - such as the Paris Convention and the 
GATT/TRIPS Agreement provided developing countries with space within which they 
can fashion their national laws regarding the transfer and promotion of technology, 
how should Iran reconstruct its local laws to secure indigenous development of its 
industrial and technological infrastructure? This basic question invites the following 
further questions: 
1. What are the legal problems relating to the transfer of technology to developing 
countries? This requires an analysis of the interfacing between intellectual property 
laws, competition laws, transfer of technology laws, general commercial laws and 
international law; 
2. How effective is the existing national legal framework within which the flow of 
technology takes place in Iran? 
3. What is an optimum legal and institutional regime for Iran to maximise the transfer 
of foreign technology and promote domestic innovative and technological activities. 
This thesis is divided into four main sections. Section I presents the subject of 
the thesis in its historical context, Section 11 analyzes the interfacing of relevant 
national and international laws in regard to transfer of technology, Section III 
considers the present legal framework within which the transfer of technology takes 
place in Iran and Section IV of the thesis concludes that countries in the same 
4 
situation as Iran could benefit from bringing the administration of patent, transfer of 
technology and competition laws under the umbrella of a single agency. The thesis 
proposes for the first time a draft Development of Technology Law for Iran to 
encompass these three areas of law and the establishment of an Iranian Board for 
Transfer and Promotion of Technology. 
1. Iran and Foreign Technology 
One may usefully begin with a brief account of the basic problems faced by 
developing countries in their struggle to achieve a satisfactory degree of 
industrialisation. But much of the discussion is concentrated on the particular problems 
of Iran in the development and acquisition of foreign technology. Many parallels can 
be drawn between Iran and other developing countries. The story of the attempted 
transformation of Iran into an industrialised society provides an understanding of the 
current problems of developing countries with regard to national and international 
regulation of technology transfer agreements. Whereas the industrialisation process of 
the developed countries began four hundred years ago, in the case of most developing 
countries, industrialisation started for the most part after the second world war. The 
particular feature of such a period was the new economic and political order in which 
many developing countries were placed after their independence and began their 
struggle to acquire economic independence as well. 
For a proper understanding of the problems of most developing countries, three 
stages of the industrial development of Iran will be examined. First, the reign by the 
Qajars (1796-1925) shows the situation of the country at the time when the industrial 
revolution was fundamentally changing the face of Europe. Second, the period 
covering the first and second world wars when Western-type industrialisation started 
and continued until the revolution of 1979 when the rule of Shah was brought down. 
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Third, the aftermath of the revolution of 1979 which terminated 2500 years rule of 
Iranian monarchs and founded the Islamic Republic of Iran. No comprehensive studies 
have been undertaken to date to analyze the inadequacies of the policies, laws and 
institutions of Iran with regard to the development and acquisition of foreign 
technology. The thesis begins with such an analysis which, inter alia, will provide the 
backdrop for a proper understanding of the intricate features of Iran's movement 
towards an industry-based economy. 
11. The Qajars (1796-1925) 
During this period, few serious efforts were made to establish new industries 
and secure the transfer of foreign technology to Iran. ' The most important example 
was a comprehensive program introduced by Amir Kabir, the Prime Minister of 
Nasser-ed-Din Shah, in 1846. He was also known by the name of Amir Nezam. 
Having realised the importance of technological progress as a necessary condition for 
economic development2 and with a view to establish new light industries and 
For this study technology is defined as technical information that empower man to produce useful 
goods, or to render services. Technology transfer implies that the recipient of technology not only 
acquires hardware and software but eventually accumulates the technical knowledge, which is 
necessary to master the imported technology. There is a general agreement that countries need to 
develop specific capabilities in order to achieve this. UNCTAD, Technology Indicators and 
Developing Countries, U. N. Doc. ITP/TEC/19,1991, p. 6. For analysis of the concepts underlying 
the discussion on transfer of technology, see Robinson A. (ed. ), Appropriate Technology for 
Third World Development, proceedings of a conference held by the International Economic 
Association at Teheran, Iran, London, 1979; Patel S. J., The Technological Dependence of 
Developing Countries, J. M. African Stud., vol. 12,1974, pp. 1-17. 
2 Technology has been widely recognised as a crucial factor that affects nearly every aspect of 
economic and social change of countries. Technology leads to effective use of labour, capital and 
natural resources thus affects productivity, amount, composition and costs of products, levels of 
employment, trade flows and degree of competitiveness. Technology itself and the ability to 
innovate are widely regarded as the main, if not dominant sources of competetive advantage of 
countries. Porter M., Competetive Advantage - Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance, 
New York, 1985, p. 3. Recent studies estimate that the contribution of technology to productivity 
growth as 75 per cent. Kunz-Hallstein H. P., Patent Protection, Transfer of Technology and 
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manufacture goods imported at that time in large quantities by Iran, Amir Kabir 
contemplated actions going beyond the mere transfer of hardware technology. ' He 
tried to provide an environment in which national skills could take root and flourish. 
He encouraged local firms which were engaged in inventive and innovative activities 
by rewarding them with an industrial policy aimed at protecting them against 
competition from imported goods. Amir Kabir also fostered the growth of a mining 
industry by issuing a decree for the liberalisation of the granting of mining permits for 
any Iranian interested in opening new mines and for Iranian mining enterprises to be 
exempted from tax levies for a period of five years. It was during this time that some 
important mines began to be exploited by Iranians themselves. 4 
Training as a Key to Development 
The important role of science and technical knowledge in industrialisation of Iran was 
recognised by Amir Kabir very early in his regime. In 1846, he founded the first 
modern university of Iran, called Darol Fonoon ( Academy of Techniques) to train 
students in acquiring proficiency in many technical fields. He was the first Iranian 
Prime Minister to encourage and support the translation of foreign scientific and 
technical books in the industrial sector. While he brought into the country foreign 
teachers to work in the Darol Fonoon, he continued to send Iranian students abroad 
in large numbers to learn new techniques and pursue a variety of science and 
engineering courses. Although the imposed treaty of Turkamanchai had encouraged 
Developing Countries: A Survey of the Present Situation, 6 IIC, pp. 427-455, p. 428. 
3 In order to achieve a sound technological base, developing countries must develop their own 
specific capabilities, domestic innovative activities and internal generation of needed technologies 
through local research and development. However, it has been accepted that, domestic innovative 
activities complement rather than substitute imported technology. See UNCTAD, Fostering 
Technological Dynamism: Evolution of Thought on Technology Capacity Building and 
Competitiveness, U. N. Doc. TD/B/WG. 5/7 of 24 September 1993, p. 6. 
4 Adamiat F., Amir Kabir and Iran, Teheran, 1944, vol. 11, p. 258 (in Persian). 
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the presence of foreigners by allowing them to enjoy many expatriate privilegeS5, 
Amir Kabir was anxious particularly to exclude all foreign manufactured goods from 
Iran, by way of promoting native industries. 
The general economic conditions in Iran during the 18th and 19th centuries 
were very promising. Iran demonstrated considerable self-reliance in her economy 
which was based primarily on agricultural products but also included the manufacture 
of handicrafts, textile and soap products and the spinning and weaving industries. 7 
Some of these products such as silk, cotton, garment, rice and fruits were exported. ' 
In 1849, there were around 2000 silk weaving factories in Iran. 9 It was during the 
premiership of Amir Kabir that, through transfer of foreign technology, several sugar, 
glass, chinaware, paper and spinning factories were established and operated. 'O 
5 In 1828, having lost her war with Russia, Iran signed the treaty of Turkamanchai. By this treaty, 
Iran among other things was forced to extend extra-territorial privileges to all Russian subjects who 
lived in Iran. Furthermore, Iran had to limit her tariff in commerce with Russia to 5% ad valorem, 
both for imports and exports. These privileges were later extended to other nations under the most 
favoured nation clauses of treaties. Thereafter the Iranians could not compete with foreign traders 
who did not pay any tax and were not obliged to respect any law or regulation of Iran, even for 
their serious crimes. Hertslet E., Treaties Concluded Between Great Britain and Persia, London, 
1891. 
6 Binning R., A Journal of Two Years Travel In Persia, etc., London, 1857, vol. 111, p. 237. 
7 Razzaghi E., An Examination of Iranian Economy, Teheran, 3th ed. 1992, pp. 4,12,13. (in 
Persian) 
8 lbid, p. 11. 
9 This statistic quoted from the third volumes of Sharon's book, "Silk", p. 123, cited in Keyhan, 
Teheran, No. 14643, p. 15, (1992); see also Curzon G., Persia and the Persian Question, 2 vols. 
London, 1966, pp. 366-369. 
10 The transfer and development of foreign technology to developing countries have been emphasised, 
because, given the highly unequal distribution of international research and development resources, 
production of new technology locally in developing countries is "relatively insignificant source for 
a long time to come". Lall S., The Patent System and Transfer of Technology to Less- 
Developed Countries, J. W. T. L., 1976, pp. 1-16, p. 2. Today even the industrialised countries 
import some of their technology and production techniques from other countries. New technology 
is the result of costly research and development activity. Wherever it takes place it is valuable and 
modifiable for other nations as well. For developing countries, thus, until the achievement of a 
certain level of industrial and scientific development, the knowledge, inventions and technological 
process already in use in industrialised countries should be regarded as a main source of 
technological progress. 
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The pace of development of the indigenous nascent industries declined in the 
subsequent years. While the industrial revolution was taking place in Europe and 
facilitating the application of science and utilisation of new technology in the mass 
production of goods, Iran was at war with her northern neighbour Russia over disputed 
territory. Russia with her advanced weapons and a far better conventional military 
force won the ten-year war and forced Iran to make a number of concessions to 
Russia, including special low tariffs. Other foreign countries, especially Britain, 
demanded and won the same concessions. " 
(b) Power Struggle Over Iran 
Unfortunately, Iran became the theatre of a vicious power struggle between Russia and 
Britain, as they competed for colonial possessions. 12 Britain regarded Iran as a 
strategic country, as well as a market for her surplus products. Russia could not stand 
to see her rival active in a country that has a long border with her territory. The 
influence of Britain and Russia in Iran had soared to the extent that almost all political 
affairs of Iran had to be authorised by them. " 
In 1872 the economic rivalry between Russia and Britain entered a new phase 
when a British subject Baron Paul Julius de Reuter, the fonder of Reuter news agency, 
gained an astonishing concession. He received conclusive rights for a period of 
seventy years to exploit all minerals throughout Iran, to construct all railways, 
irrigation works, dams and canals, and to establish a bank. 14 Lord Curzon stated that, 
II Sharon, op. cit. note 9, pp. 24-45; Hertslet, op. cit., note 5. 
12 Lambton A. K. S., Qajar Persia, London, 1987, p. 326; Salkal A., The Rise and Fall of the 
Shah, New Jersey, 1980, pp. 11-19. 
13 Ashtiani, A., Mirza Taqi Khane Amir Kabir, Teheran, 1977, p. 246 (in Persian); Binning, op. 
cit., note 6, pp. 230-242. 
14 Frechting L. E., The Reuter Concession in Persia, in Issawi C., (ed), The Economic History of 
Iran: 1800-1914, Chicago, 1971, p. 179. 
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the Reuter concession was "the complete and extraordinary surrender of the entire 
industrial resources of a kingdom into foreign hands that has probably even been 
dreamed of, much less accomplished". " 
In 1873 the Russians managed to secure the cancellation of the Reuter 
concession which they viewed as a threat to their own interests. Other concessions 
were granted, however, and were not cancelled because they did not seriously affected 
the Anglo-Russian balance. The tobacco concession was probably the most notorious 
one. In 1890 in exchange for an annual payment of 150,000 Pound to Nasser-ed-Din 
Shah, a British company, Regie, was granted an exclusive right over the production, 
sale and export of all Iranian tobacco for a period of fifty years. Tobacco was one of 
the most important domestic items in Iran's trade and the concession affected directly 
an estimated 200,000 people who were engaged in the industry. 16 
Iran became too weak economically and Iranians did not care very much for 
the Shah who was incompetent, despotic and killed innocent people casually. 17 The 
Shah could not even tolerate the publicity and popularity enjoyed by Amir Kabir and, 
in 1848, ordered his death, when three years of Amir Kabir's premiership had elapsed, 
under the pretext that he was interfering in matters within the royal domain. 18 
Thereafter, Amir Kabir's political and industrial policies were discontinued. 
Even those innovators and firms who had been rewarded by Amir Kabir, because of 
15 Quoted in Issawi (ed), lbid, p. 177. 
16 Adarniat F., The Ideology of the Constitutional Movement in Iran, Teheran, payam Pub., 1976, 
p. 3 6. 
17 Ashtiani, op. cit. note 13, p. 246. 
18 "The execution of Amir Nizam [Ami Kabir] was indeed a calamity for it arrested the progress 
which had been so painfully achieved and as the near feature was to prove. " Sykes P. M., A 
History of Persia, London, 1930,3rd ed., vol. 11, p. 360. 
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their technical creativity to compete eventually against imported goods, were 
punished. '9 Consequently, the new industries which sprung up during Amir Kabir's 
premiership were deprived of a suitable supportive environment to realise their 
potential for technical creativities and to utilise new technical knowledge. On the 
contrary, given the loss of the freedom to impose protective tariffs under the treaties, 
increasingly substantial quantities of consumer goods produced by the new factories 
in Western countries were imported into Iran. These freely imported goods frustrated 
the growth of indigenous industries and crafts, " discouraged foreign and national 
technological investment and activities and adversely influenced the agricultural 
structure and products; and since most local firms could not compete with imported 
goods, they went bankrupt. " 
As a result, for the first time, Iran's economy registered a deficit in foreign 
trade. Having discouraged the growth of accumulation of capital for local private 
industrial production, the traditional feudalistic relations with Western firms remained 
strong. That in turn, perpetuated and institutionalised the backwardness of Iran's 
economy and assisted the continuation of despotism in Iran. 22 This period of Iran's 
political economic history is usually labelled as the "semi-colonial" era of Iran. 23 
19 Ashraf A., Historical Obstacles to the Development of a Bourgeoisie in Iran, Iranian Stud., vol. 
11, Nos. 2-3,1969; see also Amirahmadi H., Towards a Dynamic Theory of the State and Civil 
Society in the Process of Development, 10 Pol. Eco. M. J., Ettela'at Publ., Nos. 3-4, December 
1995 - January 1996, pp. 4-15, p. 6, (in Persian). 
20 
21 
22 
Keddie, N. R., Roots of Revolution, Yale University Press, 1981, p. 45; Curzon, op. cit., note 9, 
pp. 405-60. 
Keddie, lbid, p. 45. 
Razzaghi, Iranian Economy, op. cit., note 7, p. 13; Arnjad M., Iran: From Royal Dictatorship 
to Theocracy, Greenwood Press, 1989, p. 9. 
23 Turned into a battleground between Britain and Russia, the two powerful European countries, Iran 
was, in fact, even worse off in this respect than countries which were subject to the imperialism 
of a single power. In this regard Moon stated: 
"Persia was more unfortunate than countries which fell wholly under the imperialist 
domination of one power. In Egypt, or Tunis, imperialist meant at least orderly, efficient 
government, and the building of railways and rapid economic development of natural 
resources. Persia, on the other hand, was torn between two powers, neither of which 
would permit the other a free hand. ... As a result, Persia today has 350 miles of 
railwa , vs, as compared with 
Egypt's 3,040, Algeria's 2,221, Tunis's 1,260. And Persia's 
commerce is likewisefar less than it would have been, had there been but one dominating 
powerwin". Moon P. T., Imperialism and World Politics, New York, Macmillan, 1937, 
The above brief description of the prewar situation in Iran indicates that during 
the industrial revolution in 19th century Europe, Iran's own development and 
industrialisation, as a sample of developing countries, was virtually stamped out by 
24 foreign powers and incompetent and despotic Iranian monarchs. Such political and 
economic instability destroyed any hope of a secure and desirable environment for the 
flourishing of indigenous technological creativity and investment. During this period 
although foreign enterprises were engaged extensively in trading activities within Iran 
they did not set up new manufacturing industries inside the country. 
In addition to the economic, industrial and social effects of the interaction 
between the dependent and despotic monarchs and foreign countries in Iran, the future 
political leadership of the country was affected seriously as well. Since then those 
Iranian regimes would be supported actively by foreign countries which allowed trade 
concessions '2' a precedent 
later followed by the United States in its relationship with 
the Pahlavi dynasty. 26 
The Bolshevik revolution in Russia diminished her intervention in Iran. At the 
same time during the latter years of QaJar rule, the constitutional revolution (1905- 
1911) in Iran provided a unique opportunity for Iranians to show their opposition to 
27 
the incompetent rulers of their country. An outcome of this uprising was a written 
Constitution which brought about fundamental changes in Iran. The legislative, 
judicial, and executive powers were separated. The Constitution limited the power of 
the King and empowered the (Majlis), the Iranian Parliament, to have the final say in 
the determination of all laws, decrees, treaties, budgets, monopolies and concessions. 
An equally important achievement of the Constitution was to guarantee the sanctity 
p. 284. 
24 Amirahmadi H., op. cit., note 19, p. 6. 
25 Keddie, op. cit., note 20, p. 47. 
26 Ibid. 
27 For a detailed account of the Constitutional Revolution, see Browne, E. G., The Persian 
Revolution of 1905, London, 1910; Adamiat, op. cit., note 16. 
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of private property, freedom of the press, and the right to free speech and assembly. " 
Thus, on paper at least, throughout the following years during which the Pahlavi 
regime was in power, the Iranian government took the form of a constitutional 
monarchy. 
111. The Pahlavi Regime (1925 - 1979) 
(a) Introduction 
The political economic and industrial settings in this period were quite different from 
the time of the reign of the Qajars- In Iran itself, apart from the aforementioned 
developments, crude oil had been discovered in commercial quantities which generated 
large amounts of foreign exchange for the country. At the international level, the 
invention of the oil combustion engine had increased the demand for oil in the 
industrial parts of Europe and North America. The progress in production tools, 
resulting from the industrial revolution and the accumulation of capital by the 
colonising powers replaced the former colonial economic relations with the 
manufacture of saleable goods for export to the markets in the colonies. This in turn 
shaped a new economic structure in the colonised countries. Their internal 
developments and changes were dictated by the needs and developments of the 
colonial powers. '9 
28 Wiber D. N., Iran: Past and Present, Princeton: University Press, 8th ed., 1976, pp. 229,230; 
Lambton, op. cit., note 12, p. 319. 
29 Mydral G., An International Economy: Problems and Prospects, London, 1956. 
13 
It led to a new world economic order in which the former colonial powers 
were at the centre and the former colonised countries pushed away to the periphery 
to serve the engines of development at the centre mainly with raw materials and 
roughly processed goods produced by cheap labour. As a result of the role ordained 
for the former colonised countries by the militarily powerful European countries, Iran 
could not seize the opportunity to emerge from the pre-capitalist stage take-off 
position in which it was placed to become a technologically advanced industrial power 
in its own right. The gradual integration of Iran into the international trade network, 
as it then was, led to the deterioration of Iran's economic structure to become one 
similar to many former colonised countries which were the main producers of raw 
materials, agricultural and mineral products. Under this new international division of 
economic roles, gradually oil in Iran and some other countries, coffee in Brazil and 
Colombia, Zinc in Chile, copper in Ghana and Bolivia and sugar in Cuba became the 
main and major products of these countries for export to the growing industrialised 
countries of Europe. 'O 
(b) Reza Shah (1925 - 1941) 
It was during this period of economic change that, in 192 1, Reza Khan, a former army 
colonel took power through a coup d'etat and called himself "Shah" of Iran. Reza 
Shah launched campaigns to modernise, industrialise and secularise the country. He 
pursued a vigourous industrialisation policy but, unfortunately, from the top 
downwards and under tight state control. His overall industrial policy was to create 
an import substitution manufacturing sector. In 1932, in order to protect domestic 
30 Malayeri M. H., Industry Section: A Research Regarding the Results of the First Plan, 
Research Centre of the Parliament, 1994, Teheran, p. 64. (in Persian) Such a process ended in 
many colonised countries becoming single producer economies with little or no diversification. This 
led to continuing dependence on the mdustrialised economies for goods and capital causing severe 
distortion in the local markets. 
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industries, the Foreign Trade Monopoly LaW31 was passed. The import and export 
of goods became a monopoly of the government which assigned its rights to private 
enterprises through special licences. " The industrialisation programmes of Reza Shah 
were driven by his obsession to establish more and more factories and his conviction 
that state-owned factories could perform better than private ones. Big factories were 
preferred to small factories and capital intensive means of production were held to be 
better for the economy than labour intensive methods of production. 33 
The major financial source for the economic and industrial development came 
from export of crude oil. 34 As the government became the supreme economic 
manager of the country, the private sector's contribution to the industrialisation of Iran 
steadily declined and became insignificant. Paradoxically, the first Iranian industrial 
property legislation to protect inventions and trade marks translated from the French 
law of 1884 31 was passed during this period. Despite the poor infrastructure and 
weak technological, educational and absorptive capabilities of the country, machinery 
and equipment for over a hundred factories had been imported by Iran by the end of 
the thirties. These state enterprises were supposed to produce enough consumer goods 
and to bring about rapid industrialisation. None of these objectives was achieved due 
to a shortage of technical personnel, key raw materials and spare parts and a general 
lack of managerial skills. 36 
31 Foreign Trade Monopoly Law of Iran , 1932, reprinted in the Code of Law of 1932, pp. 79-89. 
This law was amended in 1941. 
32 Ibid, Article 3. 
33 Bharier J., Economic Development in Iran: 1900-1970, London, 1971, p. 87. 
34 It is noteworthy to mention here that, the oil revenue in Iran, unfortunately, has been used in a way 
that invariably acted against the establishment of a solid indigenous agricultural and industrial base. 
For further reading see Karshenas M., Oil, State, and Industrialization in Iran, Cambridge, 1990. 
35 Registration of Trademarks and Inventions Act, 1931, Iranian Official Gazette, No. 772. 
(hereinafter cited as Iranian patent law) For an English version of the French Patent Act of the 5th 
July, 1884, see Carpmael A., Patent Laws of the World, London, 1889. 
36 Bharier, op. cit., note 33, p. 87. It is noteworthy to mention that Iran was occupied by the allied 
forces in September 1941. Consequently, because spare parts were not imported many factories 
could not continue and went bankrupt. 
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(C) Mohammed Reza Shah (1941-1978) 
When Reza Shah was abducted by the allies after the second world war, his son came 
to power. Mohammad Reza Shah continued his father's policies regarding 
modernisation, industrialisation and secularisation of Iran. Several points can be 
highlighted from the industrial development of Iran in the post-war era. 
Iranian oil was exported by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) until 195 1. 
Since the oil revenues paid to Iran were small, " Mohammad Mossadegh, the new 
Majlis-appointed premier, in an effort to make the system more equitable, nationalised 
the Iranian oil industry. Thus, unlike most developing countries, Iran did not have to 
face foreign currency problems because of her increased oil revenues. Unfortunately, 
38 
the industrialisation of Iran relied heavily and exclusively upon oil revenues. At 
that time, the most important concern for the Iranian government was the proper 
allocation of its foreign exchange resources to the financing of development projects 
of high economic priority. Accordingly, a central planning organisation was 
established with the objective of channelling the revenues derived from oil into 
projects and programmes for economic development. 39 
37 For instance between 1945 and 1950 Iran received E90 million, while the total net profit of the 
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company was f 250 million (after deductions for royalties, depreciation, British 
taxes, etc. ). See Keddie, op. cit., note 20, p. 133. 
38 The oil revenues rose from $817 million in 1968 to $2.5 billion in 1972 and $5.6 billion in 1973 
and $22 billion in 1974, see Karshenas, op. cit., note 34. 
39 Looney, R. E., Iran at the End of the Century: A Hegelian Forecast, Lexincton, 1977, p. 43. 
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During this period, an artificial political stability was created in the countrY40 
and five development plans were adopted. 41 In pursuit of the overriding objective of 
a so called "big push" industrialisation, the process of Import Substitution 
Industrial isation (ISI) policy was formally adopted and applied vigorously for the 
entire third, fourth and fifth plan periods. This entailed the imposition of high import 
tariffs, import controls, the extension of fiscal and financial incentives (tax exemption 
and subsidies) to local manufacturers and the introduction of industrial licensing 
regulations to create a competition-free environment for the local industries. 42 
(i) Industrial Licensing 
During this period, for the encouragement of entrepreneurial activities within the 
country, the government launched a programme to grant industrial licences. In doing 
so, private financial institutions, particularly the Industrial and Mining Development 
Bank of Iran (IMDBI) which was established in 1959, provided funds and other 
financial services to local firms. All industrial projects proposed by both state-owned 
and private agencies in order to receive financial support from the government were 
subjected to two appraisals. The IMDBI first appraised the projects based on their 
financial and commercial viability and then the Ministry of Economy used its 
40 As Professor Pesaran also stated, "political stability during this period was brought about not 
through increased participation, reconciliation, and political tolerance but by the harassment, 
imprisonment, and torture of political opponents of the regime. " Pesaran, M. H., The System of 
Dependent Capitalism in Pre- and Post- Revolutionary Iran, 14 Int. 1, J. Mid. E. Stud., 1982, 
pp. 501-522, at p. 505. 
41 The first Seven-Year Plan (1949-1956) and the second Plan (1955-1962) centred mainly on the 
building of Iran's infrastructure. The third (1963-1967), fourth (1968-1972) and fifth (1973-78) 
plans were directed more toward rapid, so called "big push", industrialisation. 
42 The Third Development Plan, clearly expressed the Government industrial policy vis-a-vis the 
protection and encouragement of local manufacturing as follows: (a) Protection of the domestic 
industry by banning the imports of goods similar to those being manufactured in Iran; (b) 
Exemption from custom duties for machinery, certain spare parts and raw materials destined for 
Iranian factories; (c) Tax holiday (d) The granting of loans to and equity participation in industrial 
firms. The Iran's Plan Organisation, Third Development Plan, Final Report, Teheran 1970, p. 
52. 
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licensing powers to study the social costs and benefits of the venture before granting 
an industrial license to permit it to go ahead with the project. The license was not 
originally a legal requirement. But it was necessary to take advantage of various 
incentives offered by the government such as protective measures against competing 
foreign goods, tax and tariff exemptions, import permits and subsidised loans. 
It is submitted that such a licensing mechanism was a sound policy at that time 
for a developing country like Iran in order to have some say in the allocation and 
utilisation of her capital resources. It could be used also as a measurement to know 
how much foreign investment is required to be permitted. Furthermore, the licensing 
could be a controlling instrument as regards the different aspects of required 
technology, size, number, location and products of firms in all branches of industry. 
And finally, it could encourage inventive and innovative activities of those Iranian 
entrepreneurs who generally were in short supply. 
Unfortunately, in practice, the aforementioned objectives were not pursued 
seriously in Iran. The IMDBI enjoyed a privileged position because of its connection 
with the government and the latter's reliance on IMDBI to assist in industrial planning 
matters and was able to obtain easily industrial licenses for certain enterprises, while 
other private companies had to go through long and uncertain procedures before they 
were approved for any industrial activity. This provided a situation in which those 
companies which had political connections and enjoyed "certain" privileges were 
granted industrial licenses for projects, particularly so-called "hot projects", which 
were potentially profitable. Sometimes, even those sources close to the Ministry of 
Economy and the IMDBI were not aware of the existence of a project until a licence 
had been allocated. 43 
From the legal point of view, although numerous regulations were provided 
concerning applications for an industrial license, the criteria for approval or 
disapproval, merits and demerits of a proposal were not clearly defined. In other 
43 Sadigh P., Impact of Government Policies on the Structure and Growth of Iranian Industry, 
unpublished Ph. D thesis, Faculty of Economics of University of London, 1975, p. 104. 
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words, the regulations did not clearly define how one proposal would be judged better 
than another. The authorities, therefore, had undefined discretionary power to decide 
on the proposals. The situation can best be described as arbitrary and dictatorial when 
one considers that there was no higher legal or administrative authority for appeal 
against the decisions. 
As a result, only a srpall group of the largest privately owned manufacturing 
firms were able to get industrial licenses from the government and qualified for access 
to financial aid from IMDBI. 44 Thus, most of government funds including IMDBI 
funds were soaked up by certain enterprises. However, according to Dr Sadigh, who 
has studied the issue, 45 some enterprises which were granted industrial licenses did 
not go into operation. In these cases, the license was obtained to pre-empt the field 
and thus to preclude competitive entry by others. 46 This policy prevented the 
expansion of the entrepreneurial class. It ensured that Iranian industry was controlled 
by a small handful of favoured industrial elites who directly or indirectly had 
connections with the Pahlavi family. In 1978, this led to reliable entrepreneurs pulling 
out of the country with large sums of money to avoid the imminent political turmoil. 
44 Alizadeh, P., The Process of Import Substitution Industrialisation in Iran (1967-1978) With 
Particular Reference to the Case of the Motor Vehicle Industry, Unpublished D. Ph, October, 
University of Sussex, 1984, p. 146. 
45 Sadigh P., op. cit., note 43, at 104-110. 
46 Ibid. See also Johnson G. C., High-Level Manpower in Iran: From Hidden Conflict to Crisis, 
New York, 1980, pp. 28-29. 
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(d) Progress of Industrialisation Under the Pahlavi Regime 
The results for Iran after seventy years of pursuit of a policy of industrialisation 
ostensibly modelled on the examples of European countries were very glooMy. 47 
Although during this period about 4800 large industrial units were established and 
notable progress was without doubt made in the manufacture of goods locally, albeit 
largely through use of extensive foreign resources, indigenous technological 
capabilities were scarcely developed and the country became more and more 
dependent on the outside world. 
In a five-year period from 1973-1978 alone, about US $100 billion of the oil 
revenues was allocated to the import of a huge variety of consumer goods, plant and 
equipment, spare parts, key raw materials and technology. " Available statistics 
indicate that expenditures on machinery and spare parts rose during this period from 
57% to 86% of the total foreign expenditures . 
49 In a twenty-year period from 1962 
to 1983 nearly $107 billion was paid for the import of capital and intermediate 
goods . 
50 From the evidence based on a study of 1,178 selected large firms, the Iran 
Bureau of Statistics in 1980 found that despite the major share of foreign expenditures 
on imports to service the large firms which were involved in the heavy industrieS51 
47 Palit, S. S., Final Report to the Government of Iran: United Nations Industrial Survey 
Mission, United Nations, Teheran, 1965; Iran Bureau of Statistics, A Survey of the Insufficiencies 
and Dependencies of the Large Industries of the Country, 1980, Teheran (in Persian); 
Katouzian H., The Political Economy of Modern Iran: Despotism and Pseudo-Modernism, 
1926-1979, London, 1980, p. 279. Bharier, op. cit., note 33, p. 193; Pesaran op. cit., note 40; 
Razzaghi E., Seven Decades Pursuit of the Mirage of the Industrialisation, 3 Pol. Eco. M. J., 
Teheran, No. 3-4, December-January (1993), pp. 78-81. (in Persian). 
48 Keyhan Havai, March 9th, 1994, p. 19. 
49 Razzaghi, Iranian Economy, op. cit., note 7, pp. 247-252. 
50 Mofid, K., Development Planning in Iran: From Monarchy to Islamic Republic, 
Cambridgeshire, 1987. p. 270. 
51 Iran Bureau of Statistics, op. cit; see also Rahnema S., Foreign Licensing Agreements With 
Iranian Industries: A Study of Technological Dependency, Industrial Development and 
Renovation Organization Study Report, 1980, limited circulation, Teheran, Industrial Management 
Institute, (in Persian). 
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and established through the Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Licensing 
Agreements", those firms made little or no contribution to Iranian exports. By 1977, 
the total value of non-oil exports constituted only 2 per cent of Iranian exports. " 
Such inefficient industries consumed a large portion of the Iranian oil revenues. 
On the basis of another study, during the latter years of the seventies, the industrial 
sector in a period of 365 days could only generate foreign currency to the tune of 5 
days of their expenditures. The balance was met out of foreign exchange earned by 
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oil exports. In all, these figures show on the one hand the inadequacies of Iranian 
industries and on the other hand their heavy dependence on foreign technology and 
key raw materials. As Dr. Razzaqi has remarked, despite "being industrialised" over 
a seventy year period, the need of the country for foreign industrial outputs had been 
increasing continuously and the range of imported goods expanded from a few 
restricted items to thousands of items of goods and machineries. 55 
52 See Rahnema S., Multinationals and Iranian Industry: 1957-1979, J. Dev. Areas, 1990, pp. 293- 
3 10, p. 306. 
53 Katouzian, op. cit., note 47, p. 279. 
54 Mardookhi, B., The First 5 Year Plan and Industrial Development Strategy, Resalat 
Newspaper, Teheran, No. 2020,1992, p. 15. (in Persian) 
55 Razzaghi E. Seven Decades, op. cit., note 47; for the same conclusion, see also, Parvin M., and 
Zamani A., Political Economy of Growth and Destruction: A Statistical Interpretation of the 
Iranian Case, Iranian Studies, 1979, pp. 43-77, p. 7 1. The causes of importation of manufacturing 
parts, components and machinery were lack of local production; inadequate local supply; low 
quality of local materials; and because of low productivity, local materials and parts were higher 
in cost than those imported; Rahnema, op. cit., note 52, Table 8, p. 307. See also Amirahmadi H., 
Revolution and Economic Transition: The Iranian Experience, 1990, Albany; State University 
of New York Press. 
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IV. The Revolution of 1979 
The occurrence of the revolution of 1979, among other factors, was the result 
of an outcry against the mismanagement of the industrialisation of Iran which had 
ruined the agricultural sector and expanded assembling and dependent industries in the 
country. It was the aspiration of Iranians that the national wealth should be spent on 
building self-reliant industries rather than on assembling products out of foreign 
components. The main changes that took place in terms of economic and industrial 
policy of Iran after the Revolution may be stated briefly by reference to the country's 
new constitution. 56 
(a) New Constitution 
The new Constitution has attached a great deal of importance to the acquisition of 
technology as well as the elimination of monopolies in the country. The Constitution 
exhorts the Islamic Republic of Iran to strengthen the spirit of inquiry, investigation 
and innovation in all areas of science and technology by establishing research centres 
and encouraging researchers. " The Republic is committed to attaining self- 
sufficiency in scientific, technological and industrial spheres. " At the same time, it 
must eliminate all forms of monopolization" and provide equal opportunity for 
all. 'O The Constitutional commitment to these ideals is unique to Iran and underlines 
56 The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 2nd edition (with amendments), published by: 
Islamic Propagation Organisation, 1990. Hereinafter cited as the Constitution. 
57 The Constitution, Principle 3(4). 
58 lbid, Principle 13. (emphasis added) 
59 Ibid., Principle 3(9). 
60 Ibid., Principle 3(6). 
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the country's determined efforts to subscribe to the basic concepts that drive modem 
economies and become a partner in promoting world trade. However, the country has 
been slow in launching needed legal reforms to realise the economic goals set by the 
Constitution. This thesis is a small contribution to spur the government to reform the 
laws and institutions in areas with the strongest impact on the economy. 
(b) Economic System 
The new Constitution deals specifically with economic and financial affairs and 
covers, inter alia, the subject of private and public ownership, and the country's 
economic system. The Constitution expressly recognises personal property and private 
ownership: "everyone is the owner of the fruits of his legitimate business 
andlabour .... and private ownership, legitimately acquired, is to be respected. it6l 
The Constitution describes the economic system of the country as consisting 
of three sectors: state, " cooperative, 63 and private. 64 The economic system is to 
be based on systematic and sound planning. 65 Ownership in each of these three 
sectors is protected by the laws of the Republic, in so far as the ownership does not 
go beyond the bounds of Islamic law, contributes to the economic growth and progress 
61 Ibid., Principles 46 and 47. 
62 The state sector is to include all large-scale and mother industries, foreign trade, major minerals, 
banking, insurance, power generation, dams and large-scale irrigation networks, radio and 
television, post, telegraph and telephone services, aviation, shipping, roads, railways and the like 
which will be publicly owned and administered by the State. Ibid., Principle 44. 
63 The cooperative sector is to include cooperative companies and enterprises concerned with 
production and distribution, in urban and rural areas, in accordance with Islamic criteria. Ibid. 
64 The private sector consists of those activities concerned with agriculture, animal husbandry, 
industrY, trade, and services that supplement the economic activities of the government and 
cooperative sectors. Ibid. 
65 Ibid. 
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of the country, and does not harm society. " The precise scope of each of these 
sectors was to have been defined and the regulations and conditions governing their 
operation were supposed to have been covered by Acts of the Parliament. 67 
To a large extent, the combination of the state, cooperative and private roles, 
in the economic system of Iran, reflects the widely held belief that the development 
and prosperity of Iran cannot be obtained through the current economic systems of 
capitalism and socialism. It is believed that the government should not become a 
"major absolute employer "6' and there should also not be a "concentration or 
circulation of wealth in the hands of few individuals or groups., '6' At the same time 
the private sector should not continue the unhealthy pre-revolutionary trade and 
technological links with Western industrialised countries. Accordingly, in contrast with 
the Shah regime, the supervision of economic affairs by the post-revolutionary 
government has increased particularly in the areas of banking, insurance, foreign trade, 
and major industries. 
It should be noted, however, that it was the interference in the private sector 
in the name of the state by the Shah and his friends and relatives and the enormous 
corruption which involved foreign nationals and enterprises that actually led to the 
discrediting of the private capitalist system in Iran. The Shah's government enacted 
and implemented laws which gave the government absolute control of the 
manufacturing industries. Unfortunately, this is being continued to this day under the 
new constitution except that different and, hopefully, safe hands are at the helm of the 
government today. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid., Principle 43 (2). 
69 Ibid., Principle 43 (2). 
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V. Economic and Industrial Policy After the Revolution 
A radical transformation of the Iranian industry in general and the private 
industrial sector in particular took place in the wake of the revolution of 1979. The 
Iranian experience during the aftermath of the revolution can be divided into two 
distinct era: first, the decade from 1979 to 1988; second from 1988 to date. 
First Experience 
The period runs from the occurrence of the revolution to the cease fire with Iraq in 
1988. The Iraq war forced the government to intervene extensively in the 
manufacturing and distribution sectors and there was lack of confidence generally in 
the free market economic principles of the Western European countries and the US. 
State intervention in the economy also had ideological support which called for a 
strong government to organise economic activities in order to bring about social 
justice and equality which did not exist under the Shah's rule. 'O 
Soon after the revolution, the protection and development of local industries 
gathered momentum. It was realised that Iranian industries were plunging into a crisis 
brought about by the disruption of management-labour relations and disputes over 
ownership and title and disruption of supplies of raw materials and markets for the 
manufactured products. The new government did not have much sympathy for the 
plights of these industries involved which relied on foreign suppliers of raw materials 
and technology. The government was of the view that the industries were "created and 
70 For example see, Taliqam M., Islam and Ownership, Teheran, second ed., 1983. (in Persian) 
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based on a type of an industry and economy dependent on the world plunderer 
capitalism. 
In order to save the economy of the country, the new government took "drastic 
measures in the direction of revitalising, proper management and development of the 
Iranian industries. 172 The result was the nationalisation of all interests in steel, 
copper, aluminum, shipbuilding, aircraft and car manufacture, other heavy industries 
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and interests. Consequently, almost 95 per cent of priority heavy industries and 70 
per cent of all industries came under control of the government. This expanded 
significantly the public sector. By 1982, there were about 1,000 publicly owned and 
managed industrial units, excluding those in the oil sector and representing 87 per cent 
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of the all manufacturing units with more than 500 employees. It was also during 
this period that although the government did not succeed in nationalising foreign 
trade, 75 the bulk of international trade in the country was conducted by government 
departments and state-owned corporations. 
The outcome of the increasing Government intervention in the country's 
industrial development was contrary to expectations. In fact, this period is now 
remembered as a "bad event" for Iranian industrialisation and economic development. 
A former Iranian Minister of Heavy Industries described the situation as follows: 
"The capitalist system is against Islamic principles and it should not dominate 
the country. Therefore, large capital firms (in Iran) should be removed from 
the hands of capitalists. For this reason a law which ensures the protection 
71 See the introduction of Protection and Development of Iranian Industries Act, 1979, Iranian 
Official Gazette, No. 10031. (in Persian) 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Middle East Economic Digest, Iran: Market Structure and Prospects for the 1990s, London, 
1993, p. 23. 
75 It may be recalled that according to Principle 96 of the Constitutional law of Iran, the Guardian 
Council has the power to veto all legislation in violation of Islamic laws. In May 1982 the 
Guardian Council repealed the foreign trade nationalisation law, calling it "non-Islamic". 
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and development of industries was enacted by the Revolutionary Council.... As 
a result of the implementation of this law, bourgeois and industrial capitalism, 
which was shaped in Iran since 1961 and were completely dependent on the 
Pahlavi regime and foreign enterprises, were destroyed. This created a 
perception that large capitalism will not exist in the country any longer. 
However, this turned out to be a myth. Although the manufacturing firms and 
units were confiscated and nationalised, commercial and intermediate 
capitalism not only remained, indeed, it continued to strengthened day by day. 
This had negative effects on our industries. The capitalist system was 
destroyed, ýut industrial bourgeois was merely replaced by commercial dealers 
and middlemen. , 76 
(b) Second Experience 
The second experience runs from the end of the eight-year war between Iraq and Iran 
and the presidency of Hashemi Rafsanjani in 1989. The new government recognised 
the new situation of the country and the fact of a real world out there and launched 
a different economic policy within the framework of the first Five-Year Development 
Plan (1989-1994) which introduced a package of bold pro-market reforms. The 
government was required: 
(i) to reconstruct and to renovate productive capacity, basic industries, 
infrastructure and population centres that had been damaged during the Iran- 
Iraq war; 
(ii) to develop the quality and quantity of the general education with emphasis on 
science and technology and requirements of the young generation; 
76 Behzade Nabavi, January 1995, Teheran, several Newspapers. 
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Gii) to accelerate economic growth in order to increase per capita income and 
create productive occupations and reduce economic dependency, with emphasis 
on self sufficiency in agriculture and strategic goods, and controlled inflation; 
(iv) to improve the organisation and management of the country's executive 
and judiciary; 
(v) to make efforts in the direction of creating legal security, execution of 
justice and protection of legitimate individual and social freedoms. 
(vi) to establish a technology development centre for the planning, 
monitoring and supporting of technological development activities. 77 
In order to achieve the above objectives, the government attempted to diminish state 
intervention in production and distribution; to revive the private sector by privatization 
of State firms; to expand foreign trade by deregulation, to attract foreign capital and 
to improve the economic monitoring system. 
Although during this period the country witnessed the implementation of a 
massive program of construction of basic infrastructure and fundamental changes in 
economic policy, the legal institutions for acquisition, development and diffusion of 
foreign technology and for a sustainable development remained untouched yet. Neither 
the Foreign Investment Law of 1955" nor the Industrial Property Law of 1931 has 
been amended and improved to fit the new domestic and international economic and 
technological scenario. The Iranian patent office has also remained in a deplorable 
situation and far from the real needs of industry. '9 
77 Organization of Planning and Budget, First Five Year Development Plan, (1989-1994), First 
Chapter, Teheran. Emphasis is mine. 
78 For more details about the Iranian foreign investment law and its merits and demerits regarding 
transfer and development of technology, see infra Chapter Eight. 
79 See infra, Chapter Nine. 
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The Iranian authorities'O assigned to deal with the transfer and development 
of technology have recognised that an appropriate and strong legal framework is 
needed for the successful acquisition of foreign technology and development of local 
technology" but little has been done towards establishing a law commission or other 
institution to introduce comprehensive legislation to achieve the stated objectives of 
the government. Despite the liberalisation of the economy, the dismantling of tariff 
barriers and highly possible membership of the World Trade Organization, 82 the 
country still lacks any systematic and appropriate regulatory regime to control 
restrictive business practices which have adverse effects on economic development, 
including technological development of the country. So much has been said on paper 
only. So far little has been done in practice after the revolution to create the necessary 
legal framework for transfer and development of technology. This thesis presents 
concrete proposals for radical law reform and institutional changes in this regard and 
contributes to the implementation of the declared economic policy in Iran. 
80 Several Ministries, government and semi-govemment organizations in Iran are dealing with the 
industrial activities. Their uncoordinated and parallel acts and decisions, have been criticised by 
several reports. For instance see Supreme Research Institute for Planning and Development, 
Development of Iran and the Need for Management of Transfer of Technology, Tadbir 
Magazine, 1992, vol. 23, p. 36-41; Ravanbakhsh M., Industrial Structure of Iran, Periodical 
No. 74, published by Ministry of Heavy Industries, 1990, p. 13-16. (in Persian) 
81 Moatamedi, (the head of Science and Industrial Research Centre of Iran) Comprehensive 
Development of Technology, a paper submitted to Seminar on Development of Technology, 
Teheran, 1995. (in Persian); Interview in London by the author with Mr M. H., Sharifzadegan, the 
former economic advisor of the Iranian Government and a former deputy of Iran's Planning and 
Budget Organization, September 17,1994; see also, Mardookhi B., (a senior economic and 
industrial advisor of Iran's Planning and Budget Organization) Industrialisation of Iran, Sci. & 
R. J. U. Sharif, No. 4,1993, p. 28. (in Persian) 
82 The Iranian government has formed a special committee to examine the membership of Iran to the 
World Trade Organization. The committee has supported the membership of Iran to the WTO, 
Resalat, Mehr 30 1774 (1995); see also Intemational Ettelaw, London, No. 233, April 21,1995, 
p. 1; see also infra, Chapter Four, note 144. 
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Chapter Two 
THE CAUSES OF IRAN'S FAILURE TO ACQUIRE FOREIGN 
TECHNOLOGY 
Few developing countries this century have found the path of 
technological and economic development an easy one. Yet, Iran's difficulties have 
been particularly acute for a country so blessed with natural resources. The above 
historical background briefly examined some political problems of industrialisation of 
Iran. It shows that during and after the industrial revolution in Europe, the country 
was not really independent. Although the country was governed by Iranian monarchs, 
they depended heavily on the support of foreign powers to remain in power. The 
despotism of the monarchs also contributed to prevent Iranians from developing their 
own potential. Foreign factors could be blamed for the lack of development of human 
capital, by far the most important key to self sufficiency and industrialisation. But, this 
is only a part of the truth. The following are some relevant causes for Iran's failure 
in building a satisfactory technological base and transfer and development of needed 
technology. 
1. Economic Development Strategy and Transfer of Technology 
During the Pahlavi regime, particularly since the early sixties, policies for 
import substitution constituted the core feature of industrialisation in Iran. ' 
It may be recalled that pursuant to the substitution industrialisation policy, locally manufactured 
goods are protected by import restrictions, high tariffs on finished goods and through a licensing 
system. At the same time, a wide range of incentives for local companies and their foreign partners 
to establish new industries and expand existing enterprises is provided. Moreover, many incentives 
such as tax holidays, loan capital on favourable terms and low import duties on plant and 
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Essentially, this policy consists of providing state aid to local industries, at times and 
very high costs, to produce goods which have been hitherto imported from the 
developed countries. The substitution industrialisation policy involves considerable 
government intervention and, as will be seen later in this chapter, was implemented 
in a way that was destined to result in the flooding of the domestic market with 
imported goods. 
(a) Import Substitution Policy 
Such a strategy, of course, is not an Iranian invention. Almost all countries have 
resorted to it as the "engine of development"' in the early stages of their 
industrialisation. In the fifties, developing countries which were influenced by the 
economic analyses of some well known economists of that time, ' adopted the strategy 
of imports substitution as the only avenue of escape from the perpetual dependency 
on foreign technologies. In fact, it was believed that developing countries like Iran 
need to impose some kind of import restrictions to build their technological bases. 4 
The reasonable protection of local industries through a well defined plan of action was 
held to be an important condition for the enhancement of local technological 
capability. 
equipment are set in place to encourage foreign investors to enter the economy. 
2 United Nations, Major Issues Arising from the Transfer of Technology to Developing 
Countries, 1975, paras. 56-70. 
3 See Perbish, The Economic Development of Latin America and its Principal Problems, New 
York, U. N. 1950. He argued that the trade gap between the North and the South resulted from the 
importation of machinery and exportation of raw materials by developing countries. Perbish 
predicted that in the long run the terms of trade of raw materials compare to machineries would 
be reduced. See also, Myradel G., An International Economy, New York, 1958. 
4 Fransman M., and King K., Technological Capability in the Third World, Macmillan Press, 
1984, at 18-19 and 20. 
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Imports substitution policy is commonly believed to have served well many 
developing countries, for example, Brazil, India, Argentina, Mexico and South Korea. 
Even in modem Europe, the protection of infant industries is considered as legitimate 
by the European Union Commission. But in the case of Iran, as indicated above, 
contrary to expectation, the same policy did not result in the construction of an 
industrial base in the country and import dependency continued. There was a 
perception that by the adoption of the imports substitution policy and setting up 
manufacturing facilities in the country its dependence on imported consumer goods 
could be gradually eliminated. But, in practice, local manufacturers themselves were 
dependent on foreign suppliers for key raw materials, machineries, technical know- 
how and even skilled labour. 
(b) The Failure of the Import Substitution Policy 
Available evidence and analysis of the failure of the import substitution policy in Iran 
rightly put the blame on the excessive protection of local companies. Undoubtedly, 
excessive protection against foreign competition and insufficient local competition, left 
little, if any, incentive for the protected firms to invest in research and development 
to improve their efficiencies and technological capabilities. In the absence of 
competitive products, import-substituting firms were not under any pressure to 
improve the quality of their products or offer competitive prices. They knew that their 
products could be sold easily in the local markets. According to Pesaran such a high 
level of protection through tariffs, low taxes, and generous investment schemes 
resulted "in making foreign firms and local wealthy industrial elites, who provide them 
with political and economic cover, the main beneficiaries of the import-substitution 
process. The fifty or more major industrialists associated with the Pahlavi family 
among them owned the bulk of the large-scale private sector industries and were the 
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ones who formed the dependent capitalist class which benefited most from the import 
substitution strategy. " 
The profiteering by the Pahlavi family and its friends as a consequence of the 
import monopolies granted to them and the resultant widespread inefficiencies 
increased costs of imports to other legitimate enterprises and damaged any prospect 
of "forward" linkages with the rest of economy. Privileged foreign partners were 
encouraged to supply the required capital and intermediate goods of the protected 
industries owned by the Pahlavi family and domestic suppliers of similar goods were 
deprived from benefitting from the so-called "backward" linkages. 6 
Another important criticism of the import substitution policy of Iran lies in a 
widely held misperception of Iranian policy makers with regard to the nature of 
transfer of technology. Although the acquisition of required technology for 
manufacturing substitutes for imported goods should be at the core of the policy, 7 
surprisingly the role of technology was not emphasised during the implementation of 
that policy in Iran. It appears that the policy makers assumed that needed technology 
would be transferred into the country more or less automatically. Although some 
factors which constitute technological activities such as individual plant operation 
skills, equipment and information systems of research and development are 
transferable, it is not easy to transfer the full technological capability of one society 
to another. The full technological capability of a country can be fostered and 
accumulated only through its own efforts and within itself. 
5 Pesaran, supra, Chapter One, note 40, p. 505; Johnson, supra, Chapter One, note 46, p. 29; see 
also Madani A., Strategies of Economic Development: a Comparative Study of Iran and South 
Korea, Teheran, 1988, pp. 30-37. 
6 The ability of an industry to encourage creation and growth of other industries is called "Linkages 
Effects". "Backward Linkages" are created when an industry purchases other locally manufactured 
products -thus substituting for needed imports and thereby, stimulating the local producers of raw 
materials and components. "Forward Linkages" are made when an industry instead of exporting 
its products, supplies them as raw materials and components to local manufacturers. These linkages 
can provide an effective growth in national economy. See Farhang M., Encyclopedia of 
Economics Sciences, Teheran, 1972, p. 690; see also Pesaran, Ibid; Johnson, lbid, p. 20. 
7 UNIDO, Guidelines for Industrial Planning in Developing Countries: Basic Principles and 
Practices, 1984, p. 42. 
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In other words, an essential prerequisite to successful implementation of import 
substitution policies is the development of a local capability to use, absorb and adapt 
foreign technology. There is little doubt that, for some industries, having the capacity 
to operate the necessary machinery and equipment is sufficient for producing various 
goods. However, given the increasing complexity of designing and manufacturing 
processes of products, specialised knowledge and techniques are necessary. As 
Schumpeter says "development does not start with goods, it starts with people and 
their education, organisation and discipline. "' 
Admittedly, an import substitution policy is pursued for the invaluable 
opportunity it offers to "learn by doing". But as noted earlier, import substitution in 
Iran with no focus on the development of local technology led to the local companies 
undertaking only the final processing of the goods which required low local content 
and minimum know-how. The over-protection of local companies in Iran and the 
failure to provide incentives to ensure the acquisition of foreign technology were 
serious obstacles to the industrialisation of Iran. 
There were insufficient skilled personnel to utilise the imported advanced 
machinery and equipment. 9 Most importantly, there was the absence of a scientific 
and research-oriented environment to serve the interests and motives of the scientific 
community and entrepreneurs. In such circumstances, factories, machineries and 
advanced technologies could not do much. In fact, some analysts believe that the basic 
cause of underdevelopment and poverty in developing countries is not a scarcity of 
capital, rather the scarcity of ideas, initiative and management skills. 'O 
8 Schumpeter J. A, Small is Beautiful, New York, 1975, p. 168. 
9 For a thorough study regarding the problem of skilled personnel in Iran, see Johnson, op. cit., note 
5. 
10 Ramaer, J. C., The Choice of Appropriate Technology by a Multinational Corporation, in 
Robinson A. (ed. ), Appropriate Technology for Third World Development, proceedings of a 
conference held by the International Economic Association at Teheran, Iran, London, 1979, p. 239. 
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To fill this gap and to reach rapidly a satisfactory degree of industrialisation, 
government policy makers relied extensively on foreign companies to supply the 
required skilled labour, managerial talent, and marketing skills. The heavy reliance on 
foreign manpower undoubtedly diminished the ripple effects on the local economy and 
the opportunities to forge linkages with local industries with the resources to service 
the foreign investor were missed. The application of this policy of dependence on 
foreign technical assistance and managers can be disrupted by upheavals, in the local 
social and political scene, which isolates the economy from its major suppliers. This 
is what happened in Iran after the 1979 revolution. 
11. Lack of Technological Planning and Policies 
Newly industrialising countries generally include a plan for the development 
of technology as an integral part of their national economic development plans. 
Technology planning focuses on the industrial sector while not, however, losing sight 
of its links with the other sectors. It seeks to transform progressively all of a country's 
socio-economic structures by introducing and adapting modem industrial production 
techniques. " Through such an action plan, technological needs are identified, the best 
way to satisfy them is determined and proper adaptation of imported technology is 
ensured. " 
UNIDO, Guidelines for Industrial Planning, op. cit., note 7, p. 42; UNCTAD, Planning the 
Technological Transformation of Developing Countries, U. N Doc. TD/B/C. 6/50. 
12 National technology plans should inter alia: 
(i) identify sectors of critical importance to the country and define technological policy objectives; 
(ii) coordinate national action in relevant areas of technology development and transfer; 
(iii) define the relationship between technology imports and indigenous development of technology, 
sector by sector; 
(iv) establish and strengthen links and feedback mechanisms between policy makers, planners, 
researchers and technologists and users of technology, especially in the area of production; 
(v) formulate programmes concentrated on the generation research, development and adaptation 
of technologies, particularly in areas of critical importance for the economic and social 
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However, during the Pahlavi regime, Iran did not have a specific technology 
policy or plan. While the national development plans were impressive in certain 
aspects, they did not often give adequate attention to the acquisition and development 
of needed technology. What was declared in the national development plans were 
financial estimates and the quantitative requirements of labour, skilled manpower, raw 
material and machinery needed to implement the projects in the development plan. 
Although project implementation entailed the importation of foreign technology, little 
attention was paid to a clear policy and the preparation of a detailed plan of action for 
unpackaging imported technology, adapting it to local circumstances, building of 
indigenous technological capabilities and generating local technology and marketing 
the transfer of technology as an integral part of the national development plans. The 
massive importation of factories, machineries and advanced technologies minimised 
the use of local labour and did not do much towards development of local capabilities. 
Such a policy increased the technological dependence of Iran's industry on foreign 
sources. Surprisingly, the appraisals of industrial projects in Iran were conducted 
without regard to the transfer of technology aspects of the projects. " 
The situation looks worse when one considers that the planning process in Iran 
left a large part of the decision making concerning the choice of technology and the 
source of technology, including domestic and foreign sources, to the executive 
ministries. 14 Faced with the alternative of using domestic technology or importing 
foreign technology, decisions favoured largely the latter. On the other hand, motivated 
by political interests, in addition to the coordination, supervision and evaluation of the 
development of the country; 
(vi) define goals and ensure their achievement through financial, personnel and institutional 
arrangements. UNCTAD, Strengthening the Technological Capacity of Developing Countries 
Including Accelerating Their Technological Transformation, Res. 112(v), 1979, para. 8. 
13 Sadigh, supra, Chapter One, note 43, pp. 130-143. 
14 It should be noted that although the Plan and Budget Organization was to be the most powerful 
and authoritative body of the planning network and responsible for the execution of development 
projects. Its authority was weakened over time and eventually the responsibility for the execution 
of industrial and development projects was transferred to different ministries and government 
institutions. For the political environment of economic planning in Iran, see Razavi H., and Vakil 
F., The Political Environment of Economic Planning in Iran, 1971-1983: From Monarchy to 
Islamic Republic, London, 1984, particularly pp. 37-50. 
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development and industrial projects, the technical appraisal of the projects which were 
the responsibility of the Planning and Budget Organization became a virtual formality 
as well. " 
111. Lack of Promotion and Encouragement of Technological Innovation 
Local technological innovations play a central role in the success of industrial 
development of a country. 16 In fact, one of the features of Iran has been her inability 
to provide the circumstances in which her national innovative and productive 
capabilities can take root and flourish and lead to the building of new industrial and 
commercial enterprises to compete in the world markets. Unfortunately, in Iran 
importance was attached to the accomplishment of physical and tangible components 
of technology and industrial development. 
Establishment of industrial complexes, creation of mechanised agricultural 
units, building large dams and construction of super highways were emphasised" and 
regarded as great achievements even though they were designed, executed and 
operated and maintained almost exclusively by foreign companies. The technology 
needed to replicate these projects remained in foreign hands. They were essentially 
political achievements for politicians to show the people something tangible. Even 
though some of the projects were studied and were of high economic priority they 
were accomplished at high cost because of the need to import all technology needed 
to execute the projects. The fundamental error in pursuing a program of high 
15 lbid, pp. 42-47. 
16 UNCTAD, Policies and Instruments for the Promotion and Encouragement of Technological 
Innovation, U. N. Doc. TD/B/C. 6/123 of 15 August 1984, pp. 1-4; Schumpeter J. A., Theory of 
Economic Development, 1949, Cambridge, p. 64. 
17 See Razavi and Vakil, op. cit., note 14, p. 44. 
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technological projects was that benefits were short lived because of lack of local skills 
to operate and maintain the projects after the departure of the foreign technicians and 
managers. In sum, the development, if any, was not sustainable and local technology 
was not there to improve on the earlier projects. It is submitted that, it is sustainable 
industrial development that transforms society into a society teeming with fertile, 
creative and inventive activities. 
(a) Technological Level of Iranian Industries 
To ascertain the technological level of a country the two important elements 
of technology namely, hardware comprising machines, equipment and physical 
infrastructure and software comprising technical knowledge, experience, training, 
organisation and management should be taken into account. Based on a model 
introduced by the ESCAP (Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the 
18 Pacific) , the technological level of industries is estimated through the total average 
number of the indicators that can be attributed to machinery and equipment, 
organisation and management, and know-how and technical and mechanical skills. In 
an ideal position, according to ESCAP model, the highest technological level of each 
indicator mentioned above is 100. The average of them, thus, is 100. In practice, while 
there is no country in the world that score the ideal level ( 100 ), many countries are 
at a very high level in some parts of the technological level. 
These indicators have also been estimated for Iran. The heavy industry 
averaged score is 26 out of 100: 58 for machineries and instruments; 31.5 for skills; 
22 for technical information; and 30.5 for organisation and management. These scores 
18 Technology Atlas: An Overview, Asian and Pacific Centre for Transfer of Technology, United 
Nations, 1988. 
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for the industries other than the heavy industry of the country generally are 
respectively, between 36 and 41; 40 and 45; 36 and 39; 31 and 36 out of 100. '9 
A graphical representation of Iran's technological position is given in Figures 
I and 2 below which has been prepared applying the ESCAP model and criteria to the 
Iranian synthetic fibre (Fig. 1) and paper industries (Fig. 2) and compared to other 
countries . 
20 The above mentioned data show that, in so far as the hardware elements 
of technology are concerned, the Iranian industries enjoy a strong position. By 
contrast, Iran is at a lower level in so far as the software elements are concerned 
though software elements represent crucial components of technology in the 
contemporary world and are key indicators of growth of technical knowledge, 
productivity and optimum use of the hardware elements. 
In the absence of a coherent national policy on science and technology in the 
country, no meaningful link can be made between research and industrial development 
in Iran. Very little research is carried out in the country. There was some over- 
emphasis on the role of science and scientific advancement compared to the utilisation 
of technology and technological development in the country. By such an over- 
emphasis on the academic excellence of science, the country has more often than not 
insulated science and scientists from the very pragmatic requirements of socio- 
economic and technological progress of Iran. It is observed that very few qualified 
scientists indeed made their experience directly bear upon adapting, upgrading and 
further developing imported technology. Evidence of this shortcoming is the small 
number of patents registered by Iranian nationals, whether they be individuals, 
institutions or corporations. " Scientific discoveries are neither patentable nor can 
they be directly used in the production process. Indeed technological innovation has 
yet to be indigenised in Iran. 
19 Institute of Commercial Studies and Research, Iran's Economy, 1991, Teheran. (in Persian) 
20 Supreme Research Institute of Planning and Development, 1993, Teheran, (in Persian). 
21 For more details see infra, Chapter Nine. 
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IV. Inadequate Legal Framework for the Transfer, Development and Diffusion 
of Technology 
(a) Transfer of Technology Law 
Recent research indicates that there is nothing automatic about the acquisition of 
technological capability . 
22 It is the recipient country's responsibility to develop its 
technological capabilities and this development process needs substantial regulatory 
effort. 23 In this regard, unlike Argentina, Brazil, Korea, India, Japan, and Mexico, 24 
Iran did not establish a strong legal framework to deal specifically with the whole 
range of complex questions of the transfer, development, adaptation and diffusion of 
21 technology. 
22 Katz, J. M., Domestic Technological Innovations and Dynamic Comparative Advantages: 
Further Reflections on a Comparative Case-Study Program, in Rosenberg and C. Fischtak 
(ed. ), International Technology Transfer: Concepts, Measures and Comparisons, Praeger, New 
York, 1985, pp. 127-166. 
23 Leonard H. L., Transfer of Technology to Japan: What We Know, What We Need to Know, 
and What We Know that May Not Be So, in Rosenberg and C. Fischtak (ed. ), Ibid, pp. 255-276; 
Larry E. W., Linsu K., and Carl J. D., Reflections on the Republic of Korea' Acquisition of 
Technological Capability, in Rosenberg and C. Fischtak (ed. ), Ibid, pp. 167-221. 
24 UNCTAD Compilation of Legal Materials Dealing With Transfer and Development of 
Technology, 1982 U. N. Doc. TD/B/C. 6/81. 
25 The objectives of technology transfer regulations may be summarized as follows: 
- Improvement of the quality and local assimilation of imported technology; 
- Protection of local innovation and technology; 
- Increase of the bargaining power of local purchasers of technology; 
- Increase of the information available to local parties as to possible sources of technology; 
- Improvement of the balance of payments; 
Control of foreign exchange remittances; 
Prevention of tax avoidance; 
Limitation of industrial property protection for foreign parties; 
Control over the nature of imported technology; 
Regulation of foreign investment made by means of intangible assets; 
Prevention of package licensing; 
Protection of local employment. See Cabanellas G., Antitrust and Direct Regulation of 
International Transfer of Technology Transactions, 7 HC, 1984; see also, UNCTAD, 
Restructure the Legal Environment: International Transfer of Technology, Common 
approaches to laws and regulations on the transfer and acquisition of technology, UN. Doc. 
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This has created a situation in Iran in which several departments of 
government, or institutions deal with the transfer and development of technology in 
a parallel, uncoordinated and unsatisfactory manner. As will be analyzed later, even 
those laws that exist were enforced in an uncoordinated and haphazard manner. This 
is chiefly because of the lack of strong institutions with the powers, procedures and 
expertise to monitor market activities including the flow of technology and the 
effective transfer of technology to the country, and to take legal and other action as 
necessary. 26 
The upshot of the weak legal frameworks and institutions in Iran, among other 
things, has been the loss of valuable practical knowledge and experience, resulting 
from the huge number of technology transfer contracts with Iranian firms during the 
last seventy years, which have either been scattered among different authorities and 
even officers, or are missing in toto. By contrast, the National Office of Industrial 
Property of Brazil by scrutinising more than 30,000 technology transfer contracts 
between 1974-1989, has accumulated a vast amount of knowledge and experience. 27 
Such knowledge and experience is used to assess and improve the legal instruments 
and institutions to facilitate the transfer and development of technology in the country. 
DT/B/C. 6/91 of October 1982, p. 2, para, 7, and pp. 127-166. 
26 The establishment of the World Trade Organisation and its strengthened standards for protection 
of patents, indeed requires that developing countries to establish a nationally appropriate and 
effective legal framework to encourage the transfer and promotion of technology and at the same 
time to prevent the abuse of patent rights. See infra, Chapter Four, note 143. For more details 
about the institutional deficiencies existing in developing countries, see UNCTAD Establishment 
of Centres for the Transfer and Development of Technology, Progress reported by the 
UNCTAD Secretariat, U. N. Doc. TD/B/C. 6/9/Add. 3 of 12 November 1975, pp. 7-20; UNCTAD, 
Promotion of National Scientific and Technological Capabilities and Revision of the Patent 
System, TD/B/C. 6/AC. 2/2 of July 1975; UNCTAD, Revision of the Patent System for 
Improving the National Scientific and Technological Infrastructures of the Developing 
Countries, TD/B/C. 6/AC. 2/4; Janiszewski H. A., National Offices for Transfer", Les Nouvelles, 
1977, pp. 111-115; UNCTAD, Strengthening the Technological Capacity of Developing 
Countries: Establishment of Regional and Sectoral Centres Dealing with Transfer and 
Development of Technology., U. N. Doc. TD/B/C. 6/33/ Add. 2,1978. 
27 Cieslik J., An Overview: Practices in Third World, 24 Les Nouvelles, reprinted in Bell and 
Simon, The Law and Business of Licensing: Licensing in the 1990s, 1992, vol. 2, pp. 441-473, 
p. 44 1. 
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A number of developing nations through such national regulatory agencies have been 
able to bring down the cost of technology transferred via transnational corporation. " 
It is important to note that technology transfer transactions are different from 
other commercial contracts. Their subject matters are intangible products, they are 
often based on long cooperation and valuable industrial property rights are exchanged. 
Therefore, an inadequate legal framework coupled with government control may deter 
the flow of foreign technology into the country or result in an inequitable relationship 
between private and public interests. 
Industrial Property Law 
Laws and regulations on protection of inventions, innovations and proprietary know- 
how are among those measures that, if properly designed and implemented, can 
promote and encourage technological innovation. " As will be considered later, 30 
Iran's patent law is deficient in many respects. The patent law of Iran has not 
encouraged and promoted technological innovation. The law, as it exists, does not help 
the acheivement of the industrial development goals of the country. The existing 
Iranian law has done all the opposite to what intellectual property laws are supposed 
to do. It served as an instrument to enable large foreign companies to systematically 
28 Miguel S., Technology Transfer Through Transnational Corporations, the CTC reporter, 19 8 1, 
p. 20. 
29 Other instruments for promotion and encouragement of technological innovations are: 
encouragement of private research and development through financial subsidies and tax exemption; 
establishment of public scientific and research and development centres; provision of technical 
assistance and dissemination of scientific information to local firms; laws and regulations on import 
of technology; industrial policy; export promotion; and technical education, UNCTAD, Policies 
and Instruments for the Promotion and Encouragement of Technological Innovation, U. N. 
Doc. TD/B/C. 6,1984, p. 123. 
30 See infra, Chapter Nine. 
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overprice their produCtS3 ' and to impose a large number of restrictive practices on 
their local counterparts. " The specific weakness of Iranian law is that it was not 
conceived as an economic instrument for the creation of incentives to national 
inventiveness, transfer and development of technology and foreign investment for the 
realization of national technology development objectives. The patent administrations 
have remained apart from institutions directly involved in formulating and 
implementing national development programs. It will be shown later 33 that, if the 
Iranian patent system is to assist in encouraging national inventiveness and strengthen 
in general the technological and scientific infrastructure of the country, it must be 
properly designed and be integrated with all other instrumentalities of economic and 
technological development. The central concern of the Iranian patent system must, 
therefore, be of internalising inventions already made and encouraging innovations 
rather than merely protecting foreigners' exclusive rights. Only then, would it be 
possible to ensure that the operation of the patent system answers not only the 
pressing needs of Iran, but succeeds at the same time in encouraging industrial 
investment and making effective use of the scarce skilled manpower available for 
development. 
Issues surrounding the transfer of knowledge across national borders have 
provoked intense discussions since the Second World War but Iran was not active in 
addressing these issues. Yet, in 1957 Iran without a thourogh examination by the 
experts ratified the Paris Convention because, at that time, there were considerable 
pressure exerted by industrialised countries to recognise their intellectual property 
31 Salehkhou in his study of the pharmaceutical industry in Iran uncovered substantial evidence of 
overpricing of foreign companies' products, ranging up to more than ten times the free-market 
prices. Salehkhou G., Commercialisation of Technology in Developing Countries: Transfer of 
Pharmaceutical Technology to Iran, unpublished Ph. D. thesis, Faculty of Political and Social 
Science of the New School for Social Research, (1974), Chapter 6. A study conducted by 
UNCTAD indicated similar situation in some other developing countries. See UNCTAD, Major 
Issues, op. cit., note 2, pp. 16-17. 
32 Salehkhou, Ibid; Rahnerna, supra, Chapter One note 52, p. 303. 
33 See Chapters Nine and Ten and Appendix Two. 
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rights or risk being portrayed as obstacle in international commerce. 34 As will be 
discussed later, the Convention has had a constraining influence in Iran in that Iran 
has not been able to introduce in its patent legislation elements specifically aimed at 
supporting domestic inventors and geared to its unique needs as a large oil rich 
country with immense natural resources without the risk of acting in violation of some 
Convention provisions. 35 
(c) Restrictive Business Practices Law 
It took almost two decades in the fifties and sixties for developing countries to realise 
that the terms and conditions of transfer of technology transactions are key factors in 
the facilitation of the transfer process. " To remedy that, Brazil, for instance, although 
she had anti-trust laws to combat restrictive agreements and anti-competitive practices 
of undertakings in her markets, enacted a transfer of technology law specifically to 
secure technology transfer on terms favourable to the realization of her domestic 
economic priorities. The transfer of technology law among other things was used to 
control restrictive practices in licensing agreements with foreign technology holders. " 
However, Iran did not show any concern for the terms and conditions of 
technology transfer agreements. She did not have in place any screening procedure to 
determine whether or not imported technologies took into account Iran's existing 
indigenous endowments or not. In other words, foreign companies were free to enter 
into technology agreements with Iranian firms, both private and public, under 
34 See Sedarat A., and Naraghi M., The Evolution of Proprietorship Rights and Intellectual 
Property, 1977. (in Persian); see also infra, Chapter Nine, text accompanying note 4. 
35 International Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property known as the Paris 
Convention, of March 20,1883, WIPO Pub. No. 201 (E), for details see infta Chapter Four. 
36 See infra, Chapter Five. 
37 Ibid. 
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whatever terms and conditions they chose. This liberal policy distorted the choice of 
products and techniques in favour of production of luxury consumer goods and capital 
intensive industries, and increased the country's reliance upon sophisticated foreign 
technology and know-how with little employment-creating effect. Furthermore, as will 
be considered in Chapter Seven, transnational companies aware of the absence of any 
legal control over restrictive business practice imposed several restrictive clauses in 
licensing agreements with their Iranian partners. Most of these restrictions are not 
allowed under the anti-monopoly or anti-trust laws in industrialised countries. Had it 
not been for the country's rapidly rising oil revenues, the effects of these mistakes 
would have been realised in time for the government to take appropriate measures. 
In sum, the combination of weak institutions and inadequate laws to give a 
suitable shape to the structure of incentives for technological innovative activities of 
Iranian and non-Iranian firms in the country, and, at the same time to combat anti- 
competitive practices of transfer of technology agreements and arrangements presented 
a virtual barrier to the acquisition of foreign technology by Iranian enterprises. 
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SECTION 11. 
INTERFACING BETWEEN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
LAWS, COMPETITION LAWS, TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY 
LAWS, GENERAL COMMERCIAL LAWS AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
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Chapter Three 
PATENT RIGHTS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY 
The patent system.... 
added the fuel of interest to the fire of genius 
Abraham Lincoln 1859 
In Chapter Two, the main reasons for the failure of Iran's 
industrialisation policies were discussed. It was noted that one of the features of the 
now discredited policy was the absence of any deliberate strategy to promote and 
encourage local technological innovation. Part of the strategy should have been a 
reform of Iranian law to include a modem intellectual property law tailored to meet 
Iran's special needs as an oil and resource rich nation. The needs of Iran dictate a 
delicate balance between the interests in developing a strong viable local technology 
base and the protection of the interests of foreign holders of intellectual property rights 
for the mutual benefit of Iran and the sources of foreign technology. Iranian laws and 
their enforcement would act as incentives to develop local talents and inventiveness 
as well as a vehicle for the transfer of technology which must be seen by the foreign 
holder of intellectual property rights as advantageous to his enterprise, truly, a tall 
order by any measure. 
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1. Introduction 
The intellectual property laws of most developing countries are either a legacy 
of their colonial masters or have been inspired by and modelled on the 
recommendations of the United International Bureaux for the Protection of Intellectual 
property (BIRPI)' and World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIpO)2 Patent 
Model Law for developing countries. The work of these international organisations 
themselves is based mainly on patent concepts, laws and practices of the developed 
countries of the West. Although they might have served well the market economies 
of the developed countries', they do not necessarily benefit in all respects the 
developing countries which not only have dissimilar social, political and economic 
settingS4 but are also several light years behind the developed countries in 
technological and industrial development. 
Worse still is the fact that developing countries are locked into international 
legal regimes - Paris Convention and GATT - for protection of intellectual property 
rights which oblige the countries to observe certain standards even though those 
standards have adverse effects on their economic and technological development. 
Thus, the focus of this chapter is the examination of national intellectual property 
laws, particularly in respect of the role of patents in the transfer and development of 
technology to developing countries. In doing so, it is pertinent to present a brief 
historical survey of patent law. 
BIRPI, Model Law for Developing Countries on Inventions, Geneva, May 1965. A copy of the 
BIRPI Model Patent Law reprinted in Appendix 3 of Baxter & J. Sinnott, World Patent Law and 
Practice, 1983. 
2 WE? O, Model Law for Developing Countries on Inventions, (Patents), 1979. 
3 Anderfelt U., International Patent Legislation and Developing Countries, Geneva, 197 1, pp. 27- 
28. 
4 For instance, the patent law of Iran was copied from the French statute, but, as will be shown later, 
their consequences were dissimilar. See Chapter Nine. 
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The survey shows that industrialised countries themselves in their early years 
of technological development had fundamentally different objectives for patent grants 
from those that were adopted later. They used patent grants initially to induce foreign 
nationals with skills and special knowledge of working in certain materials and 
processes to come into their countries and establish various industries which were then 
protected by the grants. Once the industries were firmly entrenched, the pace of 
industrialisation picked up and local innovations were introduced. Further 
technological developments took place with advancements in the sciences and 
engineering and patents took the characteristics of valuable property to be protected 
per se. Patents were no longer needed to import skills and knowledge but were 
employed to protect local inventions and innovations. In other words, modem 
intellectual property laws did not materialise overnight but evolved over centuries to 
meet contemporary needs. 
As will be seen in Section III of this thesis, developing countries have 
patterned their domestic patent systems on the more modem principles applied by the 
industrialised countries in designing their own systems. These principles are no longer 
linked to the acquisition of technology and achievement of industrialisation as their 
goal. The transfer of technology is no longer a matter of concern to the industrialised 
countries. The thesis will examine the contemporary justifications by the industrialised 
countries for the protection of patent grants and their consequences for developing 
countries. The examination will show that, although there are merits in the different 
contemporary justifications of patent protection, the most important one for the 
developing countries is still the promotion of transfer of technology and achievement 
of their primary domestic goal of industrialisation. The main concern of the patent 
system in developing countries must, therefore, be of internalising inventions already 
made and encouraging innovations rather than merely protecting foreigners' monopoly 
rights. 
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11. National Patent Rules 
(a) Historical Survey 
The City-State of Venice is considered as the first State to conceive, in 1474, the basic 
features of contemporary patent laws. England passed its Statute of Monopolies on 
patents in 1623. Other industrialising countries enacted their patent laws after the 
industrial revolution between 1790 to 1870. Legislation to protect patents was 
introduced in the United States of America in 1790, France in 1791, the Netherlands 
in 1809, Austria in 1810, Russia in 1812, Sweden in 1819, Spain in 1826, Brazil in 
1859, Italy in 1859, Argentina in 1864 and Canada in 1869. The original laws have 
since been revised. For example, the national patent law of 1791 of France has been 
revised several times, the last time was in 1992. ' 
A Patent is a legal right to a monopoly given to proprietors of inventions who 
provide adequate information on the specifications for the manufacture of a new 
product or introduction of a new process. Such monopoly rights were given to 
encourage inventors not only to present new technical ideas but also to transform them 
into goods or services. The origin of ideas was totally irrelevant; the idea might have 
originated in the mind of the applicant for a patent or could have been acquired 
abroad through travel or from published technical materials. In other words, the 
patentee himself may not have invented anything. The determining factor was whether 
or not the new product or process was known in the patent granting country at the 
5 French Intellectual Property Code, Law No. 92-597,1992. For the English version of the French 
law see WIPO, Industrial Property: Laws and Treaties, Geneva, July-August 1993. It is 
interesting to note that the Iranian patent law which was enacted in 1931 and based largely on the 
French patent law of 1844 has not been revised yet. The Iranian patent law will be considered in 
more detail in Chapter Nine. See also UNCTAD, The Role of the Patent System in the Transfer 
of Technology to Developing Countries, U. N. Doc. TD/B/AC. 11/1 9/REV. 1 1975, p. 32. 
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time of the grant. When the new industry was established within the country, further 
importation of the patented article into the country from other sources was prohibited. 
The advantages of such a policy to industrial development were three fold: 
First, the patent granting country acquired, quickly and inexpensively, technology 
which had been understood but not applied in the country before to create a new 
industry. Second, by manufacturing the patented goods, the country moved towards 
self-sufficiency in those goods and third, local inventive potential found an outlet in 
the research and development that was necessary to improve a patented product or 
process to compete in the domestic and world markets. 
England is a well known example of a nation with modern patent laws. 
According to Cunningham, while England imported fine and attractive manufactured 
goods from abroad, she exported surplus wool, corn, coal, hides, and tin. 6 The main 
reason for this "unfavourable trade" was the lack of technical knowledge and skilled 
labour in England for the manufacture of such goods. Thus, the institution of the royal 
exclusive privileges for new inventions, the precursor of today's patent system, had 
two primary objectives, namely, to transform England's rural economy into a 
manufacturing economy, and reverse the direction of flow of manufactured goods. 
Accordingly, foreigners who had useful technology that was required in England were 
granted monopoly rights to exploit the rights within the realm. Since then 
manufacturing industries have flourished in England. 
A privilege holder was expected to establish a new industrial enterprise to 
manufacture the patented goods and to teach the skills of the relevant art to the local 
firms'. The point to be bome in mind here is that the new technology useful to the 
6 Cunningham W., Alient Immigrants to England, London, 1897, p. 101; see also Cunningham W., 
The Growth of English Industry and Commerce During the Early and Middle Ages, 
Cambridge, 1915. 
7 Blanco White T. A., Patents for Inventions and the Protection of Industrial Designs, London, 
1974, p. 26. 
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United Kingdom was protected regardless of its origin. 8 As Fox pointed out, "a valid 
patent may be granted on a communication from abroad of a new manufacture, 
although the patentee himself may not have invented anything"'. Such a stress on the 
introduction of new manufacture into the realm, instead of emphasising inventive 
activities as such, clearly indicates that the patent system was initially used to 
facilitate the transfer of technology and establishment of new industries. 
Such an industrial policy-based patent system was formally legislated for the 
first time in the United Kingdom in 1623. To prevent misuse of the exclusive rights 
granted by the Kings, the Statute of Monopolies was enacted. The Statute outlawed 
all monopoly privileges of that time. It states: 
... all Monopolies, and 
Commissions, Grants, Licences, Charters and 
Letters Patents heretofore made or granted, or hereafter to be made or 
granted, to any person or persons, bodies politick or corporate 
whatsoever, of orfor the sole buying, selling, making, working or using 
of anything within this realm .... are altogether contrary to the 
law of 
this realm, and so are and shall be utterly void and of none effect. " 
However, as a special exemption, the Statute excluded letters of patent. This exception 
was the forerunner of the patent system of the United Kingdom which has been the 
model for the patent systems of many industrial and developing countries. The Statute 
states: 
Provided also and be declared and enacted that any declaration before 
mentioned shall not extend to any letters patents and grants of 
privileges for the term of fourteen years or under, hereafter to be 
8 Act Concerning Monopolies and Dispensations With Penal Laws, and the Forfeitures Thereof, 
(1623), Statutes at Large, vol. 2, section 6, p. 702; see also Edgebury v. Stephens (1693) 1 W. P. C. 
35; Boulton v. Bull (1795) 2 H. B. 463, at 491. 
9 Fox H. G., Monopolies and Patents, Toronto, 1947, p. 55. 
10 Act Concerning Monopolies and Dispensations, op. cit., note 8, section 6, p. 701. 
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made, of the sole working or making of any manner of new 
manufactures, within the realm, to the true and first inventor and 
inventors of such manufactures, which others at the time of making 
such letters patents and grants shall not use, so as also they be not 
contrary to the law nor mischievous to the State, by raising prices of 
commodities at home, or hurt of trade, or generally inconvenient. " 
Although the Statute kept silent regarding the establishment of a patent system, it 
required that in return for a patent grant the patentee should fulfil the following 
responsibilities: 
Firstly, a new product had to be manufactured not just patented in the realm. 12 
Secondly, the patentee had to be "the true and first inventor". Hulme declared that "the 
true and first inventor was the true and first founder or institutor of a manufacture. 
Invention, i. e. the exercise of the inventive faculty, was not an essential qualification - 
institution of the manufacture, from whatever source derived, was the valid 
consideration of patent grant under the Statute". 13 Put simply, the inventor in the 
patent documentation was not necessarily the inventor of the new goods and 
processing method himself. Thirdly, the patentee was prohibited from increasing prices 
that would not be in the interests of the state and would affect adversely its trade. 14 
II Ibid. 
12 Adams J. and Averley G. The Patent Specification: The Role of Liardet v. Johnson, 71 Legal 
His., 1986, pp. 156-177, p. 158. 
13 Hulme E. W., The History of Patent Law in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, 18 L. 
Q. Rev., (1902), pp. 280-288, at 281. 
14 For the objectives of patent grants of industrialised countries in their years of technological 
development see UNCTAD, Historical Trends in Protection of Technology in Developed 
Countries and Their Relevance for Developing Countries, UNCTADAITP/TEC/18,26 December 
1990. 
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In this way, England successfully lured foreign technologies and manufactured 
locally those goods which used to be imported into its markets. 15 The main objective 
of such a policy is what is known to day as the Import Substitution Industrialisation 
Strategy which made Great Britain "self-sufficient. " 16 
(b) The Emergence of Patent's Specification Doctrine 
The monopoly rights which were granted in exchange for the actual working of 
inventions have undergone important changes. Consequent upon the multiplicity of 
inventions brought about by the industrial revolution, States began to require the 
registration of inventions. The reasons for such an important change were to prevent 
multiple grants for parallel inventions of the same product or process, make available 
technological knowledge of inventions to everybody, make public aware of protected 
property which should not be violated and provide a universal scientific 
encyclopedia. 17 
15 In England the arts of weaving, ship making, glassmaking, iron working, soap making, aluminum 
and saltpetre were stimulated by the grant of special privileges to foreign innovating craftsmen and 
enterprises. In the 1550s, the silk-making and glassware industries were transferred to France 
motivated by patents. Turquetti, an Italian subject, in return of collecting royalties throughout his 
life established silk-making industry in Lyons and employed 12000 personnel. For the history and 
the list of those industries that were introduced in England by aliens, see Hulme, op. cit., note 13, 
p. 281; Cunningham, The Growth of English Industry, op. cit., note 6; and Fox, op. cit., note 
9. 
16 This intention clearly was announced by Chancellor Morton to Parliament in the reign of Henry 
VII. He desired that "our people be set on work in arts and handcrafts; that our realm may subsist 
more of itself; that idleness be avoided, and the drawing out of our treasury for foreign 
manufacture stopped". Martin W., The English Patent System, London, 1913, p. 11; Beier F-K, 
and Straus J., The Patent System and its Information Function- Yesterday and Today, 8 IIC, 
1977, pp. 387-406. p. 390; Fox, Ibid. 
17 For instance see French Patent Act of 197 1, Article I1 (1). From the patentees point of view, it 
had became very important for them to have some evidence to prove the novelty of their 
"manufacture" against possible future litigation. The registration of patent specifications, thus, 
became instrumental for them as well. 
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This new requirement was a turning point in the evolution of patent law. While 
under the old practice the test of novelty was based on the prior manufacture of the 
invention in the country, under the new practice the novelty test was to show that the 
invention had not been disclosed in any manner within the country. Given the 
significant role of patent specifications, patentees started to disclose as little as 
possible to protect their rights. Gradually, the emphasis shifted from the "actual 
working of patented inventions" to the disclosure of "new inventions". In this regard 
the leading case of Liardet v. Johnson" may be cited. Lord Mansfield enumerated 
his principles for entitlement to a patent as follows: 
The general questions on patents are: Ist. Whether the inventions were 
known and in use before the patent; 2nd. whether the specification is 
sufficient to enable others to make it up; the meaning of the 
specification is, that others may be taught to do the thingfor which the 
patent is granted, and if the specification is false the patent is void, for 
after the term the public ought to have the benefit of the discovery. 
Hence the law requires as the price the patentee must pay to the public 
for his monopoly that he should, to the very best of his knowledge, give 
the fullest and most sufficient description of all the particulars on 
which the effect depends. " 
Since then, as Professor Kingston noted, the grant of patents has been based 
more upon the disclosure of "new information" rather than actual manufacture. 10 
Patents changed from a monopoly right to undertake a new manufacture to "teaching" 
a novelty. In other words, the patents system was strongly inclined towards the 
protection of not just innovations to work inventions but the protection of the original 
18 Liardet v. Johnson, IY and C. C. C. 527, (1780). 
19 For more details of the case see Hulme, op. cit., note 13, p. 284; see also Adamas & Averley, op. 
cit., note 12, p. 170. 
20 Kingston W., (ed. ), Direct Protection of Innovation, 1987, p. 9. 
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specification of the invention which need not be worked if the holder so desired. " 
Indeed, this important shift has made it easy for the "non-working" of patented 
inventions in both industrial and industrialising countries. 
However, the departure was not accidental. Assisted by the early mandated 
industrial exploitations of new inventions, either by their inventors or introducers, 
Western countries attained a high level of industrialisation and economic self- 
sufficiency. Thereafter, they sought to extend the exploitation of their technologies 
outside their marketS22 because there was a risk that their new technologies would 
be copied by other countries. The Paris Convention of 1883 23 reflects such a motive 
and has failed to solve the problem of "non-working" of patents. On the whole, as will 
be considered in more detail later, the Convention has failed to strike a proper balance 
between the interests of patentees and those of the developing countries. 
As was shown in the case of Iran, during the evolution of patent law in the 
industrialised countries, developing countries were either colonised or semi-colonised 
by industrialised countries. Some did not exist as states. However, developing 
countries despite the widening economic and industrial gap between them and the 
industrialised developed countries, gave a special position to industrial property rights 
in their law. Partly because of the ambiguous stance taken by the United Nations in 
terms of role of patents in the transfer of technology, developing countries believed 
that a patent system modelled on the systems in the industrialised countries will attract 
foreign technology and promote their own development. 24 
21 Ibid. 
22 Other factors such as the growing number of inventions, the complexity of new technologies, the 
emergence of transnational corporations at the international scene, and the international division 
of labour facilitated a switch from protection of innovations to protection of mere inventions. 
23 International Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of 1883 known as the Paris 
Convention, of March 20,1883, WIPO Pub. No. 201 (E). The Paris Convention will be examined 
in the next chapter. 
24 In 1964, an important U. N report had concluded that, "there is reason to believe that in spite of 
licence fees and royalties the underdeveloped countries derive net benefits from the transfer of the 
patented knowledge". The Role of the Patent System in the Transfer of Technology to 
Developing Countries: Report by the Secretary-General, U. N., Doc. E/3861/Rev-1, U. N., New 
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Almost all developing countries have now enacted intellectual property laws 
and most of them have joined the international arrangements for protection of 
intellectual property, such as Paris Convention of 1883 and the GATT which recently 
has extended its jurisdiction to the protection of trade-related aspects of intellectual 
25 
property rights. Few developing countries have adapted their industrial property 
system to their own economic needs. Accordingly, while a tiny number of 
international patents belong to developing countries, their patent laws are taken 
advantage of by the industrialised countries to impose a considerable number of 
restrictive business practices in technology licensing agreements with developing 
countries under the umbrella of patent rights. At the same time, in most developing 
countries the privileges created by their patent laws have by and large failed to 
contribute either to stimulate inventions among their own nationals or to encourage 
rapid transfer, appropriate adaptation through assimilation and widespread diffusion 
of imported technologies. 
111. Contemporary Justiflcations for Patent Protection 
It can be seen from the short historical account of the patent system given 
above that the grant of monopolies for inventions was aimed at establishing industries 
within the country by exploiting ideas acquired from abroad. In other words, the early 
patent system had the exchange of technical information and the transfer of technology 
for compulsory working within the country as its primary objectives rather than the 
protection of inventive activities per se of local and foreign nationals. But, as 
mentioned, when the novelty of inventions was to be determined solely through their 
documented specifications, not by their practical application to an industrial product 
York, 1964, para. 276 (emphasis added). 
25 See Chapter Four. 
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or process itself, a gradual replacement of the requirement to work the "new 
information" by mere disclosure of "new information" took place. Various theories 
were advanced to justify this new and radical approach to patents. 
(a) Natural Law Thesis 
The philosophical argument that the creator of an intellectual work has a natural right 
to his efforts and ideas was supported by those who believed in the 17th and 18th 
centuries that rules of natural law should govern society. As regards patents, the 
inventor has an inherent right in the products of his mind (invention), and that the 
patent grant does no more than recognize this right. Put differently, the patent does 
not create a new legal right, but rather gives legal enforcement to an existing right 
inherent in the invention. 26 Accordingly, this right is presented as a fundamental and 
natural right comparable to rights to physical property. 27 From this standpoint, 
unauthorized appropriation of that "exclusive right" should be condemned as 
"intellectual theft". 28 
Although the recognition of industrial property rights as natural rights and 
synonymous with title to private real and personal property underlay the patent 
legislation of most European countries at the end of the 19th century and was 
endorsed by the Paris Convention, it has been subjected to much criticism. It has been 
argued that the logical elements of the concept of property as applied to material 
things (occupation, possession, control, appropriation, restitution, etc. ) are largely 
26 See U. N., Doc. E/3861/Rev. 1, op. cit., note 24, p. 9. 
27 See Gadbaw M. B., & Gwynn T. J., eds. Intellectual Property Rights in the New GATT Round: 
Global Consensus, Global Conflict? 1988, p. 2. 
28 Penrose E., The Economics of International Patent System 1951, pp. 20-25; Machlup F., and 
Penrose E., The Patent Controversy in the 19th Century, The J. His., vol., x, No. 1,1950, pp. 
1-29, p. 20-23. For the same view among Iranian jurists see Intellectual Property Rights: First 
Step, Hamshahri, Teheran, 16th November 1994, No. 550, p. 11. (in Persian). 
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inapplicable to ideas not embodied in material things. 29 In the same vein, the notion 
of inherent rights is hardly compatible with systems in which examination (novelty, 
inventiveness, etc. ) precedes the patent grants as occur in most countries. " 
Furthermore, the limited duration of patents, the exclusion of certain areas from 
patentability, and other limitations in the interest of the general public, like obligatory 
working and compulsory licensing, unveil its inconsistency with the concept of 
property. 
Consequently, the emphasis today is often laid on the economic incentives that 
may be created by granting patents than on the support of the natural right theory. The 
Economic Council of Canada also by rejecting the natural right thesis contended that: 
If any inherent right exists, it is the right of industry to freely imitate 
competitors in satisfying the demands of the marketplace. Any justification of 
the patent system must be ultimately founded in its net social worth to society, 
balancing its costs and benefits. " 
Incentive to Disclose New Knowledge 
In economies where private enterprises dominate manufacturing, sufficient incentives 
should be provided for the generation and disclosure of new technical knowledge. " 
It has been argued that this purpose is partially satisfied with the granting of patents 
in return for the disclosure of the new knowledge to the public. In this context, a 
29 Machlup and Penrose, lbid, p. 23. 
30 Anderfelt, op. cit., note 3, p. 19. 
31 Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs of Canada, Working Paper on Patent Law 
Revision, Toronto, 1976, p. 86. 
32 Schlicher J. W., If Economic Welfare is the Goal, Will Economic Analysis Redefine Patent 
Law, J. Prop. R., vol. 4,1992, p. 12. 
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patent can be viewed as a social contract between the community and the inventor. 
The government acting on behalf of the community, grants certain rights to the 
inventor in exchange for disclosure of the new technology. 33 The grant of 
proprietary rights encourages inventors to disclose their inventions (instead of keeping 
them secret) and make it available to others who may be interested in further 
34 innovation and development of the particular field of technology. Patent records are 
valuable sources of technical information. 
Although this argument has been very popular for sometime, its real value as 
an assured source of information and means of diffusion of technological knowledge 
for development have been questioned. 35 The opponents of this theory argue that 
inventors disclose only what they are not able to keep secret. In other words, 
inventions are patented only when secrecy is impossible. 36 In this regard, the 
Economic Council of Canada contended that: 
The patent system encourages disclosure of inventions but does not guarantee 
it. Where secrecy can be made effective, an inventor may prefer its protection 
to that furnished by the patent system and may therefore, neither patent nor 
disclose. " 
33 The drafter of the first French patent law used the contract social for the first time. See Sklan, 
African Patent Statutes and Technology Transfer, 10 Case W. Res. J. Int'l. L. (1978), pp. 55- 
56. 
34 Beier F-K., Traditional and Social Concepts of Protecting Inventions, I HC, pp. 328-339, at 
337. 
35 Machlup and Penrose, op. cit., note 28; see also Barlow J. P., The Economy of Ideas: a 
Framework for Rethinking Patents and Copyrights in the Digital Age, Wired, March 1994, 
pp. 85-129; World Bank, Strengthening Protection of Intellectual Property in Developing 
Countries: A Survey of the Literature, Washington, D. C., November 1994. 
36 Hastier E., The Inventor: the Stepchild of the Nation?, Indus. Prop., 1981, p. 27. 
37 See Economic Council of Canada, Report on intellectual and industrial property, Ottawa, 
Information Canada, 1971. In a very recent study about Know-how agreements, it was accepted 
that, the existence of patent protection is to a large extent justified by the impossibility of 
preventing the disclosure of certain types of technology when they are put to economic use. 
Cabanellas G., and Massaguer J., Know-How Agreements and EEC Competition Law, 12 IIC, 
199 1, p. 3. 
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A considerable number of new technologies and formulae (patentable or not) 
are not patented because they can be protected outside the patent system quite 
effectively and for an unlimited period of time . 
3' The disclosure of patent 
specifications even if it is drafted in great detail, can often be made vague 
intentionally, or exclude some vital information that is necessary for the industrial 
exploitation of the specifications . 
39To prove this assertion one may refer to the ever 
increasing importance of the role of non-patented know-how in transfer of technology 
transactions. 40 
Regarding the issue of know-how, the argument of those who disagree with the 
importance of patent as an incentive to disclose specifications is that the scope of 
protection of the invention in the 20th century has been changed. Most of know-how 
is no longer the unpatentable part of technology, rather it consists of knowledge that 
is patentable, but is left outside the patent system intentionally, because other methods 
such as confidential contracts or trade secret law are employed to preserve it as a 
secret for a longer period than do patent grants. 41 
Although this trend has diminished the significance of the disclosure of 
contents in patents, unlike some countries such as Iran that only register inventions, 
many countries still give an important position to the highly debatable disclosure and 
informational function of patent protection for technical, economic and social 
38 In this regard, the case of Coca Cola is just an example. Yankey G., International Patents and 
Technology Transfer to Less Developed Countries, Published by Avebury, 1987, p. 16; See also 
Greer D. F., The Case Against Patent Systems in Less-Developed Countries, 8 J. Int'l. L. & 
Econ., 1973, pp. 223-246, at 223,245,246. 
39 See Beier and Straus, op. cit., note 16, p. 404. 
40 UNCTAD, Handbook on the Acquisition of Technology by Developing Countries, TT/AS/5, 
1978, p. 47. It should be recalled here that, in addition to the patentable inventions, there has been 
a sort of complementary information named know-how (information about how to do something), 
obtained through the exploitation of patented technology, which may not be patentable itself, but 
is often necessary to utilize a patented invention effectively. For more details see Chapter Eight. 
41 UNCTAD, Promotion of National Scientific & Technological Capabilities & Revision of the 
Patent System, U. N. Doc. TD/B/C. 6/AC. 2/2 of 29 July 1975, pp. 20-21. 
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development. " No such disclosure is required in Iran where patents are registered 
without adequate disclosure formality. 
(c) Incentive to Promote Investments for Research and Development 
The intervention of law in a free market system to grant exclusive patent rights is 
justified by the importance of new information in the process of industrial and 
economic development. The existence of the patent system may work as a magnet for 
investment in research and development and a significant way of promoting 
technological and industrial progress. This leads to technological changes and more 
efficient allocation of resources which in the end will benefit the consumers. The 
incentive to invest in research and development has been recognised as the only sound 
justification for the patent system . 
4' By emphasising the necessity of research and 
development for technological progress and economic growth, this theory points out 
that patent systems encourage enterprises to invest in research and development to 
introduce innovations enabling the utilization of new inventions where economic 
viability is in doubt. In other words, without patent protection restraining imitation and 
securing exclusive use, the private sector would not be prepared to commit itself to 
the risk of investing in new technical development. 
However. ) there are others who argue 
that, notwithstanding the patent protection 
system, enterprises will invest in research and development in order to maintain their 
market position and remain competitive. Competition, in their view, is regarded as the 
main force propelling enterprises into investment in research and development. 
42 Apart from the deliberate exclusion of information by the patent holder, however, some other 
possible reasons for the inadequacy of the disclosure could be that the technology is inherently 
difficult to describe; that because of the importance of obtaining priority in filing the patent 
specification the information is not fully completed; that the patent office does not examine the 
material disclosed carefully enough; or that the legal obligations imposed by disclosure are 
insufficiently precise. Ibid, p. 21. 
43 Machlup F. The Political Economy of Monopoly, Business, Labour and Government Policies, 
1952, Baltimore, p. 25 1. 
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According to the studies undertaken on the effects of Australian patent system (1982), 
Canadian industrial research and development activities (1971), and U. K. 
manufacturing firms (1973), a small percentage of the research and development 
would not have been carried out if enterprises had not been able to patent the resulting 
discoveries. " Moreover, it has been revealed that the impact of the patent systems 
on research and development may vary according to the industry and the capacity of 
the firm or inventor. 45 
It is submitted that, where patent protection is totally absent or weak, 
enterprises do not usually invest in long term expensive research and development 
projects. Instead, they concentrate on the technologies which can be kept secret for as 
long a period of time as possible, and those which are not copied easily. In this case, 
the inventions are not disclosed and society cannot take advantage of the relevant 
technical information. 
The aforementioned arguments in support of the patent system as a factor in 
promoting investment in research and development are derived from the conditions 
that exist in industrialised countries. These countries already have the ability through 
research and development to make new patentable discoveries meeting the 
requirements of universal novelty and inventiveness stipulated by modem patent laws. 
By contrast, developing countries, because of their inability to undertake original 
research, cannot benefit under the current patent system for one main reason: the 
products of research and development cannot meet the requirements of universal 
novelty and inventiveness. As will be seen in the next chapter, many developing 
countries including Iran, have been persuaded to accept the absolute novelty criterion 
in their patent legislation. 
It means that the results of research and development must not have been 
published or used in any other country, including industrialised countries, in order to 
44 Cited from Yankey, op. cit., note 38, pp. 11-12 
45 lbid, pp. 12-13. 
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be patented in Iran. " Therefore, such a patent system in the developing countries 
does not provide adequate incentives for private entrepreneurs in these countries to 
invest in research and development because the resulting innovations may not be 
patentable as they might have already been published or used elsewhere. 
In Iran, the patent system has also not had an impact on the state owned 
enterprises and other research and development centres including universities. The 
Centre for Scientific and Industrial Research of Iran (CSIRI) has published the number 
of patents granted in the country between 1985 and 1990. Out of 200 patents granted 
in Iran during this period, only two patents were owned by the government research 
centres . 
4' The lack of success with patentable innovations by both state owned 
research establishments and private enterprises in Iran points to the unsuitability of the 
stricter criterion of newness adopted for patent grants in the industrialised countries 
to the conditions that exist in Iran. 
46 Registration of Trademarks and Inventions Act, 193 1, Iranian Official Gazette, No. 772, Article 
37. Hereinafter cited as the Iranian patent law. 
47 For more details as to the position of research and development in Iran, see Fan-nand F., Transfer 
of Technology and Economic Development: The Role of Industrial Research Base in Newly 
Industrialising Countries: Lessons from Iran, Unpublished Ph. D thesis, School of Art and 
Science, New York University, 1992, particularly pp. 257-265. 
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IV. Facilitation of Transfer of Technology 
Transfer of technology takes place through foreign direct investments, joint 
ventures between foreign and local firms or through licensing agreements between a 
foreign patent holder and a local enterprise. A strong patent system gives added 
security to a foreign holder of intellectual property rights including patents against 
imitations of his product by unauthorised persons. 
Foreign enterprises would be discouraged from setting up manufacturing plants 
using patented technology in countries where patents are not protected. They would 
be especially reluctant in such circumstances to set up joint ventures with the local 
manufacturers for fear that the local manufacturer might dissolve the joint venture 
after acquiring needed foreign technology. The introduction of patent system to protect 
intangible property rights is indicative of the extent of the cooperative stance of the 
country and its willingness to comply with international norms with regard to foreign 
investment and technology. 
However, there is consensus that, besides patent legislation, other determinants 
such as market size, infrastructure facilities, political and economic stability, sound 
judicial and bureaucratic systems, predictable taxation laws, power to repatriate profits, 
guarantees against expropriation, availability of raw materials, skilled and cheap local 
labour and the general investment climate are important for successful foreign 
41 investment and licensing agreements. In Iran also although the Iranian patent law 
excludes protection of patents in pharmaceutical compositions and formula of making 
48 For example despite the annulment of process and product pharmaceutical patent in Turkey, the 
amount of Foreign Direct Investment increased considerably. See Kirim Arman, Reconsidering 
Patents and Economic Development: A Case Study of the Turkish Pharmaceutical Industry, 
1985,13 World Development, pp. 219-236. Conversely, in Nigeria, although pharmaceutical 
inventions are protected adequately, it did not result in any significant Foreign Direct Investment. 
On the other hand, foreign pharmaceutical patents in Nigeria were used as import monopoly for 
distribution rather than manufacturing locally. Thus, local and foreign competitors were prevented 
from entering the market. See Adikibi Owen, The Multinational Corporation and Monopoly of 
Patents in Nigeria, 16 World Development, 1988, pp. 511-526. 
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pharmaceutical products in the country, " because of the open door policy of the 
earlier Iranian governments towards the Western industrial countries, firms originating 
from those countries through direct and indirect investment hold a large share of the 
lucrative Iranian pharmaceutical market. 'O 
(a) Insufficiency of Patent Laws for Transfer of Technology 
Unfortunately, investments by the foreign firms in the local pharmaceutical industry 
did not do much for the development and transfer of technical expertise to Iran. A 
foreign pharmaceutical firm usually established a joint-venture firm with an Iranian 
counterpart for the ostensible purpose of establishing a local industry but, in practice, 
the joint venture imported the individual chemical components of pharmaceutical 
products from or through the foreign parent company and the local input was limited 
to mixing the various components and packaging for the local market. Since such a 
simple assembly operation or final processing did not require a high degree of 
technical sophistication, hardly any technical knowledge and know-how rubbed off on 
the local partner of the joint ventures. 
The psychological importance of patent system for foreign investors cannot be 
dismissed as irrelevant. A United Nations report concluded that: 
FF patent protection in developing countries may or may not have a high 
place among the profitable conditions or guarantees which he (the 
foreign patentee) expects. In any case, the fact that patent protection 
is actually askedfor and expected in a large number of situations and 
49 Iranian patent law, Article 28(3). 
50 Nowshirvani V. F. and Bilinder R., Direct Foreign Investment in the Non-Oil Sectors of the 
Iranian Economy, Iranian Stud., 1973, pp. 66-109, p. 75; Salehkhou G., Commercialisation of 
Technology in Developing Countries: Transfer of Pharmaceutical Technology to Iran, 
unpublished Ph. D thesis, Faculty of Political and Social Science of the New School for Social 
Research, (1974); see also Annual Report of Bank Markazi Iran, Teheran, 1970-1976. (in Persian) 
67 
quite apart from its actual economic significance it may be of 
psychological importance for the foreign patentee inventor". 51 
There is no doubt that for the successful execution of licensing agreements for 
needed technology, there must be in place a legal framework which includes an 
effective patent system which is compatible with international accepted norms. From 
Second World War until the 1970s, Japanese industry made its most intensive use of 
foreign technology through licensing agreements. The Japan's patent system is 
believed to have played a key role in facilitating the acquisition of foreign 
technology . 
52 It is interesting to note that the method typically employed was to 
license major advanced technology from abroad, and then to improve and support that 
technology with multiple minor inventions( utility models) at home. 
It should be recalled that technology licensing agreements contain in most 
cases both patent and secret know-how. Although pure know-how licensing takes 
place on an arm's length basis quite successfully, it has been accepted that without the 
assistance of patents, mainly in mechanical engineering, there is not enough legal basis 
for pure know-how licensing and legal protection for the parties involved. " Likewise, 
the absence of strong industrial property laws in a country requires more contract, 
business and tax laws. 
51 UNCTAD, U. N., Doc. E/3861/Rev. 1, op. cit., note 24, p. 5. 
52 Mackley C., The Role of the Patent System in Technology Transfer: The Japanese Experience, 
26 Columbia J. Trans. L., (1987-8), pp. 131-166, p. 136. 
53 Ibid; Taylor and Silberston, Economic Impact of Patents, University of Cambridge, Department 
of Applied Economics, Monograph, (1972), pp. 214,215. It is worthwhile to recall that, the 
disclosure of technology contained in the patent grant is not sufficient to make it commercially 
workable without technical assistance and know-how from the patentee. Foreign patentees are 
reluctant to convey the know-how in conditions which might deprive them of the protection their 
patent provides. 
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(b) Incentives to Innovation 
While an invention is a prescription for a "new" manufacturable product or viable 
process, innovation involves all technical, managerial and marketing efforts by which 
the invention is actually manufactured and commercialised. For the successful working 
of an invention, a large amount of capital and new additional information are 
necessary. Therefore, the foremost economic justification for patent system could be 
the creation of adequate legal protection for entrepreneurs to invest confidently in the 
manufacture of new products. Clearly enough, without having a sort of "market 
power" to provide a head start by keeping others out of the market for certain period 
of time and to protect the new information from imitation by rivals, the investors may 
not be able to obtain attractive prices and recover their capital in a reasonable period. 
Thus, no industrial investment and innovation will be possible without effective laws 
54 to protect industrial property rights. For industries that are already established and 
profitable, the patent system enables the owners to reinforce their power in the 
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market. Much of the power is created by legalising, as will be considered later, the 
incorporation of some normally unreasonable restrictive clauses in technology 
licensing agreements. 
Unfortunately, although this justification was pivotal to the institution of a 
patent system, it is not borne out by most patent laws. Modem patent laws protect 
invention per se directly and innovation, namely the application of the invention in 
54 The Banks Committee reported that: 
Resources are to be put at risk to develop a new process or product, which has yet to be 
tested, then [the man with resources] will hesitate lest the expense of the development 
may prove to be irrecoverable while his competitors can wait, and without equivalent 
expense, pick up and use the successful results. It is the knowledge that a patent 
monopoly will enable him to hold off competition for a period which encourages him to 
take the risk and use those resources to develop new industrial inventions. The British 
Patent System - Report of the Committee to Examine the Patent System and Paten 
Law, Chairman, M. A. Banks, July, 1970, reprinted in Department of Consumer and 
Corporate Affairs of Canada, Working Paper on Patent Law Revision, 1976, Appendix 
C, p. 4. 
55 Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs of Canada, Working Paper on Patent Law 
Revision, 1976, p. 89. 
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actual manufacture and marketing, only indirectly. As was indicated above in the 18th 
and 19th centuries, the grant of a patent was conditional upon the active commercial 
implementation of the invention. Thus, the applicant had to have the necessary means 
to produce the new article. Today, an "invention stands between the monopoly rights 
and the innovation. "" The patent holder cannot be compelled to invest in the 
manufacture of his new product. 
The emphasis is on the introduction of new information. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that a considerable number of inventions, particularly in the developing 
countries, has not been worked in recent years. In Iran, for instance, 99 per cent of 
patents granted to foreigners have not been worked. " In the same vein, UNCTAD 
has reported that 84 per cent of all valid patents in developing countries were owned 
by foreigners, mostly multinational corporations, and 90 to 95 per cent of these 
foreign patents were unused. " This is partly because priority has been given in 
modern patent systems to the introduction and protection of "new" inventions per 
se, 59 rather than the transformation of the new ideas into tangible products. 
56 Kingston, op. cit., note 20, p. 3. 
57 Interview in Teheran by the author with Mr Soltani, the Director of the Iranian Patent Office, 
Teheran, January 15,1995. 
58 UNCTAD, U. N. Doc. TD/B/AC. 11/19/REV. 1 1975, op. cit., note 5, p. 56 
59 Unfortunately, this is the case in most non-industrial countries that are the net technology 
importers. For instance, the Iranian patent law while it confers monopoly right for any new type 
of discovery or invention in various fields of industry and agriculture, the patentee has 5 year time 
to utillse the invention. The letter-patent may be cancelled after this period when an interested 
person in the country petition to the courts and proves that the patent has not been worked. There 
has not been even one annulment of granted patents for non-working in Iran yet. Interestingly 
enough, the inventions must be new at worldwide base and no compulsory licence may be 
imposed. For more details of the Iranian patent law see Chapter Nine. 
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V. Iranian and Islamic Jurists and Justification of Patent Rights 
(a) Iranian and Islamic Concept of Patent Rights 
To date, Iranian scholars have not made a comprehensive examination of the subject 
of industrial property rights. Some references have been made in their works to these 
rights but nothing specific can be clearly discerned. More than sixty years have 
elapsed since the enactment of the Iranian patent law and throughout this period no 
economic analysis has been attempted to evaluate the costs and benefits of the patent 
system in Iran. The main sources of Iranian patent law are the work of two Iranian 
jurists'O who, for the most part, explain provisions of the Iranian Patent Act and the 
Paris Convention. Little has been written discussing the patent concept, the objectives 
of patent laws and their practical effects on transfer and development of technology. 
There has also been no elaboration of patent rights in the work of Islamic jurists 
(Moujohedin) for the reason that at the time of the origin of Islamic law, patent was 
an unknown concept. Besides, Islamic jurists do not rule on any issue until it has 
actually arisen and a solution becomes necessary. Industrial economy is relatively a 
new phenomenon even to contemporary Islamic jurists who only very recently have 
begun to address the issues. " 
There are two distinct views about patent rights among contemporary Islamic 
jurists in Iran. From one standpoint patents should not be granted by an Islamic state 
because they create industrial and economic monopolies and contribute to social 
injustice. In this regard, the late Ayatollah Khomaini stated that: 
60 Sedarat A., and Naraghi M., The Evolution of Proprietorship Rights and Intellectual Property, 
1977. (in Persian) 
61 it is worthwhile to be noted that before the emergence of industrial progress, some Islamic jurists 
had paid attention to the authors' fights. For instance, Second Shahid in Moniatolmorid states that, 
no one is allowed to alter authors' creations, or without their permission enjoy economic interests 
of such creations. Teheran, several publication. 
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what has become customary that an industry is registered for its 
inventor, and others are prohibitedfrom its imitation and its diffusion, 
from the religious point of view has no effect and it is not allowed that 
others be prohibited from imitation [of the industry] and trading with 
it. 62 
The Ayatollah's declaration has been interpreted to mean that the registration 
of inventions is an instrument for erecting trade barriers in order to monopolise 
industries and the factors of production. As a result of such a monopoly, other 
competitors are kept out of the market, prices are increased and the public, as a whole 
and consumers, in particular, will be the main losers. Therefore, by the abolition of 
patent monopoly, those trade barriers are dismantled, fair competition is established 
and products are sold at the lowest possible prices. 63 
According to commentator Shirazi, inventions are like natural resources and 
belong to the public. This is because inventors and innovators emerge from millions 
of people who have been educated by the public funds. What they do is the utilisation 
of past knowledge and experience and build up on that. A new machine or industry 
62 Alhaag Seyed Rohollah Almosavi Alkhomaini, Tahrirolvasile: Novel Problems, 1977, Teheran, 
several publishers, vol. 2, p. 626, (in Arabic). It is worthwhile to be added that, according to 
Ayatollah Khomaini, no one is allowed to alter an author's creation or claim others works as his 
works. For elaboration of the issue see generally Sadeghi, M, H., Author's Rights in Iran and 
International Convention, unpublished LL. M. Dissertation, Tarbiate Modarres University in 
Teheran, 1988. For another opponent of granting monopoly rights to inventions see Ayatollah Safi 
Golpayegani, Rahnamun, published by Motahhari High School, Teheran, No. 2,1992, pp. 206-213, 
at 207. (in Persian) 
63 Shirazi A. K., Economic Problems, Teheran, 1987, p. 272,273, (in Persian). In another 
interpretation of the Ayatollah's declaration it was stated that inventors do not always invent to 
acquire money. The psychological aspect of inventions and innovations is perhaps more desirable 
for them. On the other hand, damages resulted from such monopolies are more than damages 
which may result from the lack of those monopolistic industrial rights. Daftare Hamkarie Houze 
va Daneshgah, An Introduction to Islamic Economy, Teheran, vol. 1,1984, pp. 320-321. (in 
Persian) 
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is in fact, a product of the human intellectual activities and social progress which have 
evolved over the centuries past. 64 
In sum, this approach does not presume any legal right for inventors, and 
clearly presupposes that: 
-invention and the development of new ideas are inherent in the human mind 
and would continue to manifest without any legal protection being available 
for the results. In other words, the introduction of the legal security for 
inventors cannot provide a milieu in which uninventive persons create new 
inventions; 
-patent grants are used to strengthen the concentration of economic power of 
large foreign corporations to set up import monopolies and to facilitate the 
introduction of restrictive clauses by means of licensing agreements; 
-domestic firms have enough incentives, capital and technological capability 
to do research and development and exploit new inventions successfully and 
manufacture the required products themselves without an elaborate patent 
system. 
The first supposition above is shared by some Western jurists. 65 The second 
one, as will be seen later 66 was very true in the case of Iran and other developing 
64 Daftare Harnkarie Houze va Daneshgah, Ibid. pp. 279,280; see also Motahari, M., A Short 
Examination of Principles of Islamic Economy, Hekmat Pub., Teheran, (1983), 1 st ed., pp. 124- 
133. (in Persian) In 1960s and 1970s a similar assertion was expressed by most developing 
countries during the international debates regarding international patent and technology transfer 
laws, Fikentscher, W., The Draft International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of 
Technology, 4 HC, 1980, pp. 22-39, at 25. 
65 The British Patent System - Report of the Committee to Examine the Patent System and 
Paten Law, Chairman, M. A. Banks, July, 1970, reprinted in Department of Consumer and 
Corporate Affairs of Canada, Working Paper on Patent Law Revision, 1976, Appendix C; see 
also Phillips J., Introduction to Intellectual Property Law, Butterworths, London, 1986, p. 90. 
66 See Chapter Nine. 
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countries. 67 However, the abuses described are best resolved by improving the 
institutions that administer and enforce the law . 
6' As regards the third, it is submitted 
that it bears no resemblance to the actual conditions in which Iranian entrepreneurs 
are placed. Even industries in developed countries would have difficulties with the 
third supposition. The importance of protection of industrial property rights in the 
commercialisation of new inventions and technology to the industrialisation process 
of Iran should not be underestimated. In actual fact, many contemporary Islamic jurists 
take the view that Islamic law in itself provides a high degree of protection to 
intellectual property rights. 
Justification of Patent Rights in Islamic Law 
Burdened with the religious factor in Iranian jurisprudence, still another view 
has been advanced by other Islamic jurists. " They believe that intellectual property 
rights as a whole, are justifiable on the basis of analogy with other rights recognised 
by judicial experts. 'O It has been reasoned that, in Islamic jurisprudence, while 
religious responsibilities are established on the Koran's instructions and Islamic 
67 For similar views regarding abuse of patent monopoly see also Lehmann M., The Theory of 
Property Rights and the Protection of Intellectual and Industrial Property, 16 HC, No. 5, 
1985, pp. 525-540, p. 537; Roffe P., Abuse of Patent Monopoly: A Legal Appraisal, 2 World 
Development, No. 9, September 1974, pp. 15-26, at 18; Lall S. Technology and Developing 
Countries: a Review and an Agenda for Research, in Developing Countries in the 
International Economy, 1981, p. 136; UNCTAD, The Role of The Patent System In The 
Transfer of Technology to developing Countries, TD/BC. 6/16 Dec. 1975, p. 22. 
68 The patent monopoly, like any other form of property, might be misused: insufficient disclosure, 
non-working or inadequate use of inventions and imposing excessive restrictive practices in 
licensing agreements. While the national patent law itself can be regulated in a way to prevent 
patent abuses, it is up to each individual country to pass other legislation to control and reduce 
those abuses. For further details see Chapter Ten and Appendix Two. 
69 Ayatollah Fazel Lankarani M.; Ayatollah Emmami Kashani, M.; Ayatollah Sobhani J.; Ayatollah 
Marashi Shoshtari, M. H.; Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi, N.; and Ayatollah Mosavi Bojnordi, M. The 
above mentioned Islamic Jurists' views regarding copyright and patent may be found in Rahnamun, 
op. cit., note 62, pp. 207-213. 
70 Ibid. 
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narratives, commercial transactions are based more on the recognition accorded to 
them by the "wise jurists"" in their wisdom and great understanding. Therefore, if 
something is recognised by them as "right" and at the same time has not been rejected 
as illegal expressly or implicitly by traditional Islamic sources, that right may be said 
to have a legal basis in Islamic law. " Unless they have been specifically rejected by 
Islamic principles, intellectual property rights may be granted once "the wise" 
recognise them as rights and being in the interests of the society. 73 After all, "what 
is accepted by wisdom, is accepted by the religion as well. it74 
Furthermore, there is evidence that Islam has attached particular importance to 
the concept of ownership. The Koran says "man can have nothing but what he strives 
for. "" In other words, what human beings obtain through their legitimate efforts 
should be respected. Such an effort need not necessarily be a physical one. This school 
of thought goes to say that, since an intellectual work may lead to huge productive 
results, intellectual effort is superior to physical effort. " Against the first above 
mentioned Iranian view on patents, this legal approach regards the intellectual property 
right as a natural right and equalizes it with rights over physical property. " 
We have already discussed the demerits of the natural right thesis as a main 
justification for protection of intellectual property rights. The recognition of "ideas" 
71 Sadeghi M. H., op. cit., note 62, pp. 48-55. 
72 Fazel Lankarani, in Rahnamun, op. cit. note 62, p. 210; see also Sadeghi M. H., Ibid. 
73 Sobhani, in Rahnamun, op. cit., note 62, p. 207; Sadeghi M. H., Ibid. 
74 See Rahnamun, Ibid., pp. 210,212. "What is accepted by wisdom, is accepted by the religion as 
well", is a very important principle for Islamic shi'a Jurists who regard the wisdom as one of the 
main sources of Islamic law. For more details of the shi'a school of thought which is predominant 
in Iran and its differences with other branches of Islamic school of though, see, Langroodi, M. J, 
Legal Schools of Thought in Islamic Law, Teheran, 1974, particularly pp. II 1- 13 3. (in Persian) 
75 Koran, Section 53 (Alnajm) verse 39. 
76 Intellectual Property Rights: First Step, Hamshahri, Teheran, 16th November 1994, No. 550, 
p. 11. (in Persian) 
77 Bojnordi, Ibid.; Makarem Shirazi, Rahnamun, op. cit., note 62, p. 210. 
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should be only the "first step" towards the establishment of a coherent and responsive 
intellectual property system in Iran. Any overestimation of either the natural rights or 
the "ideas" themselves as we considered above, would isolate the intellectual property 
system from the real needs of the society. As far as the protection of industrial 
property rights is concerned, it must be understood that Iran can derive benefits from 
patents and other forms of industrial property only to the extent that technical 
knowledge is put to effective use in the country and lead to the establishment of 
production facilities called for Iran's national development plans and priorities. 
Unfortunately, in practice, the first Iranian industrial property law which was 
introduced in 1931 was modeled after the old French law of 1844 and was based on 
the natural rights of the intellectual creators. " That is why, as will be indicated in 
Chapter Nine, the Iranian patent law is more concerned with the private right of 
inventors than the public interests and the economic development of the country. 
The revolution of 1979 called for "unislamic laws" to be repealed, but the 
Guardian Council of Iran's constitutional law has not invalidated or modified the 
industrial property law of 193 1. The Iranian patent law of 1931 and its Regulation of 
1958 are still in force. Having reinforced the law, little has been done to make it 
efficient and more relevant to the achievement of industrialisation of the country. This 
will be considered in detail later. 
78 Iranian patent law. See Chapter Nine. 
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VI. Conclusion 
It would appear from the claims and counter claims that much of the 
discussion of the subject of the patent system is often quite theoretical. There has been 
a lack of conclusive evidence as to the role played by patent grants in industrial 
development of different countries. " There is a lack of empirical data on the 
consequences to economic and industrial development of the lack of a strong and 
effective patent system. As Penrose observed, "it would be helpful in evaluating the 
patent system if arguments based on comparative industrial development of different 
countries had any logical rationale. Unfortunately it is necessary to reject them since 
there is no way of showing what would have happened if the history of patent system 
had been different. , 80 
However, two general propositions have emerged in regard to the economic 
benefits of the patent system: First, if a patent system already exists, it is irresponsible 
to abolish it on the basis of the present state of knowledge. The existence of patent 
legislation in a country provides a legal framework, for the transfer of technology 
licensing agreements, which is internationally recognised and has served some 
countries very well, notably Japan .8' That is why 
developing countries, rightly, have 
79 Even the demonstration and analogy of the economic history of the industrialized countries to 
prove that patent system benefits society can not be regarded necessarily convincing as regards the 
developing countries. Since these countries have peculiar political, economic and scientific 
problems very different with those in the developed countries. 
80 Penrose, op. cit., note 28, p. 39. It is equally important to notice that, what Penrose and others 
regarding the evaluation of the patent system said, do not mean that the system at least for 
industrialised countries has not worked. But the point is that whether this system is the best one 
to create the ideal environment for improvement of technology and for the benefit of developing 
countries. In fact, as examined by Anderfelt, some scholars believe that United States industrial 
and scientific progress provides proof of patent system's effectiveness. Anderfelt, op. cit., note 3, 
pp. 27-28. 
81 It has been maintained that from Second World War until the 1970s, Japanese industry which 
supported financially by the government made its most intensive use of foreign technology through 
licensing agreements. As a survey observed, "this has been inevitable, because Japan made a late 
start and therefore had to catch up in a short period with the advanced nations". See Japan 
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resisted temptations to opt out of the major international regime for protection of 
industrial property with all its weaknesses. 82 Instead, the countries have tried to 
revise those provisions which have negative effects on their economies. 
Second, at any rate, one fact seems to be indisputable. The patent system 
should protect those economically important inventions" whose social cost will 
always be less than the benefits. Such inventions would not have been possible 
without patents. 84 The patent system yields a net benefit to the public when patents 
are granted only for those inventions which would not have been possible but for the 
patent system. Granting patent protection to inventors who would have introduced 
their products without such incentives imposes unnecessary social restrictions. At the 
same time, there is no doubt that the granting of patents, synonymous with ceding 
market power to foreign nationals by those countries which are substantial importers 
of industrial property without corresponding exports, is acceptable only if the nature 
of the power is so conditioned as to make its exercise consistent with the public 
interest of the importing country. 
The patent system, therefore, must be so designed that it encourages local firms 
to invest in research and development and routinely undertake innovative activities 
Economic Planning Agency, Economic Survey of Japan, 1978-1979, p. 135; see also Mackley, 
op. cit., note 52, p. 136. 
82 See Chapter Four. 
83 Due to various levels of economic, industrial, scientific and social development of nations, the 
economically important innovations which have radical impact on societies are varied. For instance, 
such major innovations for the Unite States of America described as xerography, instant 
photography, transistors, lasers, synthetic textile fibbers, and the airplane. See Gee, S. Technology 
Transfer, Innovation, and International Competitiveness, 198 1, p. 161. The critical innovations 
for development of a developing country can be those inventions relating to a particular industry 
for instance, mining technology because of the availability of a particular natural resource. Such 
inventions, however, in developing countries might be considered eligible for the grant of 
innovation certificates. For more details see Chapter Nine, pp. 235-242. 
84 Kahn M., The Role of Patents, in Competition Cartels and Their Regulations, 1962, pp. 308- 
311. It must be noted that, although such a cost/benefit evaluation differs from country to country, 
regarding free market and advance economy countries, scholars including Bowman believe that, 
consumer-oriented reward system that grants temporary monopoly to patentees to excludes others 
provides social benefit because resources are better allocated. Bowman W., Patent and Antitrust 
Law, 1973, p. 32. 
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and, at the same time, contribute to the development of industry by teaching industry 
new innovations. 85 The system should act as a vehicle for the transfer of technology 
from the more advanced technology countries and be sufficiently effective to mitigate 
the damage resulting from the misuse of patents. Moreover, in addition to patent rules 
which are designed specifically to prevent abuses such as insufficient disclosure or 
"non-working" of the patented inventions, other safeguards such as competition, anti- 
monopoly laws and transfer of technology laws may be desirable to control the 
practice of incorporation of harmful restrictive clauses in licensing agreements and to 
outlaw monopolistic conduct in the market. 
As will be examined later, member States of the Paris Convention are also 
free, to a certain degree, to adapt their national patent systems and to legislate 
necessary measures to counter patent abuses. Some developing countries have taken 
advantage of this freedom. 86 National patent laws continue to expand and strengthen 
in many countries because of the above approach and because of the contemporary 
faith in a free and competitive market in goods and services. 
85 The purpose of patent law of Japan is to encourage inventions by promoting their protection and 
utilisation and thereby to contribute to the development of industry. See The Intellectual Property 
Law of Japan of 1959, as amended in 1988. 
86 Some developing countries in order to minimize the disadvantages of foreign patents introduced 
changes in their patent legislation. These changes consist of: exclusion of some products and 
processes from patentability, a limitation of the duration of patent grant for specific products and 
processes, strengthening of disclosure requirements, stricter provisions for compulsory licenses, 
revocation as remedies for non-use and strong provisions against abuses in patent licensing 
agreement. See UNCTAD Secretariat, Review of Recent Trends in Patents in Developing 
Countries, TD/B/C. 6/AC. 5/3,1981; see also UNCTAD Secretariat, The Relevance of Recent 
Developments in the Area of Technology to the Negotiations on the Draft International Code 
of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology, U. N. TD/Code TOT/55,2 October 1990, p. 23. 
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Chapter Four 
INTERNATIONAL ACCORDS FOR THE PROTECTION OF 
INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
The patent systems of the developing countries and the practices of the 
international patent system, as embodied in the International Convention for Protection 
of Industrial Property (Paris Convention)', are closely related. The principles and rules 
evolved within this Convention have produced important effects on most national 
patent laws and inevitably on the flow of technology. In this chapter, the development 
of an international legal framework for the protection of patents will be traced to show 
the unsuccessful efforts made by the developing countries for a fair balance between 
patentee rights and public interests. 
The conclusion is that developing countries as a group and international 
organisations such as UNCTAD have failed to achieve any significant reform of the 
Paris Convention to recognise the particular needs of the developing countries, 
namely, the transfer and development of technology: developing nations do not enjoy 
a favourable treatment as to protection of the intellectual property rights of foreigners 
under the Paris Convention. The new changes resulting from provisions in the TRIPS 
Agreement have largely ignored the competitive capabilities of developing countries 
with respect to the creation of intellectual property. 
International Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of 1883 known as the Paris 
Convention has been ratified by 107 States, most of them from developing countries. See Indus. 
Prop. January 1993, p. 9. The original signatories of the Paris Convention were Belgium, Brazil, 
France, Guatemala, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Salvador, Serbia, Spain, and Switzerland. A 
considerable number of developing countries including the largest ones such as India, Pakistan, 
Thailand and the Andean countries (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru) have not ratified the 
Convention yet. Bangladesh in 1991 and Malaysia in 1989 became party to the Convention. For 
a history of the Convention see Lades S., Patents, Trademarks and Related Rights: National 
and International Protection, 1975, p. 1030. See also Penrose, supra, Chapter Three, note 28, 
(describing 19th century patent controversy and providing extensive analysis of events leading up 
to Paris Convention). In this study references are made to the latest revised text of 1967 
Stockholm Act), unless indicated to other texts. 
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1. International Convention for Protection of Industrial Property 
(Paris Convention) 
The study of the Paris Convention is important because it sets a compelling 
framework which must be adhered to by national patent and related legislation in 
developing countries even though their main objective, namely, to acquire foreign 
technology at an economic cost, is different from that of the Convention which is 
concerned about protecting industrial property rights per se. ' Developing countries 
have repeatedly contended that the Convention is biased towards the holders of 
industrial property rights and that it has generally ignored the question as to the 
measures to be taken if the holders do not exploit and diffuse their technology in the 
patent granting countries. ' Amongst different misuses of patent rights are insufficient 
disclosure, imposition of excessive restrictive clauses in technology licensing 
agreements and non-working of patented inventions. 
The international debates relating to the revision of the Convention clearly 
illustrate one of the key differences in the approaches of the developed industrialised 
countries and the developing countries with regard to the control of restrictive clauses 
in technology transfer agreements. The most important question to emerge is to what 
extent, if any, the adoption of national safeguards, such as restrictive business 
practices law to control and approve industrial property licence agreements, are 
regarded as an erosion of the international legal system of industrial property rights 
introduced by the Paris Convention. 
2 0' Brien P., Developing Countries and the Patent System: An Economic Appraisal, World 
Development, vol. 2,1974, pp. 27-36, p. 28; see also Vaitsos C. The Revision of International 
Patent System: Legal Considerations for a Third World Position, 4 World. Development, 1976, 
pp. 85-102, p. 88. 
3 Yusuf Abdulghawi Ahmad, Transfer of Technology, in Bedjaoui M., International Law: 
Achievements and Prospects, UNESCO/ 7012,1991, p. 630. 
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(a) The Minimum Standards of Protection 
Although certain aspects of technology policy in general and technology 
transfer in particular are left to individual states to decide 4, the Convention sets some 
minimum standards which must be strictly observed by developing countries. The 
developing countries have, however, questioned the validity of these standards and 
have argued that the standards applicable to them should logically be different from 
those applicable to industrialised countries because of the different levels of their 
economic and industrial development. 
The minimum standards that the member states should comply with concern 
"national treatment", "the right of priority", "independence of patents" and patent 
rights and to some extent the responsibilities of patentees. ' 
(b) The Principle of National Treatment 
The legal rule, which has had the greatest influence on international accord on 
the patent system, is probably the rule prohibiting discrimination against foreign patent 
holders. The same treatment as enjoyed by the local patent holder should be given 
under the national law to the foreign holder. There should be no barriers to the entry 
4A former Director General of WIPO explained the freedom of the member States of the Paris 
Convention as follows: 
[they are] entirely free to establish the criteria for patentability, to decide whether patent 
applications should or should not be examined in order to determine, before a patent is granted, 
whether these criteria have been met, whether the patent should be granted to the first inventor 
or to the first applicantfor a patent, or whether patents should be granted for products only, for 
processes only, or for both, and in which fields of industry and for what term. See Bodenhausen 
G. H. C., Guide to the Application of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial 
Property, (as revised at Stockholm in 1967), Geneva, United International Bureaux for the 
Protection of Intellectual property (BIRPI), 1968, p. 15,16. 
5 Paris Convention, Article 25 
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of foreign patent holders into a market and once there, they should be treated by the 
law in exactly the same way as national patent holders. The national treatment rule is 
regarded as the cornerstone of the Paris Convention which is designed to ensure that 
there is no discrimination in international trade in industrial property. The Convention 
provides that the "national of any country of the Union, shall as regards the protection 
of industrial property, enjoy in all other countries of the Union the advantages that 
their respective laws now grant. "' 
The principle of national treatment covers all aspects of patent laws and, 
according to Bodenhausen, consists "in the application without any discrimination, of 
the national law as applied to nationals of the country itself. "' It is on the basis of 
this principle that countries such as Iran grant equal patent protection to members of 
the Union. ' 
Due to the wide gap in scientific and technological capabilities between the 
developing countries and the developed industrialised countries, most inventions are 
made in the latter countries and, as a result, the overwhelming majority of the patents 
in developing countries is owned by foreigners, mainly transnational corporations. 9 
The principle of equality affords industrialised countries which are exporters of 
technology the opportunity to obtain a much greater advantage than the developing 
6 Ibid., Article 2(l). 
7 Bodenhausen, op. cit., note 4, p. 29. 
8 Permission Law of Adherence of Iranian Government to International General Union Known 
as Paris for Protection of Industrial and Commercial and Agricultural Property, February 
1958. On the basis of the above mentioned permission Iran ratified the convention and among other 
things, Iran agreed to observe the national treatment principle of the convention. Iranian Official 
Gazette, No. 28-7269, Article 2. 
9 In Iran 95% of all granted patents during the last sixty years belong to foreigners. For more details 
see Chapter Nine. According to Patel, some three million odd patents registered all over the world, 
only 20000 that is almost 20 per cent are owned by enterprises or persons in developing countries. 
Patel, S. J. The Technological Dependence and Developing Countries, 12 J. M. African Stud., 
1974, pp. 1-17, p. 12. UNCTAD reported another findings and mentioned, while developing 
countries hold a bare of I per cent of the world total of patent grants, foreigners own in developing 
countries six times more patents than the national of these countries. Furthermore, over 90 per cent 
of the patents so owned by foreigners are never used in production processes in developing 
countries. See UNCTAD, TD/B/AC. 11/1 9/Rev. 1,1975, supra, Chapter Three, note 5, p. 48. 
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countries. 'O Inventors in these countries face financial, sclentific, and infrastructure 
difficulties which prevent the inventors from competing with their counterparts in 
industrialised countries on an equal basis. Equal treatment would operate to the mutual 
advantage of the members of Paris Convention only if all countries were at the same 
level of technological and economic development. Unfortunately, developing countries 
are not at the same level of industrialised countries which own the bulk of intellectual 
property rights and the international legal framework does not provide any scope for 
compensating their inequalities. Thus, there is no such thing as affirmative action in 
international patent law to aid the developing countries. 
The principle of equal treatment gives the stronger foreign party an unlimited 
freedom to utilize his power to the detriment of the local weaker party. " The 
Convention prohibits all contracting member states including undeveloped states 
desperately weak in science and technology from legislating measures to benefit local 
inventors and encouraging local inventive efforts without extending the same measures 
to foreign nationals too. " In Iran, for instance, the encouragement and support of 
local technological innovative activities is very critical but because of the national 
treatment requirement, the country is not able to introduce different conditions of 
novelty and duration of the patent grant for its own nationals and exclude their 
powerful competitive foreign rivals. " 
10 World Bank, supra, Chapter Three, note 35, p. 11. 
II See, UNCTAD The Role of Patents, op. cit., note 9, p. 47. 
12 Paris Convention, Article 2. 
13 It should be noted however that under the Convention, the national treatment principle does not 
prevent the governments of member states of the Paris Convention from providing financial, fiscal 
or other supports to create a better inventive environment for their national inventors, to the 
exclusion of foreign inventors. Some developing countries have done so. For example, Philippines 
has striven to create a better environment for local inventiveness, by investing in research and 
development in the fields of science and technology, improving education, providing economic and 
financial aids, giving priority to the building of adequate infrastructure facilities and furnishing 
other resources as necessary. Political and cultural factors have also contributed to the efforts of 
the Philippines government. The results have been reported as satisfactory, at least in the 
Philippines. See WIPO, Inventiveness for Development Process: Selected Proceedings of the 
International Seminar, held in Plovdiv, Bulgaria, November 12 to 15,1985, WIPO Pub. No. 
655(E), 1987, p. 39. 
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Developing countries, therefore have demanded some exceptions to national 
treatment that allow them to adopt patent policies which would encourage their local 
technological innovative activities. Some exceptions, for instance, suggested to be in 
respect of different fees, working of the patented inventions, duration of patents, easier 
revocation of foreign patent grants and novelty. " 
Right of Priority 
Most national patent laws incorporate the "novelty" concept in one way or 
another. Publication of an invention arising out of a patent application or grant not 
only results in the destruction of the novelty of the invention in the original patent 
granting state but also in some other states under their laws. Thus, an inventor who 
wished to utilize his patented technology outside his country of origin, in practice, 
would face tremendous difficulties. The "right of priority" standard contained in the 
Paris Convention has attempted to address this problem. " The Convention provides 
that any person who has duly filed an application for a patent in one member country 
party may apply for a patent in any of the other member countries of the Convention 
within a period of 12 months. 16 
These late applications then can be regarded as if the applications had been 
filed on the same day as that on which the first application was filed. " The novelty 
14 The novelty exception means, developing countries would be allowed to require absolute novelty 
for foreign nationals and local novelty for their own national inventors and innovators. Arpard 
Bogsch (former Director General of WIPO), The Fourteen Questions of the First Session of the 
Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts: Analysis and Suggestions Prepared by the Director 
General, Indus. Prop., 1976, pp 59-62; see also UNCTAD, The International Patent System: the 
Revision of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, TD/B/C. 6/AC. 3/2 
of 28 June 1977, p. 25. 
15 Paris Convention, Article 4. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Bogsch, op. cit. not 14, p. 198. 
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of the invention is lost only at the end of the 12 month period after the first patent 
grant. In other words, a patent holder in one member state has 12 months to file 
applications in other member states, without running the risk of the patent being 
copied by someone else. That means the patent holder can fully exploit or withhold 
the invention in another member state for the same period without bothering to apply 
for a patent there, thus stalling any attempt by nationals in that state from developing 
the patented technology. This had led to the developing countries calling for the 
reduction of the priority period which is unreasonable in modern times considering the 
speed and efficiency in the means of communication and transport coupled with a 
demand for generally "preferential treatment" for their nationals. " Apart from the 
exception that a patent granted in one member country is valid for a period of 12 
months in all member countries of the Convention, the general rule is that patents 
granted in various member states are all independent. 
(d) Independence of Patents 
An inventor seldom knows which country is the most profitable for exploiting 
his technology. He takes the decision to apply for a grant or grants usually after 
exploring potential markets. He may much later on, after taking out grants in some 
countries, search for other markets to expand his enterprise or switch to other 
attractive markets. During his evaluation process he may well decide to discontinue 
patents in some of the countries in order to save on fees and taxes. This is only 
possible if he is able to discontinue the patents in some countries without invalidating 
them in others. Therefore, it is imperative to a patent holder that the various patents 
are regarded in law as independent of each other. Otherwise, the termination and 
revocation of the patent in one country will entail automatically the invalidation of the 
patent in the other countries. 
18 See UNCTAD, TD/B/C. 6/AC. 3/2 of 28 June 1977, op. cit. note 14, pp. 19-21. 
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It is also admitted that the member states of the Convention must remain free 
to decide for themselves on matters such as patentability, duration of a patent, etc. 
and, therefore, the validity of a patent in one country should not be tied to other 
countries. Based on these and other arguments, the Paris Convention has introduced 
the standard of "independence of patents". '9 It is interesting to note that since the 
examination of the patent applications in developing countries is not usually a 
comprehensive and thorough one, the application of such a standard could cause more 
damage to these countries than to the developed industrialised countries. That is to 
say, an invention which has been rejected in a developed country, because it does not 
meet the patentability requirements there, might be granted a patent in a less 
developed country with inadequate trained technical personnel to administer patent 
grants. 
(e) Importation: Production Monopoly or Market Monopoly? 
Since its early days, the Paris Convention explicitly has permitted importation 
of articles manufactured in any of the countries of the Union by the patentee into the 
country, where the patent has been granted, as sufficient defence against forfeiture of 
the product patent . 
20 A commonly mentioned reason for this provision is that, 
immediate working of the same invention, by the patentee himself or licensees, in all 
granting countries is not generally feasible or even possible because of lack of 
resources. A patent holder often needs to get more familiar with the market of the 
19 Article 4 bis(l) of the Convention provides that any patent applied for in one member States is 
deemed independent of patents obtained for the same invention in other countries, whether Union 
members or not. 
20 Article 5A(l ). Product patents are patents which are granted for inventions that appear in tangible 
form and consists of products e. g. new alloy such as machines, equipment, apparatus, devices, etc. 
The invention may reside either in an independent product or in a product which forms only a part 
of another product and may only be sold as a part of that other product. Process patent is generally 
a solution consisting of a series of steps for producing a product. It may consist of the new use of 
a known process or a known product. WIPO, Model Law for Developing Countries on 
Inventions, vol. 1, (Patents), Geneva, 1979, p. 57. Bogsch A. The First Hundred Years of the 
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Indus. Prop., (1983), p. 201 
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granting country. So the patentee must be given adequate time to test the market and 
organize exploitation, be it by himself or by licensees. In such circumstances, the 
importation of the patented articles from another country in which the patent holder 
is already manufacturing the invention has been held to be justifiable and should not 
entail revocation. 21 
It has been observed that foreign technology holders, particularly transnational 
corporations, exploit the inventions mostly in the industrial countries and take patents 
in the developing countries just to obtain a monopoly in their markets and protect the 
company's exports to the developing countries against imitators. 22 In practice, such 
a monopoly acts as a means of eliminating competition and if successful discourages 
investment and the transfer of technology to the developing countries . 
2' The point 
here is that when a foreign patentee sets up a lucrative export market, it is unrealistic 
to assume that he would voluntarily give up the monopoly for production by him 
locally or by licence holders. Having been constrained to accept the existence of that 
provision in the Convention, developing countries expressed their concern that the 
ambiguous wording of the Convention encourages importation rather than foster the 
effective local working of inventions. 
Developing countries asked the Convention Union for clarification whether 
21 It should be noted that the provision does not applies in the case of importation of articles 
manufactured in non- member countries of the Union. Bodenhausen, op. cit. note 4, p. 69. 
22 See Grundmann, H., Foreign Patent Monopolies in Developing Countries: An Empirical 
Analysis, 12 J. Dev. Stud., No. 2,1976,189-192; Greif, S., The Compulsory Working of Patent, 
26 L. & St., 1982, pp. 77-81. 
23 According to a study of the operation of the international patent system, in terms of the effects of 
the import monopolies, "such monopolies impose costs on developing countries in two senses. 
First, they inhibit domestic production and innovation within the developing countries and thus 
stifle the growth of those areas of patented, and patent-related, industry which could have been 
profitably set up in developing countries. Second, the monopoly over imports cut off competition 
even on the external trade side (unless there are close substitutes which can be imported without 
infringing the patent) and hence can be expected to lead to higher payments for imports than would 
be the case if competition in imports were to be allowed. " UNCTAD, TD/B/C. 6/AC. 3/2, op. cit., 
note 14, para. 44; see also UNCTAD, The Role of the Patent System in the Transfer of 
Technology to Developing Countries, TD/BC. 6/16 Dec. 1975, p. 21. 
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mere importation constitutes working of the patented invention 
24 
and sought 
appropriate safeguards in cases where the patent holder was content to import the 
25 patent goods rather than manufacture them locally. In response to the former, it was 
confirmed that, like other activities such as, offers for sale, sale and use of the 
patented product, importation also generally does not constitute working of the 
26 
patented product. The WIPO Model Law which was based on the Stockholm Act 
of 1967 also provides that "importation shall not justify the non-working or 
insufficient working of the patented invention in the country. vv27 
With regard to appropriate safeguard, since importation is deemed as an 
example of "non-working", in the context of Article 5 of the Convention as a whole, 
the patent granting country is able to grant a compulsory licence, as some 
28 industrialised countries have explicitly stipulated in their own patent laws. It should 
be borne in mind, however, that the compulsory licensing system established by the 
Paris Convention, because of its many reservations seems to be not an efficient 
instrument to ensure working of patented technologies in the developing countries. 29 
24 UNCTAD, The International Patent System as an Instrument of Policy for National 
Development, TD/B/C. 6/AC. 2/3 of 24 July 1975, p. 13. 
25 Bogsch, op. cit., note 20, p. 201. 
26 Bogsch, op. cit., note 14, p. 54. The Director General has also mentioned that, "there seems to be 
no doubt in anybody's mind that importation does not constitute working. The International Bureau 
has found no law, court decision or expression of opinion which would indicate the contrary". Ibid 
at 5 9. 
27 See WEPO, Model Law for Developing Countries, note 20, p. 33. 
28 See Article 48(3) of the UX Patents Act of 1977. Among other grounds under which the 
compulsory licensing is imposed are where the patented invention is not being adequately worked 
within the U. K. and demand being met by importation. 
29 First, the Paris Convention for granting of compulsory licences requires the expiration of three 
years after the granting of the patents and four years after the application of the patents, whichever 
period expires last. 
Second, the Paris Convention requires that a compulsory licence should be refused if the patent 
holder "justifies his inaction by legitimate reasons". Since the concept of "legitimate" has not been 
defined well, thus, the patentee can put would-be applicants for compulsory licences in immense 
difficulty to prove the failure to work of the patent. 
Third, a patentee whose patent has been granted to someone else by the competent authority, has 
still right to import the patented articles or license it to others to do so. 
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(f) Importation of Patented Processes 
There is yet another aspect to the import monopoly provisions in the Paris 
Convention which deal with patented processes. A new article 5quarter which was 
introduced into the Convention at the Lisbon Revision Conference of 1958 states: 
it when a product is imported into a country of the Union where there exists a patent 
protecting process of manufacture of the said product, the patentee shall have all the 
rights, with regard to the imported product, that are accorded to him by the legislation 
of the country of importation, on the basis of the process patent, with respect to 
products manufactured in that country. "'O 
The main effect of the new article is that those countries which permit the 
patent of a manufacturing process must also protect the product where it is not 
manufactured in the country but is imported from a foreign country. As a result of 
such protection, the unauthorised use or sale of the products manufactured with the 
process either in the country or abroad and then imported is illegal. 31 
Such a provision is crucial to the chemical and pharmaceutical industries where 
the protection of the processes of production is the key to their survival. Given the 
dominance of foreign oligopolies, particularly in pharmaceutical markets of most 
developing countries, it may be argued that in those countries like Iran which apply 
Fourth, forfeiture or revocation as a remedy for failure to work the patented technology in the 
country, is only permitted after the completion of compulsory licensing process. If after the 
granting of a compulsory licence, the patentee knew that his refusal to provide sufficient 
manufacturing know-how to the licensee would regarded as the "non-working" and his patent 
would be revoked, he would be under pressure to provide the needed know-how. One should not 
forget that in developing countries most of valuable patented inventions need additional 
manufacturing process or know-how to be worked industrially and commercially to the extent that 
manufacture the expected quality and quantity. That is why it has been concluded that, an import 
monopoly acts, in practice, as a means of controlling competition and as a result, it may discourage 
investment and the transfer of technology. UNCTAI), TD/BC. 6/16, op. cit., note 23, p. 21; Penrose 
E., International Patenting and the Less Developed Countries, Eco. J., 1973, p. 777. 
30 Paris Convention, Article "5quarter". 
31 Bogsch, op. cit., note 20, p. 201. 
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such a protection, control over the process is enough to give import monopoly and 
thereby total control of the domestic market in the patent gran ting country. This is 
provided, as is in the case of Iran, that the privileges of the patentee include sale and 
use as wel 1.32 Consequently, developing countries recognised this provision as being 
in conflict with any attempt to eliminate the exclusive right of importation of products 
13 manufactured abroad by a patented process. To redress those shortcomings, 
developing countries proposed that either this Article should be omitted or not 
enforced and be allowed to lapse. 34 
(g) Remedies Against Patent Abuse 
As was indicated earlier, a patent right can be abused in several ways: 
(i) by disclosing insufficient information about the invention; 
(ii) by imposing excessive restrictive clauses in licensing agreements; and 
(iii) by not working the invention commercially. 
The Paris Convention has been most concerned with the latter. The common 
safeguards which almost all national patent laws have introduced to avert the non- 
working of patents are compulsory licences and forfeiture or revocation of patents. 
Article 5 of the Paris Convention which deals with the right of member States to 
prevent the abuse of patent rights, sanctions the grant of compulsory licences with 4 
some important restrictions. The question, however, is how to design these controls 
32 Registration of Trademarks and Inventions Act, 193 1, Iraiiian Official Gazette, No. 772, Article 
33. 
33 See UNCTAD, TD/B/C. 6/AC. 3/2, op. cit., note 14. p. 18. 
34 See WIPO, Diplomatic Conference on the Revision of the Paris Convention (Geneva, February 
4 to March 4,1980): Basic Proposals (Drafts Approved or Forwarded to the Diplomatic Conference 
by the Preparatory Intergoverrimental Committee and other Proposals Referred to in the Provisional 
Rules of Procedure of the Diplomatic Conference), Memorandum by tile Director General, Doc. 
PR/DC/3 of 25 June 1979, p. 248. (hereinafter cited as Basic Proposals). 
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and safeguards against patent abuses under the Paris Convention. 
(h) Rights of the States to Control Abuse of the Monopoly 
According to Article 5 of the original text (1883) of the Paris Convention the 
patentee had "the obligation of working his patent conformably to the laws of the 
country into which he has introduced the patented articles. "" Corollary to this was 
the fact that, states in accordance with their national patent legislation could grant any 
measures such as compulsory licences or revocation to deter the abuse of monopoly 
rights. The only limitation imposed by the Convention which has remained almost 
unchanged to date was that, the importation of articles manufactured in any other 
member countries could not justify revocation. " it was during the later conferences 
to update the Convention that the obligation-to-work principle as incorporated in the 
original Convention began to be watered down. 
The Washington revision conference of 1911 amended the original text of 
Article 5 and placed two important restrictions on the right of countries to revoke 
patents for failure to work. First, the patent could not be forfeited for non-working 
until "after a period of three years from the date of filing the application". Second, the 
patent could be revoked, after that period -3 years- has expired and only in those cases 
in which the patentee could not "justify his inaction". Accordingly, under the 
Washington Act of the Convention, forfeiture or revocation of the patent was still the 
chief remedy against non-working. 37 
35 See Article 5 of the Original text (1883) of Paris Convention, reprinted In Treaties and Others 
international Agreements of the United States of America, compiled under the direction of 
Charles 1. Bevans, 1776-1949, p. 83. 
36 Ibid, Paragraph (I) of Article 5. It reads, "the introduction by the patentee into countries where 
patent has been granted. of articles manufactured in any other States of the Union, ,, hall not entall 
forfeiture". 
37 See Bodenhausen, op. cit. note 4, p. 68. 
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At the Hague revision conference of 1925, Article 5 has undergone substantial 
changes. For the first time the concept of compulsory licences was recognized and, 
at the same time, it was acknowledged that the member States have the right to take 
legislative measures to prevent patent abuses. Article 5 of the Convention specifically 
mentions "failure to work" as an example of such abuses. " According to a new 
paragraph, i. e., paragraph (3), the above mentioned necessary legislative measures 
"shall not provide for forfeiture of the patent unless the grant of compulsory licences 
is insufficient to prevent such a buses". 
At the London revision conference of 1934, another restriction was placed on 
the right of member States to apply the sanction of revocation. Paragraph (4) of 
Article 5A provided that "no proceedings for the forfeiture or revocation of a patent 
may be instituted before the expiration of two years from the grant of the first 
compulsory licence". 
While Article 5A was again amended at the Lisbon revision conference of 
1958, the Stockholm revision conference of 1967 did not amend that Article of the 
Convention. So, those member countries that have ratified the amendments of Lisbon 
conference have to comply with the following minimum standards and incorporate 
them in their national laws: 
A. Forfeiture of the patent shall not be provided for except in cases where the grant 
of compulsory licences would not have been sufficient to prevent the said abuses. (e. g. 
failure to work). '9 
B. No proceedings for forfeiture or revocation of a patent may be instituted before the 
expiration of two years from the grant of the first compulsory licence. 'O 
C. A compulsory licence may not be applied for on the ground of failure to work or 
38 See Article 5(2) which reads as: 
Each country of the Union shall have the right to take legislative measures providingfor the grant 
of compulsory licences to prevent the abuses which might resultfrom the exercise of the exclusive 
rights conferred by the patent, for example; failure to work. 
39 Article 5(3) of the Stockholm revision of 1967. 
40 Ibid. 
93 
insufficient working before the expiration of a period of four years from the date of 
filling of the patent application or three years from the date of the grant of the patent, 
whichever period expires last. 41 
D. Compulsory licence shall be refused if the patentee justifies his inaction by 
legitimate reasons. " 
E. Such a compulsory licences shall not be exclusive and shall not be transferable, 
even in the form of the grant of the sub-licence, except with that part of the enterprise 
or goodwill which exploits such licence. 43 
F. Importation by the patentee into the country is permitted where the patent has been 
granted of articles manufactured in any of the countries of the Union without 
forfeiture of the patent. 44 
These revisions make it clear that countries of the Convention Union are 
permitted to take the following steps under their national laws to prevent patent 
abuses: 
-grant compulsory licences on the ground of failure to work or insufficient working 
shall be "non-exclusive" and "non-transferable", 45 and after the expiration of three 
or four years; 
- revoke patents after the lapse of two years from the granting of first compulsory 
licence when such licence has been found to be insufficient to curb patent abuses; and 
- give to the patentee an opportunity to avoid the consequences of non-working of his 
patent if he shows that he had legitimate reasons for his inaction. 
41 Ibid, para. 2. 
42 Ibid. The legitimate reasons may be based on the existence of legal, economic or technical barriers 
to utilisation, or sufficient utilization of the patented technology in the concerned country. See 
Bodenhausen, op. cit., note 4, p. 73. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Article 5(l). 
45 It may be recalled that before the Lisbon Conference of 1958 it was possible for member States 
to grant exclusive non-voluntary licences on the ground of failure to work or insufficient working. 
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As a result of these requirements, the grant of compulsory licences became the 
major measure to combat the non-working or insufficient working of patents and other 
safeguards such as revocation or forfeiture on those grounds became subsidiary 
measures. 
46 
With every revision conference, as was examined above, more restrictions have 
been placed on the freedom of member States against non-working. However, any 
country that is a party to the Convention is not bound to ratify the amended 
Convention. The old text remains in force, thus, for those countries that have not 
ratified the new text of the Convention. Hence, at any given time there may be several 
regimes in effect depending upon the willingness of the members to ratify the latest 
revised text. 47 
(i) Permission to Legislate 
It should be noted that despite the provisions in paragraphs (2), (3) and (4) of 
Article 5 of the present (Stockholm) text of the Convention, the member States of the 
Convention have the freedom to "legislate" for themselves. The member States, as 
interpreted by the two Director Generals of WIPO, may provide for other types of 
compulsory licences or different remedies on other grounds: such as public interests, 
unreasonable terms for patent licensing, insufficient quantities of the patented product 
and when the patentee demands excessive prices. 
48 Such compulsory licences may 
46 Bodenhausen, op. cit., note 4, p. 72; Roffe, P., Abuse of Patent Monopoly: A Legal Appraisal, 
2 World Development, No. 9, September 1974, pp. 15-26, p. 23. 
47 As to the relations among countries not bound by the same Act, see Bogsch, op. cit., No. 17, pp. 
240-243; see also Lacina L., Problems of Conventional Relations Between Countries According 
to the Different Texts of the Paris Convention, Indj Prop. vol. 5,1966, pp. 257-263. 
48 The grounds are: 
1. where "the Public interest is deemed to require such measure" even in the absence of a claim 
of monopoly abuse- for instance, grounds such as public health, national security, national or Zý 
international planning and "dependent patents". If in these cases compulsory licence is granted the 
tirne-limit also can be disregarded; 
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be granted without any tiM_IiMitS. 
49 
If Article 5 is interpreted in this way, 50 the Paris Convention should be 
regarded as very flexible" because countries of the Paris Union, would have the right 
to take steps not only to prevent the abuse of non-working, but also to prevent abuses 
resulting from other transactions and activities of the patent holder. 52 This is 
particularly important for developing countries because one of the public interests is 
national economic development. 
The degree of flexibility under the Paris Convention, enables member states 
2. in cases of patent monopoly abuses other than failure to work or insufficient working. This may 
be the cases where the patentee although working the patent in the granting country: 
a) refuses to grant contractual licences on reasonable terms; 
b) imposes other restrictive measures which hamper industrial development; 
c) the patentee does not supply the national market with sufficient quantities of the patented 
product; 
d) and when he demands excessive prices. Bogsch, op. cit. note 20, p. 203; Bogsch, op. cit., note 
14, p. 52-53; Bodenhausen, op. cit., note 4. 
49 Bogsch has expressed the view that "in other cases of abuse (for example sale of the patented 
product -manufactured in the country- at an abusively high price or when a ground of public 
interest justifies such grant (for example public health, defence, development of national economy) 
compulsory licences may be granted without any time limits. " Bogsch, Ibid, 14, paras. 52-53. 
50 It is worth mentioning here that the interpretation of Article 5A given by the Director Generals of 
WIPO is not legally binding upon Convention Members. However, such interpretations carry 
considerable authority and are in line with the patent laws of some member States. For instance, 
Spanish Patent Law of 1986 which is claimed to be on the basis of the Convention consists of 
granting compulsory licenses on grounds of public interests at any time without any time-limit. See 
Casedo Cevino A., Obligation to Work and Compulsory Licensing in the New Spanish Law, 
Indus. Prop., vol. 26,1987, pp. 333-346. 
51 Kunz-Hallstein H. P., Patent Protection, Transfer of Technology and Developing Countries: 
A Survey of the Present Situation, 6 IIC, Max Plank Institute, Munich, pp. 427-455, p. 443. The 
huge economic, scientific and technological gap between the developed and developing countries 
requires that international accords such as the Paris Convention be flexible enough. The national 
industrial property laws, however, must bring about certainty in order to encourage investment, 
national or foreign, in R&D, innovative activities and transfer of technology. See infra Chapters 
Nine and Ten. 
52 Whereas the word "abuse" has not been defined in the text of the current Paris Convention, but 
it implies that the patentee has used the exclusive rights conferred by the patent in a manner which 
involves a disregard of, or damage to the interests of the public or the interests of competitors. 
Thus, the failure to work the patent which indicated as an example amounts to an abuse rather than 
a mere failure to exploit the invention. Ladas, op. cit., note 1, p. 528. 
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to adopt, in addition to granting of various types of compulsory licences, other 
national legal safeguards against monopolies and restrictive business practices. 
Member states have freedom to enact domestic competition and technology transfer 
laws with provisions prohibiting restrictive clauses in licensing agreements likely to 
impede competition and domestic economic development. Likewise, the 
implementation of appropriate controls and procedures for approval of industrial 
property licensing agreements is not regarded as a weakening of the international legal 
system of industrial property introduced by the Paris Convention . 
53 With regard to 
the non-working abuse and the act of mere importation of the patented invention, 
however, compulsory licences remain to be the main safeguard against such abuses. 
The interpretation of Article 5 given by the Directors General of WIPO, 
however, cannot easily be read into the wording of the Convention. Developing 
countries, therefore, called for including a specific provision in the Convention 
allowing member States to provide for other measures when overriding grounds of 
public interests justify such measures. 
53 Ladas S. P., Industrial Property as a Factor in Technical Development and Economic 
Progress, hidus. Prop., March 1973, p. 85. 
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11. The New International Economic Order and Revision of the Paris 
Convention 
After the Second World War, the course of events led developing countries to 
call for a New International Economic Order (NIEO). " In 1974, the Sixth Special 
Session of the United Nations General Assembly produced two important documents 
which paid special attention, inter alia, to the problems of transfer of technology: The 
"Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order' 55 and the 
"Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic 
Order. , 56 In the Declaration, the members of the United Nations solemnly proclaimed 
their united determination to work the establishment of a NEEO based on: "equity, 
sovereign equity, interdependence, common interests and co-operation among all 
states which shall correct inequalities and redress existing injustices, make it possible 
to eliminate the widening gap between the developed and developing countries and 
ensure steadily accelerating economic and social development and peace and justice 
for present and future generations. 07 
According to the Declaration, one of the basic principles of the NEEO should 
54 Developing countries, for instance, crit, clsed the world economic order that was intended to 
fiberalise trade among nations and to abolish national restrictions. They maintained that their 
economic and industrial development , vere not taken into account in the formation of such an 
economic order. Developing countries, therefore, demanded a mixed economic order -a mixture 
of market forces, general rules and discretionary interventions, whose prime purpose is economic 
development of developing countries. For a detailed account of the NIEO see Murphy C. N., What 
the Third World Wants: An Interpretation of the Development and Meaning of the NIEO 
Ideology, Int'l. Q., vol. 27.1983, pp. 55-76; Ferguson C. C., New International Economic 
Order, Univ. Illinois Law Forum, No. 3,1980, pp. 693-705; Horn N., Normative Problems of 
a New International Economic Order, J. W. T. L., vol. 16,1982, pp. 
338-35 1; Hossain K. (ed. ), 
Legal Aspects of the NIEO, 1982; Corea G., Need for Change- Towards the NIEO, 1980. 
55 United Nations General Assembly, Sixth Special Session, Res., 3201(S-VI) of May 1,1974 
(hereinafter called Declaration) 
56 United Nations General Assembly, Sixth Special Session, Res., 3202(S-VI) of May 1,1974. 
(hereinafter called the Programme of Action) 
57 See the Declaration Preamble. 
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be "aivino, to the developing countries access to the achievements of modern science t) I-) 
and technology and promoting the transfer of technology for the benefit of developing 
countries". " 
The Programme of Action was intended to make operational the principles of 
the NIEO through a wide range of measures. Part IV of the Programme of Action has 
been devoted to the transfer of technology issues. '9 In this regard, the Programme of 
Action recommended measures to improve the terms and conditions of technology 
transfer to developing countries by reforming the international legal and juridical 
framework governing the flow of technology in general and intellectual property rights 
in particular. 
Yet another important Resolution of the General Assembly of the United 
Nations regarding the transfer of technology to developing countries is: "The Charter 
of Economic and Duties of States. it6o The Charter, among other things, stated that, 
State has the right " to benefit from the advances and developments in science and 
technology for the acceleration of its economic and social development. , 61 
After the adoption of the Declaration and the Programme of Action by the 
United nations and following the adoption of another relevant ResolUtion62 the 
revision of the Paris Convention in favour of developing countries came to be seen 
as an important element in the establishment of the NIEO, which would contribute to 
the reform of the legal framework governing the flow of technology. 
58 See Declaration. 
59 The Programme of Action also called upon the international community to make all efforts to 
encourage the industrialization of developing countnes. The 
Programme of Action, Part 11, par. 1. 
60 United Nations General Assembly, Res., 328 1 (XXIV) of 12 December, 1974, reprinted in Int'l. L. 
Mat., vol. 14,1975, pp. 251-261. (hereinafter called Charter) 
61 See the Charter, Article 13. For a detailed account of the effects of the Charter see Mcwhinney E., 
International Law-making Process and the New International Economic Order, canadian 
Yrbk. Int'l L., vol. 14,1976, pp. 57-72. 
62 United Nations General Assembly, Res., 3362(S-VII) of September, 1975. 
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The United Nation Commission on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) -as 
one of the most active organs of the United Nations that pursuing the objectives of the III ZD 
NIEO- engaged in revising the Paris Convention; in drafting of an International Code 
of Conduct on the Transfer of Technol OgY63 ; and in drafting of the Set of 
Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive 
Business Practices. 6' 
(a) The Revision of the Paris Convention 
As was mentioned above, in the sixties, the effects of patents on the economic 
and industrial development of developing countries came under serious scrutiny by the 
General Assembly of the United Nations. Several studies were made and the reports 
attributed to patent protection a positive and necessary role in the flow of technology 
to developing countries and regarded it as useful in creating favourable conditions for 
foreign investment and for local innovation 65 . But, the reports also were critical of 
the basic principles underlying the existing international patent system and submitted 
proposals for a revision of the Paris Convention . 
66 
A frequent complaint of developing countries was that the Paris Convention 
and its successive revisions established standards of international patent protection, 
63 See Chapter Seven. 
64 See Chapter Six. As to the activities of the UNCTAD since its foundation in 1964, see Kislinal-nurti 
R., UNCTAD as a Negotiating Institution, J. W. T. L., vol. 15,1981, pp. 3-40. 
65 See for instance, UNCTAD, The Channels and Mechanism for Transfer of Technology from 
Developed to Developing Countries, U. N. Doc. TDIB/AC. 11/5 of 27 April 197 1; UN. Doc. 
E/3861/Rev. 1,1964, supra, Chapter Three, note 24, para. 276; see also Lall, Technology and 
Developing Countries: A Review and Agenda for Research, in Developing Countries in the 
International Economy, London, 1981, p. 137. 
66 UNCTAD, TD[B/C. 6/AC. 2/3, op. cit., note 24. Brazil which is the only develop"I", country that 
has remained in the Paris Convention since its inception, first raised the question ot'hi-m-ging, the 
patent system into line with socio-econoinic conditions of developing countries at the United 
Nations General Assembly of 1961. See UNCTAD, UN. Doc. 1, J3861/Rev. 1, Ibid. p. 35. 
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which were not geared to their domestic development needs. " Developing countries 
argued that the revisions of the Convention until then have tended to strengthen the 
rights of patentees and to tilt the balance in favour of industrialised producer 
countries. 68 
Developing countries maintained that the revisions were very weak on 
clarifying their obligations to safeguard the national interests of developing 
countries. 
69 Of course, it is hardly surprising, because the purpose of the revision of 
the Convention is to "improve" the system of the Union. 70 Developing countries 
generally put greater emphasis on their public economic interest as opposed to the 
private interest of patent holders, on more accountability by them, on absolute 
requirement of the actual working of patents, and on preferential treatment including 
extended period of priority only for local patent holders .71 For these reasons 
developing countries called for the revision of the Paris Convention. 
The proposed revision of the Paris Convention was influenced heavily by the 
technological and economic needs and aspirations of the developing countries. The 
statement of objectives in the terms of reference for the revision emphasised: 
- the establishment of a new economic order in the world in which social 
justice prevails and economic inequalities between nations are reduced; 
- the role of inventions in the transfer of technology and industrialisation; 
67 UNCTAD, Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on the Role of the Patent System 
in the Transfer of Technology to Developing Countries: U. N. Doc. TD/B//C. 6/8, Geneva, 1975, 
paras 14-110; see also U. N Doc. TD/B/C. 6/AC. 3/2, op. cit. note 14, p. 14. 
68 Cornish W. R., The International Relations of Intellectual Property, an inaugural lecture 
delivered in the East Room, Old Schools, University of Cambridge on 27 February 1992, p. 3, 
reproduced in Camb. L. J., vol. 52, March 1993, pp. 46-63. 
69 WIPO, Diplomatic Conference on the Revision of the Paris Convention, WIPO, Doc. 
PR/DC/INF/9,1980, p. 2. 
70 See Article 18 (1) of the present (Stockholm) text of the Convention. 
71 Kunz-Hallstein, The Revision of International System of Patent Protection in the Interest of 
Developing Countries, 10 IIC, 1979, pp. 649-670, at 649,650. 
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-a proper balance between economic and social needs of countries and the 
rights granted by patents; 
- the promotion of the actual working of inventions in each country itself; 
- the definition of the principal obligations and rights of the owners of 
industrial property rights to facilitate the transfer of technology from 
industrialised to developing countries under fair and reasonable terms; 
- the encouragement of inventive activity in the developing countries; 
- the improvement of the capability of developing countries in screening and 
controlling licensing contracts; and 
-the enabling of member countries to take all appropriate measures to prevent 
abusive practices in the field of industrial property. " 
72 The full text of Declaration of the Objectives of the Revision of the Paris Convention is as follows: 
1. The revision of the Paris Convention should aim to contribute to the establishment of a new 
economic order in the world in which social justice prevails and economic inequalities between 
nations are reduced. 
2. Industrial property, in particular as it relates to inventions, should constitute an element in the 
process of the transfer of technology and should contribute to the achievement of new 
technological advances. It should serve the goals of a new economic order, in particular through 
the industrialisation of developing countries. 
3. Thus, any new orientation in the industrial properlyfield, in particular any revision of the Paris 
Convention and the model lawsfor developing countries, should be undertaken taking into account 
inter alia the following objectives: 
(i) to give full recognition to the needs for economic and social development of countries and to 
ensure a proper balance between these needs and the rights granted by patents; 
(ii) to promote the actual working of inventions in each country itself; 
(iii) to establish the principal obligations and rights of the owners of industrial property rights; 
(iv) to facilitate the development of technology to developing countries and to improve the 
conditionsfor the transfer of technologyfrom industrialised to developing countries underfair and 
reasonable terms; 
(v) to encourage inventive activity in the developing countries; 
(vi) to increase the potential of developing countries: in judging the real value of inventions for 
which protection is requested; in screening and controlling licensing contracts; in improving 
information for local industry; 
(vii) to contribute to the building of the institutional infrastructure in developing countries designed 
to serve the above purposes, particularl 'v 
the modernisation or creation of industrial propertv 
office, technical documentation centres and information services at the disposal of national industry 
and national inventors; 
(viii) to enable member countries to take all appropriate measures in order to prevent abusive 
practices in the field of industrial propero,; 
(IX) in general to ensure that all forms of industrial property, including trademarks, be designed 
to facilitate economic development and to ensure cooperation between countries having different 
systems of industrial propero, protection. 
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Pursuant to these objectives a draft of basic proposals was prepared" and 
submitted to the Diplomatic Conference for the revision of the Paris Convention. 74 
Four Diplomatic Conferences for the revision of the Paris Convention were held from 
4 February 1980 to 24 March 1984, and the fifth one was supposed to be convened 
as soon as prospects existed for positive results. 75 
Some of the proposals with minor changes were approved but others, 
particularly Article 5A, did not receive the needed support to justify another 
diplomatic conference. It is worth mentioning that Article 5 has been the most debated 
and controversial provisions of the Paris Convention. It sets the minimum standards 
regarding the compulsory licenses and revocation of patents that the member States 
have to comply with and implement in their national laws. Penrose pointed out that: 
4. As far as revision of the Paris Convention is concerned, consideration is to be given to certain 
defined cases in which exceptions andlor correctives to the principles of national treatment and 
independence of patents, and preferential treatmentfor developing countries, should be allowed. 
5. One of the principal immediate and continuing tasks with regard to industrial property should 
be, by establishing within the Paris Union and by strengthening within WIPO special services for 
developing countries, to provide in the shortest possible time the necessary technical assistance 
to help developing countries to strengthen their scientific and technological structure, and to train 
their specialists. 
6. Consideration should be given to the question of equality of treatmentfor all existing fonns of 
protection of industrial property. 
7. International treaties within the competence of WIPO, in particular the Paris Convention, should 
beframed in the light of the above objectives, leaving a maximum degree of liberty to each country 
to adopt appropriate measures on the legislative and administrative levels consistent within its 
needs and social, economic and development policy. 
8. The principal lines of this declaration should be consideredfor incorporation as a part of any 
Preamble to the Paris Convention in order to redefine industrial property concepts in an effort to 
better meet the needs and aspirations of developing countries. See WIPO, Diplomatic Conference 
on the Revision of the Paris Convention: Basic Proposals, Doc. PRIDC/3, op. cit. note 34, pp. 7-8; 
see also Indus. Prop., 1976, p. 47. 
73 See Basic Proposals, Ibid., pp. 66-75; see also Indus. Prop. 1979, pp. pp. 243-276. 
74 See Indus. Prop., 1976, p. 213. 
75 WIPO, Diplomatic Conference on the Revision of the Paris Convention, (Fourth Session), Geneva, 
February 27 to March 24, (1984) WIPO Doc. PR/DC/57. The four Diplomatic Conferences were 
held as follows: the first from 4 February to 4 March 1980 in Geneva; the second from 28 
September to 24 October 1981 in Nairobi; the third from 4 to 30 October 1982 in Geneva; and the 
fourth from 27 February to 24 March 1984 in Geneva. 
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"these provisions have had a turbulent history because they touch directly on the 
conflict between the interests of the national economy as a whole and the interest of 
the individual patentee in obtaining the maximum return from his patent". " 
The proposed Article 5A is much longer with more provisions than the 
Stockholm (present) text. In the proposed Article 5A several demands of developing 
countries have been expressed. For example, it emphasises and makes clear that 
importation "does not constitute working of the patented invention". " Countries of 
the Union have the right to provide in their national laws for possibility of 
exploitation, "at any time" of the patented invention where such exploitation is in "the 
public interest. , 78 Countries of the Union may grant "exclusive non-voluntary 
licences in special cases where such exclusive licences are necessary to ensure local 
working" . 
71 Paragraph (8) of the proposed Article 5A dealing with non-working or 
insufficient working which can be applied only by developing countries: they have the 
right to forfeit or revoke any patented invention that is not worked, or is not 
80 sufficiently worked in the country. Countries of the Union have the right to adopt 
legislative measures to prevent abuses resulting from the exercising of the rights 
granted by the patent. 81 
After almost 10 years of preparatory work and tense negotiations, although 
industrial countries had succeeded to modify the draft proposal and to put some 
76 Cited from UN. Doe. E/3861/Rev. 1,1964, op. cit. note 65, para. 327. See also Ladas, note 1, p. 
519. He observed that the history of this article is, in a sense, the history of the Paris Union. Ibid. 
77 Basic Proposals, op. cit. note 72, p. 59, para. (1)(b). 
78 Ibid, para. (6). Public interest includes, "national security, nutrition, health or the development of 
other vital sectors of the national economy". Ibid. 
79 lbid, para. 
80 lbid, para. (8)(b). 
81 Basic Proposals, par. 2(b). 
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restrictions for granting an exclusive non-voluntary licence in the text, " the proposals 
of the developing countries eventually were not accepted and no revised version of the 
Paris Convention has been adopted. 
The Group B countries" argued that the possibility of granting exclusive non- 
voluntary licences should not be given to the Paris Convention. 84 They reasoned that 
the exclusive non-voluntary licence would be a measure more radical than forfeiture, 
because if the patent was forfeited, the patentee like anybody else could use the 
invention but when an exclusive non-voluntary licence was granted the patentee also 
could not use his invention. 85 
On the other hand, developing countries believed that in certain cases granting 
of exclusive non-voluntary licences is necessary. For instance, a patentee, which might 
be a powerful Transnational Corporation, would be in a position to compete with the 
non-voluntary licence and could face the latter out from the market. 86 Accordingly, 
while developing countries placed significant value for the granting of exclusive non- 
82 The industrialised countries proposed paragraph 8(abis) and reluctantly was accepted by developing 
countries. The paragraph reads as follows: "However, a non-voluntary licence may be exclusive 
for a period of up to four and a half years in the case where it is determined by the national 
authority, competent to grant non-voluntary licences, that there are circumstances constituting abuse 
of a patent right and that the non-working or insufficient working is one of the constituent elements 
of the abuse, subject to a condition that the patent may not be forfeited or revoked for non-working 
or insufficient working for a further period of eighteen months after the expiration of the exclusive 
licence. " For the various proposals of Article 5 and 5quarter, see WIPO Doc. No. PR/DC/lNF/ 5 1, 
1984. 
83 It is worth mentioning that according to the standard practice of the United Nations for conducting 
negotiations and debates, counties were classified into three main groups of States: Group B, 
consisting of the OECD countries; Group D, consisting of the former socialist countries of Eastern 
Europe; and Group of 77, consisting of the developing countries of Africa, Asia and Latin 
America. 
84 WIPO, Diplomatic Conference on the Revision of the Paris Convention, (Geneva, February 4 
to March 4,1980): Final Summary Minutes, Doc. PR/SM/3 of 12 September 1983, pp. 90-95. 
According to the Basic Proposal, the possibility of granting exclusive non-voluntary licences would 
be for all member States in special cases where exclusive licences were necessary to ensure local 
working. Basic Proposal, op. cit. note 72, para. 6. 
85 Ibid. 
86 UNCTAD, TD/BC. 6/16, op. cit., note 23, pp. 20-25. 
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voluntary licences and made enormous efforts to preserve such a right for themselves, 
industrialised countries in particular the United States of America maintained that the 
application of such a right, even with the certain restrictions provided in the paragraph 
8(abis), is regarded as confiscation of private property and deprives the inventor of his 
individual right. " 
The replacement of principle of unanimity for revising the Paris Convention 
by a principle of qualified majority was another basic reason for frustrating the 
protracted attempt to revise the Paris Convention. 88 Traditionally, all provisions of 
the Convention were adopted on the basis of unanimous vote. Developing countries 
at the first session of the Diplomatic Conference argued that the Paris Convention 
itself does not provide for the requirement of unanimity . 
89 They stated that the 
unanimity principle was an outdated-nineteenth Century phenomenon. 90 
Developing countries found it unfair to allow a member State of the Union to 
prevent the revision of the Convention. 9' Accordingly they proposed that the revised 
text of the Convention should be adopted by majority of two-thirds. This proposal also 
was not accepted by the Group B countries, particularly, the United States. " 
In sum, the industrialised countries concluded that these changes eroded and 
weakened the international standards of industrial property protection and were 
87 Kunz-Hallstein H. P., The United States Proposal for Gatt Agreement on Intellectual Property 
and the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, 22 Vanderbit J. Trans. L., 
1989, pp. 242-64, p. 243. 
88 See WIPO, Diplomatic Conference on the Revision of the Paris Convention, Geneva, February 
4 to March 4,1980: Final Summary Minutes, Doc. PR/SM/3 of 12 September 1983, pp. 20-21. 
89 Ibid, para. 65. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid, para. 68. 
92 See WIPO, Diplomatic Conference on the Revision of the Paris Convention, Geneva, March 
4 1980, Report of the Chairman of the Committee of Nine -Rule 36(l), WIPO, Doc. PR/DC/14, 
1980. 
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inconsistent with the Paris Convention. They referred to the wording of Article 18 of 
the Convention which permits only revisions made "with a view to introduction of 
amendments designed to improve the system of the Union". " On the other hand, 
several years of negotiations made developing countries aware of the flexibility of the 
Paris Convention which allow them to shape their patent system in such a way as to 
enable them to achieve their technological objectives, without violating the Paris 
Convention. 
93 Ibid; Paris Convention, Article 18(l). 
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111. International Trade and Intellectual Property Rights 
General 
In the interdependent world of international trade, large companies find it 
necessary to have footholds in markets world wide. This is only possible if there are 
no barriers to international trade and access to the international market is available to 
all countries of the world. General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) entered 
into force for original signatories on I January 1948 to provide an international trading 
system based on open markets and fair competition. 
In the eighties, intellectual property became a trade issue and calls for free 
unregulated trade in intellectual property rights were resisted by the industrialised 
countries as a category of unfair trade. Consequently, in September 1986, when the 
GATT contracting parties met in Punta Del Este, Uruguay, to launch multilateral trade 
negotiations on goods and services the negotiations included Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS ). 94 Seven years later, on 15 December 1993 
the Uruguay Round was successfully concluded. 95 
The Uruguay Round established the "World Trade Organisation" (WTO) as the 
instrument to implement the agreements reached. GATT becomes a permanent world 
trade body covering goods, services and intellectual property rights with a common 
disputes resolution procedure. The intellectual property agreement in the Uruguay 
Round package is clearly a triumph for the industrialised countries. The industrialised 
countries succeeded in bringing the intellectual property laws of developing countries 
in line with the standards acceptable to the industrialised countries. Developing 
94 GATT Focus Newsletter, 1,1986. 
95 Final Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade 
in Counterfeit Goods, MTN/FA H-AIC, Article 27. (hereinafter cited as the TREPS) 
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countries are obliged to incorporate the decidedly strict rules of the international 
system in their domestic intellectual property laws. " 
(a) The Reasons for Addressing Intellectual Property Issues in GATT 
As has been examined above, in 1974 two important resolutions by the United 
Nations, 97 called for reforming the international legal and juridical framework 
governing the flow of technology in general and intellectual property rights in 
particular. Until 1984, therefore, immense efforts were made by UNCTAD and 
developing countries through piece-meal revisions of the Paris Convention to strike 
a proper balance between their public interests and those of patent holders. The failure 
to revise the Paris Convention largely reflects the conflict between demands of the 
developed countries for a stronger international patent system and interests of 
developing countries that view acquisition of technology as a fundamental to their 
progress. 
This experience according to Kunz convinced the U. S Government that further 
improvement of international protection of intellectual property should be made 
through a more comprehensive world wide forum: the multilateral trade negotiations 
of the GATT. 9' Putting aside the theoretical arguments, 99 the following are the main 
concerns of industrial countries, particularly the U. S, in their search for a stronger 
96 The accord is regarded as the most important international agreement on intellectual property in 
this century, Financial Times Tuesday, March 29,1994, p. 4. For a pessimistic view regarding the 
successful implementation of the TRIPS Agreement see The Economist, December 4,1993, p. 26. 
Professor Jagdish Bhagwati points out, such "compulsory liberalisation in areas such as intellectual 
property tends to yield disappointing results, because countries are less enthusiastic about enforcing 
rules imposed on them against their wishes than they are about enforcing ones they have adopted 
willingly. " Ibid. 
97 See supra, notes 55,56 and 60. 
98 Kunz-Hallstein, op. cit. note 87. 
99 As stated earlier while to most industrial countries the protection of intellectual property Is regarded 
as "a fundamental right comparable to rights to physical property", to most non-industrial countries 
the protection of those rights is regarded as an economic policy question "reflect a development 
strategy based on making technology available within the domestic economy at the lowest possible 
short-term price. " Gadbaw & Gwynn, supra, Chapter Three, note 27, p. 2. 
109 
level of international protection for intellectual property through GATT. 
It has been stated that the role of information products in international trade 
has increased significantly since 1948 when the GATT entered into force. This has 
changed the composition of U. S. trade. Between 1947 and 1986, U. S. exports 
containing valuable intellectual property (books, chemicals, movies, records, electrical 
equipment, and computers) increased from 9.9% to 27.4% of all U. S exports. '00 
Alongside this, the U. S. industries received more than $8 billion per year from the 
royalties of intellectual property licensing'O' Thus, there is a perception that U. S. 
competitiveness in such industries in world markets is dependent very much on a 
strong international intellectual property protection regime. 102 
Another reason behind involving the GATT with the protection of intellectual 
property is the issue of piracy by "free riders" and trade in counterfeit goods. This line 
of argument contends that improved international communications have created an 
international market-place and while companies seek to develop foreign markets for 
their protected goods they inadvertently create opportunities for unauthorised copying 
of those same goods'O'. In addition, the relatively straightforward and inexpensive 
technologies for the reproduction of audio and videotapes, and also radio and 
television broadcasts have increased the volume of pirated works. Furthermore, while 
the cost of research and development has steadily increased, especially in some high 
technology industries such as semiconductor industry, periods for obtaining a return 
of the investment have increased while at the same time product life cycle has been 
100 Ibid, p. 4. 
101 Katenmeier R., & Beier D., International Trade and Intellectual Property: Promise, Risks, and 
Reality, 22 Vanderbilt J. Trans. L., 1989, pp. 285-307, at 286. This amount is accounted more 
than six times of royalties that American industries paid to foreign licensors. ibid. 
102 O'Connor D. H., TRIPS: Licensing Challenge, Les Nouvelles, March 1995, pp. 16-18, p. 17. It 
has been argued that, many of the developed countries are increasingly investing in knowledge-base 
industries, therefore, "the further a country is involved in knowledge-based industries by definition, 
the more important intellectual property and its protection is to them. " Ibid. 
103 Gadbaw & Gwynn, op. cit., note 99, p. 4. 
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reduced. '04 
This also has led to entrepreneurs in the business of piracy of intellectual 
property rights, since copying a product saves the costs of research and development. 
As a result of the trade in counterfeited goods, U. S. exports of the genuine article to 
the world markets have suffered because importers prefer to buy the cheaper goods 
from pirate-entrepreneurs. 105 The U. S. International Trade Commission has estimated 
that unauthorised copying of U. S. products throughout the world cost the U. S. 
manufacturers more than $40 billion per year. 106 To deal with piracy and weak 
protection of intellectual property rights in other countries the U. S. Government during 
the Regan presidency decided to act unilaterally by enforcing the so-called Super 301 
trade law. 'O' Eventually, U. S. took the position that the Paris Convention and other 
present intellectual property treaties are not responsive enough and sufficient "to stop 
the extensive worldwide trade losses to world economies caused by counterfeiting and 
piracy". 'O' These problems, thus had to be addressed and determined in the context 
of a broader institution such as GATT. 
Furthermore, certain aspects of some new technologies such as computer 
software, semiconductor chips, and biotechnology prevent them from being fitted 
within any of the existing mechanisms for intellectual property protection. 
The increasing ability of other countries, including developing countries, to 
104 Ulrich H., GATT: Industrial Property Protection, Fair Trade and Development, in Beier F-. 
K., & Shricker G., GATT or WIPO? New Ways in the International Protection of Intellectual 
Property, lIC, 1989, p. 131. 
105 Standback W. A., International Intellectual Property Protection: An Integrated Solution to the 
Inadequate Protection Problem, 29 Virginia J. Int'l. L., 1989, p. 517. 
106 The United States International Trade Commission, Foreign Protection of Intellectual Property 
Rights and the Effect on U. S. Industry and Trade, , 1988, 
App. H, at H3. 
107 See Judith H. Bello & Allan F. Holmer, "Special 301": Its Requirements, Implementations, and 
Significance, Fordham Int'l. L. J., vol. 13,1989/1990, p. 259. 
108 Suggestion by the United States for Achieving the Negotlating Object've, GATT-Doc. 
MTN. GNG/NG II /W/ 14 of 20 October 1987. 
manufacture many goods which they previously imported and their growing capacity 
to penetrate distant markets for traditional industrial products has forced the developed 
countries to rely more heavily on their comparative advantages in the production of 
intellectual goods than in the past-'O' Accordingly, U. S. and other industrialised 
countries see the intellectual property rights protection under GATT as the best means 
to open the markets of developing countries which are beginning to compete with the 
industrialised countries which have much stronger capital formation power and 
technological capabilities, adequate infrastructure facilities, efficient transport and 
distribution system, and about 200 years head-start in experience of manufacturing and 
trade. 
(b) Developing Countries and Intellectual Property Issues in GATT 
Developing countries reacted initially with outright opposition. While they, 
notably Brazil and India, were prepared to examine the trade effects of counterfeiting 
goods, they resisted any extension of the GATT negotiations into an exercise to set 
standards of protection of intellectual property rights or to attempt to raise the level 
of such protection beyond that provided under existing multilateral agreements through 
further strengthening of enforcement procedures. They also pointed out the 
jurisdictional inadequacy of the GATT as a forum for a broad debate on intellectual 
property rights. "O 
However, the views of the developing countries were seldom seriously 
109 Such a shift in share of wealth from developed nations to developing nations has been recognised 
by recent estimations. According to O'Connor, "in 1990 the OECD countries accounted for 54% 
of the world GDP and that by the year 2010 they will only account for 38%. " O'Connor, op. cit., 
note 102, p. 16. 
110 Primo Braga C. A., The Economics of Intellectual Property Rights and the GATT: A View 
From the South, 22 Vanderbilt J. Trans. L., 1989, p. 250. 
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considered in the GATT negotiations. "' There were also perceptions among some 
developing countries that they would gain more market access for their agricultural 
and textile products, "' and that the strong intellectual property protection will attract 
foreign investment. "' Thus, the non-industrial member countries of GATT 
grudgingly accepted the GATT provisions. One also should not underestimate the 
"increasingly aggressive arm-twisting [pressure particularly through the Super 301 
trade laws] by the U. S. itI14 The Super 301 Trade and Omnibus Act calls for 
extraterritorial protection of intellectual property rights. The unilateral trade sanctions, 
therefore, may be exerted against countries that do not protect sufficiently the 
intellectual property rights. "' 
(c) New Changes 
The TRIPS Agreement addresses certain issues relating to intellectual property 
rights which are not covered by the Paris Convention. The Agreement provides for 
new high international standards for the protection of intellectual property rights of all 
kinds -including patents for processes and for products, for biotechnology and for 
micro-organisms, and copyrights for computer programs and integrated circuit layout 
designs- and for the protection of trade secrets. 116 
Mahatir Mohammed, Prime Minister of Malaysia was quoted as saying that: "in the new GA7T 
negotiations [Uruguay Round] developing countries were only listeners as if they did not exist. 
Business Times of koallalampor, August 16,1996, reprinted in Salam, Teheran, No. 1501, August 
17,1996, p. 1. (in Persian) 
112 See, World Health Organization, WTO: What's in it for WHO?, 1995, p. 10; Jackson J. H., 
GATT and the Future of International Trade Institutions, Brook. J. Int'l. L., vol. 18,1992, p. 
13, viewing agriculture and textiles as trade-offs for services and intellectual property rights. 
113 Jackson, Ibid. 
114 Financial Times Tuesday March 29 1994, p. 4. 
115 For a detailed account of the significance of the Super 301 Trade and Omnibus Act of the US see 
Judith H. Bello & Allan F. Holmer, op. cit. note 107. 
116 TRIPS Agreement, Articles 27 and 39. 
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This provision is one of the major concessions of developing countries. The 
Paris Convention did not commit its members to grant patent to all fields of 
technology. The selective exclusion of technological fields from patentable subject- 
matter was an instrument by which the members could protect their infant industries 
and reduce the transfer of national wealth to foreign patentees. ' 17 At the time the 
Uruguay Round started, a considerable number of developing countries did not confer 
patents to pharmaceuticals, plant varieties and computer software. 
The Patentee's exclusive right to import the patented product was 
recognised. "' But contrary to the doubts raised on this issue by some scholars, "9 
the TRIPS has not changed the position under Article 5A of the Paris Convention. 
Although Article 27 of the TRIPS provides that patents shall be available and patents 
rights enjoyable without discrimination and whether products are imported or locally 
produced", this provision should not be interpreted to mean that patentees may no 
longer be penalised if they do not work patents locally. 
The heading of Article 27 is "patentable subject matter", that is, what should 
be or should not be patentable and the grounds of discrimination recognised for refusal 
to grant patents. Article 27 also means that the fact that a product is imported or 
locally manufactured should not affect the right to obtain a patent. More importantly, 
neither Article 31 of the TRIPS on compulsory licenses, nor Article 32 on 
revocation/forfeiture -common penalties in many national laws against patentees who 
do not work their patent- makes any reference to the annulment or otherwise of the 
local working requirement. It is suggested that, since the consequences of changing 
117 Moy R. C., The History of the Patent Harmonization Treaty: Economic Self-Interest as an 
Influence, The John Marshall L. Rev., vol. 26,1993, pp. 457-495, p. 477; see also supra, Chapter 
Three, note 86. 
118 TRIPS, Article 28 (a). The Article reads: "where the subject matter of a patent Is a product, a 
patent shall confer on its owner the exclusive rights to prevent third parties not having his consent 
from the acts of: making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing for these purposes that 
product. " 
119 See for example, Reichman J. H., Implications of the Draft TREPS Agreement for Developing 
Countries As Competitors in an Integrated World Market, UNCTAD/OSG/DP/73, November 
1993, p. 8. 
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the patentees right to import would be far reaching, such a change would have been 
brought about by a specific provision. 
The Agreement further requires member states to protect products obtained 
directly from a patented process. 120 The introduction of process patent for 
pharmaceutical products has already been regarded as a cause of concern. "If a new 
and more efficient technique were to be invented for producing an off-patented drug, 
that process could be patented: the new product might then be in a dominant market 
position. 121 
There will also be certain limits on compulsory licensing of patented products 
by Governments. 122 The TRIPS subjects all compulsory licenses to conditions such 
as non-exclusivity, equitable compensation, termination on change of circumstances, 
judicial review, and restrictions on the exportation of the resulting products. 12' For 
the first time in the history of the international protection of intellectual property 
rights, trade secrets are protected from unauthorised disclosure 124 and patent 
protection has been fixed for a uniform term of twenty years. 125 
What is clear from the changes wrought by the agreement on intellectual 
property rights within the umbrella of GATT is that its high standards ignore the 
120 TRIPS, Article 28(l)(b). See also Article 34(l) that reverses the burden of proof in actions for the 
infringement of process patents. 
121 World Health Organization, op. cit. note 112, p. 36 and 37. 
122 TRIPS, Article 30 solemnly declares that states "may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive 
rights conferred by a patent, provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a 
normal exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the 
legitimate interests of the 
patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties. 
123 TRIPS, Article 31 (a-h). 
124 TRIPS, Article 39. 
125 Ibid. 
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technological and developmental requirements of developing countries. "' Even the 
principle of preferential treatment for least developed countries, which was a well 
known principle of GATT, has not been respected. Accordingly, the acquisition of 
foreign patented technology by developing countries through mechanisms other than 
imports or licensing agreements is regarded as unlawful and causes loss for foreign 
technology suppliers. 127 
The strengthened regime for intellectual property rights envisaged in the TRIPS 
Agreement will cost developing countries more in the short term 128 than possibly in 
the long term. This is mainly because developing countries are users rather than 
generators of technological innovations. Thus, the new high standards of TRIPS, at 
least in the short term, will mean for them: larger costs in the form of increased 
royalty payments to foreigners; the corresponding loss of investment opportunities in 
domestic research and development; increase in prices of products manufactured under 
licence or imported; greater dependence on imports in general; and significant 
administrative costs to legislate and enforce the TRIPS provisions. 129 
In the longer term, however, developing countries may have the opportunity 
126 The Director General of the WIPO has been quoted as saying that the WIPO did not have any role 
in the enactment of the TRIPS, and that in some aspects the TRIPS Agreement is not in conformity 
with the WIPO's objectives. Radjivis Centre, The Role of Intellectual Property in the 
Development Process, proceedings No. 5,1996, quoted by Miremadi T., TRIPS, Pol. and Eco. 
ETTELA'AT, No. 107-108,1996, pp. 140-149, at 148. (in Persian) 
127 This perspective is in conflict with the philosophy behind the protection of intellectual property 
rights that these rights are territorial in character and intended to promote competition. Professor 
Ulrich states that, "the GATT agreement was established to protect the competitiveness and 
technological lead of industrialized nations against losses by imitation through the imposition of 
standards on intellectual property protection that have been shaped by these countries according 
to their own needs. The inclusion of intellectual property rights in GATT negotiations, reinforces 
the monopoly of transnational corporations over science and technology. " Ulrich, op. cit., note 104, 
p. 151. 
128 See Sang-Gon Kim, Intellectual Property Protection Policy and Technological Capabilities, J. 
Int'l. Sc. Pol. Found., vol. 21,1994, pp. 121-130; Reichman, op. cit., note 119, p. 4-5; Emmert E. 
F., Intellectual Property in the Uruguay Round: Negotiating Strategies of the Western 
Industrialised Countries, Mich. J. Int'l. L., vol. 11,1990, pp. 1359-1362; see also World Health 
Organization, op. cit., note 112, p. 34. 
129 Ibid. 
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to gain if intellectual property protection provides greater incentive to foreign 
technology suppliers to invest and to license new and advanced patented technology 
to entrepreneurs in these countries. Likewise, familiarisation with the benefits of the 
system will possibly stimulate greater investment in local research and development 
activities, encourage local industries to develop their own intellectual property, and 
provide incentives to promote indigenous technological and innovative activities in 
developing countries. "O 
In view of the new changes mentioned above, while developing countries will 
under the GATT agreement enjoy the "most favoured nation treatment" and market 
access for their trade, they need to formulate their own approaches to minimise the 
adverse effects of the TRIPS Agreement. They also need to take nationally appropriate 
measures to enhance their technological development in a post-TRIPS environment. 
In doing so, developing countries should resort to all available instruments to check 
abuse of power of intellectual property right holders and to provide legal bases for 
maintaining some degree of domestic control over intellectual property policies 
consistent with the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement. 
(d) Mechanism to Check Abuse of Power Within the TRIPS 
It should be noted that the TRIPS Agreement itself insists that the 
Fr protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should 
contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the 
transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of 
producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner 
conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights 
130 See Evenson R. E., Intellectual Property Rights and the Third World, E. I. P. R., vol. 5,1983, 
pp. 330-334, at 331. 
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and obligations. " "' 
In fact, the preamble to the TRIPS states the following intentions: 
a) "To ensure that measures and procedures to enforce intellectual 
property rights do not in themselves become barriers to legitimate 
trade", whilst 
b) "Recognizing the underlying public policy objectives of national 
systems for the protection of intellectual property, including 
developmental and technological objectives", and 
C) "Recognizing also the special needs of the least-developed country 
Members in respect of maximum flexibility in the domestic 
implementation of laws and regulations in order to enable them to 
create a sound and viable technological base. " 
Members, therefore, should administer the intellectual property system in such 
a way that it achieves the above mentioned objectives: the system should stimulate 
promotion of technological innovation, the transfer and dissemination of technology, 
foreign investments, and strike a balance between the private rights of intellectual 
property owners and their obligations to the public. 132 
Furthermore, the TRIPS allows developing countries "in formulating or 
amending their national laws and regulations, to adopt measures necessary to protect 
public health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital 
importance to their socio-economic and technological development, provided that such 
measures are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement. " 133 These provisions 
131 TRIPS, Article 7. 
132 While developed countries are obliged to align their laws with the TRIPS within a period of one 
year after the TRIPS takes effect, developing, least-developed and former socialist countries may 
rely on the transitional provisions to delay the date when the TRIPS will become binding on them. 
In that time, some works or inventions would have fallen into public domain, giving freedom to 
use them free of charge, even when the TRIPS takes effect in such countries. Article 65. 
133 TRIPS, Article 8(l). It should be noted however that, Article 40 commits both sides to 
consultations concerning measures that adversely affect the transfer of technology, including abuse 
of intellectual property rights. 
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arm developing countries with legal bases for maintaining some degree of domestic 
control over intellectual property policies in a post-TRIPS environment. Accordingly, 
the internal system-checks of the TRIPS, such as compulsory licensing and 
cancellation, may be used by developing countries to prevent the abuse of power of 
a patented technology right holder. 
(e) Mechanism to Check Abuse of Power Outside the TRIPS 
It has been agreed in the TRIPS Agreement that "some licensing practices or 
conditions pertaining to intellectual property rights which restrain competition may 
have adverse effects on trade and may impede the transfer and dissemination of 
technology. " 134 In the same vein, Members may specify in their national law, 
"licensing practices or conditions that may in particular cases constitute an abuse of 
intellectual property rights. " 135 The TRIPS Agreement, therefore, empowers 
developing countries to adopt measures which are necessary "to prevent the abuse of 
intellectual property rights by right holders or the resort to practices which 
unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international transfer of 
technology". 136 
The most notable regimes for checking abuses outside the system are transfer 
of technology regimes and competition or anti-trust regimes. 137 The rationale for all 
these regimes seems to be that the ultimate objective of protecting intellectual property 
rights is economic development -including technological development, - promotion of 
competition and making more goods available at reasonable quantity and price. No 
134 Article 400). 
135 Article 40(2). 
136 Articles 8(2). 
137 See Chapter Five. 
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right , owner, thus, should be permitted to engage in a conduct which will frustrate 
these objectives. The regimes just mentioned will be discussed in more detail because 
of the trend in developing countries to rely on these regimes. "' 
(f) Adopting Hybrid Legal Regimes 
The TRIPS allows member states to devise intellectual property laws that 
exceed the requirements of prevailing international 
AA*91190 AA*AU AA 
ards. 
139 This empowers developing countries to adopt hybrid 
legal regimes of their own, to modify the incentive structures of their patent systems. 
As has been noted, many industrialised countries favoured such models at earlier 
stages of their technological development. 
140 Developing countries, then, should take 
advantage of this privilege by providing special incentives to encourage private 
investment in sectors targeted for rapid development. Among such instruments, 
innovation patents and utility models merit particular attention and have much more 
to offer by providing a limited monopoly for the teaching and adaptation of foreign 
technology locally. 
141 
138 Ibid. 
139 TRIPS, Article I (I). 
140 See supra, UNCTAD/ITP/TEC/18,26 December 1990, Chapter Three note 14. 
141 See Chapter Nine. 
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IV. Conclusion 
A detailed analysis of the Paris Convention and the TRIPS Agreement have 
been impossible given the constraints of space and the theme of this thesis. 
Nevertheless, a few points have emerged: 
To strike a balance of the interests of industrial property rights holders and 
the public interests, the Paris Convention wisely sets up certain minimum 
standards for the protection of industrial property rights of those enterprises 
willing to transfer technology to other countries. Under such standards, 
while the member States are restricted in using instruments such as 
forfeiture and compulsory licensing on the ground of non-working, they are 
allowed to adopt other types of compulsory licensing as well as other 
national legal measures as may be necessary or desirable in the public 
interests; 
Developing countries within the framework of the New International 
Economic Order failed to strengthen the patentee's obligation to work a 
patent locally. In fact, as Dr. Chandler rightly concluded, rigid patent 
requirements would discourage international transfer of technology to 
developing countries; 142 
While developing countries will, under the GATT agreement, enjoy the 
"most favoured nation treatment" and market access for their trade, they 
should resort to all available instruments, within and outside the TRIPS's 
system, to check abuse of power of intellectual property right holders and to 
provide legal bases for maintaining some degree of domestic control over 
intellectual property policies consistent with the provisions of the TRIPS 
142 Chandler, P. A., The Modern Revision of the International Patent System in Favour of 
Developing Countries: Analysis and Effects, Unpublished Ph-D thesis, Univ. of Southampton, 
1987; see also Beier F-K., Does Compulsory use of Patents Promote Technology Transfer to 
Developing Countries?, 12 EIPR, (1986), 363-365. 
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Agreement. This requires a close and structural links between patent and 
protection of competition institutions in developing countries; 143 
Ov) The compulsory licensing system established by the Paris Convention and 
the TRIPS Agreement seems to be not an efficient instrument to ensure 
working of patented inventions, particularly in those developing countries 
that are not able to work the invention effectively and economically without 
the patentee's collaboration in providing the needed technical know-how. 
Developing countries are empowered by the TRIPS also to adopt hybrid 
legal regimes of their own, to modify the incentive structures of their patent 
systems; 144 
(v) In a post-TRIPS era, the wise choice before developing countries is not 
overemphasizing the reform of international patent system. Rather they have 
to administer the patent granting system in such a way as to encourage 
innovative activities and competition and to prevent any abuse of power. 
(vi) Leaving aside other costs and benefits analyses relating to the membership 
of Iran to the WTO, 
145 
since Iran is and intends to be 
14' 
a party to the 
143 See supra, Chapter Two, note 26; and infra, Chapter Ten. 
144 This thesis suggests, among other things, the direct protection of innovations that encourage joint 
investment of foreign and national enterprises to utilise new technology for the first time in the 
country. In this regard, the foreign partner usually provides necessary technical know-how. See 
infra, Chapter Nine. 
145 In Iran those authorities supporting the membership argue that today reliance on a one-product 
economy has a risky future and Iran has to adopt an outlook economic policy to gain access to 
foreign markets for its non-oil products: WTO with its principles provide such a condition. See 
Ale-eshagh Y. -Ministry of Trade- Seminar for Examination of Legal Aspects of World Trade 
Organization, August 5 1996, reprinted in Ettelaat, No. 20835, August 12 1996, p. 7, in Persian; 
for a similar view see Kalantan, Agriculture Minister, Salaam, No. 1501, August 18 1996, p. 1. 
On the other hand, the opponents to Iran's membership to WTO point to unequal level of economic 
development of developed and developing countries and conclude that " GATT has targeted 
economic development of developing countries and with their membership they will loose their 
political independence as well and will become the second class members of the so called world 
wide village. " Thus, "for export products of a country like Iran its Northern and Southern markets 
are adequate. " Interview with Dr. Mousavi S. D., Sobeh, No. 52, April 30 1996. For an analysis 
of different views of Iranian authorities in terms of Iran's membership to WTO, see Tayeb A. R., 
Iran and World Trade Organization, Midd. East Exec. Rep., December 1995; In this regard see 
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Paris Convention and is determined to secure a foothold in the global 
market, 147 it is a good idea for Iran to join the WTO. The TRIPS 
agreement particularly as regards to the protection of technological 
inventions should not be regarded as a serious impediment for Iran's 
economic and technological development. 14' The country, however, must 
restructure and reform its legal framework relating to the transfer and 
promotion of technology. 149 
(vii) Developing countries, are left thus with designing their nationally 
appropriate legal framework so as to encourage inventive and innovative 
activities and at the same time to prevent patent abuses but within the 
framework of the Paris Convention, and the Trade Related Aspect of 
Intellectual Property Agreements. In this regard, the national patent 
administration would require a reassessment of its functions and duties and 
location within countries' general structure of administration. The proposals 
of this thesis furnish a workable starting point. "O 
also a 2000 page report published by the special committee for examination of the question of 
Iran's membership to WTO, Resalat, Mehr 30 1974, in Persian. 
146 A paper submitted by Dr Eftekhare Jahromi, the head of Iran's Legal Bureau, to National Seminar 
of Reviewing Industrial Property Rights in Iran and TRIPS in World Trade, Teheran, Dec. 
16-17,1996. 
147 In this regard see the Iranian Ministry of Commerce's views reprinted in Keyhan, No. 15769,21 
October 1996, Teheran, (in Persian). 
148 Fasih Marnani, S. M., Iran, GATT and Transfer of Technology, Ettelaat, No. 20597, October 
9,1995, p. II and No. 20609, October 23,1995, p. 11; Fasih Marnani M. S., Preliminary 
Examination of Effects of Iran's Membership to WTO with Particular Reference to 
Pharmaceutical Industries of Iran, Teheran, March 1995. (in Persian) The study was conducted 
for the Ministry of Health and Education. It was concluded that the present phannaceutical 
manufacturing system of the country which is heavily subsidised and regulated and produces 
mainly the so-called "generic" medicines is in contravention with the WTO's principles. The 
liberalisation of the system as well as the provision of an effective legal protection for new 
pharmaceutical products and processes to encourage private investment 
in R&D activities were 
recommended. Ibid. 
149 lbid. 
150 See infra, Chapter Ten and Appendix Two. 
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Chapter Five 
NATIONAL COMPETITION LAW AND THE TRANSFER OF 
TECHNOLOGY 
Another important obstacle faced by developing countries has been 
explicit restrictive clauses in technology licensing and other contractual agreements 
and implicit practices imposed by foreign technology suppliers that extract further 
concessions from technology recipients. In this regard competition or antitrust laws' 
are employed to eliminate or control such restrictive practices. This chapter uncovers 
the legal problems faced by developing countries in controlling the restrictive 
agreements and practices in arrangements between technology suppliers and recipients 
and between technology suppliers themselves. 
1. Overview 
In international transfer of technology transactions, there are restrictive clauses 
which directly or indirectly limit the recipients from the assimilation and diffusion 
locally of imported technology and which preserve control of technology in the hands 
It is worthwhile to be mentioned here that a common international name has not yet been accepted 
for such a law. It is called Antitrust Law in the United States; Competition Law or "regles de conc 
urrence"In European Economic Community; Cartel Law in Germany, Switzerland and Austria; 
Restrictive Practices Law in the U. K.; "droit des entents" in France; Anti Monopoly Law, and Law 
on Restraints of Competition in the legal literature; and Restrictive Business Practices in United 
Nations. In this study we use all of them interchangeably. 
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of the suppliers. 
2 Such clauses, when unduly restrictive, result in a substantial increase 
in foreign technology costs considerably beyond the direct payments made for such 
technology3; limit the effective absorbtion of technology by domestic firms and 
licensees'; and delay the development of indigenous technological capability of the 
5 
recipient countries. In effect, uncontrolled restrictive clauses in licensing agreements 
can be a danger to economic and industrial progress of developing countries. 6 
Therefore, some control over the restrictive business practices widely prevalent in 
international trade transactions, in particular technology transfer transactions, is one 
of the areas that has long been a subject of both national and international concern. 
Restrictive business practices may be used by technology suppliers individually 
in order to strengthen their position in a given market, or to monopolise and control 
a market. Such a market power may be also acquired when the practices are used in 
concert with other enterprises supplying similar goods or services, by agreeing with 
them to refrain from competing, dividing markets between themselves, patent cross 
licensing, or boycotting particular markets. These practices are much more common 
in international commerce in goods and services than in international transfer of 
technology agreements per se. This chapter analyses mainly those restrictions 
occurring mainly in vertical agreements between a technology holder and the 
2 Aguilar E. M., Restrictive Clauses: Good or Bad? in Marcus B. Finnegan and Robert 
Goldscheider, eds., The Law and Business of Licensing, New York: Boardman, 1977, p. 2B-98; 
Miller D. L., Panacea or Problems? The Proposed International Code of Conduct for 
Technology Transfer, J. Int'l. Affair, 1979, pp. 43-62, at 48. Brusick, P., The Restrictive 
Business Practices Set of Principles and Rules, The CTC Reporter, No. 24,1987, p. 41. 
UNCTAD, An International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology, U. N. Doc. 
TDH3/C. 6/AC. 1/2/Supp. I/Rev. 1 1975, pp. 2,34-37. UNCTAD and WIPO, The Role of the Patent 
System in the Transfer of Technology to Developing Countries, U. N. Doc. 
TD/B/AC/. 11/19/Rev. 1,1975, para, 378. RBPs have been defined as those that "directly or 
indirectly have adverse effects on national economy of the recipient country". UNCTAD, Report 
of the Intergovernmental Group of Experts on an International 
Code of Conduct on Transfer 
of Technology, U. N. Doc. TD/B/C. 6/1 1976, p. 23. 
3 Rafii F., joint Ventures and the Transfer of Technology: The Case of Iran, in Stobaugh and 
Wells (eds. ), Technology Crossing Borders, 1984, pp. 203-243, at 221-228. 
4 lbid, pp. 205-220. 
UNCTAD, Trade and Development Report, U. N. Pub., UNCTADfrDR/ 11,199 1, p. 189. 
6 Aguilar, op. cit., note 1, p. 98; Miller, op. cit., note 1, p. 48. 
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recipients in developing countries, irrespective of whether these restrictions stem from 
industrial property rights or other market power. 
Putting aside the political reasons for controls on technology transfer', other 
main causes for the extensive use of such restrictive clauses in the transfer of 
technology transactions' deserve to be considered. 
11. Intellectual Property Rights and Restrictive Business Practices 
(a) Restrictive Business Practices 
A principal factor causing the adoption of restrictive business practices in transfer of 
technology agreements arises from the nature of these transactions. Transfer of 
technology transactions are fundamentally different from the other commercial 
transactions: that is, unlike ordinary commercial transactions, where goods are sold, 
in technology transactions, technology is rented. The supplier of technology by 
incorporating restrictive clauses in agreements involving the transfer of technology 
intends to retain the ownership of knowledge as well as corresponding property rights. 
7 For the political dimension of the control of technology transfer see generally, Miller D. T., 
Political Struggles for Control of the International Transfer of Technology, unpublished thesis, 
Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusett, September 1979; see also, Kuruk P., Controls on 
Technology Transfer: An Analysis of the Southern Response to Northern Technological 
Protectionism, 13 MD. J. Int, l. L& Trade, 1989, pp. 301-329. 
8 According to a survey carried out by a group of Iranian researchers in 1980, the data on the 
restrictive clauses in technological licensing agreements reveal that over half of the agreement ( 
74 out of a total 108 samples ) include unfair contractual terms, see Rahnema Saeed, Foreign 
Licensing Agreements with Iranian Industries: A Study of Technological Dependency, (in 
Persian), Industrial Development and Renovation Organization Study Report, 1980, limited 
circulation, Teheran, Industrial Management Institute; for a similar studies in other developing 
countries see Vaitsos C. V., The Process of Commercialization of Technology in the Andean 
Pact: A Synthesis, Lima, Peru, October 1971. (mimeographed); Jinjoo, The Implementation of 
Laws and Regulations on Transfer of Technology, the Experience of the Republic of Korea, 
prepared by the UNCTAD Secretariat, UNCTAD/TEC/6/1990. 
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He protects his interests by controlling the use that the recipient makes of the acquired 
technology. 
In fact, legal rights that are granted to a technology supplier by intellectual 
property laws are used to legitimate the incorporation of a considerable number of 
restrictive practices in transfer of technology agreements. Studies carried out by 
UNCTAD on transfer of technology transactions in various countries have disclosed 
that, while industrial property rights generally and patents in particular are not 
prerequisites for the inclusion of restrictive clauses, restrictions are more common and 
generally more serious when they are based on industrial property rights. 9 Put 
differently, the absence of intellectual property rights particularly patents in licensing 
agreements makes the agreements more vulnerable to the control of authorities dealing 
with restrictive practices. Thus, a patent may be used to include abusive practices that 
otherwise would be exposed to more strict screening, not only by the public authorities 
but even by the licensee. 
The abuse of the rights for imposing restrictive business practices has 
deteriorated since, as noted above, the approach to international standards for the 
protection of patents switched from striking a balance between private and public 
interests to protecting the rights of the patent holder as the higher priority. In this 
regard, the presence of restrictive clauses in technology transactions might have more 
to do with abuse of the international patent system than with foreign ownership. 
The real problem is caused by the restrictions or limitations in agreements 
granting the licence that go beyond the scope of the patent rights and which attempt 
to control or restrain industry and commerce. Patent in such circumstances, may be 
considered to be in restraint of trade as similar restrictions in any other commercial 
contracts. Drawing a line between the legal and illegal restrictions, 
however, is not 
generally an easy task. As a matter of fact, the question of what 
is within or without 
9 The legal monopolistic character of patents help to legitimise a number of the abusive practices 
through the normal exercise of these fights. UNCTAD, The Role of The Patent System in the 
Transfer of Technology to Developing Countries, TD/BC. 6/16 Dec. 1975, p. 22. 
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the proper scope of the patent grant has been one upon which there exist both a 
substantial body of agreement and disagreement. 
Dominant Power of Technology Suppliers 
Another important factor encouraging the imposition of restrictive business practices 
stems from the fact that the transferor, usually a transnational. corporation, has a 
monopoly in the supply of the required commercial technology in the world market. 
In other words, the technology supplier has a very strong market or dominant power 
and has decidedly an edge in the negotiation of technology agreements. From the 
evidence based on a considerable number of reports and studies of international 
agreements of technology transfer, it is well established that transnational corporations 
have misused their dominant power in the market and imposed harmful restrictive 
business practices in agreements involving the transfer of technology to developing 
countries. 'O 
The concentration of market power in the hands of a few firms has long been 
recognised as detrimental for a county's economic and technological development. 
Consequently, the emergence and rapid growth of transnational corporations in 
national and world economy, despite their positive effects, have been a source of 
concern for both developed and developing countries. " 
10 See UNCTNC, Transnational Corporation in World Development: Third Survey, U. N. Doc. 
ST/CTC/46,1983, p. 169. UNCTNC, Transnational. Corporations in World Development: 
Trends and Prospects, 1988, New York, p. 184; UNCTAD, Report of the Third Ad Hoc Group 
of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices at its Third Session, U. N. Doc. TD/B/C. 2/AC. 6/10 
1977; UNCTAD, Control of Restrictive Business Practices in Transfer of Technology 
Transactions, U. N. Doc. TD/B/C. 6/72,1982; The Impact of Multinational Corporations on 
Development and on International Relations, U. N. Doc. E/5500/Rev. 1, ST/ESA/6,1974, p. 30. 
see generally also Nanyenya T. P., Technology Transfer and International Law, Westport, 
Praeger, 1980; Zaphirion G. A., Transnational Technology Protection, 40 Am. J. Comp. L., 
1992, pp. 879-889. 
U. N. Doc. E/5500/Rev. 1, ST/ESA/6, Ibid, p. 30; OECD, Competition Policy and Intellectual 
Property Rights, Paris, 1989; OECD, Declaration By the Governments of OECD Member 
Countries and Decisions of the Council on International Investment and Multinational 
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These large corporations possess and control three important elements of 
development, namely, technology, finance capital, and managerial and marketing 
skills. Coupled with their strong presence across borders, they have developed the 
ability to avoid traditional forms of economic regulation. Thus, it has been declared 
that transnational corporations control substantial shares of local and world markets 
and "engage in export market allocation, price discrimination and transfer pricing, 
place stringent conditions on the transfer of technology and patents, and enter into 
cartel agreements that reduce competition. "" There is also market sharing within 
transnational corporations, so that a particular subsidiary might not be authorised to 
export to certain designated foreign markets. Furthermore, such restrictive clauses are 
also quite frequent in joint ventures involving these corporations. " 
Such a market power creates superior bargaining power for technology 
suppliers vis-a-vis the recipient of their technology, particularly in developing 
countries. 14 As a result of this imbalance of bargaining positions, the objectives of 
Enterprises, Paris, 1976; see also Hymer, S. H., The Multinational Corporation: A Radical 
Approach, Cambridge, 1979. 
12 U. N. Doe. E/5500/Rev. 1, ST/ESA/6, Ibid. 
13 For an extensive discussion of dominant position of transnational corporations in the international 
marketplace, see UNCTAD, Dominant Positions of Market Power of Transnational 
Corporations, U. N Doc. TD/B/C. 2/167,1978. 
14 The weaknesses of the receiving country of which the technology suppliers takes advantage can 
be identified generally as follows: 
1. The lack of capacity to prepare a project properly, from the preparatory study to the economic 
and technological feasibility study and then to the engineering study; 
2. Lacking the technology for the project and information of alternative sources thereof; 
3. There is a lack of capital, which is usually offered by the technology supplier as a contribution 
to the equity and ... 
4. management liability is lacking or limited; 
5. Specific kinds of skilled personnel are not available; 
6. There is a lack of knowledge and skilled ability to purchase other inputs such as raw materials, 
components, equipments, etc.; 
7. The recipient needs access to the market of the technology supplier as an outlet for the product 
to be produced (in the case of exports)( the trademarks have an important role to play here); 
8. Even where there is a world market, i. e., many potential outlets, the recipient country enterprise 
lacks the marketing skills. 
9. There is a lack of domestic R&D designing and engineering capacity; 
10. The widespread corruption of the state -"soft state". 
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the transfer of technology are seriously affected by the presence of numerous 
restrictive business practices in transfer of technology agreements. 
(c) Law and Restrictive Business Practices 
Finally, it has been well established that those countries that have provided sufficient 
incentives for technology suppliers and at the same time have questioned the validity 
of restrictive business practices, have succeeded in controlling them to the benefit of 
the countries. This has been achieved through efficient, consistent and strong legal 
institutions which, among other things, encourage and maintain favourable conditions 
for investment, competition and economic and technological development. 
It must be born in mind that a natural priority for the owner of the technology 
is to prevent as much competition as possible in the market for his goods and services. 
In response, a large number of countries with different economic systems have 
attached great importance in their domestic legislation to providing for the control and 
elimination of restrictive conditions in licensing agreements. 15 At the same time, 
restrictive business practices have been the subject of intense international 
negotiations 16 held to study the feasibility of an international convention on antitrust 
or competition which could be used to control the excesses of restrictive business 
practices in international commercial transactions including transfer of technology 
agreements. 
For more details see UNCTAD, Technology Planning in 
Developing Countries: A Preliminary 
Review, TD/B/C. 6/30. 
15 See for instance, Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic 
Community, and the Commission Regulation of the Community, No 2349/84 of 23 July 1984 on 
the application of Article 85 (3) of the Treaty to certain categories of patent 
licensing agreements. 
See generally, Raybould D. M. and Firth A., Law of Monopolies: 
Competition Law and Practice 
in the USA, EEC, Germany and the UK, 1991. On November 8,1993, the European Economic 
Community officially became known as the European Union. For consistency, however, the terms 
European Economic Community (EEC) will be used throughout this thesis. 
16 See Chapter Six. 
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111. Action by Developed Market-Economy Countries 
In the leading industrialised countries, comprehensive laws and effective administrative 
and judicial institutions to control restrictive business practices have long been in 
existence. The main legal vehicle is the so-called antitrust law or competition law 
which lays down rules against anti-competitive conduct and abuse of a dominant 
position in the market. Restrictive business practices fall within the purview of these 
laws in addition to the laws governing commercial contracts generally. The advocates 
of a free and competitive market as an economic concept maintain that such a market 
alone can result in the most efficient allocation of a country's resources and lead to 
innovative and competitive industries which can produce the best product at the 
cheapest price to the consumer. " No intervention by the state is necessary other than 
supplying the rules to ensure a free and competitive market. Theoretically speaking, 
intellectual property laws add up to an interference in the market. '8 
Adam Smith, the author of The Wealth of Nations, has been widely regarded 
as the innovator of modern capitalism. 
19 According to him, the doctrine of laissez- 
faire is the key to the wealth of nations and applies equally to poor citizens of the 
20 
world as for the rich. Smith added, this is not because businessmen or capitalists 
would have it so, rather, it comes about as a result of competition, and businessmen 
everywhere are the enemy of the competitive process . 
2' Adam Smith followed that 
17 Browman W., Patent and Antitrust Law: A Legal and Economic Appraisal, 1973, pp. 1-3. 
18 For an interesting analysis of a free market economy see generally 
Buchanan J. M., Liberty, 
Market and State: Political Economy in the 1980s, 1986. 
19 The economic collapse of the Soviet empire, has 
drawn attention once again to the inherent 
inefficiencies of the "command economy". For the time being at least, Market capitalism appears 
to have triumphed. 
20 Smith A., Wealth of Nations, 1776, vol. I, Book 
1, Ch. 10, p. 2. 
21 Ibid. 
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It people of the same trade seldom meet together even for merriment and diversion, but 
the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to 
raise prices. "" Furthermore, "the interest of the dealers in any particular branch of 
trade or manufactures, is always in some respects different from and even opposite to, 
that of the public. To widen the market and to narrow the competition, is always the 
interests of the dealers. To widen the market may frequently be agreeable enough to 
interests of the public: but to narrow the competition must always be against it. tiD 
It was based on the above principles that Adam Smith labelled existing 
government intervention in the economy as the "mercantile system" and held out for 
free enterprise, free trade, and the free movement of people and goods within and 
between countries. Furthermore, it is believed that by enforcing competition rules 
without harming the freedom of contract and competition in supply and demand, the 
law can promote economic justice and distribute opportunities by controlling or 
abolishing monopolies. 24 Equally important is the political dimension of economic 
power. That is to say no one in a democracy should have power over the things that 
people want to buy or over their opportunities to work except under a rule of law 
passing by an elected Parliament. 
The U. S. Sherman Act of 1890 was the first law in an industrialised country 
to be enacted deliberately to guarantee a free and competitive market in goods and 
services. " The Sherman Act prohibits all contracts, combinations and conspiracies 
that restrains trade as well as monopolization and attempts and conspiracies to 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
24 For a thorough elaboration of law as an economic policy 
instrument see Daintith T., (ed. ), 
Comparative Perspective in Law as an Instrument of Economic Policy: Comparative and 
Critical Approach, 1988, particularly, pp. 3-55; see also Areeda p., Antitrust Analysis, 3d. ed. 
1981. 
25 The Sherman Act was reinforced by the Clayton Act in 1914, which prohibits certain potential 
restraints on competition by tie-ins, exclusive dealing, and mergers. 
In 1914, another Act was 
passed which prohibits unfair method of competition, and 
Acts 1936 and 1950, respectively 
prohibit certain price discrimination and some aspects of merger. 
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monopolize the market. Either the government or a private plaintiff may bring legal 
action against violations of the law . 
2' Besides civil antitrust suit for violations of the 
law, the government is empowered by the Sherman Act to ask for criminal penalties 
as well. A defendant convicted of a criminal antitrust violation may be imprisoned for 
up to three years and fined up to one million dollars. On the other hand, in a civil 
antitrust suit, a convicted defendant must pay three times the actual damages plus the 
attorney's fees and costs of the litigation. 27 
Moreover, the United States antitrust law may be applied to foreign restrictive 
business practices in agreements even where one party is a foreign subject. This 
extraterritoriality, however, is applied to those restrictive business practices that 
adversely affect commerce and export of U. S. goods. It is interesting to note that 
under the United States antitrust law foreign States damaged by restrictive business 
practices of the United States are entitle to sue for treble-damage when those 
restrictive business practices are contravening the United States antitrust laws. 
Governments of India, Iran and the Philippines, in 1977 brought the treble- 
damage suit in the United States for alleged price-fixing by six major United States 
pharmaceutical companies in respect of their sales of a broad range of antibiotic drugs, 
purchased not only by those Governments but also by their citizens. " Although the 
companies challenged the claims, the court subsequently decided that foreign 
governments had the right to seek treble damage in respects of goods they had 
purchased, since it held that a foreign government was a person within the meaning 
29 of section 4 of the Clayton Act. On the other hand the court held that damaged 
26 Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C. A., 1890, Sections 1-7. It is noteworthy that the number of private actions 
brought under antitrust laws of the United States has exceeded by ten times the number brought 
by the government since 1941. See Stelzer M. I., Private Anti-Trust Enforcement in the United 
States, 5 ECLR, 1985, pp. 285-357, p. 287. 
27 Sherman Act, Ibid., Sections 1,2,9,15 (a). 
28 Pfizer Inc. v. Government of India et al, 434 U. S. 308 (1978). 
29 Ibid. 15 U. S. C. Section 15 (1978). For a critical study of the 
Phizer v. India, see Parpal J. M. and 
Sneeden E. M., Standing of Foreign Governments to Bring Antitrust Suits: Congress 
Responds to Pfizer v. India, Harv. J. Leg. vol. 19,1982, pp. 253-85. 
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could not be sought by a foreign government for purchases made by its citizens under 
a "parense patriae" claim. 'o 
Articles 85 and 86 of the European Economic Community, also have 
established a comprehensive set of rules and precedents as regards restrictive business 
practices .3' Enforcement of the competition rules in the European Economic 
Community rests primarily with the Commission which has a broad powers to 
investigate and prosecute violation of the European Economic Community laws. 32 In 
contrast with the United States antitrust laws, among other differences, the European 
Economic Community competition rules do not impose any criminal sanctions for 
competition violations, but companies and individuals may be fined up to ten percent 
of annual sales . 
33 The competition law excludes non-member claims so far as no 
restriction has been placed on intra-States trade relations. 34 
(a) Antitrust v. Intellectual Property Rights 
Because of the fact that intellectual property laws and antitrust laws have different 
objectives in virtual opposition to each other, several points of conflict occur in their 
enforcement and they are sometimes very difficult to reconcile. While antitrust laws 
encourage and protect free competition in both supply and demand sides by 
prohibiting undue restraints, a patent law, for example, confers upon the inventor of 
30 Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 522 F. 2d 612 (8th Cir. 1975). The sovereign as "parense patriae" has a kind 
of guardianship over various classes of persons, who 
from their legal disability, stand in need of 
protection. See Whartons, Law Lexicon, 14th ed., 
London. 
31 Raybould D. M. and Firth A., op. cit., note 15; Frazer Tim, 
Monopoly, Competition and the 
Law, New York, 1988. 
32 Regulation 17/62 OT 1962,204. 
33 Ibid, Articles 15(2) and (3). 
34 See Quinine Cartel case, Re (69/240) [19691, OJ 
L 192/5; [ 19691, CMLR D23, D4 1; [ 19701 ECR 
66 1. Dreinger A., The Common Market Competition Rules, With Particular Reference to 
Non-Member Countries, 12 Int'l. & Comp. L. Q. 582 1963, pp. 584-585. 
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a new product or process the exclusive rights to make, use, and sell the patented 
technology. There is the risk that the patentee may abuse the right of exclusivity in 
an anti-competitive manner. This risk is greatest if the patent gives the patentee 
substantial market power or even a monopoly for a particular type of product. 
Therefore, the parallel application of competition and intellectual property laws 
requires careful evaluation and balancing of their underlying purposes in order to 
minimise potential conflicts and avoid frustrating the key objectives of either of these 
laws. 
A considerable number of articles and books have been written and many 
symposiums have been held to examine and clarify the relationship between the two 
fields of law. 35 Some scholars believe that both are closely related and share a 
common ultimate goal of efficient resource allocation by providing protection of the 
law for a free and competitive market in goods and services. The special character of 
that protection in the two cases, however, are different: industrial property law protects 
competitive accomplishments and the fairness of competition while antitrust law 
ensures freedom of competition by prohibiting restraints of trade and abuse of 
economic power. 
Professor Korah Valentine also regards intellectual property rights and 
competition as allies and not enemies: "If you perceive the transaction ex ante, before 
investment has been made in developing the technology, work or whatever, it is clear 
that.... we need protection from "free riders" as an incentive to investment in creative 
effort. Few firms would consider investment worth while unless each could 
appropriate the results. On the other hand, if the matter is perceived ex post, after the 
35 Browman, op. cit., note 17, pp. 1-3; Fox H. G., Monopolies and Patents, Toronto, 1947; 
Oppenheim, The Patent Antitrust Spectrum of Patent and Know how Licensing: 
Accommodation? Conflict? or Antitrust Supremacy?, 15 IDEA, 197 1, pp. 1,5; Kaplow, L., The 
Patent Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 Har. L. Rev., 1984, pp. 1813-92, at 81. 
Schlicher J. W., If Economic Welfare is the Goal, Will Economic Analysis Redefine Patent 
Law, The J. Prop. R., vol. 4,1992. A recent symposium held in the Institute of Advance Legal 
Studies in London on November 1,1993 entitled Intellectual Property and Competition Law: 
Changing Views in the European Community and the United States of America. The 
symposium was presented again in New york on April 15,1994. 
See Brooklyn J. Int'l. L., 1993, 
vol. xx, Number 1. 
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investment that led to the right has been made, the right can be seen only as a barrier 
to entry, since by that time incentives to investment have become irrelevant". 36 
Therefore, although antitrust law condemns restraints of trade and declares such 
practices unlawful, it recognizes the existence of intellectual property rights and the 
law governing those rights as a partner in meeting common economic objectives. It 
is submitted that such a coexistence is only possible and beneficial if the rights are 
utilized for the original and basic purposes of intellectual property law, namely, to 
promote innovation, encourage the society to become more creative, reward the owner 
for the time and effort he puts in technology which eventually benefits the country's 
economy, and do not go beyond these purposes or otherwise abused. 
It is apparent from the above that antitrust or competition law of the developed 
industrialised countries is applied to all commercial agreements and arrangements 
including transfer of technology through licensing and franchising agreements. The 
competition law in those countries is primarily concerned with restrictive business 
practices that directly or indirectly distort competition in the domestic market. In other 
words, legal systems of developed countries do not as a rule, deal with transfer of 
technology transactions as such. These countries, having a more or less equal level of 
economic development with trade among them evolving under normal market 
conditions, do not feel obliged to enact any transfer of technology specific regulation 
within their national legal systems. So for them transfer of technology transactions are 
deemed to be normal contracts, governed by the rules of civil or common law, 
particularly domestic antitrust law and the law protecting industrial property rights. 
Although for the developed industrialised countries that have secured about 
95% of world patents, such a complicated and elaborated legal machinery to control 
the misuses of patent rights seems inevitable and satisfactory, 
developing countries 
which are the main importers of foreign technology must adopt a system appropriate 
36 Cornrnentary of Korah Valentine in Changing View of 
Intellectual Property and Competition 
Law in the European Community and the United States of America, Brooklyn J. Int'l. Law, 
1993, p. 16 1. 
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37 to their peculiarities and needs. It is believed that, as a part of a package which will 
be introduced by this thesis, the best solution for the developing countries is the 
adoption of an industrial policy-based patent system which protects directly 
innovations rather than inventions. Such an innovation patent, as will be considered 
in detail later, unlike the traditional patents, cannot be easily misused and would bring 
market power for the small and medium sized enterprises which play an important role 
in the developing counties, and lead to a different structure of the market in 
technology where technology is transferred to developing countries more effectively 
on conditions appropriate to these countries. 
37 It is understood that about 550 persons are employed 
by the Antitrust Division of the United States. 
The European Economic Community employs about 270 persons to enforce the competition law. 
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Controlling Restrictive Business Practices in Technology Transfer 
Transactions - Non-Industrial Countries Approach 
Some developing countries also have attached particular significance to the elimination 
of restrictive business practices that are prejudicial to their economic and social 
development. Given the insufficiency of the classical law of contracts to govern the 
relationship between parties with an unequal level of development and bargaining 
power, international transfer of technology agreements came to be subject to a special 
law expressly enacted to govern such agreements. By the end of the 1994 about 40 
States had adopted special transfer of technology laws. " The underlying concept of 
the new laws is the fact that the market for technology is imperfect and enterprises in 
developing countries are in a clearly disadvantageous position vis-a-vis the technology 
suppliers who generally are located in industrialised countries. '9 
It is submitted that the existence of an appropriate legal framework which 
promotes a favourable and beneficial environment for the transfer, application and 
development of needed technologies is critical to successful technology development 
and long term technological transformation. As was considered above, the absence of 
such a framework has been one of the causes of the failure of industrialisation of 
Iran . 
40 The enactment of transfer of a technology law which prescribes the rational 
intervention of governmental bodies in the transfer of technology process is deemed 
38 Interview in Geneva by the author with Dr Assad Omer, the Transfer of Technology Director of 
UNCTAD, December 12,1994, UNCTAD, Geneva. Some developing countries which have 
introduced transfer of technology regime are; Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba 
Dominican Republic, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela in Latin America, Ethiopia, ghana, Nigeria, 
Sudan, the United Republic of Tanzania, Togo and Zambia in Africa, China, the Democratic 
People, s Republic of Korea, India, Iraq, Japan, Malaysia, Nepal Pakistan, The Philippines, the 
Republic of Korea, and Sri Lanka, in Asia; and Bulgaria, Greece, Portugal, Spain and Yugoslavia 
in Europe. Ibid. 
39 UNCTAD , 
The Possibility and Feasibility of an International Code of Conduct for Transfer 
of Technology, U. N Doc. TD/B/AC. /I 1/22, at 1,7,8,1974; see also Major Issues Arising from 
the Transfer of Technology to Developing Countries, U. N. Doc. TD/B/AC. 1 1/10/ Rev. 1,1974. 
40 See Chapter Two. 
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necessary to improve the recipient's position and to ensure that technology transfers 
take place on terms favourable to the recipient country. Under such regulatory 
regimes, transfer of technology agreements, are not subject to the autonomous will of 
the parties but are a matter of "public order" and national interests instead. 
A salient feature of these laws is the establishment of screening procedures for 
approval of agreements for the acquisition of foreign technology which must satisfy 
rules excluding certain types of restrictive clauses. Approval may be made subject to 
the deletion of restrictive clauses deemed unlawful . 
4' These regulations, have been 
patterned after similar provisions contained in the U. S. antitrust legislation, Articles 
85 and 86 of the treaty of Rome and provisions taken into account by the Fair Trade 
Commission of Japan. 42 These regulations contain: a general provision stating the 
principle on the basis of which particular practices can be found restrictive and 
therefore unacceptable; an illustrative list of practices; per se illegality of some 
restrictive clauses; a list of exceptions and pre-submission of agreements for 
43 evaluation of their anti-competitive clauses. Accordingly, the technology transfer 
laws also have placed emphasis on increased competition which is the concern of the 
competition law of industrialised countries as well. 
41 Roffe, P., Transfer of Technology: UNCTAD's Draft International 
Code of Conduct, Int'l. 
Lawyer, 1985, pp. 689-707, p. 691. 
42 See U. N. Doc. TD/B/C. 6/1 1976, op. cit., note 2, p. 22. 
43 UNCTAD, Restructure the Legal Environment: 
International Transfer of Technology, 
Common approaches to laws and regulations on the transfer and acquisition of technology, UN. 
Doe. DT/B/C. 6/91,1982, p. 35,36. 
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IV. The Validity of Restrictive Business Practices under Competition and 
Transfer of Technology Laws 
The question arises as to how these two sets of laws, antitrust and transfer of 
technology, deal with restrictive business practices. Although both competition rules 
and technology transfer rules have a common economic purpose, their approaches to 
solving restrictive business practice issues are influenced by different goals. 
Competition rules are aimed at using resources efficiently but transfer of technology 
rules are aimed at acquiring technological resources. To procure technological 
resources at the lowest economic cost some degree of competition would be necessary 
but not to the point that no technology supplier wants to sell. In the following 
paragraphs certain important types of restrictive business practices, incorporated 
frequently in transfer of technology agreements, will be considered from the 
standpoints of both antitrust and transfer of technology laws. 
(a) Grant Back Provisions 
Grant-back provisions in transfer of technology agreements oblige the licensee to grant 
back to the licensor any improvements and inventions that are made to the acquired 
technology. A close examination of the licensing agreements concluded between 
transnational corporations and Iranian firms before 1979 reveals that nearly in all 
agreements the Iranian firms were prohibited to patent any innovation of the 
technology. The Iranian firms were not free to licence or transfer any innovations and 
improvements of the licensed technology to a third party, but only to the licensor. 
Clearly enough, such provisions, particularly those which do not provide for any 
compensation, eliminate the transferee's incentive to 
do innovative activities to adapt 
and internalise the imported technology. There 
is less objection, however, to the grant 
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back provisions that are reciprocal and obliging all parties to transfer back additional 
knowledge for further technological progress-44 
While under a rule of reason test of U. S. anti-trust laws, grant-back provisions 
have been considered as valid consideration for the license, and pro-competitive so 
long as the original patent is in force '45 
in Germany and Japan, grant-back provisions 
are valid, provided that the existence of substantial reciprocity by the suppliers, 46 and 
in the European Economic Community exclusive and non-reciprocal grant-backs are 
objectionable. 47 
Most technology transfer regimes have prohibited unilateral or non-reciprocal 
grant-back obligations with a wide variation . 
4' The Andean Pact countries -except 
44 For instance see Philippines Technology Regulations, Rule V, Sect. I (c), Nos. 3 and 4, reprinted 
in UNCTAD Compilation of Legal Materials Dealing With Transfer and Development of 
Technology, 1982 U. N. Doc. TD/B/C. 6/81 (hereinafter UNCTAD Compilation). It should be borne 
in mind however, that, as was the case in Iran before the 1979 revolution, often the grant-back is 
not remunerated, and here the supplier has the advantage of securing access to all developments 
made by the acquirer, free of charge, without sharing his risks and contributing towards the 
acquiring party's financial burdens; see also UN. Doc. DT/B/C. 6/91, op. cit., Ibid., para. 139. 
45 Transparent-Wrap Machine Corp. v. Stockes & Smith Co., 329 U. S. 637 (1947); Antitrust Division 
U. S. Dept. of Justice, Antitrust Guide for International Operations, (1977), p. 44; for more 
elaboration of the issue see, Chevigny P. G., The Validity of Grant-Back Agreements Under the 
Antitrust Laws, Fordham L. Rev., vol. 34,1966, pp. 569-592; Cabanellas G, Jr. The 
Extraterritorial Effects of Antitrust Law on Transfer of Technology Transactions, IIC, vol 
10,1988, pp. 119-125. 
46 UNCTAD, UN. Doc. DT/B/C. 6/91, op. cit., note 43, p. 46, para. 140. 
47 The EEC Regulation No. 2349/84,0. J. Eur. Comm. (No. L 219) 15 (1984), Article 1 (10). 
"Pursuant to article 85 (3) of the Treaty and subject to the provisions of this regulation, it is hereby 
declared that article 85 (1) of the treaty shall not apply an obligation on the parties to communicate 
to one another any experience gained in exploiting the licensed 
invention and to grant one another 
a licence in respect of inventions relating to improvements and new applications, provided that 
such communication or licence is non-exclusive. " Ibid, 
(emphasis added) 
48 Brazil Act 015, Sec. 4.5.2.; Colombia Decree No. 1234, 
Art. 2; Nigeria, National Office on 
Industrial Property, Decree No. 70,1979, Sec. 6 (2) (d), reprinted in UNCTAD Compilation, op. 
cit., note 44; Mexico, Law on the Control and Registration of the 
Transfer of Technology and 
the Use and Exploitation of Patents and Trade Marks, 1981, Art. 15, reprinted in UNCTAD 
Compilation, op. cit., note 44. 
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50 for VenezuelP- have an absolute prohibition of grant-back. Others forbid them 
51 52 53 if they are exclusive, or gratuitous or onerous, or "inequitable". Countries 
such as India, Malaysia and Zambia have not even mentioned grant-back in their 
guidelines or legislations. 54 
(b) Field of Use Restrictions 
Limitations on the field of use occur when a patented technology can be used in 
several technological fields but its supplier authorises a limited or restricted use of the 
technology, declining to authorise all other uses of the technology and reserving some 
use for self-exploitation or exploitation by third parties. For instance, by restricting a 
licensee to the manufacture of a patented technology for use in homes, the licensor 
reserves manufacture for use in commercial establishments for itself or third parties. 
In such cases field-of-use restrictions can have the effect of market allocation. " 
Restrictions in the field of use of technology could restrain the recipient from 
49 Venezuela has recently enacted a general competition law. For more details see, De Leon I. and 
Garcia 0. E., Venezuelan Competition Law, Int'l. Buss. Lawyer, vol. 21, No. 10, (1993), pp 473- 
476. 
50 Andean Group, Decision 24 of the Commission: Common Regulations Governing Foreign 
Capital Movement, Trademarks, Patents, Licenses and Royalties, 197 1, reprinted in UNCTAD 
Compilation, op. cit., note 44. 
51 Philippines Technology Regulations, Rule V, Sect. I (c), Ibid. 
52 Nigeria, Decree No. 70,1979, Section 6 (2) (d), Ibid; Mexico, Law on the Control and 
Registration of the Transfer of Technology, Art. 15, Ibid. 
53 China, Law of Joint Ventures, 1979, Ibid. 
54 As to Malaysia see Guidelines on the Selection, Evaluation and Negotiation of Technology 
Transfer Arrangements, 1979; Government of India, Guidelines for Industries, 1982; Zambia, 
Act No. 5,1986, revising the Industrial Development Act, No. 18/1977, Ibid. cit. 
55 UNCTAD, Restrictive Business Practices in Relation to the 
Trade and Development of 
Developing Countries, reported by the [first] Ad Hoc Group of Experts, U. N. Doc. TD/B/C. 2/119, 
26 April 1973, p. 10. 
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extending his production to other goods which might be of great use to meet local 
needs or might have a greater chance of being exported. 
The treatment of field of use restrictions under antitrust and transfer of 
technology regulations differs. Antitrust laws generally consider valid those field of 
use restrictions that fall inside the exclusive powers derived from industrial property 
56 
rights. By contrast, while some developing countries regard such restrictions as part 
of the rights conferred by the industrial property rights as well, " under some 
technology transfer regimes field of use restrictions are not considered or considered 
only to a lesser extent to be part of the rights conferred by industrial property 
rights. 58 
(C) Tying Agreements 
Transfer of technology agreements frequently require the licensee to purchase all or 
certain additional unpatented materials, components or equipment exclusively from the 
licensor or from designated suppliers. " Of course, where unpatented and patented 
articles are used in close conjunction., and the two are technically compatible to assure 
56 For a leading case in which a field of use restriction imposed upon a 
licensee by a patent holder 
was not recognised as an anti-trust violation per se, see 
General Talking Pictures Grop. v. Western 
Electric Company, 305 US 124 (1938); see also German Act Against Restraints on Competition 
(1957); Commission Regulation (EEC) no 2349/84 of 23 July 1984 on the application of Article 
85 (3) of the treaty to certain categories of patent licensing agreements, 
Art. 21 (3). 
57 Colombia Commercial Code, 1971, Art. 557. 
58 Brazil, Normative Act No. 015, establishing basic principles and norms 
for the registration of 
contracts involving the transfer of technology and related agreements, 
Art. 2.5.2,11 September 
1975, reprinted in UNCTAD Compilation, op. cit., note 44. 
59 Rahnema S., Multinationals and Iranian Industry: 
1957-1979, J. Dev. Areas, 1990, pp. 293- 
310, at 301. 
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efficient operation or necessary to assure the quality of the patented product, such a 
tie-in is justified. 60 
Apart from such technical and justifiable grounds, tied purchase provisions may 
be used as a means for receiving compensation in the form of enhanced prices on tied 
purchases rather than royalty payments, due to tax or other fiscal considerations; and 
may be used to maximise profits by extending the contract beyond the rights he would 
normally enjoy under the system of industrial property rights. " This results in what 
is called overpricing of technology. Because, if tied purchase materials are available 
on the world market, both the recipient and third parties who are excluded by this 
provision from supplying it, are unable to make use of market opportunities. This 
tends to raise production costs and may have significant effects on import substitution, 
export diversification and the growth efforts of developing countries. As a 
consequence, most countries condemn tying provisions with limited specific 
exemptions. In this regard developing countries while prohibiting tied purchases, 
provide for some exceptions as well. " 
Both the U. S. and the European Economic Community competition laws 
condemn the tying of unpatented products to the grant of a patent licence. " 
However, a specific exemption from the prohibition on tying is found under the 
European Economic Community competition law when the tying "products or services 
are necessary for technically satisfactory exploitation of the licensed invention". 
64 
60 United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E. D. Pa. 1960). 
61 See U. N. Doc. TD/B/AC/. 11/1 9/Rev. 1, op. cit., note 2, paras. 372-377. 
62 Article 20(a) of Decision No. 24 of the Andean Countries; Philippines, Technology Transfer 
Regulations, Rule V, Sec. I(c) op. cit., note 44; see also UNCTAD, Control of Restrictive 
Business Practices in Transfer of Technology Transactions, UN. Doc. TD/B/C. 6/72 (1982), pp. 
36-41; UN. Doc. DT/B/C. 6/91, op. cit., note 43, pp. 49,50. 
63 Section I of the Sherman Act or Section 3 of the Clayton 
Act, op. cit., note 26; As to the 
European Economic Community, see Commission Regulation No. 2349/84, op. cit., note 74, Art. 
3.9 that asserts that block exemption is not applicable when licensee is included to accept further 
licenses that he does not want or to agree to use patents, goods or services that he does not want. 
64 Commission Regulation No. 2349/84, Arts. 2.1 (1) and 
3.9, Ibid. 
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The test that determines the validity of such restrictive clauses under the U. S. antitrust 
65 law is again whether the clauses create an anti-competitive market or not. 
Accordingly, in cases where the license relates to a new business with an uncertain 
future, and where the licensor guarantees the product manufactured under the patent 
licence a tying agreement may be tolerable. 66 Under German competition law, tying 
arrangements are illegal unless it can be proved that they are necessary for technical 
reasons. 67 
65 Section 3 of the Clayton Act, op. cit., note 26, as applied in 
Times Picayune Publishing Co. v. 
U. S., 345 U. S. 594 - 1953. 
66 United States v. Jerrold Elec. Corp., 365 U. S. 565 (1961); 
Joelson M. R., United States Law and 
Z---ý 
the Proposed Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology, 23 Antitrust Bull., 1978, pp. 
833-891, p. 885. 
67 See UN. Doc. TD/B/C. 6/72, op. cit., note 62, p. 37. 
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V. Challenges to the Validity of Industrial Property Rights 
(a) Conceptual Differences 
It should be noted that a more precise comparison between antitrust and transfer of 
technology laws reveals that their fundamental differences are based on their different 
conceptual approaches or objectives. As noted above, while the antitrust law of 
developed market-economy countries are primarily aimed at avoiding restraints on 
competition, " most regulations on transfer of technology enacted by developing 
countries are aimed at protecting certain wider interests closely related to the 
economic and technological development of the acquiring country. Moreover, this so- 
called "development test approach" "is based on the premise of the existence of de 
facto inequality in the bargaining position of the parties to transfer of technology 
agreements and, therefore, seeks to prohibit any practice that establishes a relationship 
of dependence or control over the productive, technological or marketing activities of 
the acquiring country". 69 
The approach of developing countries includes the prohibition of certain 
practices which have possible anti-competitive effects but, is clearly not limited to 
them. 'O In other words, they use the same legal means for different ends. That is to 
68 It is noteworthy that due to different social and political values in the EEC and the US they have 
had different competition policies. While both of them recognize the promotion of competition as 
the principal policy objective, the United States sees competition as the exclusive policy objective. 
For a comparative examination of the development of EEC and 
US law, see, Barry E. Hawk, The 
American (Anti trust) Revolution: Lessons for the EEC? ECLR, 1988, pp. 53-87. 
69 UNCTAD, UN. Doe. DT/B/C. 6/91, op. cit., note 43, p. 35, para. 102; see also UNCTAD, Control 
of Restrictive Practices in Transfer of Technology Transactions, op. cit., note 
62, p. 2. 
70 In the negotiations of the international antitrust law, the 
developing countries, based on their 
economic and developmental particularities, introduce the 
"development approach" for the 
evaluation of Restrictive Business Practices. They argued that the competition test criterion 
presuppose some sort of essential equality among parties concerned, which 
did not in fact exist. 
In this regard a representative from a developing country contented that, competition between 
unequal is a handicapped race. UNCTAD, Report of The 
Second Ad Hoc Group of Experts on 
Restrictive Business Practices, U. N. Doc. TD/B/600, TD/B/C. 2/166, TD/B/C. 2/AC. 5/6,8 March 
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say, the transfer of technology regulations are not necessarily incompatible with rules 
of antitrust law, though their concepts are substantially different. To take an example, 
under the transfer of technology legislation a technology transfer contract that contains 
a restraint of trade clause may be regarded as legal and authorised on the ground that 
looking at whole contract, despite its restrictions, is beneficial to the local recipient 
and social and economic development of the country. " 
Certain practices such as the use of natural resources, the adaptation of 
technology transferred to local conditions, and research for latter purpose, though they 
do not involve competition should satisfy requirements of the transfer of technology 
regulations. Therefore, the objectives pursued by developing countries are wider than 
those behind the competition policy for controlling restrictive business practices. 
To be sure even some developing countries such as Argentina, Brazil, 
Colombia and Mexico, which already have general competition laws, have enacted 
transfer of technology regulations to, among other things, control restrictive business 
72 
practices in the transfer of technology transactions. Indeed for countries which are 
still in the process of development and have ultimate goals of gaining technological 
independence and becoming economically strong enough to compete in the 
international market, it makes sense to first achieve development instead. According 
to Dr. Phillips, " any country which does not protect small, weak and fundless 
enterprises against having to compete within its own jurisdiction against technology- 
rich enterprises, but which the principle of international technology transfer, might feel 
that its own principles were ripe for reconsideration". 
73 
On the other hand, if neutral antitrust principles are applied in developing 
countries, they would face the problem of shortages of 
foreign technology as well. 
1976, p. 78. 
71 Cieslik J., An Overview: Practices in Third World, 24 Les Nouvelles, 
1989, pp. 162-175, p. 172. 
72 UNCTAD, UN. Doc. DT/B/C. 6/91, op. cit., note 43, p. 35, para, 
105. 
73 Phillips J., Some Thoughts on the Transfer of Technology, 
1981, EIPR, pp. 171-175, p. 171. 
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Pursuant to the competition rules, they have to declare invalid all agreements that 
contain restrictive clauses, though those agreements offer more advantages to the 
country. The importance of acquisition of foreign technology on conditions which are 
consistent with overall economic aims of the acquiring country has also been 
74 
recognised by the specialised international organisations. 
It is interesting to note that one of the major post-war legislation forced upon 
the Japanese government was the Anti-Monopoly law of 1947 which was modeled 
after the U. S. anti-trust law. The law was aimed at maintaining a free and fair 
competitive economic order in Japan . 
7' Given the post war economic and social 
circumstances of Japan, soon it was realised that such a general and neutral law was 
not capable of promoting the acquisition of needed foreign capital and technology. 76 
As a result, Japan pioneered the enactment of the transfer of technology law by which 
it controlled technology imports to promote the use of advanced technology, improve 
the terms, quality, price and appropriateness of technology licensing agreements and 
the bargaining position of Japanese firms, facilitate the diffusion of new technology 
and shape Japanese industrial structure. 77 
The Republic of Korea has also followed the same pattern. She controls 
restrictive practices in transfer of technology agreements through the application of its 
74 WIPO Model Law for Developing Countries on Inventions vol. II, Know-how, Examination 
and Registration of Contracts, Inventors' Certificates, 
Technovations, Transfer of Technology 
Patents, 1980, p. 37. 
75 Layton D. W., Japan and the Introduction of Foreign Technology: 
A Blueprint for Less 
Developed Countries?, Stanford J. Int'l. L. 1980, pp. 171-214, p. 180; see also Ariga, 
International Trade of Japan and the Antimonopoly Act, J. Int'l. L. & Econ. 1973, vol. 8, p. 
185. 
76 Layton, lbid, p. 182. 
77 Reddy N. M- & Zhao L., International Technology 
Transfer: A Review, 19 Research Policy, 
1990, pp. 285-306, at 291. 
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competition rules, using an approach which is, in practice, similar to that followed in 
its earlier technology transfer regime. " 
It is submitted that this departure from a broad antitrust law to a more specific 
one has been regarded as a lack of confidence of these countries in the ability of 
traditional antitrust legislation to overcome restrictive practices of transfer of 
technology transactions. According to Ebb, the antitrust laws of these countries seem 
to be relatively ineffectual because of "their sheer breadth of scope and occasional 
vagueness, taken together with a background of social, economic and political factors 
that has not hitherto made their implementation highly popular. "79By contrast, "the 
sheer narrowness in scope and the specificity of the mini-body of antitrust laws 
contained in the regulations governing transfer of foreign technology have helped 
create an atmosphere of earnest endeavour to implement and effectuate that body of 
law. , 80 
Another reason for the effectiveness of the transfer of technology regimes of 
developing countries in controlling restrictive business practices is the general cultural 
factor underlying such regulations which are aimed at protecting indigenous firms and 
consumers against transnational corporations. In fact, as Joelson bluntly contends, 
"many developing nations do not view rules of law against restrictive business 
practices as neutral instruments to promote the greatest possible economic competition, 
but as shields to protect their struggling economies from domination by transnational 
enterprises of the developed nations". 81 
78 Hyun, C. W., Legal Aspects of Technology Licensing in the Republic of Korea, Col. J. Trans. 
L., 1989, vol. 27, pp. 53-89, p. 53. 
79 Ebb, F. L., Transfers of Foreign Technology in Latin America: The Birth of 
Antitrust Law?, 
Fordham L. Rev., vol. 43,1975, pp. 719-732, p. 722. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Joelson M. R., The Proposed International Codes of Conduct as 
Related to Restrictive 
Business Practices, 8 L. & P. Int'l. Bus., 1979, pp 837-874, p. 847. 
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It should also be noted that there is a flexible framework of technology transfer 
regimes when dealing with restrictive business practices. Given the economic and 
industrial realities of developing countries, in addition to the detailed list of 
unacceptable provisions, the competent office is generally granted discretionary power 
to approve agreements with restrictive clauses when it would be in the national 
interest. 
The intent of such technology transfer regimes clearly is not the protection of 
competition per se, but regulation and control of international transfer of technology 
transactions through state intervention to steer the course of economic development. 
In other words, the objective of transfer of technology regulations is more from the 
context of economic development rather than from the point of view of competition. 
(b) No Competition Clause 
It is not uncommon that a licensee is required to refrain from challenging the validity 
of the patents and other types of protection for inventions involved in the technology. 
The imposition of such a restriction in technology licensing agreements seems to 
reflect recognition by licensors of the weakness of their patents and their desire to 
maintain certain restrictions which are only permissible under valid patents. In most 
cases a thorough novelty investigation is not performed in developing countries. 
Similarly, only a small proportion of inventions are disclosed efficiently in these 
countries. Therefore, when such a patented technology is licensed, the licensee will 
be frequently in a good position to question the legal validity of the patent in order 
to reduce the royalties and to discontinue certain restrictive clauses of the 
license. The 
inclusion of non-contestation clauses in technology agreements, thus, may affect the 
payment obligations of the licensee, weaken his competitive position vis-a-vis the 
licensor, and deter the promotion and diffusion of technology. 
82 
82 Mclean W. F., EEC-U. S Views on Restrictive Clauses, Les Nouvelles, 1990, pp. 82-89, p. 87. 
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Except Germany, " it seems that the countries that have enacted antitrust or 
transfer of technology laws consider non-contestation clauses relating to patents as 
restrictive clauses. In the U. S., in Lear, Inv. v. Adkins "a licensee was permitted 
to contest the validity of a patent, even though there was a clause in the license 
agreement to the contrary. In the same vein, an European Economic Community 
Regulation pointedly excludes non-contestation clauses from block exemptions. " 
Countries like Brazil have extended such a prohibition to trade marks as well. 86 
(c) Restrictions After Expiration of Industrial Property Rights 
The developing countries, which have enacted technology transfer regimes, prohibit 
the technology supplier from requiring payments for continuing the use of industrial 
property rights which have been invalidated, cancelled or have expired. 87 Competition 
laws of Germany, the European Economic Community and the United States also 
unanimously regard any payments after expiration of an industrial property right as 
unlawful. " Indeed this is the essence of the patent system that once a patent is 
expired its technical knowledge enters into the public domain to be used freely by any 
interested party, and any further payment obligations based on that patent should be 
discontinued. 
83 Germany, Act Against Restraints of Competition of 1957, Section 20(2)14. The law provides that 
"obligations of the acquirer or licensee not to contest the statutory privilege" are permissable in so 
far as these restrains do not exceed the statutory term of the privilege acquired or licensed. 
84 Lear, Inv. v. Adkins, 395 U. S. 653, (1969). 
85 Regulation No. 2349/84, op. cit., note 47, Art. 3.1. 
86 Brazil, Normative Act No. 015, op. cit., note 58, Art. 3.5.2. c (iv). 
87 See for instance, Brazil Industrial Property Code, (1971), Art. 30 (c), in UNCTAD Compilation, 
op. cit., note 44. 
88 The U. S. Supreme Court In this regard has decided that royalties from patents cease when the 
patent ends. Lear, Inv. v. Adkins, 395 U. S. 653 (1969). 
151 
An important question arises as to package licensing which contains a main 
patent with some improvement patents, whether payment obligations should cease 
once the main patent expires or continue until the expiration of the last or the 
if youngestil patent. While this question has not been addressed directly by the 
technology transfer regimes, some competition laws of developed market-economy 
countries have required an adjustment of payment obligations and other related 
restrictions. " 
(d) Export Restrictions 
From the evidence based on 23 agreements between Iranian enterprises and foreign 
partners, it was revealed that only in four cases the Iranian firms were allowed to 
export their products. 'O This restriction is extremely onerous to developing countries 
because most of them have limited home markets and cannot operate their industries 
efficiently without producing for markets abroad. Furthermore, the export of 
manufactured goods will encourage innovation of the products to compete in the world 
markets and yield larger returns on investments in technology in the long run. Most 
importantly, exports provide valuable foreign exchange to acquire more sophisticated 
technology. The countries also benefit from the foreign exchange earnings and the 
resultant improvement in the balance of foreign trade. 
89 Fikentscher, W., The Draft International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology, 
1980, pp. 137-140, at 104,105; see also EEC Fifth Report on Competition Policy, 1975, para. 
64. 
90 Daftari F. and Borghey M., Multinational Enterprises and Employment in Iran (Geneva: I. L. O., 
1976). Nine types of export restrictions which have been identified are: export restriction (general); 
global ban on exports; exports prohibited to specified countries; exports pen-nitted to specified 
countries only; prior approval for exports; price control of exports; exports restricted to specified 
products; exports permitted to or through specified firms only and exports prohibited of substitute 
products. UNCTAD, Restrictive Business Practices: Interim Report by the UNCTAD 
Secretariat, U. N. Doc. TD/B/C. 2/104/Rev. 1,1971, p. 19, 
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Export restrictions may indirectly raise the unit price of a product to domestic 
consumers because capacity of the industry is not sufficiently utilised to reap the 
benefits of economies of scale. Finally, the evidence available suggests that export 
restrictions tend to be not very significant in some of the traditional industries, such 
as primary processing, as compared to import-substitution and modem research- 
intensive industries, for example, chemicals and pharmaceutical which are potentially 
more dynamic and can offer greater prospects for export-based industrial isation. 9' 
Save exceptional cases in which export restrictions relate to intellectual 
property rights or to areas where the supplier himself is manufacturing or selling 
patented goods or where he has granted exclusive licence, other export restrictions are 
prohibited by almost all technology transfer regimes. 9' In the same way, the U. S. 
antitrust laws, the European Economic Community competition rules and the German 
Act against restraints of competition have prohibited export restrictions, except those 
cases where the technology supplier enjoys intellectual property rights in the country 
to which exports are made. 93 The above attitudes towards the export restrictive 
clauses, curiously enough, show the importance of industrial property rights as a 
means of expansion of foreign exports. 
(e) Parent-subsidiary Relations 
The technology transfer regimes generally do not provide for liability on the part of 
national firms for antitrust violations. While these regulatory regimes are aimed solely 
91 UNCTAD, UN. Doe. DT/B/C. 6/91, op. cit., note 43, p. 53, para. 154. The negative effects of 
export restrictions has received considerable attention in the literature on the subject, see for 
instance Major Issues Arising From the Transfer of Technology to Developing Countries, 
U. N., 1975, paras. 56-70. 
92 Brazil, Normative Act No. 015, op. cit., note 58; Argentina, Law No. 22,426 on Transfer of 
Technology, 1981, op. cit., note 44. 
93 Fikentscher, op. cit., note 90, p. 89. 
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at the foreign suppliers of technology, ' antitrust laws do not discriminate against 
foreign firms. Nevertheless, despite many similarities between the antitrust rules and 
transfer of technology regulations, antitrust rules are enforced differently in developed 
market-economy countries as compared to developing economies where highly 
developed markets do not exist. 
An important difference in the enforcement of antitrust and transfer of 
technology rules is the way in which parent-subsidiary relations are treated. Under 
antitrust or competition laws it is not believed that branches of a corporation can or 
should be forced to compete with one another. 95 These countries have adhered to the 
position exemplified in the decision of the European Court of Justice on the Sterling 
Drug-Centraform case that internal decisions of enterprises were not considered to be 
restrictive business practices, unless such decisions or transactions have an anti- 
96 competitive effect outside the ambit of the entities' relationship. Furthermore, a 
parent-subsidiary internal decision generally raise questions not of restrictive practices 
but rather of investment, tax or fiscal policies. 9' 
On the other hand, the technology transfer regimes pertain to the relations 
between the parent and its subsidiary enterprises as well. Government intervention is 
based on the fear of possible adverse effects of internal decisions or agreements of 
parent-subsidiary enterprises on the economic and technological development of the 
host country if they are not controlled. It has been well founded that a very substantial 
94 Ebb, op. cit., note, 79, p. 722. 
95 Raybould and Firth, op. cit., note 15, p. 209,212; Rissanen, K., The Special Needs of Developing 
Countries in the Field of the Transfer of Technology, Scand. Stud. L., 1983, pp. 141-162, p. 
153; UNCTAD, UN. Doc. DT/B/C. 6/91, op. cit., note 43, p. 8, para. 23. 
96 Korah Valentine, Competition Law of Britain and Common Market, London, 1975, pp. 57 and 
199; UNCTAD, U. N. Doc. DT/B/C. 6/91, Ibid. 
97 Report of the Third Ad Hoc Group of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices on its Fourth 
Session, U. N. Doc. TD/B/C. 2/AC. 6/13 (1978), p. 15. 
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international transfer of technology takes place within the framework of parent- 
98 subsidiary relationships. 
Studies conducted in various developing countries have revealed significant 
evidence of the weight of payments between parent and subsidiaries in the total 
amount paid regarding transfer of technology. In Brazil, for instance, 52% of the total 
country's payments were made in during 1965-1970 between subsidiary and parent 
companies in respect of royalty payments for technology. 99 Given the perception that 
technology licensing operations between parent and subsidiary enterprises are used for 
tax avoidance and for privileged foreign exchange remittances, the national technology 
transfer regimes generally provide a special screening procedure for licence 
agreements and limit or prohibit royalty payments between such companies. '00 
Indeed such provisions are totally unrelated to antitrust laws of developed market- 
economy countries. 
(f) Restrictions on Adaptations 
Another area of dissimilarity between antitrust or competition laws and the technology 
transfer regimes is prevention of the recipient from adapting the technology to 
domestic conditions or making improvements and innovations in the imported 
technology. "Adaptations may result in a higher utilization of local human and 
material resources, or in the production of goods more accessible to a large part of the 
population or more appropriate for local conditions ". 
'0' Given the significant role 
98 See Dominant Positions of Market Power of Transnational Corporations, op. cit., note 13, at 34-36; 
UNCTAD, UN. Doc. DT/B/C. 6/91, op. cit., note 43, p. 8, para. 26. 
99 UNCTAD, U. N Doc. TD/B/C. 2/167, op. cit., note 13, p. 30; Coffea C. M., Transfer of 
Technology in Latin America: A Decade of Control, J. W. T. L., 1981, p. 397. 
100 Andean Code, UNCTAD Compilation, op. cit., note 44, Art. 2 1; Argentina Transfer of Technology 
law, op. cit., UNCTAD Compilation, note 44, Arts, 2,5. 
101 UNCTAD, UN. Doc. DT/B/C. 6/91, op. cit., note 43, p. 45. 
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of adaptation in the process of transfer of technology, developing countries have 
attached particular importance to the elimination of those clauses that either restrict 
the adaption of imported technology, or require unwanted or unnecessary designs or 
specification changes in the technology to the extent that such changes may make the 
products more costly or unsuitable for the local demand. 102 
It should be noted, however that in some instances such as using the supplier's 
name, trade or service mark or trade name, and those that, if tampered with, 
unsuitably affects products and the process for their manufacture, the technology 
supplying party will have serious interests in maintaining certain standards or qualities 
in the use of the imported technology or with respect to goods produced by it. 
Therefore, developing countries are recommended to deal with such restrictions on the 
basis of rule of reason than per se illegality. By contrast, antitrust laws of developed 
market-economy countries have paid little attention to such questions. 'O' 
(g) Patent Pool and Cross-Licensing 
A patent pool comprises all modes and forms of cooperation between patent holders 
with different interests through cross licenses or assigning all patents to a trustee who 
in turn gives each member a license under the combined patents. 104 Patent pool 
members by deciding not to grant licences to third parties artificially reduce the 
number of alternative sources of new technology available to recipient firms, solidify 
the already superior bargaining power of the technology owners and enable them to 
102 For instances, Art. 37 (1) of Yugoslavia Technology Law, in UNCTAD Compilation, op. cit., note 
44; Rule V sec. I (c) (10) of Philippines Technology Regulations, op. cit., note 44; UNCTAD, UN. 
Doc. DT/B/C. 6/91, op. cit., note 43, p. 45. 
103 Fikentscher, op. cit., note 89, pp. 137-140; Joelson M. R., United States Law and the Proposed 
Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology, 23 Antitrust Bull., (1978), pp. 833-891, p. 866. 
104 Wood, The Validity under the Antitrust Laws of Cooperative Arrangements Among Patent 
owners, 28 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1966, pp. 221,223; Andewelt R. B., Analysis of Patent Pools Under 
the Antitrust Laws, Antitrust L. J., vol. 53,1984, pp. 611-639, p. 611. 
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fix prices, divide markets, erect quotas and impose conditions which they could not 
otherwise obtain if they were competing with one another. In other words, the patent 
pooling and cross-licensing arrangements may alter the structure of the technology 
markets by preventing access to new technological developments. 
In the United States, if patent pooling arrangements are used to exclude certain 
members of the industry, or to impose quantity, price, or quality restriction upon the 
members, or territorial allocations, it would be illegal under the antitrust laws. 'O' 
However, patent pooling arrangements may be legitimate, when it is ancillary to co- 
operative arrangements such as co-operative research arrangements. 106 In a case 
regarding a pool of oil cracking patents, it was held that, since the objectives of the 
patent pooling were to give the public the benefit of better technology, it was not 
objectionable under the antitrust law. 10' 
Unlike antitrust laws, transfer of technology laws generally deal with 
agreements concluded between technology suppliers and technology recipients - 
vertical agreements- and do not include provisions directly related to patent pool, a 
distinctive example of horizontal agreements between technology suppliers. Chief 
among the reasons is the perception that national legislation of developing countries 
is not in itself sufficient and may not be implemented effectively with regard to such 
restrictive agreements which are decided upon by enterprises located in other 
countries. Horizontal agreements, it is believed, should be controlled through 
international arrangements with the cooperation and support of related states. This will 
be considered in the next chapter. 
105 See Standard Sanitary Mfg v. United States, 226 U. S. 20 (1912); Hartford Empire Co. v. United 
States, 323 U. S. 386 (1945). 
106 UNCTAD, Draft International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology, as at the close 
of the Sixth Session of the Conference on 5 June 1985, U. N. Doc. TD/CODE 
TOT/47 of 20 June 
1985, p. 10. 
107 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U. S. 163, (1931). 
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IV. Conclusion 
This chapter shows the link between competition or antitrust laws and transfer 
of technology. It was noted that, terms and conditions of transfer of technology 
agreements, due to the weak bargaining power of recipient countries, are usually in 
favour of the technology suppliers. Among those terms and conditions, there have 
been several clauses that restrict the recipients from using the technology with some 
flexibility. Restrictive business practices in technology licensing agreements have been 
very contentious. These are terms and conditions that prevent full exploitation of the 
licensed technology by the recipients. While most industrialised countries regulate 
technology licensing agreements by antitrust law, developing countries apply specific 
legislation to deal with issues relating to transfer of technology. These two areas of 
law have shared some common approaches and applications, but they also differ in 
some significant respects. 
While some of the restrictive clauses in licensing agreements stem from the 
monopoly rights granted to patented technology, others are imposed because the 
supplier has a dominant position in the market or acts in collusion with other 
suppliers, and because there is lack of market information in the recipient countries. 
Little can be done with the cases of abuse in the absence of effective rules of 
international law. Since patent monopolies are granted by national industrial property 
law, the recipient countries have legislative power to at least minimise the adverse 
effects of those restrictive clauses. Therefore, some developing countries have attached 
particular importance to controlling restrictive clauses or behaviours imposed on their 
local recipients of technology through special laws to govern transfer of technology. 
Despite their different scopes and conceptual approaches, it was noted that the 
provisions enacted pursuant to the goals of transfer of technology regulations are in 
many ways and aspects similar to those embodied in antitrust 
law against restrictive 
practices. Both legal approaches tend to eliminate and control the restrictive clauses 
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in transfer of technology agreements as much as possible. For the antitrust laws 
to competition" is the criterion for the evaluation of restrictive practices, while for 
technology transfer regimes the criterion is economic "development". 
In practice, even those developing countries, which already have antitrust laws, 
control restrictive business practices in transfer of technology transactions under 
technology transfer laws. This is because of the effectiveness of such particular laws 
in dealing with the restrictive clauses of transfer of technology agreements. In fact, the 
general experience of controlling restrictive business practices through screening of 
transfer of technology agreements suggests that they can have a substantial impact on 
the incidence of restrictive clauses and an improvement in those countries' capacity 
to absorb foreign technology. 'O' At the same time, the improvement in formal 
conditions of technology agreements does not appear to have had any noticeable effect 
on the inflow of the foreign investment or on the volume of contractual technology 
transfer. " 
However, although the outcome of technology transfer laws in some non- 
industrial countries still need to be evaluated, what is apparent is that they are much 
more important in terms of practical implications for national technological and 
economic development of developing countries than neutral antitrust type legislations. 
Furthermore, as noted above, with the current trend towards the intemationalisation 
and standardisation of the rules governing the grant of industrial property, technology 
suppliers, mostly transnational corporations, would gain more market and bargaining 
power in developing countries than in the past. 
110 
108 UNCTAD Secretariat Report, The Implementation of Transfer of Technology Regulations: A 
Preliminary Analysis of the Experience of Latin America, India and the Philippines 
(UNCTAD/TT/32), Nigeria (UNCTADfff/74), Portugal (UNCTAD/TT/73), The Republic of 
Korea (UNCTAD=P/TEC/6), and Brazil (UNCTAD/ITP/TEC/15). 
109 UNCTNC, Transnational Corporations in World Development: Trends and Prospects, United 
Nations, 1988, New York, 1988, p. 185; Marton K., Technology Transfer to Developing 
Countries via Multinationals, World Economy, December 1986, pp. 409-426, p. 417. 
110 See supra, Chapter Four. 
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In the absence of a licensee-friendly patent system, there must be a special law 
to control restrictive business practices in order to prevent, inter alia, those restrictions 
which go beyond the rights granted by intellectual property rights. It is submitted that 
patent systems in general are abused mainly because of the almost complete failure 
of a legal system to control and limit private legal power under restrictive business 
practices legislations. Furthermore, in view of the weak negotiating position of 
domestic firms and because of the close-knit interrelationship between foreign parent 
companies and their subsidiaries in developing countries, these countries cannot in the 
long run, afford to do without appropriate measures to control restrictive business 
practices in transfer of technology transactions with foreign suppliers. It should be 
born in mind that, improved effectiveness of technology transfer regimes in controlling 
restrictive practices does not mean that the technology suppliers are not compensated 
adequately for their intellectual property rights. Rather, while those rights as well as 
the repatriation of royalties are respected and enforced, restrictive practices that are 
excessive and may frustrate economic development of the country are eliminated. 
It is in the light of such a conclusion that, it will be suggested that a 
developing country like Iran should devise a unitary legal framework in which while 
industrial property, particularly patents are granted and protected, the transfer of 
technology and antitrust aspects of granted patents are closely and meaningfully 
implemented as well. "' 
III See Chapter Ten and Appendix One. 
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Chapter Six 
INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION LAW AND TRANSFER OF 
TECHNOLOGY 
Although the developing countries through their national laws on the 
transfer of technology have minimised the adverse effects of abusive practices in 
transfer of technology agreements, their laws and regulations are valid only within 
their territories and countries. They are not applicable to those international 
transactions and arrangements which have adverse effects on their economic and 
technological development. In other words, developing countries for more effective 
action need supportive international laws as well. The question is whether present 
international competition or antitrust law is responsive to the technological problems 
and needs of a developing country like Iran. This requires an appraisal of the 
interaction between international antitrust law and transfer of technology. Therefore, 
in this chapter we will examine first international efforts for enactment of an 
international antitrust law. Then, the accepted law by the international community 
regarding the protection of competition will be analyzed to show its merits and 
demerits regarding the control of restrictive business practices in the transfer of 
technology agreements and arrangements. 
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1. The Havana Charter 
History of the Charter 
Since the foundation of the League of Nations in 1927, nations have attempted 
periodically to formulate international rules relating to the control of restrictive 
business practices in international technology transfer agreements. In 1948, attempts 
were made to devise international norms and principles in the Havana Charter' 
which was intended to lay down the foundations of a new trading system and create 
2 an International Trade Organization (ITO). The ITO was intended to guarantee, 
among other things, free but fair trade relations between members of the United 
Nations. For the first time in history, such an attempt was made through 
intergovernmental action to eliminate the abuses arising from the operations of 
international monopolies and cartels. 
The Havana Charter consisted of general rules and criteria governing restrictive 
business practices in international trade transactions. ' However, it did not pay 
particular attention to the restrictive business practices in transfer of technology 
agreements. Rather, like the European Community and U-S antitrust laws, the Charter 
The Charter was negotiated by 53 nations. It contains six agreements on: trade policy; cartels; 
commodity agreements; employment; economic development and international investment; and the 
constitution of a new United Nations agency in the field of international trade. The text of the 
Havana Charter has been reprinted in, Wilcox Clair, A Charter for World Trade. (World 
Affairs: national and international viewpoints), New york, 1949. The negotiation described in 
Fumish D. B., A Transnational Approach to Restrictive Business Practices, Int'l. Lawyer 
(1970), pp. 317-351. 
2 It might be worthwhile to recall that, at the end of the Second World War, the world order was 
designed to rest on three pillars: the International Monitory Fund as a world central bank; the 
World Bank for extending project loans to developing countries and; ITO for stabilizing and 
protecting primary commodity prices. From those pillars, the ITO was not adopted. The newly 
accepted World Trade Organization under the Uruguay Round of the GATT, to some extent has 
the functions of the International Trade Organisation. 
3 Chapter 5 of the Charter. 
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dealt with those international agreements and arrangements that restrict competition 
and have harmful effects on international trade applying equally to restrictions in 
4 technology licensing agreements and the contracts for the sale of goods. However, 
among practices that were regarded as harmful were those which prevent by agreement 
the development or application of technology or invention whether patented or 
unpatented. 5 Furthermore, it included the extension of the use of rights under patents, 
trademarks or copyrights granted by any member of the Charter to matters which, 
according to its own laws and regulations, are not within the scope of such grants, or 
to products or conditions of production, use or sale which are likewise not the subjects 
of such grants. 6 
Despite the fact that representatives of 53 countries accepted the Havana 
Charter and submitted it to their governments for ratification, the U. S. did not ratify 
it. Because of insufficient political will, the Charter was never adopted and the 
International Trade Organization was not established. Some sharp differences of 
opinion among the participants occurred in the negotiations of the Havana Charter. 
4 Chapter 4 of the Charter. 
5 Ibid. 
6 The Charter has enumerated the specific practices that would be regarded harmful and subject to 
complaint as follows: 
(a) preventing by agreement the development or application of technology or invention 
whether patented or unpatented; 
(b) extending the use of rights under patents, trade marks or copyrights granted by any 
Member to matters which, according to its laws and regulations, are not within the scope 
of such grants, or to products or conditions of production, use or sale which are likewise 
not the subjects of such grants; 
(c) discriminating against particular enterprises; 
(d) limiting production or fixing production quotas; 
(e) fixing prices, terms or conditions to be observed in dealing with others in the 
purchase, sale or lease of any product; 
(f) excluding enterprises from, or allocating and dividing, any territorial market or field 
of business activity, or allocating customers, or fixing sale quotas or purchase quotas; 
(g) any similar practices which the organization may declare, by a majority of two-thirds 
of the Members present and voting, to be restrictive business practices. See Chapter 5 
Article 46(3). (emphasis added) The list of RBPs, thus is not exhausted and the members 
of ITO would be able to include new types of RBPs in the prohibited practices. 
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They still exist in the negotiations of the UNCTAD Technology Transfer Code of 
ConduCt7 and merit mentioning here. 
Irreconcilable Differences 
Although there was a general agreement that something should be done about abusive 
restraints in international trade, there was no consensus as to whether cartels were 
harmful per se. There were countries which expected the Charter to outlaw cartels per 
se instead of merely setting up a forum for international discussion. ' The U. S., for 
instance, maintained the view that restrictive business practices were inherently 
detrimental to commerce, production and employment. Developing countries and 
Canada as consumers of cartelized goods and services and the net importers of foreign 
technology tended to support the U. S. views. ' They pointed out that restrictive 
business practices were to be judged by their form, not by their effects -rule of 
reason. 10 
On the other side of the spectrum, some countries argued that combinations 
and cartels functioned as one of the more useful and effective means of intelligent 
economic planning, subject to abuses in a few isolated instances, but on the whole 
benevolent in their effects. " They were willing to investigate international 
7 Davido J. Solutions for Remaining Issues in Chapter 4 Chapeau, in "Draft International Code 
of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology, " report and notes by experts on the outstanding issues, 
compiled by the UNCTAD Secretariat, U. N. Doc. TD/CODETOT/52,5 August 1988. 
8 Wilcox, op. cit., note 1, p. III- 
9 Furnish, op. cit., note 1, p. 324. 
10 Wilcox, op. cit., note 1, p. I 11. It should be recalled that the Rule of Reason approach refers to 
the legal practices in antitrust cases to consider the details of the case in question. With the per se 
rule, the reverse is the case, namely, if a particular conduct of enterprises is illegal per se, no 
further evaluation will be made. 
II Furnish, op. cit., note 1, p. 324. 
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restrictions and to take action against those that they found harmful, but not to commit 
themselves to the belief that particular kinds of restriction were inevitably or typically 
harmful 
. 
12 This viewpoint clearly prevailed in the draft, changing the restrictive- 
practices Chapter from an indictment of such activities to an endorsement with 
reservation. 13 
It can be argued that the weak position of developing countries in the 
international forum at that time, when world trade was controlled by the enterprises 
of the developed market economy countries, was another reason for the failure of the 
Havana Charter. If the Havana Charter generally and its provisions regarding 
restrictive business practices in particular had materialised, it would have established 
the basis for new and fair rules in international trade as regards commodities as well 
as technology transactions at the enterprises level. 
Although the International Trade Organisation was not established 14 , those 
efforts, however, spread the antitrust doctrine worldwide: encouraged enactment of 
legislation to control restrictive business practices in several countries, be it as general 
antitrust law, or particular to the transfer of technology agreements, 15 generated some 
positive impacts in the much later GATT negotiations regarding the effect of such 
12 Corwin D. Edwards, Control of Cartels and Monopolies: An International Comparison, 
London, 1967, p. 231. 
13 Timberg S., Restrictive Business Practices as an Appropriate Subject for the United Nations 
Action, Antitrust Bull. 1955, p. 410. 
14 It is interesting to recall that, in the latest meeting of the partners of GAIT, a World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) which is intended to fulfil some functions of ITO was established. 
15 Ladas considered the ITO as the precursor of the Rome Treaty which established the European 
Community. Ladas S. P., Patents, Trademarks, and Related Rights: National and International 
Protection, vol. 1,1975, p. 705. 
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practices at the international trade", and facilitated the UNCTAD Code of Conduct 
on Restrictive Business Practices. 17 
11. Efforts to Control Restrictive Business Practices in International Forums 
(a) The Work of the United Nations 
Within the framework of the New International Economic Order (NIEO) to restructure 
international political, economic and legal systems for furthering developing 
countries'economic and industrial development and their political autonomy" in the 
1970s, international antitrust issues again cropped up at the United Nations. 
Surprisingly, this time developing countries had initiated the formulation of 
international norms to deal with restrictive business practices in international trade 
transactions including those of the technology transfer agreements. 
To address the demand of developing countries in respect of the problems 
stemming from restrictive practices, two separate inter-governmental negotiations were 
commenced: one of them was in the context of the liberalisation and expansion of 
16 In 1960 contracting parties to the GATT agreed to consult with each other respecting RBPs on 
international trade. See GATT, Decision of 18 November 1960; Czako J. M., The Set of 
Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business 
Practices, 13 L. & Pol. Int'l. Bus. 1981, pp. 313-337, at 315. 
17 The Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive 
Business Practices ( hereinafter cited interchangeably as Set of Principles and Rules, RBPs Code 
or RBP-Set). U. N. Doc. TD/RBP/ CONF. /10/Rev. / 1 (1980); The text reprinted in 19 Int'l. L. Mat., 
(1980), p. 813 ; for commentaries see Oesterle D. A., United Nations Conference on Restrictive 
Business Practices, 14 Cornell Int'l. L. J., 198 1, pp. 1-55; Fikentscher W., United Nations Codes 
of Conduct: New Paths in International Law, 30 Am. J. Comp. L., 1982, pp. 577-604; Fidler 
D. P., Competition Law and International Relations, 41 Int'l. & Comp. L. Q. 1992, pp. 563- 
589; Czako, Ibid. 
18 See supra, Chapter Four, text accompanying note 54. 
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trade which sought to assist those developing countries wishing to develop domestic 
competition and to apply competition rules, and to contribute to more transparent and 
fair competition in international transactions. Likewise, necessary measures had to be 
taken into account to expand and diversify the export trade of developing countries. '9 
The negotiations were finalised and led to agreement on the Restrictive Business 
Practices Code which is currently in force. As in the provisions in the Havana Charter, 
the Code deals with restrictive business practices generally. 
Perhaps the most difficult issue of this agreement was a conceptual one. The 
question was whether to choose "competition" or "development" as the determining 
factor for the validity of a restrictive practice. Both sides to the issue advocated those 
norms and conceptions that exist in their national competition laws. According to the 
developed market-economy countries those agreements and arrangements which stifle 
competition are regarded restrictive and as a result, illegal. In other words, competition 
law principles should be applied for the evaluation of restrictive business practices. 
The developing countries, based on their economic and developmental particularities, 
emphasised the "development approach". They argued that the competition criterion 
presupposes some sort of essential equality among parties concerned, which did not 
in fact exiSt. 20 In the view of developing countries, injury to their industries, not 
injury to the competitive structure of an international or domestic market, should be 
the criterion for relief. 21 
19 UNCTAD resolutions 25(11), 73(IH) and 96(IV) 
20 A representative from a developing countries, contended that, competition between unequals is a 
handicapped race. UNCTAD, Report of The Second Ad Hoc Group of Experts on Restrictive 
Business Practices, U. N. Doc. TD/13/600, TD/B/C. 2/166, TD/B/C. 2/AC. 5/6,8 March 1976, p. 7-8. 
It is interesting to note that, such a proposition has recently been expressed by Mr Karel Van Miert 
the EC's Competition Commissioner. He warned that the US airlines companies "grew strong on 
the back of the world's largest and still protected market". EC companies deserve an equal chance 
to become stronger before the European market can be opened to full outside competition. He 
added, it would not improve competition to give US companies immediate access to the European 
market. Financial Times, Oct. 8,1993, p. 6. In this case "sauce for the goose is not sauce for the 
gander". 
21 Oesterle, op. cit., note 17, p. 17. 
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However, in a compromise, the Code defines restrictive business practices as: 
"acts or behaviour of enterprises which, through an abuse or acquisition and abuse of 
a dominant position of market power, limit access to markets or otherwise unduly 
restrain competition, having or being likely to have adverse effects on international 
trade, particularly that of developing countries, and on the economic development of 
these countries, or which through formal, informal, written or unwritten agreements 
or arrangements among enterprises have the same impact. , 22 
(b) UNCTAD Restrictive Business Practices Code (RBPs Code) and 
Technology Transfer Transactions 
The application of the RBPs Code to transfer of technology agreements raises 
interesting issues. The Second Ad Hoc Group of Experts convened to draft the RBPs 
Code excluded consideration of certain restrictive practices in technology licensing 
agreements which were left to be considered under the UNCTAD Transfer of 
21 Technology Code. One may argue credibly that while the RBPs Code does not 
make specific reference to the transfer of technology, a number of the Principles and 
Rules of the Code could be regarded as relevant to technology transfer, albeit in a 
general manner. Put differently, the division of labour with regard to consideration of 
restrictive practices between the RBPs Code and the Transfer of Technology Code 
does not mean that licensing agreements are necessarily outside the scope of the 
UNCTAD Rules on restrictive business practices. 24 
22 The RBP Code, op. cit., note 17, Section B, paragraph 
23 "The Group recognised that, patents, trademarks and other intellectual property fights frequently 
raised questions of competition and consumer protection. However, the Group noted that the 
questions of patents, know-how and trademarks, and any other RBPs relating to transfers of 
technology, were currently under consideration by the Committee on Transfer of Technology in 
line with the decision of the Trade and Development Board at its sixth special session. Therefore, 
whilst appreciating their relevance to its work, the group decided not to consider theses questions 
further". UNCTAD, Report of The Second Ad Hoc, op. cit., note 20, p. 21. 
24 Oesterle, op. cit., note 17, p. 38; Fikentscher, 30 Am. J. Comp. L., op. cit., note 17, p. 584. 
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According to the RBPs Code, enterprises should refrain from certain acts and 
behaviour in a relevant market when, through an abuse or acquisition and abuse of 
dominant position of economic power, they limit access to markets or otherwise 
unduly restrain competition, having or being likely to have adverse effects on 
international trade, particularly that of developing countries and on the economic 
development of these countries. " Consequently, at the vertical level, partners to 
patent licensing agreement at least in a typical situation are regarded as "potential 
rivals", and therefore should comply with the Set. 26 Likewise, horizontal agreements, 
such as cross-licences of patents between competing firms with additional elements 
in the agreements to fix prices or allocate markets, and also the refusal to license 
technology or license it only on disadvantageous terms to non-members of 
associations, can be regarded as violations of the Code. 
Despite the above argument, one should bear in mind that, restrictive business 
practices in the technology licensing agreements are widespread and peculiar. Unlike 
ordinary commercial transactions, where goods are sold, in technology transactions, 
technology is rented, thus, restrictive clauses are imposed to retain the ownership of 
knowledge as well as corresponding intellectual property rights. The RBPs Code 
apparently does not address the particular problems arising from such practices in 
technology licensing agreements. 
In conclusion, it was very important and potentially effective that a RBP-Code 
accepted by all developed and developing countries and supported by most major 
enterprises condemned certain acts and behaviour of enterprises as harmful for 
competition and the economic progress of developing countries. Further, within its 
institutions, information, expertise, encouragement and support for development in 
antitrust laws and antitrust enforcement have been provided for those developing 
25 The RBP Code, op. cit., note 7, part B, (i)(1). 
26 Fikentscher, 30 Am. I Comp. L., op. cit., note 17, p. 584. 
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countries without laws to control restrictive business practices and related 
experience. " 
However, while the developed market economy countries seem to be satisfied 
with the Code, the result was not exactly what developing countries expected. Many 
of the rules developing countries wished to write into the RBP Code did not survive 
the negotiations. For instance, although developing countries stressed that compliance 
with the Code should not be voluntary without any legal sanction, because there would 
be the problem of enforcing a moral code, the Code was held to be not legally 
binding. 2' The evaluation of restrictive business practices is based exclusively on the 
principles of the developed market economy countries7 competition law and the 
"development test approach" of developing countries was downplayed. 29 There are 
no strict rules prohibiting intra-enterprise restrictions or rules regulating transfer 
pricing. " The Code does not condemn the practice of export associations which are 
particularly very common in the developed market-economy countries. " 
The "rule of reason" as a standard for judgment of restrictive practices was 
accepted while developing countries preferred to leave the matter to national 
authorities to make exceptions, particularly taking into account the development 
interests of their countries. " Moreover, the RBPs Code concentrated on the classic 
"horizontal" offenses: price-fixing, market and customer allocation, and boycotts which 
27 Davidow believes that, at a minimum, "for those countries that are not yet ready for an antitrust 
law, the Principles and Rules establish at least their rights not to be the victims of misconduct by 
enterprises, a right that may be furthered by the publicity aspects of United Nations studies and 
meetings". Interview With Joel Davido, The CTC Reporter, No. 11,1982, p. 35; see also Fidler, 
op. cit., note 17, p. 563. 
28 The code is not a treaty, but a resolution of the General Assembly. According to Article 10 of the 
U. N. such resolutions are regarded as "recommendations to states". See Benson, S. E., The U. N. 
Code on Restrictive Practices: An International Antitrust Code is Born, 30 Am. U. L. Rev., 
1981, pp. 1031-1048, at 1031. 
29 The RBPs Code, op. cit., note 7, Section D. 3, DA. 
30 lbid, Section D. 3. 
31 lbid, Section B(109. 
32 lbid, Section D. 4. 
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are not proper subjects for licensing agreements. " Indeed serious anticompetetive 
effects can arise, especially when the licensor and licensee are actual or potential 
competitors. Accordingly the RBP Code is a liberal Code which most of its rules and 
principles are, all in all, consistent with rules of competition in developed market- 
economy countries. 34 
(c) The Failure of the RBPs Code 
In a ten year-assessment of the RBPs Code, although developing countries 
welcomed the advantages of the Code particularly its role in helping them to have 
national antitrust law, they revealed its inadequacy as well. Developing countries 
maintained that during the ten-year period, in many cases, the Code was infringed and 
that enforcement of the Code was not efficient. Accordingly, developing countries 
maintained that, enterprises should register their restrictive business practices. They 
reasoned that compared to regulations, laws and other obstacles to trade which must 
be notified to appropriate organisations such as GATT, and are, therefore, transparent 
to all trading countries, restrictive business practices of enterprises are either secret by 
their nature or not disclosed anywhere. In this regard, even a developed country such 
as the United Kingdom has experienced great difficulty in obtaining certain vital 
information as regards the activities of parent transnational corporations. " 
Moreover, developing countries argued that "not only had RBPs continued to 
be used by enterprises, in a manner detrimental to the trade and development of 
developing countries, but also as tariff and non-tariff barriers in world trade were 
gradually dismantled, States relied on the freedom of action of their champion 
33 lbid, Section D-3. 
34 See Miller D. L., & Davidow J., Antitrust at the United Nations: A Tale of Two Codes, 
Stanford J. Int'l. L., 1982, pp. 347-375, p. 355. 
35 lbid, pp. 3,16. 
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enterprises to defend and even improve their position on the international game 
board. 166 
As a matter of fact, developing countries in their assessment of the Code 
believe that, while they have been opening up their markets continually and, therefore 
expected the rules against restrictive business practices to be respected at national and 
multilateral level, the developed market-economy countries have minimised the 
importance of such practices and were closing their eyes to or even encouraging the 
use of certain practices, particularly, the restrictions on exports by their firms. 37 
To remedy these shortcomings and to improve and strengthen the RBPs Code's 
application, developing countries have submitted new proposals. Among the proposals, 
they demanded that the major escape clauses such as exemption contained in 
paragraph D(3) regarding enterprises that are part of the same economic entity, and 
the footnote to paragraph D(4) concerning acts in abuse of dominant position, and the 
expression "unduly" which appeared in the provisions of the Set, be deleted, and the 
wording of paragraph 6 be amended . 
38 The developed market-economy countries 
flatly rejected the new proposals of developing countries. 39 
Since the Code does not include provisions regarding restrictive clauses of 
technology licensing agreements within the context of antitrust, it falls short in its 
application to the issue of transfer of technology to developing countries. This task 
was given to the United Nations Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology. 
36 UNCTAD, Report of Intergovernmental Group of Experts on RBPs on its Ninth Session, 
Geneva, U. N. Doc. TD/13/1261 of 28 May 1990, p. 2. 
37 lbid, p. 3. 
38 Ibid, p. I 
39 Ibid. 
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111. International Regulation of Transfer of Technology 
(a) Code of Conduct for Transfer of Technology 
The most important international attempt to establish international legal frameworks 
to govern the restrictive clauses in the transfer of technology agreements was the 
establishment of an international code of conduct for transfer of technology. In the 
sixties, the unsatisfactory and quite often harmful effects of international transfer of 
technology agreements led many developing countries to enact their own transfer of 
technology laws and to request UNCTAD to initiate a responsive international legal 
framework to facilitate transfer of technology to their countries. 
In 1974, following the adoption of the "Declaration on the Establishment of 
a New International Economic Order" and the "Programme of Action on the 
Establishment of a NIEO" by the United Nations, 40 special attention was paid to the 
transfer of technology issue. The Programme of Action recommended the creation of 
a new technological order including measures to prevent restrictive practices in 
transfer of technology agreements and improve the terms and conditions of technology 
transfer by reforming the legal and juridical framework governing the transfer of 
technology to developing countries .4' To achieve those objectives, among other 
things, an international Code of Conduct for Transfer of Technology (hereafter, 
referred to as the TOT Code) was to be formulated. 
40 See supra, Chapter Four, text accompanying note 65. 
41 Ibid. It is interesting to note that while the protection of intellectual property rights has been the 
subject of several international Conventions, there has been no specific or systematic international 
agreement to protect the right of the recipient of technology. Wilner G. M., Transfer of 
Technology, the UNCTAD Code of Conduct, in Horn N., (ed) Legal Problems of Codes of 
Conduct for Multinational Enterprises, 1980, pp. 172-192, at 177. 
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Compared to the RBPs Code, the TOT Code had three distinctive features: 
first, the TOT Code was intended to govern a wide range of aspects of transfer of 
technology transactions including issues of intra-enterprise transfer, contracting, 
applicable law, foreign investment, patent and trademarks, and restrictive practices; 
second, as against the RBPs Code which is based on the western countries competition 
approach and regarded merely as a guide to national legislation, the TOT Code 
presented an alternative approach which rejected current practices of transnational 
corporations in transfer of technology agreements; third, while the RBPs Code covered 
international trade which will benefit both developed and developing countries, the 
TOT Code is directed at the particular issue of technology transfer which will benefit 
developing countries which are net importers of foreign technology. 42 
While in principle the aim of the TOT Code is to spread technology more 
evenly throughout the world, the industrialised countries were more concerned with 
the protection and preservation of their industrial property rights . 
4' Therefore, it was 
not surprising that, from the beginning of the negotiations, the two protagonist-groups 
of countries sought to attain different objectives: developing countries sought to obtain 
an international framework to deal with various aspects of transfer of technology 
transactions in order to spread technology and to recognise their national technology 
transfer regimes; the developed countries sought to pre-empt the adoption of more 
stringent national transfer of technology legislations. 44 These characteristics indeed 
made the TOT Code negotiations very lengthy and complicated. 
Between 1974 and 1980, a large number of meetings took place and significant 
progress was achieved, resulting in an agreement on a number of important issues. In 
42 UNCTAD , The Possibility and Feasibility of an 
International Code of Conduct for Transfer 
of Technology, U. N Doc. TD/B/AC. /I 1/22, at 1,7,8 (1974); see also Miller and Davidow, op. cit., 
note 34, p. 357. 
43 Phillips J., Some Thoughts on the Transfer of Technology, 1981, EIPR, pp. 171-175, p. 171. 
44 Fikentscher, supra, Chapter Five, note 89, pp. 60-62; It is worth mentioning that, developing 
countries, inter alia, argued that technology is the common heritage of mankind. Group B strongly 
opposed such argument. Ibid. 
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the sixth session of the Conference in 1985, despite substantial progress differences 
still remained. The final draft of the TOT Code is a reliable reflection of views and 
interests of the different participating parties on the subject of transfer of 
technology. 45 
(b) Chapter 4 of the TOT Code 
The major outstanding issue is contained in Chapter 4 of the TOT Code which deals 
with the evaluation and treatment of restrictive business practices in international 
transfer of technology agreements. 46 In fact, Chapter 4 is regarded as the centrepiece 
of the Code, without which the code would be useless. 47 The formulation of the 
chapter proved to be the most difficult subject of the entire negotiations. This 
difficulty is reflected already in the different titles proposed for the chapter. The 
Group 77 countries (developing countries) propose "the regulation of practices and 
arrangements involving the transfer of technology", the Group B (the industrialised 
countries) prefer "restrictive business practices", and the Group C (the socialist 
countries) spoke of "the exclusion of political discrimination and restrictive business 
45 For the text of the draft Code of Conduct, see UNCTAD, Draft International Code of Conduct 
on the Transfer of Technology, as at the close of the sixth session of the Conference on 5 June 
1985, U. N. Doc. TD/CODE TOT/47 of 20 June 1985, p. 10; for more details about this Code see 
UNCTAD, U. N Doc. TD/B/AC. /l 1/22, op. cit., note 42; Miller and Davidow, op. cit., note 34; 
Fikentscher, op. cit., note 44; Zuijdwijik T. J. M., The UNCTAD Code of Conduct on the 
Transfer of Technology, 24 Mcgill L. J. 1978, pp. 562-587; Thompson D., The UNCTAD Code 
of Conduct on Transfer of Technology, 1982,16 JWTL, pp. 311-317. 
46 UNCTAD, Further Consultation on a Draft International Code of Conduct on the Transfer 
of Technology, U. N. Doc. TD/CODE TOT/57,15 November 1991, p. 4,5. Another important 
outstanding issue is chapter 9 dealing with applicable law and settlement of disputes. See 
Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly, U. N. Doc. A/RES/48/167 of 17 February 1994. This 
resolution "recognises that the conditions do not currently exist to reach full agreement on all 
outstanding issues in the draft international code of conduct on the transfer of technology". Ibid. 
47 UNCTAD, An International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology, U. N. Doc. 
TD/B/3/C. 6/AC. 1/2/Supp. I /Rev. 1 (1975); Miller and Davidow, op. cit., note 34, p. 349; Roffe P., 
Transfer of Technology: UNCTAD's Draft International Code of Conduct, Int'l. Lawyer, 
(1985), pp. 689-707; Fikentscher, op. cit., note 44; Davidow & Chiles, The United States and the 
Issue of the Binding or Voluntary Nature of the International Code of Conduct Regarding 
Restrictive Business Practices, 72 Am. J. Int'l. L., 1987, pp. 247-271. 
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practices". The main differences of opinion, however, are between the Group 77 and 
Group B. 
A general understanding is that it should consist of two sections: Section A, 
introductory section (chapeau); and Section B, dealing with those restrictive business 
practices that should be avoided by parties to transfer of technology agreements. As 
regards Section B, although the Group 77 countries specified some 40 practices and 
arrangements to be avoided by parties to transfer of technology transactions, in the end 
of the negotiations only fourteen of them were the subject of substantial agreement. 48 
Section B, thus, lists and describes the objectionable restrictive practices in transfer 
of technology agreements and arrangements. 
Immense difficulties were raised again when the code was to determine 
precisely how the aforementioned restrictive business practices should be outlawed. 
In this regard, the chapeau is supposed to: (i) define the practices and delineate 
circumstances under which they should be avoided; (ii) establish the criteria to be 
followed by parties or by competent authorities in the determination of whether a 
practice is restrictive or not for the purpose of the code; and (iii) ascertain the 
applicability of Chapter 4 provisions in the TOT Code to transfer of technology 
transactions between related parties (affiliated enterprises). 49 
Group B countries maintain that, in furtherance of the objectives of the TOT 
Code, restrictive business practices RBPs that are unduly restrictive and adversely 
affecting the international transfer of technology should be avoided. 'o Furthermore, 
they believe whether a practice is unduly restrictive, adversely affecting international 
48 UNCTAD, Report of The Second Ad Hoc Group, U. N. Doc. TD/13/600, TD/B/C. 2/166, op. cit., 
UNCTAD, Negotiation of an International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology, 
TD/CODE TOT/3 of 26 September 1978, p. 11. 
49 UNCTAD, The Relevance of Recent Developments in the Area of Technology to the 
Negotiations on the Draft International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology, U. 
N. TD/Code TOT/55,2 October 1990, p. 3. 
50 The Draft Code, op. cit., note 45, Appendix A, p. 9. 
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transfer of technology, should be determined according to the principles and rules for 
enterprises set out in section D. 3 and DA of the Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable 
Principles and Rules for Control of Restrictive Business Practices. " 
This position of the developed market-economy countries is consistent with 
their national antitrust test approach. Accordingly, they intend to build into the TOT 
Code a general standard of reasonableness by which each practice should be examined 
in terms of its purpose and its effect on competition. Curiously enough, such 
proposition reveals that Group B even in the negotiations of the TOT Code, treat 
transfer of technology as a trade issue not a developmental issue. 
By contrast, the Group 77 countries has put great emphasis on the avoidance 
of practices that either restrain trade or adversely affect international flow of 
technology, particularly those practices that might hinder the economic and 
technological development of acquiring countries". In the same vein, the Group 77 
countries believe that restrictions between commonly owned enterprises should be 
examined in the light of the rules, exceptions and factors applicable to all transfer of 
technology transactions. " These positions clearly show that the main concerns of the 
Group 77 countries relate to potential adverse effects of restrictive business practices 
on their economy and development (including technological development), although 
such concerns might also include the possible anti-competitive effects of restrictive 
practices. In fact, if developing countries were seeking an international antitrust law 
merely to police anti-competitive arrangements, they had already endorsed the RBPs 
Code. The goal of Group 77 countries is that the code like their national laws should 
regulate foreign investment and foster economic development. 54 
51 Ibid; see also supra, text accompanying note 39. 
52 The Draft Code, op. cit., note 45, Appendix D. 
53 lbid, Appendix D, P. I 
54 Arusha Programme for Collective Self-Reliance and Framework for Negotiations, U. N. Doc. 
TD/236, (1979) p. 62. 
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Another problem arises from the position, taken by the Group 77 countries, 
regarding the method of formulation of the provisions. In their view all restrictive 
practices, whether anti-competitive or not, which adversely affect the social, economic 
or technological development of countries are per se harmful and should be 
eliminated. " Furthermore, the practices listed in the Chapter 4 of the TOT Code 
should be considered as examples of adverse practices and that they are not to be 
considered an exhaustive enumeration of restrictive business practices. 56 
In response to the approach of the Group 77 countries that all restrictive 
business practices per se should be prohibited, the Group B argued that in their 
experience it is not possible, except in a very few cases to lay down legislation 
containing absolute prohibitions. In their view, there are certain conditions which, 
despite the fact that they would restrict competition, present a distinct advantage to 
57 the country. Indeed this is based on a course of reasoning that suggests that the 
"competition test approach" of most developed market-economy countries is being 
liberalised further. " In these countries, particularly in the U. S., based on public 
interest considerations, there is a lenient approach towards restrictions in technology 
transfer arrangements stemming from the legitimate exercise of intellectual property 
rights. Such restrictions are now evaluated in a more flexible manner on a case-by- 
case basis compared to the situation in the eighties . 
59As a result, "those restraints 
which are reasonably connected with a technology transfer ... [a]nd those which permit 
55 Syquia Enrique, The UNCTAD Code and Problems of Transfer of Technology and Restrictive 
Practices: The Viewpoint of Developing Countries, in Horn N. (ed) Legal Problems of Codes 
of Conduct for Multinational Enterprises, ( Studies in Transnational Economic Law, vol. 1), 
1980 pp. 211-218, p. 212; Roffe P., Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology, The CTC 
Reporter, No. 24 (Autumn 1985), pp. 39-40. 
56 Syquia, lbid, p. 212. 
57 Roffe, op. cit., note 47, p. 700. 
58 U. N. Doc., TD/Code TOT/55, op. cit., note 49, p. 26. 
59 For an excellent examination of this trend in the United States, see Rule C. F., The 
Adminstration's View: Antitrust After the Nine No-NO's, 55 Antitrust L. J., 1986, pp. 365-372; 
see also U. N. Doc., TD/Code TOT/55, Ibid, p. 27. 
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the innovator to capture the surplus inherent in his innovation are considered pro- 
competitive, even if they impose restrictions upon the licensee or third parties". 60 
It is submitted that a blanket application of an a priori approach towards 
restrictive business practices be adopted. This would serve to invalidate the per se rule 
to the transfer process that seem to be harmful to the interests of many developing 
countries. While certain restrictions indeed reflect legitimate interests of the 
technology holders, they do not have serious adverse effects on the interests of the 
acquiring country. The per se illegality approach may be said to discourage potential 
technology suppliers from the outset not to negotiate technology transfers with 
developing countries. As noted earlier, some developing countries already have 
procedures in place to evaluate certain restrictive practices and are themselves not 
totally committed to the per se rule of illegality of all restrictive business practices. 
60 U. N. Doc. TD/Code TOT/55, lbid, at 27,28. (emphasis added) 
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IV. Conclusion 
At the international level, after negotiations of several drafts of the TOT Code, 
there is still a vacuum to be filled before an effective international anti-trust law can 
be realised for controlling restrictive business practices in international transfer of 
technology agreements. As was noted, the real obstacle for such an achievement is 
that the industrialised countries refuse to accept the development test approach of 
developing countries to govern transfer of technology agreements. Indeed, the 
industrialised countries possess capital formation power, technological abilities and 
infrastructures, strong distribution system with 150 years experience. In such 
circumstances the competition principles would have adverse effects on the transfer 
and development of technology to developing countries, although such principles may 
be useful for other commercial and trading activities. 
In other words, had developing countries accepted the competition test 
approach of developed market-economy countries, the legitimacy of the national 
technology transfer regimes of developing countries would have been undermined, 
thus, they would be the real losers. " Accordingly, in this uncertain international 
political environment, the developing countries's main legal instrument to control 
restrictive business practices is still their national or regional transfer of technology 
laws which have originated from their own particular economic, industrial and political 
situations. 
61 For instance, the acceptance of the competition test approach would have the consequence that 
application of the national transfer of technology law to parent- subsidiary relationships would be 
logically impossible. Such enterprises do not compete among themselves as they form parts of an 
economic entity. 
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Chapter Seven 
CONTRACT LAW AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY 
1. Overview 
In the Chapter Six those negative obligations, namely restrictive 
practices, which should be avoided in the transfer of technology transactions, were 
presented and discussed. It was noted that, antitrust law and antitrust-like provisions 
in technology transfer regimes overlap provisions in the general contract law to the 
extent that they declare ineffective or void those agreements and contractual 
arrangements which have adverse effect on competition and development. In other 
words, they limit the validity of certain provisions of transfer of technology contracts. 
Important also are those general contractual obligations of the parties to a 
transfer of technology transaction of a positive character such as guarantees, contract 
payments, performance schedule, assignment, conditions of termination etc.. This 
chapter argues that for a dynamic, responsive and objective legal framework for 
transfer of technology, the general contract law of developing countries also has an 
important role to play. The contractual relations between parties to a technology 
licensing agreement should be framed in a way that, on the one hand, they must 
provide adequate protection for every legitimate right of the transferor, including 
know-how protection - for encouraging inflow of technology - and, on the other hand, 
observe the general positive obligations in order to assure the effective performance 
of transfer of technology agreements in the country. 
Without an effective protection of secret know-how, inflow of valuable 
technology would be impeded and, in the absence of a particular legal framework 
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which rules on responsibilities and obligations of the parties to a transfer of 
technology contract, the terms and conditions of a technology transfer contract 
founded on the general contract law would be insufficient to effect a real transfer of 
technology. The country would, thus, become more and more dependent on foreign 
technology suppliers as is the case with Iran. Reliance solely on the general contract 
law will lead to local recipient enterprises consenting to terms of technology transfer 
agreements which yield short term returns to individual enterprises but which might 
have adverse effects on the technological and economic development of the country. 
The TOT Code' has provided a fair balance between the rights and 
responsibilities of the parties and, as a result, it may be used in shaping national 
legislation in developing countries. 
Two distinctive legal approaches as to the positive obligations in technology 
licensing agreements may be conceived. One approach regards technology licensing 
contracts as typical commercial contracts, thus, subject to the general commercial law 
of contracts and intellectual property and anti-trust laws. Most developed market- 
economy countries have accepted this approach under their doctrine of freedom of 
contract. This doctrine was introduced and developed in nineteenth century Europe 
under the liberal, political and economic philosophies of that time which considered 
the rules of a free and competitive market as the best safeguards of justice between 
the parties. As regards transfer of technology agreements, this approach argues that 
it is only within the principles of party autonomy and freedom of contract that 
I UNCTAD, U. N. Doe. TD/CODE TOT/47, supra, Chapter Six, note 45. 
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different incentives of licensee'and the licensor 3 are freely and properly satisfied and 
2 Clearly enough, the development of new technology as well as adaptation of imported technology 
to a particular environment requires a Research and Development capability. Enterprises with little 
or no Research and Development facility, have no other meaningful alternative to taking a licence. 
Domestic Research and Development can be a lengthy process and clearly lacks the certainty that 
a technology licensing agreement provides. By concluding a licence contract, such firms save huge 
resources on hiring qualified personnel and purchase of equipment, and also save considerable 
amount of time, to gain a desirable result. Further, when such a technology is understood the 
licensee can add its own innovations to obtain a more competitive position. 
In addition to provision of continuing access to the results of Research and Development of the 
licensor, a licensing agreement also enables the licensee to acquire the necessary know-how and 
further improvements of a given product or process through appropriate arrangements. 
Another incentive to enter into licence contracts is that, licensees obtain technology that could 
improve the quality of their products and make them more competitive in domestic market and 
allow them to enter export markets. Likewise, the licensee obtains a better position to compete with 
the licensor after the patent rights legally is expired. 
Once designing around an advantageous patent is so difficult on the one hand, and be infringement 
of the patentee's right, a licence appears to be the best way to obtain the technology. 
On the other hand, countries that desire to limit the amount of foreign equity participation in their 
countries and to broaden their own control over economic operations within their borders, but at 
the same time want access to new technology, also prefer the licensing agreements to other types 
of transfer of technology arrangements. Goldscheider, International Licensing Agreements 
Involving Developing Countries, in Marcus B. Finnegan and Robert Goldscheider, eds., The Law 
and Business of Licensing, New York: Boardman, 1980, pp. 520-533; UNCTC, Licence 
Agreements in Developing Countries, New York, 1987, p. 3. According to another U. N report, 
licensing agreements with locally owned firms in Korea and Malaysia increased sharply after the 
introduction in 1970s of restrictions on Direct Foreign Investment. See UNCTC, Transnational 
Corporation in World Development: Third Survey, U. N. Doc. ST/CTC/46,1978, p. 169. 
3 From the licensor point of view, apart from the fulfilment of patent working requirements and 
avoiding the compulsory licensing, there are some other grounds for patent licensing as well. 
Through licence agreement the intangible property rights in the technology is protected and 
controlled, while outright sale or assignment of the patent rights would forego control over the 
rights. The licensor derives additional income from the intangible property through royalties. With 
no capital requirement, the licensor penetrates and tests markets which are otherwise not accessible. 
Such a situation may arises when the government of destination has established barriers to foreign- 
owned manufacturing ventures. Through licensing the risks are reduced, e. g. risk of expropriation 
by the host government. The licensing agreement may circumvent antitrust or trade regulation 
problems. The licensor can have reciprocal access to its competitor's technology. Alternatively, the 
licensor may protect its markets against foreign competitors. It should be noted that although 
generally enterprises are reluctant to venture abroad and would prefer staying at home, but due to 
the "defensive" strategy, they must go out if they are to protect their markets. The licence contracts 
serve them in this way as well. On the other hand, the licensor's country may have established 
trade or tax barriers that make the export of the finished product cost prohibitive or when foreign 
exchange or political limitations restrict imports. A patentee with insufficient resources for the 
utilisation of the technology may also license it to someone else to do that. Alternatively, the 
licensor may manufacture the product for particular markets and let other markets be supplied by 
its licensees. Similarly, one particular purpose of the technology may be utilised by the licensor 
and its licensees be permitted to utilise others. Telesio, P., Technology Licensing and 
Multinational Enterprises, Praeger, 1977, pp. 22-50; Fox, Jr. W. F., International Commercial 
Agreements, 1987, p. 63; Eckstrom L., Licensing in Foreign and Domestic Operations, 1987, 
§ 1.10; Fikentscher W., The Typology of International Licensing Agreements in: Horn/ 
Schmitthoff (eds). The Transnational Law of International Commercial Transactions, 1983, 
p. 216. 
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embodied in fair terms and conditions of the contract. 
Instead of over-regulating the process of technology transfer, these countries 
attach particular importance to the "licence climate". In this regard, their commentators 
have pointed to the importance of such a climate and introduced its characteristics as 
the existence of a reliable and predictable government, a sound protection for 
intellectual property rights, an honest and impartial judiciary to settle disputes, respect 
for the rule of law, few regulations imposed by the government on the terms and 
conditions of the licensing agreement; and a skilled work force. 4 In other words, 
minimum state intervention is better for efficient allocation of resources, technological 
innovations and economic development. 
As regards the important issue of the proper law clause of technology licensing 
agreements' this school of thought, to a considerable extent, has recognised the 
principle of party autonomy in contractual relationships. As a result, whereas the 
parties of an international licence contract are left free to decide the governing 
contract law in relation to their mutual rights and obligations under the agreement, 
other aspects of the agreement such as the fiscal consequences of withholding taxes 
on royalties, the validity of the patent which is the subject matter of the licensing 
agreement, liability for causing injury and damages while rendering the services 
required under the agreement, or the validity of restrictive clauses are governed by the 
public policy rules of the country which has the most connection with the agreement. 6 
4 Urey D. S., Ideal Climate for Technology Transfer, 26 Les Nouvelles, 1991, reprinted in Bell 
and Simon, The Law and Business of Licensing: Licensing in the 1990s, 1992, vol. 2, pp. 1433- 
1439, p. 1439. 
5 It is recalled that the proper law determines performance of responsibilities by the parties, the 
validity of contract and patents, the invalidity of restrictive business practices, payments after the 
expiration of industrial property rights, legal consequences of bad performance or no performance, 
e. g, damages, termination, nullify of agreement and its consequences, force majeure, etc. 
6 The EEC Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, Article 3 (3), 23 O. J., 
9 October ( 1980), L 266, p. 2. The Article reads: the fact that the parties have chosen a foreign 
law whether or not accompanied by the choice of a foreign tribunal, shall not, where all other 
elements relevant to the situation at the time of the choice are connected with one country only, 
prejudice the application of rules of the law of the countn, which cannot be derogatedfrom by 
contract, hereinafter called "mandatorv rules". See also Cabanellas G, Jr. Applicable Law Under 
International Transfer of Technology Regulations, 15 HC, 1984, pp. 39-67; Dessemontet F., 
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This line of argument leaves the positive obligations of the parties to be decided by 
the governing contract law principles as much as possible. 
In contrast with the above approach, the second school of thought points out 
that not only private interests but public interests are also involved in transfer of 
technology agreements. While freedom for private parties in the market-economy 
countries with their advanced economic, political, industrial and legal development 
may coincide with public interests as well, in developing countries the interests of 
national community is secured only by laying down in law the rights and 
responsibilities of the parties and enforcing them. In this regard, the application of 
some contract law provisions because of their generality and mostly vague character, 
are inapplicable to technology licensing agreements in which bargaining position of 
suppliers and the recipients firms is unequal and market for technology is imperfect. 
In other words, given the distinct characteristics of transfer of technology contracts for 
developing countries some modifications to normal contractual relations of the parties 
are necessary. ' 
Transfer of Technology under UNCTAD and EEC Draft Codification: A European View on 
Choice of Law in Licensing, J. Int'l. L. & Eco. vol. 12,1977, pp. 1-55. 
7 UNCTAD, The Channels and Mechanism for Transfer of Technology from Developed to 
Developing Countries, U. N. Doc. TD/B/AC. 11/5 of 27 April 197 1, p. 54-55. 
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11. Iranian Contract Law and Transfer of Technology Transactions 
A look at the historical evolution of the Iranian legal system shows that the Iranian 
jurists did develop principles of the private aspects of contract law. ' In contrast little 
attention was paid to the important social and economic effects of such contracts. The 
numerous volumes of judicial books and dissertations in which private relations - 
relations between people themselves and between them and Almighty- have been 
analyzed in details testify to the great work of the jurists but subject matters such as 
public interests and development and safeguarding the national economy were 
marginalised. ' 
The civil code of Iran which was enacted to modernise Iranian laws to cope 
with the social., economic and industrial situation that existed in the thirties did not 
attract the interests of the jurists so much as private relations. 'O The code defined 
contract" in the following terms: "a contract is made when one or more persons 
make a mutual agreement with another one or more persons, on a certain thing, and 
that agreement is accepted by the latter. " This definition is based on the 
individualistic theory of law which put individuals rights over communal interests. In 
the contemporary world, the concept of contract has been broadened to cover not only 
relations between individuals but also contracts between large enterprises and 
government agencies as well. However, the contractual rules derived from the Iranian 
Civil Code could not be stretched to apply to a transfer of technology contract because 
8 See for instance, Langroodi M. J., Judicial Schools of Thought in Islamic Law, Teheran, 1974, 
(in Persian). 
9 Ibid. 
10 The Civil Code of Iran was enacted between 1928 and 1936. Its position in the Iranian legal 
hierarchy is second in importance only to the Constitution. A few provisions of the Civil Code 
have been amended yet. The Code comprises a wide range of issues, among them are contracts, 
transactions and obligations. 
II Ibid., Chapter 1, Article 183. 
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of its complexity, the inequality of the bargaining position of suppliers and the 
recipient firms and the imperfections in the international technology market. 12 
There is a presumption that the contracts defined by the Code and those 
introduced by Article 10 of the Code 13 are between an individual who commits 
himself to supplying goods or rendering services to some one else with equal 
bargaining positions and under simple and private circumstances. This notion of 
contract does not reflect the emerging social, economic and industrial realities of Iran. 
The provisions in the Iranian Civil Code governing contracts are simply not geared 
to deal with the issues raised by collective interests of a country striving towards 
economic and industrial development. 
In contrast, those who emphasise the public dimension of contracts such as 
transfer of technology contracts see these contracts as matters of public policy like 
serving an evolving economy. It is this approach that justifies government intervention 
to set rules to guide enterprises towards those manufacturing goals that are desirable 
for the economic and industrial well being of the country as a whole. Both 
government and enterprises need each other. What is required is that recognition 
should be given in law to the public dimension of contracts. Transfer of technology 
agreements should no longer be subject to the autonomous will of the parties but 
treated as a matter of ordre public and national interests instead. This thesis points out 
that a considerable number of developing countries have already provided in their 
legislation for the presumption of certain conditions in transfer of technology 
12 Iranian law has not kept pace with the changing political and economic landscape. While 
governments changed drastically, the laws have remained the same and were often regarded as a 
phenomenon apart from the economic and business life of the people. Iranian law has also not been 
responsive to the needs of business people who were placed at a great disadvantage vis a vis 
foreign enterprises because of the absence of major legislation specific to their activities and 
interests and weaknesses in the general contract law of Iran. Transfer of technology transactions 
in Iran are applied within the broad framework of the general principles of civil and commercial 
law and some rules of the patent law. This has been found to be inadequate to achieve the purposes 
for which these transactions are entered into, namely, to establish a local technological base and 
help in the diversification of Iran's economy away from crude oil extraction and rural agriculture. 
13 Article 10 of the code provides that: "private contracts so long as they are not expressly contrary 
to statutes are enforceable between the contracting parties. ", op. cit., note 11. 
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agreements whether expressly incorporated or not to recognize the mandatory nature 
of public dimension concerns. 
14 
(a) Protection of Secret Know-how 
According to a survey conducted by the present writer, in Iran most of the 
valuable patented inventions need additional manufacturing process or know-how to 
be worked industrially and commercially to the extent that the expected quality and 
quantity can be achieved. "In the same way, an analysis of transfer of technology 
agreements in Iran reveals that between 1989 and 1992, out of 50 transfer of 
technology agreements approved by the Ministry of Industry of Iran, the number of 
cases where patent rights were actually the point of discussion was not more than I 
percent. 16 Those agreements were all transfer of technological know-how 
agreements. 
17 
It should be bom in mind that know-how either is omitted intentionally from 
the disclosure of the invention by the patentee, or was simply unavailable at the time 
of disclosure. Moreover, it might be so standard in the country where the technology 
14 For instance see Mexico, Technology Law, Art. 1, which provides that, "this law is of public order 
and of social interest... "; The public aspects that transfer of technology laws require are, the 
conditions of validity of the contracts, the obligation to register, the obligations of the parties vis-a- 
vis the authorises, certain rights and obligations of the parties with respect to the transfer of 
technology, RBPs and the obligation to report royalties. UNCTAD, Common approaches, UN. Doc. 
DT/B/C. 6/91, supra, Chapter Two, note 25, p. 14. 
15 The study was conducted during my two visits to Iran for the purpose of my research. In this 
regard, documents of 40 patented inventions were studied, and some authorities and directors of 
private enterprises were interviewed. As the Director of the Iranian Patent Office aknowledged, 
those patent documents are so insufficient, vague and general that Iranian firm should conclude 
agreement with the foreign patent holders to acquire necessary know-how for the industrial 
exploitation of those inventions. See Interview with the Director of the Iranian Patent Office, supra, 
Chapter Three, note 57; see also infra, Appendx Four. 
16 The Research and Training Deputy of the Ministry of Industry of Iran, Specifications of Technical 
Know -How Contracts Between 1989 and 1992, Table No. 1. January 1995, (in Persian). 
17 Ibid. 
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originally was invented that specifying them is regarded as unnecessary. Whatever the 
reason, as will be noted later", the Iranian Patent Act neglects the information 
function of patents in general. 
However, the fulfilment of the thorough disclosure requirement19, does not 
necessarily mean that the patentee and licensee will succeed in their efforts to 
manufacture and apply the technology economically and quickly. This is particularly 
true in the case of raw inventions and sophisticated technologies which can only be 
worked when supplemented by special expertise and knowledge which is acquired 
through long experimentation. " Such a special expertise consists of descriptions of 
manufacturing process, recipes, formulae, designs or drawing and is usually transferred 
through trade secret agreements. It has been revealed that almost two-thirds of 
technologies are transferred under trade secret protection agreements .2' The economic 
and technological importance of secret know-how in disseminating technical 
knowledge has created a tendency to provide sufficient legal security for the protection 
of secret know-how in some industrialised 22 and less industrialised countries. 2' The 
European Economic Community probably has introduced the most comprehensive 
18 See infra, Chapter Nine. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Despite the "enablement" requirement, patent specifications are not required to be engineering 
documents that reveal every possible facet for the manufacture of the invention. See Todd F. V., 
Agreement Consummation in International Technology Transfers, 33 IDEA, 1993, pp. 241- 
295, p. 275. 
21 Sherwood R. M., New Theory of Conductivity in Licensing, Les Nouvelles, 1989, pp. 186-189, 
at 189. 
22 The Restatements of the law of Torts of the United States, 1939 ed., Section 757. The 
Restatement observes that: "A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or 
compilation of information which is used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity 
to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it". Ibid. 
23 Mexico Transfer of Technology Law, Art. 13, reprinted in UNCTAD Compilation, U. N. Doc. 
TD/B/C. 6/81, supra, Chapter Five, note 44. 
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definition of know-how, 
24 
as a" body of technical information that is secre 
ý5 
substantial26 and identified 27 in any appropriate form". 
A legal framework for the transfer of foreign secret know-how for developing 
economies seems to be vital. Such a framework, while encouraging the transfer of 
valuable know-how, will ensure that know-how right holders do not misuse their rights 
as well. In the case of Iran, although Parliament has tried to provide for general 
protection of secret information, the provisions fall short of creating a meaningful and 
comprehensive legislation with regard to secret know-how for transfer and 
development of technology. 
24 See Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 556/89,1988, Article 1(7)(1), [hereinafter cited as EEC 
Regulation No. 556/891. 
25 The term "secret" means that the know-how package as a body or in the precise configuration and 
assembly of its components is not generally known or easily accessible. lbid, Article 1(7)(2). 
26 The term of "substantial" means that the know-how includes information which is of importance 
for the whole or a significant part of (i) a manufacturing progress or (ii) a product or service, or 
(iii) for the development thereof and excludes information that is trivial. Such know-how must be 
useful, i. e. can reasonably be expected at the date of conclusion of the agreement to be capable of 
improving the competitive position of the licensee ...... with other manufacturers". Ibid, Article 
1(7)(3). 
27 The term "identified" means that the know-how is described or recorded in such a manner as to 
make it possible to verify that it fulfils the criteria of secrecy and substantiality and to ensure that 
the licensee is not unduly restricted in his exploitation of his own technology. To be identified the 
know-how can either be set out in the licence agreement or in a separate document or recorded in 
any other appropriate form, provided that the separate document or other record can be made 
available if the need arises. lbid, Article 1(7)(4). 
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(b) Iranian Penal Code and Disclosure of Trade Secrets 
The Penal Code of Iran prohibits the disclosure of industrial secrets and 
18 provides one to three years imprisonment for the offence. The law does not define 
what an industrial secret consists of. Instead, the law introduces the elements of an 
action for disclosure for misuse of industrial secrets as follows: 
(i) the offender should have acquired the industrial secrets due to his "technical status" 
or his "trustworthiness status". Put in a simple way, the offender was in a fiduciary 
position under the contractual or administrative relationship between the industrial 
secrets owner and the offender; 
(ii) the industrial secret should be concerning an invention and the way that an 
invention is carried out. This requirement confined the protection to information that 
is related to inventions and excludes other types of non-industrial technology 
information, such as business, administrative, commercial and marketing technology 
which are necessary steps towards the efficient use of the technology; 
(iii) the revelation of the industrial secrets is against public interests. The interpretation 
of this provision is very dependent on the term "public interests". The question is 
whether the disclosure of a foreign secret know-how by an Iranian recipient would 
endanger the public interests. 
(iv) the industrial secrets are being misused. The term "misuse" is again vague and 
needs to be elaborated to bring more certainty. 
28 Islamic Punishment Law of Iran, Art. 125, LO. G., No. 10972, November 1983. The Article states: 
Any one who, due to his technical status or his trustworthiness status, is informed of 
secrets of an invention or the waY that an invention is carried out, and divulge or misuse 
them in a wa 'v which 
is harmful to the public interests, shall be convictedfrom one to 
three years impri . sonment. 
191 
It is submitted that such an indirect, vague and limited protection of secret 
know-how appears to be discouraging the transfer of valuable know-how. The nature 
of know-how is such that once it is communicated it is lost because it cannot be 
retrieved. Therefore, valuable know-how is either not licensed at all or communicated 
only when the licensor perceives the contract as "etched in stone , 29 . This is 
particularly true in high-technology industries. 'O Since the essential value of such 
information indeed depends on its being kept secret, the licensee should exercise the 
necessary security precautions to preserve such secret information. The duty to do this 
has been widely accepted. 31 Consequently, Iran, in order to facilitate inflow of 
needed valuable technology, should attach particular importance to the protection of 
secret know-how. 
The Islamic Punishment Law of Iran 32 has left no doubt that the Iranian 
legislator has appreciated the important role of such a body of knowledge in the 
process of transfer of technology to the country. However, a close look at the law 
indicates that the absence of a precise definition of terms such as "public interests" 
and "misuse" may be discouraging and problematic. The law is silent also regarding 
the disclosure of the secret know-how after the termination of the agreement. 
Likewise, the law has not clarified the situation in which an employee who has 
knowledge of the know-how passes the information to a competitor-firm. On the other 
hand, having not defined "secret know-how" precisely, there is the danger that 
information which is in the public domain abroad but not in Iran be considered as 
industrial secrets know-how. This would impede the transfer and diffusion of 
technology to the country. And finally, the country as a whole lacks any appropriate 
legal institution responsible for the implementation and improvement of the secret 
know-how law in the country. As a consequence of that the proposed law, 
29 Todd F. V., op. cit., note 20, p. 293. 
30 Mansfield, E., Intellectual Property Protection, Foreign Direct Investment, and Technology 
Transfer, the World Bank, 1994, p. 1-5. 
31 UNCTAD Draft Code, op. cit., note 1, Sect. 5.4 (iii). 
32 Article 125, op. cit., note 28. 
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recommended in the thesis for the development of technology in Iran, is intended to 
protect secret know-how in the context of the whole process of transfer of technology 
to the country. 33 
The above concerns have been taken into account by Chapter 5 of the TOT 
Code 34 which is devoted to those positive contractual obligations that should be 
complied with by the parties to a transfer of technology transaction. Similar to other 
international uniform codes, the purpose of Chapter 5 of the Code is to provide 
internationally applicable norms and guidelines in the field of contract law. 35 Except 
for two provisions relating to confidentiality and dispute settlement and applicable law, 
all the other provisions in Chapter 5 of the TOT Code were accepted by the various 
negotiating parties. In the same vein, some advanced developing countries, through 
their own statutes governing technology transfer transactions, mandate the parties to 
observe certain terms, conditions and practices while negotiating, concluding and 
executing transfer of technology agreements. 36 
At the negotiating phase of technology transfer agreements, the parties are 
required to be responsive to the declared official economic and social development 
objectives of the recipient country. For instance, since the use of local resources is 
very important for successful achievement of import substitution and saving of foreign 
exchange, the parties should negotiate specific provisions for the use of locally 
available resources. Such resources including local materials, technologies, technical 
skills, consultancy and engineering services and other resources are to be inventoried 
and subsequently made available by the potential technology recipient". It is 
33 See infra, Appendix One. 
34 See U. N. Doc. TD/CODE TOT/47, op. cit., note 1. 
35 Fikentscher, supra, Chapter Five note 89, p. 121. 
36 For instance see, Brazil, Normative Act No. 015, Sect. 6.1.2. (c), 6.1.3,6.1.4; Government of India, 
Guidelines for Industries, 1982, Part 1, Ch. IV. 4(x), reprinted in UNCTAD Compilation, op. cit., 
note 23. 
37 lbid; UNCTAD, Draft Code of Conduct, op. cit., note 1, Chapter 5, Sect. 5.2. 
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important to note, however, that, despite the necessity and desirability of using local 
capabilities, a strict obligation to use local resources, may affect the quality of the 
production, and the supplier may be reluctant to give performance guarantees where 
local inputs, which are outside his control, are used. 
In the same way, at this stage the supplier of technology should make adequate 
arrangements as regards unpackaging in terms of information concerning the various 
elements of the technology to be transferred, such as that required for technical, 
institutional and financial evaluation of the potential supplying party's offer. " The 
supplier should also disclose, "to the actual extent known to him, any limitation, 
including any pending official procedures or litigation which adversely concerns, in 
a direct manner, the existence or validity of the rights to be transferred, on his 
entitlement to grant the rights or render the assistance and services specified in the 
proposed agreement. " 39 
In order to facilitate and make possible the disclosure of needed information 
before conclusion of the contract, the TOT Code wisely provides that parties "should 
keep secret, in accordance with any obligation, either legal or contractual, all 
confidential information received from the other party and make use of the 
confidential information received from a potential party only for the purpose of 
evaluating this party's offer or request or for other purposes agreed upon by the 
parties. "" Under some national transfer of technology laws, particular aspects of 
confidentiality such as illegal disclosure of know-how by employees are protected. 
Some technology transfer laws have either stipulated the maximum duration of the 
38 Ibid., Chapter 5, Sect. 5.2. 
39 lbid, 5.3 (C) (ii). 
40 Ibid., Sect. 5.3 (iii). 
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confidentiality obligation '41 or the continued use of the secret know-how after the 
termination of the agreement or the passage of certain time period. 42 
M. Other General Provisions 
(a) Proper Law 
Faced with numerous cases in which licensors with stronger bargaining power have 
imposed their preferred choice of law on the licensees to their detriment, most 
developing countries have departed from the principle of absolute party autonomy in 
licensing agreements. In the laws enacted by the countries specifically to regulate 
transfer of technology agreements, the countries have provided that the agreements 
shall be subject only to their own laws and jurisdiction and not to the laws of the 
technology exporting countries. In other words, the national laws of the recipient 
countries will govern the validity, interpretation and performance of transfer of 
technology agreements. 43 
41 Technology licensing agreements shall not be registered if the acquirer is under the obligation to 
keep secret the technical information given by the supplier, beyond the term of the acts, 
arrangements and contracts or beyond the times established by the applicable laws. Mexico, 
Technology Law, Art. 15, Sec. XI, UNCTAD Compilation, op. cit., note 23. 
42 The contract [for the supply of industrial technology] shall not contain... any clause that prevent 
the free use of technology, following the lapse of a period deemed to be reasonable after the 
termination of each item of information, Brazil Act. No. 015, Sec. 4.5.2. (d) (vi) and 6.5.2. (b), 
UNCTAD Compilation, Ibid. 
43 UNCTAD, UN. Doc. DT/B/C. 6/91, op. cit., note 14, para. 46. The law of the licensee is the best 
suited to such an agreement because above all it is primarily the licensee's antitrust, transfer of 
technology and industrial property laws that must be complied with. The so-called territoriality 
doctrine of intellectual property rights requires that the validity of the patent will be judged 
according to the law of the country which issued the patent. Apart from the validity of the patent, 
other important issues such as creation, content, scope and termination, as well as the permissibility 
of the transfer and licensing of the patent are determined solely by the law of the granting patent 
country. Likewise, it is the country of the licencee which is, in the common law world, the natural 
centre of gravity of the contractual relationship. It is also the licensee that use the technology over 
() AZ 
-7-) 
A survey of provisions relating to the proper law in transfer of technology 
regimes shows considerable interaction between transfer of technology laws and the 
general contract law. Technology transfer laws provide the substantive framework for 
licensing agreements including the rights and duties which cannot be opted out by 
agreement between the parties. The laws have emphasised expressly the mandatory 
nature of public interest considerations in transfer of technology agreements. 44 
In practice, there is no consistency in the applicable law provisions in transfer 
of technology regulations. Some countries provide explicitly for the application of the 
law of the licensee. 45 Others either prohibit foreign law from being applied 46 or do 
not have explicit rules on the proper law, but, usually, the registration office requires 
that the national law should be the proper law of transfer of technology agreements. 47 
It is submitted that, a radical departure from the party's autonomy to choose 
the law of their contractual relationship cannot be constructive. Traditionally, party 
autonomy has had a significant impact on international commercial transactions. 
This party autonomy, however under many legal systems is not deemed to be absolute. 
Rather, the party's autonomy is subjected to public policy "order public" rules of 
country which has a close connection with the contract and to the territorial nature of 
an extended period of time, and will bear indeed a greater financial risks than the licensor in cases 
of defective performance, environment and social hazardous impacts of the technology. See 
Dessemontet F., Transfer of Technology Agreements and Conflict of Laws, See UNCTAD 
Draft International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology, report and notes by 
experts on the outstanding issues, compiled by the UNCTAD Secretariat, U. N. Doc. TD/CODE 
TOT/52,5 August 1988, pp 28-34. 
44 For instance see Mexico, Technology Law, art. 1, reprinted in UNCTAD Compilation, op. cit., note 
23. 
45 The Mexican Federal Constitution, Article 133, and Article 7 of Mexican transfer of technology 
law which provides the all registrable acts, agreements or contracts of transfer of technology shall 
be governed by Mexican laws or by the applicable international agreements or treaties to which 
Mexico is a party. Ibid. 
46 Argentine Law 21,617, art. 10(l 1) (1977), replaced by law 426,198 1, reprinted in UNCTAD 
Compilation, op. cit., note 23. 
47 For instance Brazil, Transfer of Technology Law, reprinted In UNCTAD Compilation, Ibid. 
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industrial property rights . 
4' The public policy provisions include mandatory laws such 
as transfer of technology and antitrust law, which are aimed to safeguard the national 
economy and the public interests and cannot be derogated from by contract. Under 
conflict-of-law rules, public policy enables the judge to exclude any foreign law which 
its application would violate the social or legal concepts of his legal system. 49As a 
result, parties to transfer of technology agreements can be free to choose the proper 
law of their contractual relations. This choice of law, however, should not prevent the 
application of the relevant rules of any of the national legal systems having a 
substantial connection with parties or the transactions which cannot be derogated by 
contract. 
The TOT Code to strike a balance between the parties' interests adopted this 
approach as well. As was mentioned earlier, Chapter 9 of the draft code of conduct 
on the transfer of technology which deals with the issue of proper law is one of the 
most controversial and no agreement has yet been reached. For a reconciliation of the 
different views, the following has been suggested by the President of the Conference 
to draft the TOT Code during its sixth session: "Parties to transfer of technology 
transactions may, by common consent, choose the applicable law to their contractual 
relations, it being understood that such a choice of law will not limit the application 
of relevant rules of national legal system which cannot be derogated from by 
contract. "0 It is believed that, such a multi facet and controversial issue maybe 
48 See for instance, The EEC Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, op. 
cit., note 6. 
49 Derains Y., Public Policy and the Law Applicable to the Dispute in International Law, 1987, 
p. 227; Beier, F-K, When Licensing Laws Conflict, 18 Les Nouvelles, No. 3, reprinted in Bell 
and Simon, The Law and Business of Licensing: Licensing in the 1990s, 1992, vol. 1, pp. 2C- 
145-160; see aslo supra, text accompanying note 6. 
50 U. N. Doc. TD/CODE TOT/47, op. cit., note 1, Appendix A, p. 6. It should be noted that "relevant 
rules" is meant mandatory rules or public policy rules. The reference was not made directly to 
"public policy" in order to minimise the possibility of extraterritorial application of the "public 
policy" of the technology-exporting State -a possibility which is enhanced by the reference to the 
public policy of the countries of the parties concerned. See U. N. Doc. TD/CODE TOT/52, op. cit., 
note 43, p. 39. The U. S. has assumed extraterritoriality application for its antitrust law. This has 
made controversial conflicts with other nations. See generally, Jennings, Extraterritorial 
jurisdiction and the United States Antitrust Laws, 33 Brit. Yb. Int'l. L., (1957); For a 
discussion of the issues of the Chapter on applicable law and dispute settlement of the UNCTAD 
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determined better in the context of a particular international treaty, as the European 
Union members did. 
51 
(b) Settlement of Disputes 
Disputes arising from a technology transfer agreement, not settled through negotiation 
and conciliation, may be submitted to courts of law or arbitral tribunals. Subject to the 
same conditions pertaining to proper law which were indicated above, courts and 
tribunals of the technology acquiring country shall have jurisdiction over disputes 
concerning public policy issues. Where public policy is not in an issue, the contract 
may allow a choice of forum. However, the forum chosen must have a "direct, 
effective and permanent relationship" with the contract. 52 Accordingly courts or 
arbitral tribunals of the country of residence of the recipient can be convenient choices 
of the forum for the resolution of disputes. 
Transfer of technology statutes of some countries make it clear that the parties 
are obligated to bring all claims before the national adjudicatory bodies of the licensee 
country. " It is submitted that, unless a convention on the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments is in force between the two countries, such a compulsory 
local jurisdiction may create enforcement problems where the defendant is the foreign 
Code on transfer of technology, see UNCTAD, Applicable Law and Settlement of Disputes: 
Preliminary Considerations on Drafting Provisions in the International Code of Conduct on 
Transfer of Technology, U. N. Doc. TD/AC. 1/113,1978; Fikentscher, op. cit., note 35, pp. 137- 
140. 
51 See The EEC Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, op. cit., note 6. 
52 UNCTAD Draft Code, lbid, Appendix D, Section I. B. para. 1-2; for the issue of the settlement 
of disputes in transfer of technology agreements see generally, Zuijdwijik T. J. M., The UNCTAD 
Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology, 24 Mcgill L. J. 1978, pp. 562-587. 
53 For example, Mexico, Law on Transfer of Technology; the Laws and Guidelines of Nigeria, and 
India, reprinted in UNCTAD Compilation, op. cit., note 23. Mention of the forum did not appear 
to be crucial for the TOT Code because it is implicit in the reccommended text for proper law. See 
supra, text accompanyng note 43. 
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technology supplier. Furthermore, the imposition of rigid rules of the proper law and 
forum can have adverse effect on the transfer of advanced technology to developing 
countries. In this case as Dessemontet pointed OUt54 the choice of the licensor law 
has phycological effects on him and provides confidence to evaluate the extent to 
which the contract binds the licensee, and the extent to which he may consequently 
disclose confidential techniques and know-how to licensee. It is suggested, therefore, 
that the proposed Iranian Board on Development of TechnologY55 will decide the 
proper law of those transfer of high technology agreements whose transferers insist 
on their proper law. 
In the same vein, as an alternative to the courts, parties to a technology 
agreement might include in their agreement a clause binding them to use arbitration 
as the means for settling disputes concerning the agreement. The place of arbitration 
and the manner of choosing the arbitrators and the rules of procedure under which 
arbitration is to be held can be detailed in the agreement. In this regard, there is a 
general agreement regarding international rules on arbitration procedures" and 
multilateral conventions on the enforcement of arbitration awards. " 
(C) Guarantees 
Perhaps the most difficult question in the whole process of technology licensing 
agreement is that of guarantees from the licensor that his technology shall achieve the 
defined result at the certain cost and within the specific period of time. The advantage 
54 Dessemontet F., op. cit., note 6, at 13. 
55 See infra, Chapters 9 and 10. 
56 For instance, UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, U. N. Pub., Sale No. E 77. V. 6; and the Arbitration 
Rules of the Economic Commission For Europe. 
57 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 10 June 1958; 
UNCTAD, U. N. TD/Code TOT/55, supra, Chapter Six note 49, p. 35. 
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of such guarantees is that the supplier will do his best to ensure that the manufactured 
product conforms to the contractual requirements. 
According to national contract laws and court decisions, a licensor is not held 
responsible for a guarantee without an express covenant to that effect in the licensing 
agreement. Under some technology transfer laws a contract, which does not contain 
a guarantee clause and provision for compensation for default, is not valid. For 
instance, the transfer of technology law of Brazil requires express terms in a licensing 
agreement calling for all particulars of the technology to be transferred to the licensee 
and providing him with a guarantee that the intended results of the licensing 
agreement will be achieved. " 
The TOT Code requires three guarantees: first, the technology supplier's 
guarantee that the technology meets the description contained in the technology 
transfer agreement; 59 second, the technology supplier's guarantee that the technology, 
if used in accordance with the supplier's specific instructions given pursuant to the 
agreement, is suitable for the manufacture of goods or production of services as agreed 
upon by the parties and stipulated in the agreement; 6' and third, performance 
guarantees by the supplying party as regards the consequences of failure to meet that 
performance. 61 
58 Brazil Act No. 015, op. cit., note 23, Section 5.5.1. (e) and 4.4. 
59 Draft TOT Code, op. cit., note 1,5.4. (iv). 
60 lbid, 5.4. 
61 Ibid, 5.4. 
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(d) Duration of Technology Licensing Agreements 
Another example of the interaction between transfer of technology and contract law 
is the provision relating to the duration of the agreement. Licensees are obligated by 
the transfer of technology law not to exceed the duration of the transfer of technology 
arrangement exceeding a specific period. 62 By limiting the duration of the licensing 
and by refusing an automatic renewal clause, those countries seek on the one hand to 
ensure adequate adaptation and absorbtion of the technology during the original span 
of the arrangement'6' and on the other to preclude extra royalty payments . 
64 
In doing so, some transfer of technology regulations specify that the duration 
of the arrangement may not exceed the period of validity of the protection accorded 
to industrial property rights which is equivalent to setting a time limit for the duration 
of the agreement. " Other technology transfer regimes prohibit an unduly long 
duration. " In the case of duration of those transfer of technology agreements which 
contain unpatented know-how, it is noteworthy that, some technology transfer laws 
62 For instance the laws, regulations and policy guidelines of Brazil, India, Mexico, Nigeria, 
Philippines and Venezuela in UNCTAD Compilation, op. cit., note 23. 
63 Philippines Rules and Regulation to Implement the Intent and Provisions of Sec. 5 P. D. 1520 
creating the Technology Transfer Board within the Ministry of Industry, 1978, Rule V, 10 (e), 
reprinted in UNCTAD Compilation, op. cit., note 23; UN. Doc. DT/B/C. 6/91, op. cit., note 14, p. 
12. 
64 Cieslik J., An Overview: Practices in Third World, 24 Les Nouvelles, reprinted in Bell and 
Simon, The Law and Business of Licensing: Licensing in the 1990s, 1992, vol. 2, pp. 441-473, 
p. 468. He observes that: 
Since licensors often attempted to extend the duration o contracts by including slight amendments !f 
and modifications to existing arrangements, the rules adoptedfor extensions were usually much 
stricter than those governing registration procedures for new ones. Ibid at 469. 
65 Byrne N. J., Law of Contract: Transfer of Technology to Developing Nations, New Law 
Journal, March 29,1979, pp. 309-312, p. 310; Brazil, Normative Act No. 015, op. cit.; Duration 
of technology agreements in developing countries with technology transfer regulation has been 
mostly five years, but for sophisticated technologies is 10 years. See also Cieslik, Ibid. 
66 For instance, Section 3, para. 14 of the Spanish Technology Regulation, reprinted in UNCTAD 
Compilation, op. cit, note 23. 
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also have introduced a time liMit. 
67 That is to say, following the lapse of a period, 
the licensee should be allowed to use the transferred technology without any more 
payments. 
(e) Legal Validity of Patents Involved 
The licensee of a technology which is covered fully or partly by patents will seek to 
obtain a position which is not likely to be endangered by the invalidation of those 
patents. As will be considered later 68 , if patents are granted after a through 
examination as to substance and universality, it provides a security that the patents 
will not be challenged likely. In any case, the licensor is normally required to warrant 
that as far as he is aware there is no prior use or publication or other ground for 
objecting to the patent and that he has not previously assigned or dealt with the patent 
in any way which might affect the validity of the patent or of the licence. 69 
By such a declaration, the licensor gives assurance to the licensee and concedes 
that he will be in breach of contract if the patent is invalidated. In the event of the 
invalidation of the patent(s), since payments under the licensing agreement are based 
on the continued existence of the patent rights, the question arises as to the rights of 
the licensee to terminate the agreement and to recover royalties that have been already 
paid. These and other important legal questions deserve to be clarified by the parties 
to the technology licensing agreements. 
67 Brazil Act. No. 015, Sec. 4.5.2. (d) (vi) and 6.5.2. (b), reprinted in UNCTAD Compilation, op. cit, 
note 23. 
68 See Chapter Nine. 
69 In other words, the licensor declares that "on the date of signing, it is to the best of its knowledge, 
not aware of third parties' valid patent rights or similar protection for inventions which would be 
infringed by the use of the technology when employed as specified in the agreement". UNCTAD 
Draft Code, op. cit., note 1, sect. 5.4 (vi). 
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(f) Non-infringement of a Third Party Patent 
Another important question regarding the licensed patents arises when third parties 
object to the manufacture of the licensed product by the licensee. The licensee is 
alleged to infringe the rights of the third parties merely by manufacturing the licensed 
product. It is argued that the licensor owes his licensee an implied duty to protect him 
against a claim that the subject matter of the licensed patent infringes another 
patentee's rights. As a result, it is not uncommon that the licensee often requires 
indemnification by the licensor against suits alleging patent infringement brought 
against him by third parties. Such a warrantee may also be required by the transfer of 
technology laws. 'O 
Most-Favoured Licensee Clause 
A "most-favoured licensee" or non-discrimination clause provides that if the licensor 
later executes a licence agreement with a third person on terms more favourable to 
that person than those accorded to the licensee, the licensor will give the licensee the 
benefit of the more favourable terms. This clause is particularly important for the 
licensee who is among the first to deal with the licensor and the technology is to be 
further developed or there is a likelihood of competition from other licensees in the 
same market. It is submitted that the formulation and application of this clause can be 
difficult and troublesome. On the one hand information on the contents of other 
licences granted by the licensor is often not accessible to the licensee. On the other 
70 Technology Law of Mexico, Art. 15, Sect. XII, op. cit., note 22, which provides, the Ministry of 
Patrimony and Industrial development shall not register the acts, agreements or contracts referred 
to in the second Article thereof, if it is not expressly established that the supplier shall be liable 
for the infringement of industrial property rights of third parties; [The contract shall not contain 
any clause which: I exempts the supplier from liability in any action brought by third parties in 
respect of faults or defects or for infringement of industrial property rights inherent in the 
technological content of the contract. See also Brazil, Act No. 015, Sect. 4.5-2. (d)(vii), op. cit., 
note 23. 
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hand, if the royalty rate, for instance, set in a later licence is lower and other terms 
such as conditions on supply of materials, the training of personnel, the provision of 
follow-up technological advances, the size of the market and the economic conditions 
in the two agreements are different, it may be difficult to decide which agreement is 
actually the more favourable. " 
However, it is recommended that, despite the above mentioned weaknesses, a 
most-favoured clause be included but with a provision that the licensee has a right to 
opt for the terms of a later licence or to continue under his original agreement. At the 
same time, the licensor may be required not to discriminate among the various 
licensees in terms of the price or other consideration for similar technologies under 
similar circumstances. 72 As was mentioned above, by unpackaging the technology, 
the licensor can provide more information regarding the prices of different parts of the 
technology to the licensee to enable him to monitor other transactions in the market. 
71 Such clauses also are considered against unfair competition and RBPs law in some countries and 
may give rise to legal conflicts. Partly because of these difficulties, only few national laws on the 
transfer of technology have incorporated the most favoured licensee clauses. UNCTAD, UN. Doc. 
DT/B/C. 6/91, op. cit., note 14, p. 12-13. 
72 UNCTAD draft Code, op. cit., note 1, sect. 5.4 (xii) (c). 
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111. Conclusion 
The above examination shows that transfer of technology laws can impose 
positive obligations on the parties to a transfer of technology agreement over and 
above those obligations required by the general contract laws. Compliance with those 
positive obligations are critical to the effective performance of transfer of technology 
agreements and, therefore, should override any conflict with general contractual 
obligations. Despite the advantages of special legislation to address transfer of 
technology issues, most developing countries, including Iran, have generally relied on 
their general contract laws to govern transfer of technology agreements. As a result 
of the failure on the part of these countries to provide an appropriate institutional and 
legal framework, there is no protection to protect the secrecy of the "know-how" of 
technology suppliers who then turn to other devices such as restrictive business 
practices which in turn prevents the flow of technology into these countries. On the 
other hand, the imposition of excessive and rigid obligations will only scare away 
technology suppliers who will then keep away entirely. 
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SECTION III: 
LEGAL FRAMEWORK WITHIN WHICH THE FLOW OF 
TECHNOLOGY TAKES PLACE IN IRAN 
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Chapter Eight 
FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAW OF IRAN AND TECHNOLOGY 
TRANSFER 
Since the end of the Second World War much of the modem advanced 
technology has been developed and commercially exploited by multinational 
corporations. ' They hold the centre stage in world economy and are the driving force 
behind the accelerating pace of technological innovations and some of them are at the 
cutting edge of modem science and technology by investing enormous resources in 
pure research. ' The main strengths of multinational corporations lie in their ability to 
mobilise financial, material and human resources from around the world and 
marshalling them to carry out major business ventures. They have the capacity to 
develop new technology and skills and constantly introduce new products to compete 
in world markets'. Multinational corporations possess and control three important 
elements of development, namely, human and financial capital and know-how. 
Multinational corporations also have a head-start in the markets of the 
developing countries and have unmatched marketing organisations and know-how. 
Those abilities and the incentives to seek new markets across borders as well, can 
A multinational corporation or enterprise is a combination of companies of different nationality, 
connected by means of shareholding, managerial control or contract and constituting an economic 
unit. Professor Schmitthoff expressed the view that "the multinational corporation is from legal 
point of view, conveniently ambiguous: in many respects its subsidiaries are treated as national 
companies in the host countries but, as an economic unit, it does not lose its character as pertaining 
to the home countries. " See Schmitthoff C. M., The Multinational Enterprise in the U. K. in 
Hahlo H. P., (eds. ) Nationalism and the Multinational Enterprise, 1973, p. 22. 
2 World Investment Report of 1993, in UNCTAD Bull., Number 21, July-August 1993, p. 3. 
3 See generally, UNCTC, Multinational Corporations in World Development, DOC. ST/ECA/ 
190, U. N. 1973; UNCTC, Transnational Corporations in World Development: Trends and 
Prospects, U. N. 1988. 
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make multinational corporations as the ma or conduits for the transfer of technology 
to developing countries. Properly drafted and regulated technology agreements 
between developing countries and multinational corporations can help in the avoidance 
of unnecessary and wasteful duplication of efforts on the part of the developing 
countries, to reinvent the wheel so-to-speak, be cost-efficient and lead to significant 
productivity gains. Multinational corporations adopt different mechanisms for the 
commercialisation of their technical assets. Among them are: direct foreign 
investments, licensing agreements, joint ventures, franchising, management contracts, 
marketing contracts, technical service contracts, turnkey contracts, and international 
sub-contracting. 
Since the 1950s, developing countries have tried to attract multinational 
corporations and to benefit from their potentially positive contributions to the transfer, 
development and diffusion of technology, by enacting laws and regulations to 
minimise the non-commercial risks of investing in their countries. The potentially 
negative aspects of their activities have been subject to control by other laws and 
regulations and there has always been a degree of tension between the two categories 
of laws and regulations. 
1. Law Concerning the Attraction and Protection of Foreign Investment in Iran 
In common with other developing countries, Iran's industrialisation also 
depended heavily on multinational corporations. In 1955, the "Law Concerning the 
Attraction and Protection of Foreign Investments in Iran" and in 1956 its regulations 
were passed 4 aimed at providing a range of incentives for multinational corporations 
4 Law Concerning the Attraction and Protection of Foreign Investment, November 28,1955, 
Iranian Official Gazette, No. 3187; Regulations Implementing the Law on the Attraction and 
Protection of Foreign Investments, 1956, Iranian Official Gazette, No. 3471. Hereinafter cited 
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to invest in Iran. The law provided many desirable conditions for these corporations 
to operate in the country. According to the law and its regulations, foreign investment 
may be in the forms of foreign currency, machinery, machine tools, spare parts, raw 
materials, patent rights related to and part of the productive operations, and expert 
services and the like'. Compared to other developing countries which through a 
positive list prohibit entry of foreigners to some sectors, Iran has allowed entry of 
foreign investment into all economic sectors that are open to local private investors. 6 
The foreign capital investment as well as profits were given absolute legal 
protection by the government. ' The investments had to be made for development, 
rehabilitation, and productive activities in industry, mining, agriculture, and transport. 8 
All rights, exemptions, facilities accorded to domestic capital and private enterprises 
also applied to foreign capital and firms'. Persons, companies, and private firms of 
foreign nationality investing in Iran were required, if possible, to specify "whether 
operations will be carried out independently or in partnership. "'0 The government 
guaranteed the repatriation of the net profit derived from the investment in the same 
currency as originally imported. " In the case of nationalisation, the government 
guaranteed a fair compensation. " The investments, however, were required not to 
"involve any monopoly rights or special privileges. 13 
as the law of investment and the regulations respectively. 
5 The law of investment, Article I and the regulations Article 2. 
6 The regulations, Article l(a). 
7 The law of investment, Article 1. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid, Article 3. 
10 The regulation, Article 3(e). 
II The law of investment, Article 4. 
12 Ibid, Article 3. 
13 The regulations, Article 1. 
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(a) Multinational Corporations and the Transfer of Technology to Iran 
Available statistics show that, out of 1850 registered foreign companies in Iran, 195 
of them relied for their formation on the foreign investment law of Iran. 14 The actual 
number of multinational companies in the country totalled 255, because in some cases 
more than one multinational company was involved. 15 Unfortunately, these 
investments were not made for the establishment of manufacturing facilities and 
transfer of technology to the country. They were attracted by the Iran's lucrative 
market resulting from strictly enforced application of high tariffs on imported finished 
packaged goods. 16 Domestic value added in many of foreign companies' subsidiaries 
in Iran were derived only from packaging, assembly, production of less-sophisticated 
items or simple processing of finished or semi-finished products imported from 
abroad. In other words, the required intermediate and capital goods with relatively low 
import tariffs were provided by the parent enterprises whose subsidiaries in Iran were 
engaged mostly in the final stages of production or packaging for the local market. " 
Almost all industries established through foreign investment in Iran, 
particularly those which dealt with sophisticated products, had a very limited local 
content. This was one of the principal weaknesses of past foreign investments in the 
country. The industries that were established pursuant to the foreign investment law 
14 Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance, List of Foreign Investors in Iran, August 1976, (in 
Persian); Keyhan Havai, November 15,1992, p. 18. From the point of view of the amount of funds 
involved, 34% of those investments was less than one million dollar, and only 7% was more than 
one hundred million dollars. From the type and content point of view, between 1966-1977, subject 
matters of 28% of those investments were supposed to transfer technical know-how for production. 
In 24.9% of the investments, licence was granted. 14.9% of the investments were made for 
installations. In 13.8% of the investments the sole agency was granted to the Iranian counterparts. 
In 9.7% of the investments the intention was solving technical difficulties. And only in 6.7%, 
skilled and technical personnel had to be trained. Ibid; see also Financial Times, Iran: State a 
Barrier to Investment, July 25,1977. 
15 Rahnerna, supra, Chapter One note 52, p. 296. 
16 Daftari F., Multinational Enterprises and Employment in Iran (Geneva: I. L. O., 1976), Table 
B-2; see also Bahrier, supra, Chapter One note 33, p. 257. 
17 Rahnerna, op. cit., note 15, pp. 293-310, 
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of Iran were mainly capital-intensive. 18 They merely assembled under license 
imported CDK (completely-knocked-down) parts and materials to produced consumer 
goods. '9 In this regard good examples are the establishment of pharmaceutical 
firms, 'o car assembly plants, 21 radio and television assembly plants and other 
electronic appliances like electric meters and telephones. The largely assembly plants 
used mainly local cheap labour and took advantage of the financial resources and the 
large growing markets in the country but, by the very nature of their operations, 
hardly any planned transfer of technology to the country took place. Only 6.7% of all 
foreign investments made in Iran before the 1979 revolution provided for training 
programs for local skilled and technical personnel. 22 
The Iranian foreign investment law was demonstrably inadequate as an 
instrument for the transfer of technology through investments by foreign nationals. 
Unlike some developing countries which benefited from foreign investment in building 
their technological capabilities and realising one of their development objectives, " 
the Iranian law, although it encouraged foreign investment, failed to mandate 
maximum utilisation of local supplies and manpower and provide means for better 
absorbtion of the imported technology. The Iranian law did not call for the 
18 Mohtadi H., Industrialisation and Urban Inequality in Less Developed Countries: A 
Theoretical Analysis with Evidence from Pre-revolutionary Iran, 22 J. Dev. Areas, 1987, pp. 
42-44. 
19 Rahnerna, op. cit., note 15, p. 305. 
20 See generally, Salehkhou G., supra, Chapter Two, note 31. 
21 See generally, Alizadeh, P., supra, Chapter One, note 44. 
22 Keyhan Havai, November 15,1992, p. 18. 
23 UNCTAD, Interrelationship Between Investment and Technology Transfer - Law and 
Regulations Dealing With Transfer and Development of Technology: An Overview, U. N. 
Document, TD/B/WG. 5/10,4 February 1994, p. 11; Sapalo I., Transfer of Technology 
Regulation: the Experience of the Philippines, paper presented in the UNCTAD Workshop on 
Technology Transfer and Management, Manila, December 1990, pp 9-15. 
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contribution and firm commitment of foreign enterprises to the transfer, development 
and diffusion of technology in the country. 24 
The wording of the law and other evidence indicate that the main concern in 
regard to foreign private investments in Iran was the net movement of funds out of 
Iran rather than technology transfer to the country. 25 As a result, a considerable 
number of the provisions of the regulations were concerned with financial matters 
rather than measures to ensure technological spill-over to local firms. Surprisingly, 
during the period between 1957 and 1976 when the foreign investments took place in 
Iran, the country was building a growing reserve of foreign currency derived from her 
oil revenues to the extent that the Pahlavi regime used to lend money to some foreign 
countries. Despite this, one cannot find a single provision in the law to ensure that 
foreign investments were accompanied by the actual transfer of technology to Iran. 
The effective contribution of multinational corporations to technology transfer requires 
more than the mere transfer of capital goods and software to the host countries. Their 
contribution should lead to genuine assimilation of the technology by recipient 
enterprises and should help to strengthen indigenous technological capability. 
The foreign investment law of Iran did not even mention licensing agreements 
which are usually the contractual vehicles for the transfer of technology to local 
entrepreneurs. 26 In a considerable number of cases, the foreign investments were 
connected with licensing agreements. While the Iranian firms invested considerable 
amount of capital, the contribution of foreign enterprises was merely the capitalization 
of license rights. As will be shown, it was through such unregulated licensing 
24 Compare to other developing countries, since Iran had oil revenues, its priority was less the 
attraction of foreign investment than the transfer of appropriated technology to the countries. 
25 The license application for the importation of capital required only information on the number of 
foreign technicians to be employed, the proposed training of Iranian personnel, royalties and 
technical fees. See Noshirvani v., & Bildner R., Direct Foreign Investment in the Non-Oil 
Sectors of the Iranian Economy, Iranian. Stud., 1973, pp. 66-109, p. 73. 
26 UNCTC, Licence Agreements in Developing Countries, U. N., New York, 1987, p. 3. Some 
developing countries such as Korea and Malaysia successfully regulated licensing agreements 
through their foreign investment laws, see UNCTC, Transnational Corporation in World 
Development: Third Survey, U. N. Doc. ST/CTC/46,1978, p. 169. 
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agreements that multinational corporations imposed contractual clauses to, among 
other things, control the firm. 
However, despite these ominous features of foreign investments, the Iranian 
law did not recognise the need for the control and prevention of the potentially 
negative aspects of the activities of multinational corporations - an important and long 
standing concern of developed" and developing" countries alike as well as of 
international economic organizations. " The situation was aggravated by the fact that 
Iran had no laws for the protection of competition and elimination of restrictive 
agreements and arrangements. The multinational corporations in Iran did not make a 
significant contribution to the process of industrialisation of the country. On the 
contrary, they created barriers to the entry of indigenous firms into domestic and 
international markets. 
(b) Joint Ventures and the Transfer of Technology to Iran 
It can be said that joint-venture companies are excellent vehicles for the acquisition 
of foreign technology. Because of the equity participation in the project by the foreign 
partners who have a stake in the venture, there are enough incentives and commitment 
for the joint ventures to be managed and operated efficiently. The significant role that 
27 OECD, Declaration By the Governments of OECD Member Countries and Decisions of the 
OECD Council on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, Paris, 1976; 
OECD, Competition Policy and Intellectual Property Rights, Paris, 1989. 
28 Hymer S. H., The Multinational Corporation: A Radical Approach, Cambridge, 1979; Mirabito 
A. J., Control of Technology Transfer: The Burke-Hartke Legislation and the Andean 
Foreign Investment Code: The Multinational Enterprise Faces the Nations, Int'l. Lawyer, vol. 
9,1979, pp. 215-238. 
29 UNCTC, Draft United Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations: Outstanding 
Issues, U. N. Doc. E/C. 10/1985/5 of 17 October 1984; Horn N., (ed), Legal Problems of Codes 
of Conduct for Multinational Enterprises, ( Studies in Transnational Economic Law, vol. 1), 
1980; Timberg S., Impact on Transnational Corporations of the International Code of 
Conduct on the Transfer of Technology, IlC, vol. 12,198 1, pp. 133-152; Wafflace C. D., Legal 
Control of the Multinational Enterprise - National Regulatory Techniques and Prospects for 
International Controls, The Hague, 1982. 
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an appropriate collaboration between foreign technology holders and local recipients 
can play in the transfer of technology process cannot be disputed. However, since the 
Iranian partners contributed little to the management and control of the joint ventures 
before 1979, and in many cases the partnership was only in name, the appropriateness 
of the joint-ventures as vehicles for the transfer of technology to the country can be 
challenged. Foreign partners in joint-ventures firms in Iran committed negligible 
financial capital but, in practice, they controlled the ventures directly or through 
restrictive contractual clauses. 
On the basis of a study of joint-venture enterprises in Iran, Rafii maintained 
that firms with more than 24% foreign equity were almost entirely controlled by 
foreign shareholders . 
30 Bildner, who also studied joint-ventures operating in Iran, 
revealed that the top management and technical positions were staffed mostly by 
expatriates and adequate training programs for local employees were not provided. 31 
Alizadeh, in her in-depth examination of the Iranian automotive industry, shows that 
a majority of the shares of the industry was owned by local investors but multinational 
corporations despite their relatively limited shareholding obstructed the adaptation and 
technological innovation of the industry by imposing a variety of restrictive business 
practices . 
32 Finally, another study of thirteen Iranian joint-ventures in nine different 
groups disclosed that they had not established any significant linkages with the 
domestic economy except for the local packaging industry. " The above studies 
clearly show that being majority shareholders does not necessarily mean that Iranians 
would have control of joint ventures with foreign partners. As will be considered in 
30 Rafil F., Joint Ventures and Transfer of Technology to Iran: The Impact of Foreign Control, 
unpublished Ph. D thesis, Harvard University, (1978), pp. 2-33. 
31 Bildner, R., Strategies and Effects of Multinational Corporations in Iran and Yugoslavia, Yale 
University, 1973, Chapter 6, cited in Noshirvani and Bildner, op. cit., note 25, p. 90. For Instance, 
13 years after the establishment of a joint-venture firm, not a single top management and technical 
position was occupied by an Iranian. Ibid. pp. 90-93. 
32 Alizadeh, op. cit., note 21, p. 322. For instance, all parts manufactured by local firms In Iran had 
to be confirmed by the foreign shareholders. Most of those locally manufactured parts were 
rejected under pretext of being non-standard. Ibid. 
33 Daftari and Borghey, op. cit., note 16. 
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the last part of this chapter, this conclusion would challenge the current interpretations 
by Iranian jurists of Principle 81 of the new Constitution of Iran. 
(C) Monopolisation of Iran's Market 
Soon after the 1979 revolution, a group of Iranian researchers examined 108 major 
licensing agreements concluded between multinational corporations and Iranian 
firms 
. 
34 This path-breaking study revealed the depth of the influence of multinational 
corporations in Iran. It was disclosed for the first time that multinational corporations 
imposed 27 types of restrictive business practices to limit the use of their technology 
by Iranian licensees. 35 
A closer examination of the licensing agreements reveals that, almost all 
multinational corporations required that the Iranian licensee should not patent any 
improvement or innovations of the technology. Such improvements or innovations 
were regarded as the property of the licensor or, in some cases, should be licensed 
only to the licensor. In a considerable number of cases the licensee was barred from 
adding to its manufacturing capacity through contractual clauses such as non- 
competition, territorial restraint, tying, field of use, non-use of competitive technology, 
and export clauses. 
The above restrictions directly or indirectly limited the use of acquired 
technology in a broad sense, i. e., in production, marketing, research and development, 
etc. Thus, while it enabled effective market control by the licensor, it kept local 
technological content to a low level. Indeed, the low utilisation of the capacity of the 
pharmaceutical industries in Iran can be attributed in part to those contractual 
34 Rahnema, Foreign Licensing Agreements With Iranian Industries, supra, Chapter One, note 5 1. 
For similar studies in other developing countries see Vaitsos C. V., The Process of 
Commercialization of Technology in the Andean Pact: A Synthesis, Lima, Peru, October 197 1. 
35 Rahnerna, op. cit., note 15, p. 303. 
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limitations imposed by licensor companies. " The restrictive clauses also had the 
effect of perpetuating the dependence of the Iranian licensees on the multinational 
corporations; causing excessive delays in the use and non-optimal use when the 
technology is employed; and overpricing owing to the preclusion of domestic firms 
from the most rapidly growing sectors of the economy. " 
Accordingly, having an encouraging foreign investment law does not 
necessarily lead to the transfer and development of foreign technology. There is no 
doubt that the strategy of multinational corporations in commercialising their 
technological assets is to maximise their technological advantages in international 
markets but it leads to suppressing any material transfer of technology even within 
their affiliates. " It is the well defined policy of the host countries that devise 
appropriate laws and regulations to concede multinational corporations' preferences 
to some degree so long as technology is transferred on terms which benefit the 
country. 
Unfortunately, Iran did not have sufficient wisdom, in the past, to secure a 
better return from the foreign investors. It has been accepted that while such factors 
as the investment law, the patent law and tax holidays encouraged multinational 
corporations to invest in Iran, the lack of a clear and sound technological policy of the 
36 Salehkhou, op. cit., note 20, p. 5 1. Rahnema, a former senior analyst in the Industrial Management 
Institute of Iran, has summarised the effects of transnational corporations licensing agreements as 
follows: 
1. "Local production of the Iranian firm was limited to the manufacture of a set of less- 
sophisticated components of the finished product and was heavily reliant on the 
continuous import of the major CKD components and materials; 
2. The supplier of technology (the licensor) did not commit itself to give the technical 
assistance, training, and research and development needed for increasing the share of local 
production and adding to the local content; and 
3. Conversely, the supplier of technology imposed a variety of restrictions to prevent the 
Iranian firm from adding to its technical capabilities, reducing the items in the imported 
CKD pack list, and consequently lowering the increasing costs of imports. " Rahnema, op. 
cit., note 15, p. 305. 
37 Nowshirvani and Blinder, op. cit., note 25, p. 89. 
38 Dunning J. H., The Consequence of International Transfer of Technology by Multinational 
Enterprises: Some Home Country Implications, in International Production and 
Multinational Enterprises, London, 1981, p. 339. 
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government and the absence of an efficient legal framework for its implementation 
made such investments have insignificant impact on the transfer of technology to Iran. 
(d) Foreign Investment after the Revolution 
The unsatisfactory economic and industrial development of Iran is alleged to have 
been the work of some foreign countries and multinational corporations which were 
said to have interfered in the economic and political life of the country. The collapse 
of the Pahlavi dictatorship and the establishment of an Islamic Republic meant an end 
to political incursion by foreign countries. Provisions in the new Constitution require 
the government to adopt national policies, enact laws and establish institutions to 
prevent foreign companies from dominating Iranian economy. " 
11. The New Constitution and Foreign Companies' Activities in Iran 
Principle 81 of the new Constitution is very drastic in its condemnation of 
foreign participation in Iranian economy. So much so that various interpretations are 
being given to Principle 81 in order to justify and encourage the flow of foreign 
investments into the country. According to Principle 81, the granting of concessions: 
39 The Constitution, Principle 43 (8). 
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rrto foreigners for the formation of companies or institutions dealing with 
commerce, industry, agriculture, services or mineral extraction is absolutely 
forbidden. "' 
(a) First Interpretation 
Serious questions were levied at Principle 81 when the first post revolutionary 
government took office and faced with the practical application of the principle. 
Several contracts with foreign companies for the supply of spare parts, technical 
assistance and experts were due to be signed by government ministries when questions 
were raised as to the legality of the contracts under Principle 8 1. Although the 
Registration of Companies Act authorised the registration of established foreign 
companies, 41 the Iranian Registrar of Companies refused to register any foreign 
company on the grounds that it was unconstitutional. 
The government sought an interpretation of Principle 81 from the Guardian 
Council. 42 This Council is responsible under the Constitution for giving the 
authoritative interpretation of constitutional provisions . 
4' The Council's response to 
Principle 81 was as follows: 
40 The Constitution law, Principle 81. The Constitution also provides that, "any form of agreement 
resulting in foreign control over the natural resources, economy, army, or culture of the country, 
as well as other aspects of the national life, is forbidden. " Principle 171, Ibid. 
41 The Registration of Companies Act, 1931, Article 3. 
42 The Government letter No. 83240 dated 198 1, Iranian Official Gazette, 199 1, No. 10625. It should 
be recalled that under the constitutional arrangements of the 1979 Iranian Constitution, the Council 
of Guardians is vested with the authority to interpret the Constitutional Law of Iran as well as veto 
any legislation which does not conform to Islamic law. See The Iranian Constitutional Law, supra, 
Chapter One, note 56, Principles 94 and 98. 
43 The Constitution, Principle 98. 
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"foreign companies which have concluded contracts with government organs 
can, for their legal affairs and commercial activities in the framework of the 
concluded contracts, in conformity with the article 3 set of the law of 
registration of companies, register their branches in Iran and this [registration] 
has no discord with the Principle 81 of the Constitutional law. "44 
This interpretation makes the conclusion of a contract with the government or 
a government agency a precondition for the registration of a foreign company in Iran. 
It clears the way for the government and government agencies to be able to enter into 
contracts with foreign companies. 
(b) Second Interpretation 
Another interpretation of the Principle 81 suggests that a "concession" under principle 
81 may be avoided by restricting a foreign company's share in a joint-venture to 49% 
or lower and the foreign company does not control the joint-venture. In other words, 
a foreign company owning more than 50% shares of an Iranian company, and is thus 
able to control the company, is disqualified from registration under Principle 8 1, 
because that would amount to a grant of a "concession" and thus unconstitutional 
under Principle 8 1.45 
44 Iranian Official Gazette, 1991, No. 10625. 
45 This interpretation was attributed to the Organisation for Investment and Economic Technical 
Assistance of Iran (OIETA) which required that: "Foreign direct investment in Iran is allowed only 
through participation of foreign persons in the equity capital of existing and new Iranian 
companies. Maximum foreign participation in the joint companies is 49%, however, this proportion 
will be determined on merits of each project. " Emam, F., The Law of Foreign Investment in 
Iran, Teheran, 1994, p. 98. (in Persian) 
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(C) Third Interpretation 
The third interpretation of Principle 81 emerged when the government after the Iraq 
war began to formulate plans to reconstruct the country's war ravaged economy based 
on a policy of a free competitive market and expansion of the private sector. This 
entailed large investments both domestic and foreign which meant a fresh 
interpretation of Principle 81 of the Constitution. It was argued that a foreign 
investment per se in the country is not a "concession" within the meaning of Principle 
81 and was, therefore, not unconstitutional. " According to this approach, it was 
further argued that the actual amount of foreign investment bore no relevance to the 
question of exclusion of Principle 8 1. The proportion of foreign holding was regarded 
as not having any legal basis and was, therefore, not to be taken into account in a 
47 determination of constitutionality. Until there is a submission to the Guardian 
Council for a ruling, there will be uncertainty as to whether or not the Guardian 
Council will accept this interpretation. 
(d) Analysis of the Interpretations 
The correct interpretation of Principle 81 remains in doubt to date, more than 15 years 
after the introduction of the new Constitution. The registration of a foreign company 
conditional upon securing a contract with the government has no statutory support. 48 
It is also not supported by Islamic Common Law. In fact, the intention of the 
46 This interpretation is attributed to some Ministers and to the Iran Chamber of Commerce, Industries 
and Mines. For instances see the view of Ministry of Industry, Mr. Neamatzadeh, regarding the 
foreign investment in Iran, Keyhan Havai,, August 19,1992, p. 19; and views of Mr Khamoshi, 
the head of the Iran Chamber of Commerce, published in Keyhan, Teheran, No. 14903, p. 3,1993. 
47 Keyhan Havai, Ibid. 
48 See for instance, Amendment Act for Improvement of Regulation of Registration of 
Companies, September 1961, Art. 1, which only requires the registration of foreign companies. 
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Parliament, as reflected in the final round of debates leading to the adoption of the 
new Constitution, was not to exclude foreign companies from being registered in Iran. 
This was in direct contrast to the thinking behind the adoption of Principle 8 1. There 
is no evidence of any express view or specific discussion in regard to preventing 
foreign companies from entering the country. The questions asked in Parliament 
centred around the concepts of concession and associated monopoly characteristics 
rather than a policy to avoid registration of foreign companies. 49 
What Principle 81 objects to is the establishment of a foreign company 
following an exclusive grant extended by the government to foreign nationals for the 
extraction of oil and minerals, production and distribution of a particular product such 
as tobacco, etc. Many such grants had been made in the past hundred years of the 
history of Iran and they were detested by the Iranians who now intensified their efforts 
to outlaw such concessions. " Therefore, one should distinguish between 
"establishment" of a foreign company to exploit a monopoly and mere "registration" 
of a company in the ordinary course of its business. The registration of a company 
that already has been established abroad and is engaged in commercial and industrial 
activities cannot be characterised as a "concession" with its monopolistic connotations. 
A foreign company transacting a business in Iran, like other local and foreign 
companies already registered in Iran, should be allowed to have a legal personality and 
do business within the legal framework of the country. This is not only an essential 
minimum legal requirement in every country but also mirrors contemporary economic 
and commercial realities and should be encouraged. 
The Guardian Council's exclusion of foreign companies under contract with 
the government from the provisions of Principle 81 is evidence that there is no blanket 
prohibition against registration of foreign companies ipso facto. The overriding 
concern is the fear of uncontrolled activities of foreign companies and the fact that a 
49 Parliamentary Debates on Final Examination of the Constitutional Law, vol. 3, Teheran. (in 
Persian) 
50 See for instance, Keddie N. R., Religion and Rebellion in Iran: The Tobacco Protest of 1891- 
1892, London, 1966. 
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foreign company is under a contract with the government means that there is adequate 
supervision by the government to keep such a company out of the ambit of Principle 
8 1. One may then ask if such an argument can be extended to other foreign companies 
which are potentially not harmful to the economic interests of Iran. Principle 81 is 
directed at companies that are engaged under conditions such as monopoly rights 
given by "concessions" as the term has been understood in the era of foreign intrigue 
and the despotic Shahs. It can, therefore, be submitted that the single important 
prohibition under Principle 81 of the Constitution is the granting of "concession" to 
a foreign enterprise as the meaning of the term "concession" is understood in Iran and 
that is giving monopoly rights to a foreign company. 
Any other interpretation of Principle 8 1, if not defective, would be highly 
problematic to government planners and policy makers. Principle 81 should be looked 
at in the context of all the provisions in the Constitution which prohibits the 
government from becoming the absolute employer in the country. " The Constitution 
recognises the private sector as an important component of the economic system of 
the country". The Guardian Council's narrow interpretation of Principle 81 while 
providing some limited scope for foreign companies to operate in Iran suggests 
increasing government interventions in the economy. In many areas of the economy, 
the Iranian private sector requires foreign investment of capital and technology and 
the Guardian Council's interpretation would result inevitably in the weakening of the 
Iranian private sector which might seek ways to escape abroad. 
The approach to direct foreign investment in Iran has swung from one extreme 
to another, from the disappointing indifferent attitude of the Pahlavi regime towards 
the activities of multinational corporations in the country and the near paranoidal 
attitude in the early years of the post revolutionary period resulting in state over- 
interventionism. Since then the government's attitude has moderated as can be inferred 
from the Parliamentary debates. The crux of the issue of foreign enterprises is rightly 
51 The Constitution, Principle 43 (2), see also supra, Chapter One text accompanying note 68. 
52 Ibid, Principle 44. 
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the prohibition of "concessions" because of the anti-competitive and monopolistic 
behaviour of foreign and even domestic enterpriseS53 : not the rooting out of foreign 
companies from investing in the country. 
As far as the issue of transfer of technology is concerned, those suspicious of 
the conduct of foreign companies argue that foreign companies did not effectively 
transfer their valuable technology to Iran in the past and are not likely to do so in the 
future. They also believe that foreign technologies are inappropriate for a developing 
country like Iran. All research and development efforts leading to those technologies 
are made to satisfy the needs and problems of the societies from which the foreign 
companies originate and not those of the developing countries. Indiscriminate use of 
foreign technologies keep Iran in a condition of permanent technological dependence. 
The proponents of this school of thought in Iran, thus believe that for breaking out the 
permanent technological dependence of the country, the transfer of foreign technology 
to the country should be selective and instead local research and development centres 
should be established and improved in the country. 54 
These arguments certainly have some merits. The problem with a strict 
interpretation of Principle 81 is to, if not prevent, limit severely the activities of 
foreign companies in the country which would then be deprived of foreign investments 
in capital funds and technology needed to achieve Iran's economic and industrial 
goals. It is a proposition of this thesis that Principle 81 should be applied only to 
concessions in the narrower meaning of the word as synonymous with a monopoly and 
that it is perfectly constitutional to allow foreign companies generally to register and 
operate in Iran but that, to do so, Iran must legislate for screening transfer of 
technology agreements and controlling restrictive agreements. As will be suggested 
53 A closer look at the final debates for the enactment of the Principle 81 reveals that some 
representatives still insisted on the inclusion of the prohibition of concessions for domestic 
enterprises as well; Iran Chamber of Commerce, What is the Place of Participation and Foreign 
Investment under Iranian Laws, Letter of Iranian Chamber of Commerce, No. 9,1993, pp. 5-8, 
P. 6. (in Persian) 
54 Razzaghi, supra, Chapter One, note 47, pp. 78-81; see also Foreign Investments Do not Play a 
Favourable Role in Economy of Non-Industrial Countries, In Keyhan Havai, Numbers 1006, 
1007, November 1992. 
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later, what is required is the establishment of a strong legal and institutional 
framework to deal with the entire aspects of transfer and development of technology, 
including questions of industrial property rights and protection of competition. The 
final round of Parliamentary debates on the new Constitution support the submissions 
of the thesis. " 
(i) Interpretation or Expediency? 
Fortunately, the validity of the Guardian Council's interpretation of Principle 
81 is in question. To prevent abuse of the process of interpretation by the Guardian 
Council, the Constitution provides that: 
The authority of the interpretation o the Constitution is vested with the ýf 
Guardian Council, which is to be done with the consent of three fourth 
of its members. " 
The Guardian Council should meet in special session to respond to a request 
for interpretation of the Constitution and the support of three-fourths of all its 
members will be required for a valid interpretation. The ordinary meaning of the 
words will be used in the interpretation which will also take into account the 
objectives of the legislator and the practical needs of the society. 
Because of the failure of the Guardian Council to meet in special session and 
put the matter to vote as required by the Constitution and as evidenced in the text of 
the answer to the government request to interpret Principle 8 1, the interpretation given 
by the Council is not legally binding" and gives the government the freedom to 
55 Parliamentary Debates, op. cit, note 52. 
56 The Constitution, Principle 98. 
57 In this regard see also Emam, F., op. cit., note 48, p. 97. 
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consider further the application of Principle 8L In passing it may be noted that the 
Guardian Council has not determined whether or not the foreign company is allowed 
to conduct business with Iranian private companies after the registration of the 
company on the ground that the foreign company is under a contract with the 
government. Apparently, there is nothing preventing the company from operating in 
Iran. Thus, the first interpretation which was regarded as expedient at that time by the 
Guardian Council, can be discounted as having no legal basis. 
(ii) Control of Foreign Companies Activities Through Share Limitation 
The second interpretation has attached importance to the stock ownership of foreign 
nationals of companies registered in Iran. Those who support it have the same 
objective as the first interpretation, namely the control of activities of foreign 
companies in the country. While the first interpretation intends to control foreign 
companies through their contracts with the government, the second believes in control 
through the requirement that majority shares should be owned by Iranian nationals for 
a company to be registered in the country. This school of thought accepts that 
multinational corporations can play a useful role in the transfer of technology to Iran 
provided they transfer their technology through indigenous-controlled firms. Two 
points should be made regarding the arguments of this school of thought: 
Firstly, a limit on foreign ownership is not inferrable from the text of Principle 
81 so long as no monopoly is granted and applicable rules of law are observed. it is 
a matter for government policy makers to set ceilings, if any, on foreign investments 
in Iran. Secondly, it is believed that, in the absence of an appropriate legal and 
institutional framework to cover patent, competition, foreign investment and transfer 
of technology, the second interpretation would be ineffective as well. Majority share 
holders are not necessarily those who control the company. It has been shown that, 
in practice, Iranian joint-ventures used to be controlled by minority foreign 
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shareholders through mechanisms such as the restrictive business practices. 58 One 
should bear in mind that the ownership of a company's shares is not necessarily 
synonymous with control of the company. In the Algeria Accord accepted by the US 
and Iran, ownership of shares as a criterion was rejected for those companies which 
were subject to the control of government. 59 
(iv) Control of the Foreign Companies Through Market Forces 
The third interpretation of the Principle 81 leaves the control of activities of foreign 
companies in the country mainly to the market forces. From the legal point of view, 
the proponents of this interpretation argue that their approach is based on the law of 
investment of Iran. The law and its regulations have neither conditioned the foreign 
investments to the conclusion of a contract with the government, nor restricted the 
foreign investments to a minority ownership of shares in an Iranian company. On the 
contrary, the regulations of the foreign investment law give foreign investors the 
freedom to choose between disposing their capital in the country directly and via 
partnership with Iranian nationals. 60 
As far as Principle 81 is concerned, the proponents of the third interpretation 
maintain that unlimited foreign investment in the country is not unconstitutional. For 
this, they base their view on two grounds: firstly, the law of investment has not been 
58 Rafii in his study of 35 joint ventures in the manufacturing sector in Iran in 1977 disclosed that 
the foreign firms without having majority ownership exercised considerable influence over joint- 
venture operations through control of key managerial functions or by imposing RBPs in contractual 
agreements, principally licence and technical assistance agreements. op. cit., note 30; and Rafii F., 
joint Ventures and the Transfer of Technology: The Case of Iran, in Stobaugh and Wells 
(eds. ), Technology Crossing Boards, Harvard and Business School Press, 1984, pp. 203-243, at 
213. 
59 Nasiry M., Recognition of Companies' Nationality Based on the Algeria Accord, Research 
Pamphlet, No. 92, Teheran, p. 2 (in Persian); see also Emam, op. cit., note 48, p. 102. 
60 The regulation of foreign investment law, Article 3; Iran-Chamber of Commerce, 1993, op. cit., r_1 
note 53, p. 7. 
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repealed as non-Islamic by the Guardian Council; " secondly, as was noted earlier, 
the Council has not given a formal interpretation of Principle 81 yet. The situation is 
similar to the question of interpretation of Principle 139 of the Constitution where the 
Council held that the current laws may continue to be followed as long as the Council 
has not deemed otherwise. 62 As a result, the present law on the attraction and 
protection of foreign investments which has not been rejected by the Council is still 
in force and there is no limit placed on foreign investment by the Iranian constitution. 
From the economic point of view, the proponents of the above interpretation 
of Principle 81 insist that the population of the country is increasing rapidly and oil 
revenues will not be adequate to finance needed infrastructures and all the capital 
63 
needs for development of the country. If Iran limits foreign share holdings to 49%, 
the local private sector must find the balance 50% which it does not have. This will 
be the case particularly for those projects which are capital intensive. This school of 
thought believes that the creation of a sound and predictable investment climate which 
assures a reasonable return on investments and adequate protection of industrial 
property rights provide the best opportunities for the transfer of technology to the 
country. 64 
61 According to the Principle four of the Constitution, all civil, penal, financial, economic, 
administrative, educational, military, political and other laws and regulations shall be based on the 
Islamic principles. The Council of Guardian, thus had to determine the pre revolution laws that 
were non-Islamic. The foreign investment and patents law are among those laws that have not been 
stated as non-Islamic. For the constitutional relationship between the Iranian Parliament and the 
Guardian Council see supra, note 43. 
62 "With regard that the current laws are not enforceable when they are against the Constitutional law, 
in the events that the comprisal of any Principles of the Constitution to the current laws requires 
the interpretation of the Guardian Council, as long as the Guardian Council has not given its 
interpretation's view, those laws are enforced. " Collection of Council of Guardian's Views, vol. 
2, p. 907, Teheran. (in Persian). 
63 See for instance the interview with Mr Mahloogi, the Mines and Metals Minister, Keyhan Havai, 
September 16 1992, p. 14. 
64 KeYhan Havai, August 19,1992, p. 19; Keyhan, Teheran, No. 14903, p. 3,1993; Keyhan Havai, 
September 16 1992, p. 14,23. 
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The third interpretation of Principle 81 has raised fewer legal problems 
compared to the other two interpretations because it meant far less control over 
foreign investments which would generally be accompanied by technology unavailable 
in the country. That interpretation has not been seriously challenged and, in practice, 
65 has worked well except in matters of transfer of technology. This interpretation 
might continue to be accepted provided, however, that it is shown that foreign 
investment activities in the country do not violate other Principles of the 
Constitution. 66 Nevertheless, the third approach to foreign investment in Iran has its 
own weaknesses. Chief among them is the absence of rules against distortion of 
competition and abuses of privileged positions in the market and rules addressing 
transfer of technology issues. One of the points constantly articulated by the 
government authorities is the acquisition of modern technology through foreign 
investment but few measures were taken to make that happen. 67 
The problem has been the opening up of the markets without having sound and 
responsive national and international legal institutions to protect public interests. Iran, 
after seven decades of spending vast sums of money on foreign goods and services, 
has not a satisfactory local industrial and technological base. Iran may have lost 
opportunities to develop local skills and technological capabilities because of the 
unregulated activities of foreign investors especially during the Pahlavi regime. 
Continued neglect to introduce the necessary legal and institutional reforms will not 
improve the situation under the current regime as well. " 
65 One recent example for its acceptance is the conclusion of an agreement between the National 
Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) and French company, TOTAL, in July, 1995. According to the 
agreement, TOTAL will make all necessary investment for the extraction of oil and gas from Siri 
Island. International Ettela'at, London, No. 269, Friday July 21,1955, p. 10. 
66 See supra, notes 40 and 41. 
67 Mashaiekhi A. N., Iran's Economy Under Microscope, Intemational Ettelaw, London, No. It 9, 
October 1994. See also Keyhan Havai, December 29,1993, p. 16. 
68 Dr Mashaiekhi, who is a senior advisor of Iran's Plan and Budget Organisation, also criticises that 
while the physical aspects of development have been excessively pursued by the Government, there 
is no sufficient appraisal and monitoring of development projects and transfer of technology 
agreements in the country. Ibid. For types, merits and demerits of government intervention in the 
process of transfer of technology, see McFetridge D. G., Government Intervention in 
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At the time of writing of this thesis a draft of a new foreign investment law 
of Iran is in its first reading in the Parliament. The draft has clearly adopted the third 
interpretation of Principle 81 of the Constitution. Foreign ownership of the majority 
share in a company registered in Iran has been made expressly lawful. 69 Other 
incentives and guarantees have also been introduced and the proposed changes are still 
vague and insufficient. The draft has provided that the investment "should not involve 
monopolistic rights and [should not involve] granting privileges to foreign 
partners. iv7O It introduces important and complex concepts into the Iranian legal 
system without a serious attempt to define them. Worse still, the draft law, like the 
law currently in force, makes no provision to deal with technology licensing 
agreements and restrictive business practices. 
International Technology Transfer: More or Less?, Canada-US. L. J., vol. 11,1986, pp. 331- 
344. 
69 The draft of new Iranian Investment Law, Article 8 (a) remark. 
70 lbid, Art. 5(d). 
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111. Conclusion 
The weakness of the existing legal framework within which the flow of foreign 
investments take place in Iran is the absence of provisions aimed at ensuring 
maximum utilization and better absorbtion of the imported technology. The law does 
not specify precisely the conditions under which multinational corporations should 
operate and what they should achieve. The main concern of the current law is the net 
movement of funds out of Iran rather than the related technology transfer into the 
country. The need for the control and prevention of the potentially negative aspects 
of multinational corporations activities has not been recognised. Technology licensing 
agreements, which were frequently used in ventures with local partners, were left 
unregulated but there is no antitrust legislation to act as a compensating force. The 
results have been disappointing. The new Constitution, promulgated after the 
revolution, has introduced new elements which are, however, being interpreted in a 
way to permit foreign investments to continue. Other laws have been untouched and 
transfer of technology issues continue to be neglected despite a deep awareness of the 
lack of progress in industrial development of the country. 
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Chapter Nine 
IRANIAN PATENT ACT: A NEGATIVE INSTRUMENT FOR 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND PROMOTION AND 
ATTRACTION OF INVESTMENT 
1. Introduction 
(a) The Historical Development of the Iranian Patent System 
As was described in Chapter One of the thesis, Iran gained astonishing wealth and 
enjoyed relatively stable political and economic conditions in the thirties. Crude oil 
was being extracted in the country, the first Iranian Parliament was established, and 
laws and regulations for adminstration of the country in the modern sense were being 
passed. The growing importance of Iran's rich natural resources, particularly crude oil, 
its foreign currency earnings and its forward looking industrial policy and eagerness 
to acquire foreign technology had made Iran a target for foreign investors and 
suppliers of goods and services. However, at that time, Iran did not protect any 
intellectual property rights either through its national laws or by accession to 
international conventions. 
It was in such circumstances that foreign countries were eager to conclude 
bilateral industrial property rights protection agreements with Iran to facilitate the 
importation of their manufactured goods in the country. In 1928, the first bilateral 
agreement between Germany and Iran to protect patents, trademarks, trade names, and 
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copyrights of their respective nationals, consisting of two provisions, was signed and 
approved by the Iranian Parliament. ' Two years later, in 193 1, the first Iranjan patent 
and trademarks law, based largely on the French patent law of 1844, was prepared and 
hastily passed by the Iranian Parliament without any serious deliberations. ' In the 
same year, regulations under the law were enacted to enforce it. ' 
In the ensuing years, foreign political pressure on Iran to become a member 
of the Paris Convention gathered momentum. However, this did not materialise until 
the democratic government of the late Dr Mosadeq, who was against any surrender 
of the sovereignty of the country, collapsed following the coup d'etat of 1951. 
Subsequently, a law for attraction of foreign investment was enacted in 1955' and in 
order to facilitate the Iranian membership of the Paris Convention, in 1958, the patent 
regulations were replaced by new regulations issued by the Ministry of Justice. The 
5 regulations comprised 67 provisions. Iran became party to the Paris Convention on 
16th December, 1959, and the latest Act of the Convention to which Iran is a party 
is the Lisbon amendment of January 4,1962.6 A separate law in 1961 makes the 
Office of Registration Organization of Deeds and Industrial Property responsible for 
the registration of trademarks, inventions, commercial names and industrial designs. 7 
I Code of Laws, Seventh vol. 1929, p. 316. 
2 Registration of Trademarks and Inventions Act, 1931, Iranian Official Gazette, No. 772. For 
an English version of the French Patent Act of July 1884, see Carpmael A., Patent Laws of the 
World, London, 1889. 
3 Regulations for Execution of Trademarks and Patents, 1931, Iranian Official Gazette, No. 
12871-833. 
4 See Chapter Eight. 
5 Revised Regulations for the Execution of the Law of 1st Tir 1310 (1931) Relative to the 
Registration of Trade Marks and Patents, Iranian Official Gazette, March 1958. 
6 The Permission Act for the Ratification of the Iranian Government to the International 
General Union Known as Paris for Protection of Industrial, Commercial and Agricultural 
Property, February 1958. 
7 Act for Improvement of Regulation of Registration of Companies, September 196 1, art. I- 
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11. The Iranian Patent System and Transfer of Technology 
According to the Iranian Patent Act of 193 1, discovery or invention of a novel 
industrial product and discovery of new means, or application of existing means in a 
new manner, for obtaining a novel industrial or agricultural result or product are 
registrable in Iran. ' The discoveries and inventions to be qualified for registration 
should be absolutely novel. 9 The requirement of non-obvious (or inventive step)'O 
has not been recognised by the law. Except for financial plans, formulae and 
pharmaceutical compositions and those inventions that disturb public order or are 
contrary to morals or against public health, virtually all inventions, whether products 
or processes are patentable in the country. " 
Once a patent is granted under the Iranian Patent Act the patentee and his legal 
successors are legally empowered for up to 20 years in the territory of Iran to 
manufacture, sell, assign, license or import the patented invention. 12 As regards the 
exclusive right of importation, although it has not been mentioned expressly by the 
law itself, the Regulation of Patent Act in several articles, particularly in Article 64, 
has recognised such a right specifically for the patent holder. This may be explained 
in the context of Iranian membership of the Paris Convention which has, as cited 
8 Iranian patent law, Articles 26 and 27. 
9 The Regulations of Iranian patent law, Article. 26. 
10 An invention, although novel, may not be patentable if it is obviously deducible from the prior art 
by an ordinary "person skilled in the art" of the relevant technology. It has been argued that 
theoretically, unlimited compound variations from the existing materials might be produced and 
claim patent for each new combination. In the same way, the requirement of non-obviousness, like 
novelty, is intended to limits patent monopolies to those inventions that in fact serve to advance 
the state of the useful art. 
II Iranian patent law, Articles 27 and 28. 
12 Iranian patent law, Articles 33 and 39; Regulations of the patent law, Articles 40 and 43. 
According to Article 39 of the law, the patent holder may assign to another person the title to, or 
the right of use of the subject of invention, totally or in part, and in any manner. 
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above, recognised the right of importation. The Regulation of Patent Act was passed 
in 1958 - the year that Iran applied to become a party to the Paris Convention - to 
emphasise the exclusiveness of the right of importation for patent holders as well. 
The patent holder has the right to take legal action against any person 
exploiting the invention without his agreement. If infringement is discovered and the 
dispute is not resolved amicably, the patentee and the alleged infringer may agree to 
arbitrate the dispute. Alternatively, an action may be brought in certain courts in 
Iran. 13 The civil remedies available under the Iranian Patent Act against an alleged 
patent infringer include an injunction to restrain further infringement 14 and damages 
in respect of the infringement. " 
Besides the civil remedies, the infringement of a patented technology in Iran 
also is regarded as a criminal offence. Under Article 249 of the annulled General 
Punishment Law, every infringement on registered patents, either by manufacturing 
of the product or by application of the subject matter of patents, was regarded as fraud 
and the infringer would be imprisoned for a period between 3 to 6 months or fined 
to pay 100000 Toman ( Iranian currency unit) or both. After the revolution of 1979, 
pursuant to the policy of the islamisation of Iranian laws, the General Punishment Law 
was replaced by the Islamic punishment law. 16 The law, which is now in force, 
excludes patent infringement as a punishable offence. 
13 The Regulations of Iranian patent law, Article 6. 
14 The Regulations of the Iranian patent law, Article, 64 and the Civil Procedure Law, Article 778. 
15 The Regulations of Iranian patent law, Ibid. 
16 Islamic Punishment Law of Iran, Iranian Official Gazette, No. 10972,1982. It is important to 
have in mind that although the current Iranian criminal code does not refer directly and specifically 
to the infringement of patented inventions, it takes care of trade secrets related to inventions. 
Article 125 of the current criminal code reads as follows: 
Imprisonment of one year to three years will be applied to person who on the basis of his/her 
professional and trustworthiness status Is Informed of secrets of an invention and the way that 
invention is carried out, and use it against public interests or misuse it in any manner. 
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In Iran, the burden is initially on the patent holder to prove that infringement 
of his rights over the patented product or process has occurred. The patent law, 
however, has provided that patent holders in the country may be granted interim 
injunction for the collection of evidence. 17 The defendant, on the other hand, has the 
burden of proving the invalidity of the patented invention. A defendant in patent 
infringement proceedings in Iran, generally has two major defences. The first is 
invalidity. The Iranian court may revoke a patent on the basis that it had not met the 
requirements of patentability. " To do so, the accused infringer has to prove one of 
the following issues: 
- the invention is not novel; 
- subject matter of the patent comprises financial plans, or alleges disturbing 
public order, or acts contrary to morals or against public health; 
- the invention covers pure scientific methods and cannot be worked 
particularly in industry or agriculture; 
- five years have elapsed from the issuance of the patent and the technology 
has not been actually worked in the country. 19 
The second basic defense of an accused infringer is a claim of non- 
infringement: that is to say, his acts fall outside the scope of the patent rights. Given 
that the patentee has the burden of proving infringement, this defense is usually 
preferred. 'O While in most countries an infringer can avoid liability for infringement 
by establishing that the patentee has misused his rights through tying ; prohibiting the 
production or sale of competing goods; conditioning the grant of a license to use one 
17 The Regulations of Iranian patent law, Art. 64. 
18 Iranian patent law, Art. 37(l), (2). 
19 Ibid, Articles 28 and 37. 
20 In addition to the above defences, another defence has been recognized in the U-S and Western 
countries that usually called unclean hands. This is to prove that the patentee's licences contain 
restrictive clauses exceeding the legitimate patent fights, or in violation of competition or antitrust 
laws. Chisum, Patents, sections 19.04,1989. This defense is also available in the countries with 
the " built-in safeguards" patent law. 
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patent on the acceptance of a second license (mandatory package licensing); requiring 
licensees to pay royalties after the expiration of the patent; charging different royalties 
to licensees in different parts of the country, " in Iran such a defence for an alleged 
infringer of patent rights is not available. One cannot find even one single limitation 
relating to the use of patent property rights under the Iranian Patent Act. Neither is 
there an anti-monopoly law to invalidate restrictive business practices in licensing 
agreements. One can only rely on Iranian civil law which is inadequate in this regard 
as well. 
The Iranian civil law clearly has adopted the principle of freedom of contract. 
According to Article 10 of the Civil Code, private contracts shall be binding on those 
who have signed them, providing they are not contrary to the explicit provisions of 
a law. Similar situation exists in terms of conditional clauses of a contract since they 
are part of the contract though auxiliary to the main contract. 22 However, although 
the law has introduced conditions for validity of a contract23 in terms of conditions 
of effectiveness and validity of conditional clauses the civil law is generally silent on 
the matter. Iranian legal authors and courts also have paid little attention to this 
important issue. 24 Instead, the civil law has merely introduced those conditions that 
are not acceptable . 
2' Accordingly, the conditions for validity of conditional clauses 
may be perceived from those Articles as follows: 
- conditions should be possible to fulfil; 
- conditions should be useful and profitable; 
- conditions should be legal; 
- conditions should not be contrary to the requirements of a contract; 
21 Chisurn, Ibid., sections 19.04. 
22 Katouzian N., Iranian Civil Law: General Principles of Contracts, A Comparative Study, vol. 
111, Teheran, 1989, p. 161. (in Persian) 
23 Iranian Civil Law, Art. 190. 
24 Katouzian, 1989, op. cit., note 22, p. 162. 
25 Iranian Civil Law, Articles 232,233. 
236 
- conditions should be fully disclosed otherwise lack of knowledge will be a 
good defence. 
There is little doubt that most restrictive clauses in technology licensing 
agreements that have been accepted by the parties would satisfy those conditions. 
Because the restrictive clauses in licensing agreements, whether arising out of patent 
rights or not, are valid in Iranian law, they have advantages for the licensor provided 
the restrictive clauses are not against moral and public order and are not against the 
essence of licensing contract. As far as the issue of defence is concerned, the 
defendant under the Iranian laws cannot avoid liability for infringement by 
establishing that the patentee has misused his rights. The Iranian civil law would 
sustain the validity of those mutually accepted agreements and conditions which are 
not against the patent law. 
Similar to other developing countries, a few of foreign patented inventions 
have been actually utilised and worked in Iran. Most of the locally owned patents in 
Iran remain unexploited either because they are not suitable without further 
development or because of lack of interest among investors. Equally unacceptable is 
the insufficient disclosure of patent specifications which for the most part consist of 
general descriptions of the inventions and are not capable of being used without 
complementary technical knowledge. 26 
It is interesting to note that, since the occurrence of the 1979 revolution in Iran 
the number of foreign patents in the country has decreased significantly. 27 Putting 
aside the general political and social changes created by the revolution in the country, 
other reasons for such a decline may be attributed to: 
26 See supra, Chapter Seven, note 15. 
27 Based on the present writer's calculations, during the period from 1963 to the revolution in 1979, 
a total of 16492 patents were granted in Iran, out of which 95% belonged to foreigners. As regards 
trademarks, between 1959 to 1979, from the aggregate of 42140 trademarks registered in the 
country, 71% belonged to foreigners and 29% to local firms or individuals. 
237 
- the tight control of the government, particularly in the first decade after the 
revolution, over imports and exports; 
- the eight year war imposed by Iraq; 
- the lower oil revenues of the country comparing to the period before the 
revolution; and 
- the industrial policy of the government that prohibited patent and technology 
licensing agreements. 
The industrial policy, among other things, required the outright purchase of 
technical know-how. " This policy, however proved to be inappropriate, mainly 
because the suppliers of technical know-how had no firm commitment and stake in 
the business to be concerned about the successful outcome of the projects. 29 In 199 1, 
the ban on licensing agreements was lifted in line with the new economic policy of 
the government. 30 
The number of local patents exceeded foreign patents for the first time in 1993. 
This can be attributed to the new management of the Iranian patent office. Fortunately, 
the new director is a lawyer himself and tried to implement the current law as best as 
possible in the interests of the country albeit within the scope of the law as it was 
enacted. In this regard, he refused to grant patents to pharmaceutical compounds 
although grants had been made previously despite provisions against such grants in 
the Iranian Patent Act3l .A case is now pending before Iranian Courts regarding the 
new attitude of the patent office to the protection of pharmaceutical compounds. 32 
28 Interview in Teheran by the author with Mr. Hajrassoliha a high rank Director of the Ministry of 
Electrical Power, January 10,1995. According to him, since the revolution up to 1991, on the basis 
of a guidelines issued by the Ministry of Industry, the transfer of technology projects had to be 
accomplished through the lump sum contracts and not contracts based on payment of royalties. 
Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
30 See Chapter Eight, the second experience. 
31 Iranian patent law, Art. 28(3). 
32 For more details of this case see infra. 
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It is possible to enumerate other causes for the unsatisfactory situation in Iran. 
As far as the Iranian Patent Act and its Regulations are concerned, they suffer from 
some important and fundamental weaknesses which have discouraged investment, 
despite the fact that they are very liberal and allow patent holders considerable 
freedom in their contractual arrangements with licensees, subsidiaries and joint venture 
partners. The same weaknesses have prevented the development and real transfer of 
technology. One of the weaknesses is the issue of novelty prescribed by Iranian law. 
(a) Absolute and Relative Novelty 
In contrast with countries like the US., the UK., Germany and Japan that switched 
from the local novelty criterion to the universal one only recently", Iran selected the 
universal novelty when its industries were hardly developed at all 34 and Iran was not 
in a stage of scientific and technical development to take advantage of the modem 
criterion for patents. The Iranian Patent Act was enacted without consultations with 
the local entrepreneurs. At the time of enactment of the Iranian Patent Act of 1931, 
the majority of people in Iran were illiterate, lived in the countryside and were 
involved in agrarian activities. 
Notwithstanding these facts and the immaturity of Iran's industry, the Iranian 
Patent Act provides that, any invention or improvement of an existing invention shall 
33 The United Kingdom adopted the universal novelty criterion in its Patent Act of 1977 based upon 
European Patent Convention Articles 52,54. In Germany universal novelty was not required until 
the enactment of the patent law of 16 December 1980. Japan as an inspiring model of development 
for non-industrial countries until 1959 required a local standard of novelty. Still, however, in some 
countries legislation, the novelty is nullified where the invention is known by publication or public 
use on a local basis. This category is usually called "insular novelty" since patentability is affected 
only by acts which occur within the country. See for instance, patents law of Pakistan, New 
Zealand and Egypt. Baxter & J. Sinnott, World Patent Law and Practice, 1983. 
34 An invention is new if it is not anticipated by prior art. Prior art shall consist of everything 
disclosed to the public, anywhere in the world, by publication in tangible form or, in the country 
by oral disclosure, by use or in any way, prior to the filling, or, where appropriate, priority date 
of the patent application claiming the invention. See I WIPO, Model Law for Developing 
Countries on Inventions, (Patents), WIPO publication No. 840(E) (1979), p. 19, sec. 113. 
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not be considered novel if, prior to the date of application, the descriptions and plans 
thereof have been printed, either in Iran or abroad, in writings or publications 
available to the public, or if it has been worked or utilised. " In other words, a 
technology that is patented abroad and its priority period is exhausted cannot fulfil the 
universal requirements novelty in Iran. This policy, inter alia, has two main 
disadvantages: it discouraged local innovation from gaining competitive advantage and 
offered no incentives for the transfer of technology to the country. These will be 
considered in the following sections. 
(b) Absolute Novelty and Competition Policy 
To control the anti-competitive abuses of powerful foreign technology holders, 
developing countries usually have either excluded them from their markets or, as was 
considered above, they have subjected them to pervasive regulation. It is believed that 
neither of these policies in the long term would be appropriate for development and 
acquisition of foreign technology. Instead, among other policies, an effective 
competition policy is needed to encourage technological innovations of new products 
and processes and flow of foreign technology to the country. An effective competitive 
policy is not just a matter of protecting price competition. An effective competition 
policy must encourage technological innovations of new products and processes which 
can make better use of economic resources. Towards this end, new potential rivals 
must be created and be encouraged to get involved in technological innovations and 
enter the market to compete with the established firms. In this regard, the role of the 
novelty criterion should not be underestimated. 
Curiously enough, since almost all useful inventions are registered in 
industrialised countries, those inventions will loose their novelty, when their priority 
period has been exhausted, in countries which apply the universal novelty norm to the 
35 Iranian patent law, Article 37. 
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patent system. A patent in one country does not mean that the patented technology has 
been utilised in other countries as well. In fact, it is well founded that although a vast 
array of technologies have been published worldwide in the media, much of it has 
never been worked in developing countries. But, enterprises in developing countries 
are reluctant or unable to import technologies patented abroad and develop them 
further or adopt them to local conditions for the reason that they cannot secure 
proprietary rights by taking out local patents because of the universal novelty criterion. 
There is little, if any, incentives left for domestic firms to "import" those technologies 
and manufacture required goods locally. 
There is genuine concern that without legal protection of innovations to an 
imported technology, rivals are free to copy and compete with the innovator firm 
without incurring any development costs of their own. This is particularly true for the 
small and medium seized enterprises that lack enough resources to maintain secrecy 
over their innovations until they are able to establish them in the market. As a 
consequence, entrepreneurs dare not invest in technological innovations. The universal 
novelty standard, thus, discourages the domestic innovation and adaptation of 
technologies which have not been introduced to the country even if the technologies 
36 are appropriate for the conditions in the developing country. Few domestic firms 
are encouraged to enter the market which becomes less competitive and prone to be 
dominated by one or two multinational corporations. 
This leads to continued industrial backwardness which in turn encourages the 
multinationals to strengthen their grip on the economy of the country concerned which 
slips more and more into a heavily dependent state on foreign technology and the 
vicious circle is complete. It is submitted that the absolute universal novelty standard 
for patents excludes local firms from investing in the development and innovation of 
foreign technology to enable them to manufacture goods locally to compete in the 
36 According to Patent Office of India, which also requires the universal novelty, only 2 or 3 per cent 
of Indian patents pass the search of novelty. See Tabassurn Igbal, Indian Patent System and 
India's Economic-Technical Cooperation with other Developing Countries, in Indian Patent 
System and Paris Convention: Legal Perspectives, Sangal P. S and Singh K. (ed. ), University 
of Delhi, 1987, p. 94. 
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domestic and foreign markets. In Iran, partly as a result of such a high standard of 
novelty, and at the same time the lack of any secondary type of patents for local 
inventions which many industrialising countries such as India, Brazil and Argentina 
have introduced in their domestic law, only a very few number of patented inventions 
belong to local individuals and firms and even much fewer utilisation has been made 
of foreign technologies. 
(c) Technology Transfer and Absolute Novelty 
An objective of the patent system is its potential as a vehicle for the transfer of 
foreign technology. Unfortunately, a patent grant based on the application of the 
absolute universal novelty criterion will not facilitate the movement of the technology 
of the patent into developing countries. This is because the patent holder or owner of 
technology, in the absence of a local patent system to enable him to secure a new 
patent in the recipient country, will not invest in the transfer of his skills, expertise 
and knowledge to produce the goods in the recipient country. There is every incentive 
for him to try to import the goods into the country instead. Besides a technology 
developed and patented in an industrialised country may have to be modified or 
adopted to suit the conditions in the recipient developing country because, for 
example, capital intensive and state-of-the-art technology may not be technically and 
economically feasible in the country. It is the importation of the advanced technology 
in toto without any adaptation to Iranian conditions that has made Iran so dependent 
massively on foreign inputs particularly technical assistance. " 
37 One of the major problems of Iranian "large industries" is their fierce dependence on foreign 
technology, machineries, parts and raw materials. As to the foreign raw materials, the most 
dependence relates to miscellaneous industries with 53%, chemical, petroleum, coal, rubber and 
plastic industry with 43.1%, machineries, equipments, tools and metal industries with 32.7%. In 
terms of "small industries" the dependence on foreign raw materials is between 2 to 14 times lesser 
than the large industries. Razzagghi, supra, Chapter One, note 47, p. 80. 
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Japan is an inspiring model of development for developing countries. Until 
1959, Japan required a local standard of novelty for the grant of local patents but, as 
it developed and reached her current stage of industrial development, she switched to 
an universal novelty standard as being more appropriate for her as member of the 
class of "industrialized" countries. 38 
Today, information is disseminated very rapidly but, even then, the examining 
and recognition of the novelty is not as simple as it appears on paper. Moreover, since 
between 1,500,000 to 2,000,000 new patent documents are filed per annum 
worldwide" and as technology advances rapidly, it becomes more onerous to invent 
something which is completely novel. 40 
It has been argued that local patents granted on a lower standard of novelty 
could restrict the free flow of patented products inside the country and outside. 41 
Therefore, the universal novelty requirement has been taken as a defensive policy to 
reduce the number of foreign patents in developing countries . 
4' Given the side 
effects of foreign patents, this line of argument may justify the universal novelty 
criterion in developing countries. However, it cannot justify the objection to other 
types of patent based on less stringent standards of novelty which encourage local 
technological innovation activities. This is particularly true of Iran which has not 
provided, from the inception of her patent legislation, for other types of patent to 
38 The 1921 Japanese Patent Law declared that an invention was not new if it "has publicly known 
or publicly used within the Empire before application of a patent" (Articles 4.1) or if it "has been 
described in a publication circulated in the Empire in such a manner that it can be easily worked" 
(Article 4.2). For an English translation of the law, see Becker E. D., The Patent, Trade Mark, 
Design, and Utility Model Law of Japan, London, 1970, p. 6. 
39 Interview in Geneva by the author with Mr. Jaiya, G., S., senior program officer of WIPO who is 
responsible for Asia and the Pacific countries including Iran, December, 12,1994, Geneva, WIPO. 
40 Phillips J., & Firth A., Introduction to Intellectual Property Law, sec. ed., 1990, p. 41. 
41 BIRPI, Model Law for Developing Countries on Inventions, Annex A, BIRPIP Publication No. 
80 1 (E) 1965, p. 21. 
42 This justification reveals one of the disadvantages of the Paris Convention for non-industrial 
countries. This issue was considered in more details in Chapter Four. 
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intemalise inventions and encourage the local entrepreneurs in technological 
innovation activities. 
(d) Lessons from Other Developing Countries 
Some developing countries, in order to accommodate the conflict between international 
patent policy and national industrial interests, have adopted a so called two-tier patent 
system. According to that, incentives are provided for attracting foreign advanced 
technology, as well as for domestic technological activities. Foreign advanced 
technology is attracted with full patent protection as an incentive. Domestic 
entrepreneurs, particularly small and medium firms are also encouraged to engage in 
inventive activity and to invest in the introduction of new products and processes 
through unconventional patents. These patents internalise inventions already made and 
encourage innovations rather than protect foreigner's patent monopoly, and have been 
recognised as the major function of patent system in developing countries. 43 It is 
submitted that, a well adapted unconventional patent will, in the long term, improve 
indigenous technological capability and lead to research, investment and production 
in the developing countries. Such a system also will strengthen the negotiating power 
of developing countries for the acquisition of foreign technology. 
The unconventional patents range from the introduction of inventors' 
certificate, utility models, improvement of the existing technology or conversion of 
that technology to some other application and the introduction of unpatented foreign 
technologies to the country. These are elaborated upon below. 
43 UNCTAD Promotion of National Scientific and Technological Capabilities and Revision of 
the Patent System, TD/B/C. 6/AC. 2/2 of July 1975, p. 10. 
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111. Unconventional Patents 
(a) Inventors' Certiricates 
The award of Inventors' Certificates is a common form of industrial property 
protection in some emerging market econornies. ' Unlike a patent holder, the 
certificate holder gains no monopoly rights to exclude others from use of the 
technology. Under the certificate arrangement, state-owned companies hold the 
exclusive rights in the invention while the inventor is entitled to receive remuneration 
when savings in production costs are made through the use of the invention. The grant 
of the right is not necessarily restricted in time. 45 
Similar to the grant of regular patents, the invention must be novel, it must 
pass the "first application field" principle and foreigners can apply for the certificate. 
Furthermore, the certificate is also intended to encourage research and development 
of an invention to the stage of industrial applicability and to provide disclosure of the 
invention specifications to the publiC. 46 The certificate can benefit the state-owned 
companies if they can effectively work the certificated inventions. The distinct 
disadvantage of such a certificate is that effective working of the invention is not 
encouraged. 47 
44 For instance, Bulgaria, Rumania, Poland, and the former USSR, Cuba, Vietnam and the 
Peoples'Republic of Korea. 
45 Baxter& Sinnott, op. cit., note 33, p. 8.3; UNCTAD, TD/B/AC-11/19/Rev. 1, supra, Chapter Three, 
note 5, p. 2. 
46 UNCTAD, DT/B/C. 6/91, supra, Chapter Two, note 25, para, 12. 
47 Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs of Canada, Working Paper on Patent Law 
Revision, Toronto, 1976, p. 45. 
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(b) Utility Models 
Utility model or petty patent means "an invention protectable, upon application 
through the registration, by a government office, of the description, drawing or other 
picture or also by the filling of a model. 1148 Utility models give exclusive rights to 
those inventions that do not necessarily satisfy the requirements of patentability but 
offer some useful function. Utility models, provide protection not for a process but 
rather for the shape or configuration or combination of both of certain inventions in 
the mechanical arts . 
4' They also fill the gap between traditional patents and industrial 
designs. 
An object to qualify as a utility model should not have been used publicly or 
described in a printed publication in the granting country. In other words, prior to the 
date of application, it should be novel in the country not in the world. The scope of 
protection however, is narrower and its term is considerably shorter than standard 
"patentable" inventions. The best known of this kind of patent are the German (since 
1891) and Japan (since 1905) utility models. Grants of utility models have played an 
important role in the industrial development of Germany and Japan. Twenty five other 
countries have introduced legislation empowering the grant of utility models. 50 
On the whole, it is believed that the gap between big firms and small and 
medium sized ones in relation to taking advantage of patent activities and establishing 
industries is bridged by the introduction of utility models. The utility patents suit those 
countries, like Iran, that want to take maximum advantage of advanced imported 
48 UNCTAD, Negotiation of an International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology, 
TD/CODE TOT/3 of 26 September 1978, p. II- 
49 For the purposes of industrial property law, inventions are classified into three major technical 
fields, namely, mechanical, chemical and electrical and electronic. Petty patents are mostly 
concerned with the mechanical arts. This is why, they are also called devices or useful objects. 
50 Among these countries are: Australia, Brazil, China, France, Italy, Morocco, the Philippines, 
Poland, Portugal, Spain, South Korea, Taiwan and Uruguay, Baxter and Sinnott, op. cit., note 33. 
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technology for industrial growth and at the same time provide enough incentives for 
domestic technicians and employees to do inventive activities. 
In practice, advanced foreign technology is imported, mainly through 
technology licensing agreements, with full patent protection as incentives, then 
national firms can use it as a base and improve the quality and increase the quantity 
of its production by supporting inventions and minor advances. Therefore, the utility 
patents indirectly facilitate transfer of technology. According to the WIPO industrial 
property statistics, the number of applications for utility models is usually very close 
to the number of regular patents. Nationals and residents have filed the majority of 
utility model applications. In South Korea, for instance, between 1968 to 1982, 
111,982 applications for utility models were made, out of which 5548 were filed by 
51 foreigners and 106,434 by local firms or individuals. 
At the time of the writing of this thesis, utility patents are being considered 
seriously in the EU, and the EU Commission has started a study with a view to 
harmonizing the utility patent laws of Member States. On the other hand, although the 
utility model as an industrial property right has been recognised by the Paris 
Convention, Iran has not recognised such a right for both local and foreign innovators. 
As a consequence, domestic inventive activities for innovations of minor important 
technology which can stimulate technological progress are not encouraged by the 
patent system. 
(C) Patents of Improvement or Addition 
It is interesting to note that, instead of utility models, the Iranian Patent Act provides 
for the grant of patents of improvement in favour of the principal patent holders. The 
Act states that a patent holder whose invention has been patented abroad may acquire 
51 See WEPO, 100 Years of Industrial Property Statistics, Geneva, 1983. 
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a patent of improvement for improvements, alterations and additions in respect of his 
basic patented invention. 52 While third parties also are authorised to obtain patent of 
improvement for an invention that has been patented by others, the permission of the 
original patentee is necessary for the improvement patent holder if the improvement 
is to be worked. 53 
Whereas in some countries such a patent is granted irrespective of whether or 
14 
not the subject matter is universally novel and involves any inventive step, under 
the Iranian law, the improvement patent should also meet the basic requirements of 
patentability. " As a consequence, there is little possibility for local enterprises to be 
able to secure patents for improvement of foreign patents. Even when such a patent 
is secured by a domestic entrepreneur, as was mentioned above, he cannot utilise it 
without the permission of the original patentee. 
(d) Patents of Importation or Introduction 
Another type of patent which has been introduced to encourage and facilitate the 
transfer of technology is the patent of importation. Patent of importation which is also 
called the patent of confirmation, revalidation or introduction, is a patent generally 
awarded for the import of economically desirable technologies previously unknown 
in the granting country but which are available abroad. The key purpose of patent of 
52 Iranian patent law, Art. 30, the Regulations , Art. 24 and 36. The duration of such a patent is 
restricted to the unexpired term of the basic patent. 
53 The Regulations, Ibid, Art. 37. 
54 For instance Colombia does not require novelty for this type of inventions, Baxter and Sinnott, op. 
cit, note 33. 
55 See Iranian patent law, Art. 37 (remark). It states: 
Any invention, or any improvement of an existing invention shall not be 
considered novel if, prior to the date of application, its descriptions or plans 
thereof have been printed, in writings or publications available to the public, 
or if it has been worked or utilised either in Iran or abroad. 
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introduction is to encourage the introduction and adaptation of an existing technology 
to a new market. " Stringent novelty requirementS57 are overlooked with the 
expectation that the patentee or preferably a local enterprise will exploit the 
technology within the country. 
Surprisingly, the Iranian patent regime, which mandates absolute novelty for 
local and foreign inventions, has placed severe restrictions on the patent of importation 
notwithstanding its reasonable objectives. According to Article 30 of the Iranian Patent 
Act, inventions registered abroad may be patented in Iran for their remaining term, not 
by local entrepreneurs, but specifically by the registered foreign owners of the 
patents. " The only restriction imposed on the foreign patent holder is when a person 
or firm in Iran has worked the patent wholly or in part or made preparations for such 
use prior to the date of application for the registration. " In this regard, the foreign 
patent holder although he may still obtain a patent for his invention in Iran, he cannot 
object to the operations of the local person or firm in the country. This exception was 
adopted from the Swiss patent law which supports those who have used or have made 
preparations of use of the invention in goodwill in Switzerland. 60 
Iran, however, has not recognised the importance to her economy of 
importation and exploitation of those foreign inventions which have not been patented 
56 Since, a considerable number of patents are industrialised countries-oriented inventions, even when 
those inventions are patented in non-industrial countries, certain adjustments are required to be 
adapted to the developing countries. Accordingly, there should be some incentives for technology 
owners as well as for local enterprises to adapt and commercialize the imported technology. 
57 It is worthy to be recalled, when an invention patented abroad and its priority period has been 
exhausted, it can not fulfil the universal requirements novelty of other countries. In fact, countries 
patent those inventions, extend the priority period until the invention is produced or sold in the 
country. 
58 Iranian patent law, Art. 30. "An inventer who has obtained a letters-patent for his invention in his 
name outside Iran in accordance with the local laws and regulations can, if the term of the patent 
has not expired, apply for a patent in Iran for the remaining term thereof. 
59 Iranian patent law, Art. 30. 
60 Imam, N., Inventor's Right: Comparative Study of a Branch of Industrial Property, Teheran, 
197 1, p. 155. (in Persian) 
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in Iran but which are required for her economic and industrial development. Iran has 
not recognised that local entrepreneurs should be encouraged to do so. One of the 
main problems of the Iranian Patent Act has been its isolation from the scientific and 
technological needs of the country. The law was devised to grant patents to foreign 
and national inventors on equal terms without realising that they are not on the same 
footing economically and technologically. Having such an inappropriate law inevitably 
would weaken the local licensees' bargaining power vis-a-vis foreign licensors. Thus, 
there should be a serious examination of what the Iranian patent system was supposed 
to do as regards local inventors and public interests when it was brought into 
existence. 
Still there are other differences between patent of introduction granted in Iran 
and other developing countries. Unlike Iranian patent regime, some countries, which 
adopted such a patent6l to ensure local working of the invention, have allowed 
62 importation of the subject matter of the invention by third parties. Meanwhile, it 
has been proposed that the owner of the patent or the licensee would be penalised for 
not working the invention . 
6' The BIRPI Model Patent Law requires annulment of the 
patent of introduction if holder of such a patent does not work the invention within 
the country within two years of the date of grant of the patent, or if effective 
exploitation subsequently ceases for a period exceeding two years. 64 
61 Twenty four countries offering such patents were listed in Ladas S., Patents, Trademarks and 
Related Rights: National and International Protection, 3rd ed., 1975, p. 218. 
62 See e. g. Uruguay patent laws in Baxter & Sinnott, op. cit., note 33, pp. 8.3-8.4. 
63 BIRPI Model Patent Law, op. cit., note 41, Sec. v. 
64 lbid, Sec. iv, par. (d). 
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(e) Transfer of Technology Patent 
Another proposal for the optimal exploitation of inventions and for the provision of 
adequate incentives to the foreign patentee to cooperate fully in achieving the 
successful working of the invention is what the WIPO calls the "transfer of technology 
patent , 65 . Here again, the legal requirement of novelty is reduced as regards this 
untypical patent for the guarantee of acquiring needed existing technology. As 
discussed above, the technical information that patents have to provide is not sufficient 
for a large number of patented inventions to be worked economically in the 
developing countries. Additional technical information is required. 
This information might be obtained either by indigenous research and 
development which can be very expensive and take a long time, or by purchasing the 
information from the patent holder or other firms. Almost invariably, the additional 
knowledge is sold to the transferee through know-how licensing. It is interesting to 
note that WIPO, by introducing this form of patent title, has recognised the 
inadequacies of the traditional patent system in providing enough technical information 
for the sufficient utilization of patented inventions in developing countries. 
The "transfer of technology patent" is granted to the existing foreign patent 
holders, " providing that the foreign party has concluded a transfer of technology 
contract with a local party. " The patent is granted jointly to the foreign and the local 
parties, " but the invention should be worked either jointly or by the domestic 
65 WIPO Patent Model Law, op. cit., note 34, sections 601-616, at 82-102. 
66 Ibid. Sec. 603(l)(i). 
67 Ibid, Sec. 604(l)(b). The domestic party required to be a person having an effective and serious 
industrial establishment in the country or proving that he will have such an establishment. Ibid, 
Sec. 604(l)(ii). This paragraph continues, if the domestic party is a legal entity, the majority 
ownership and effective control thereof is vested in nationals of the country. 
68 Ibid, Sec. (604)(1)(a). 
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enterprise alone . 
69 The foreign party transfers to the local party all the know-how 
related to the invention which is necessary to enable the invention to be worked. 70 
Although the proposed patent has tried to respond to the needs of developing 
countries for the transfer of technology and cooperation, " the results would be even 
better if such patents could be granted unconditionally even in circumstances where 
a foreign grant does not exist and the original owner of the patent is not available. 
Foreign patent holders will be under great pressure to seek for themselves transfer of 
technology patents and patents of importation because failure to do so will result in 
other foreign and local firms applying for these secondary grants. It should be borne 
in mind that, as has bee examined above, granting of such patents would not violate 
the Paris Convention and the TRIPS Agreement. Developing counties through such 
patents would provide sufficient incentives and protection for local firms as well as 
for foreign patentees to invest in working those technologies that are new and needed 
in the country. The granting of such patents, however, would be advisable only if key 
and valuable parts of the technology are included and the law is enforced. Otherwise, 
it will lead to monopolies for inventions which are already in the public domain 
causing still more harm to a country's economic development. 
Direct Protection of Innovations 
For a country like Iran where private entrepreneurs are supposed to have a 
wide role to play in the economic and industrial development and to increase 
69 lbid, Sec. (604)(2)(i). 
70 lbid, Sec. 604(b)(ii) 
71 It may be recalled that, a prominent characteristic of transfer of technology licensing in developing 
countries is the supply of additional technical information through know-how agreements. See for 
instance, Dessemontet F., Transfer of Technology Under UNCTAD and EEC Draft 
Codification: A European View on Choice of Law in Licensing, J. Int'l. Eco. vol. 12,1977, pp. 
1-55. The author quoted that licences on unpatented know-how account for approximately 98 
percent of technology transfer to non-industrial countries. Ibid, p. 14. 
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productivity, still other unconventional patents are conceivable. As was noticed in the 
historical survey of the industrialisation of Iran, Chapter One, almost all improvement 
activities and programmes in the country started from the top downwards and did not 
succeed to involve people into productive activities. In other words, there has not been 
any serious plan and action to create a favourable climate for the flourishing and 
development of private sector in manufacturing products required by society. 
Unfortunately, as noticed above, Iran has not benefited from the protection of 
traditional patents. The Iranian Patent Act has not created a supportive and 
encouraging environment for local innovative activities. It has not been also an 
effective vehicle for industrial investment and the transfer of technology. Such 
insufficiencies have been more harmful in the present economic and political situation 
of Iran in comparison with the time of Shah. 
Before the fall of Shah, Iran's oil revenue was huge to the extent that the 
country could not absorb it. Therefore, Iran either invested or gave as loan a part of 
her income to some foreign countries. The political situation of Iran, at the same time 
had provided circumstances in which, as considered above, some foreign investments 
took place in the country, albeit as assembling industries with low local content and 
little effective transfer of technologies. 
In the post revolutionary Iran, however, the country's oil revenue has dropped 
significantly. The government invested a considerable amount of its income in 
providing a sound infrastructure and in establishing heavy industries. But, the 
government has not succeeded to create a favourable climate for industrial investment 
by the private sector although it has conceded the need for incentives to the private 
sector to invest in manufacturing as a solution for rescuing the econoMy72 . There is 
a huge amount of private capital in Iran which unfortunately is rarely invested in 
manufacturing industries. The capital, instead, is used in buying and selling foreign 
72 For instance see article written by Mr M. Assali in Keyhan Havai, March 2,1994, p. 18. Other 
requirements for the recovery of Iranian economy are passage of specific law regarding monitory 
policies, encouragement of export of non-oil goods, transfer of advanced technology to the country 
and education and training of needed labour. Ibid. 
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currencies, gold, other capital properties and investment in the non-productive sector. 
This trend raises an important pertinent question: in circumstances where a country 
is not able to create favourable climate for industrial investment by the local Private 
sector how can foreign nationals be expected to do so? 
One answer to the problem lies in the lack of sufficient legal protection of 
investments in the manufacturing sector. The deficiencies in the legal system do not 
present the same risks and insecurity to those engaged in buying and selling and in 
areas of the service sector. The manufacturing sector is perceived as risky, legally 
insecure and less profitable. " Unfortunately too, Iran has not benefited from the 
unimaginative protection of conventional patents for encouraging industrial and 
innovative investment. The direct protection of innovations in a way that will be 
introduced by this work will help Iran to provide the right incentives to the private 
sector to invest in innovative and technological activities and apply the results to the 
manufacturing of products competitive in the domestic and world markets. 
73 It is interesting to note that in 1994 investment in non-productive sector in Iran could secure 20% 
profits while maximum profits for production and innovation was between 10 to 15%. See Keyhan 
Havai, April 6,1994, p. 25. 
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(g) Innovation Warrant and Innovation Patent 
Professor Kingston and Krnonz have already addressed the question of direct 
74 
protection of innovations. They quite independently proposed two almost identical 
models designed to promote creative activities and manufacturing capacity. 
Kingston' model is usually called innovation warrant. He has chosen "warrant" 
rather than "patent" because warrants are granted by a newly established innovation 
office and in exchange for actual investments in working the new ideas rather than the 
ideas themselves. He places more weight on innovation than invention. This school 
of thought believes that in the process of technological change while invention is the 
easy part, innovation is much more difficult. Through the introduction of the 
innovation warrant local as well as foreign firms will be encouraged to use any 
information in the public domain to manufacture those new products which were not 
previously manufactured locally and which are badly needed by the country. 
Like during the early years of patent grants, the true and first inventor is the 
true and first founder or promoter of a manufacture. Invention in the abstract meaning 
the mere exercise of the inventive faculty unaccompanied by actual manufacture of 
the invention would not be sufficient to secure a patent grant. The valid consideration 
for the grant of an innovation warrant will be the manufacture of the subject matter 
itself regardless of the origin of the inventive ideas which are applied in the 
manufacture. Therefore, Kingston's proposal would involve the re-introduction of 
something like the old system under which limited monopolies were granted in return 
for the introduction of new industries. 
Kingston has argued that in a competitive market where prices are pushed 
down as much as possible investment is not made for the production of a first- time 
74 Kingston, supra, Chapter Three, note 20; Kronz H., Patent Protection for Innovations: A Model 
Part 1,7 EIPR, (1983), pp. 178-183; Kronz H., Patent Protection for Innovations: A Model - Part 11,8 EIPR, (1983), pp. 206-210. 
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product unless there is a real and strong monopoly that will give sufficient "head start" 
over competitors and a legal security to encourage firms to invest in innovation. In 
other words, market power" is an integral part of innovation. Multinational 
corporations in commercialising new ideas have relied mainly upon their capability, 
secrecy and persuasive market power. Patent monopoly rights are used to reinforce the 
other market powers. For those entrepreneurs which do not possess such market 
powers, a real and strong monopoly should be devised in order to encourage them to 
invest and to innovate products and compete with imported products. As a result of 
such a "real monopoly", investments are increased, employment is created, smaller 
firms grow and the power of multinationals decreased and foreign economic pressure 
is resisted. The length of the monopoly period of innovation patent depends on the 
project and the commercial risks involved. 
In granting a innovation patent, the legal requirement of inventive step and 
universal novelty criteria for ordinary patents are replaced by the single criterion of 
local novelty alone. This can have a stimulating effect on both inventive activity and 
investments in the country. 
In order to provide circumstances in which innovations are worked, Kronz also 
has introduced an almost identical new protection which he calls innovation patent. 
Some important differences exist between the Kingston and Kronz's models. In the 
Kronz's scheme, the patent office is responsible for granting innovation patents as well 
and, therefore, the establishment of a new office is not necessary; the innovation 
warrant is not granted for mere importation whereas importation may satisfy the 
requirements for innovation patents; innovation patent may be secured by commercial 
enterprises as well as individuals and research and development institutions and new 
processes are not granted innovation patents. 76 
75 Power which act to keep others out to excludes others from competition and to erects barriers to 
entry to a market. 
76 Kronz, Part 1, op. cit., note 74, p. 18 1. 
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(h) Innovation Certificates and Developing Countries 
It can be seen that the adoption of the local novelty criterion in the grant of patents 
can have positive effects on industrial investments, increase the flow of technology 
and strengthen the bargaining power of the technology recipient countries. However, 
one should notice that Kingston and Kronz designed their innovation schemes for 
promotion of manufacturing capacity and incremental innovations within developed 
Western economies. In other words, not all developing countries may benefit from the 
application of such schemes. It is submitted that a successful and effective innovation 
certificate scheme for the developing countries is highly dependent on, at least, two 
factors: 
- the adminstration of the competent office which should be more active than 
a present-day patent office; " and 
- the existence of a big enough market to generate competition. 78 
Iran has a huge market and already has started the process of dismantling trade 
barriers and has committed herself to a free market economy. 79 But, unfortunately 
the Iranian patent law has established a patent office whose main function is nothing 
more than the registration of the patent applications. Such a patent office 
understandably is not an effective instrument for certifications of innovations. 
In the next chapter based on the considerations above and given the particular 
problems facing Iranian industries, and the positive role of the local novelty criterion, 
the thesis will recommend a development of technology law which encompasses patent 
77 Kingston W., Compulsory Licensing With Capital Payments as an Alternative to Grants of 
Monopoly in Intellectual Property, 23 Research Policy, 1994, pp. 661-672, p. 663. 
78 Adams J., Book Review (Antitrust and Direct Regulation of International Transfer of Technology 
Transactions, IIC, Max Plank Institute, 1984) 33 Int'l. Com. L. Q., October (1984), pp. 1084-1086, 
p. 108. Kingston W., Innovation, Creativity and Law, 1990, (Kluwer Publishers, Dordrecht, The 
Netherlands), p. 176; see also Du Vail M., Criticism of Direct Protection of Innovation, Patent 
World, May 1988, pp. 52- 53. 
79 See supra, Chapter One, text accompanying note 77. 
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rules, transfer of technology rules and antitrust rules in a single piece of legislation. 
The proposed Patent Office has a structural relationship with the offices dealing with 
Transfer of Technology and Competition. These offices will be under supervision of 
a single independent agency whose central purpose will be to develop a technological 
base in the country and advance industrial progress. Such an institutional arrangement 
will make the Iranian patent system an industrial development-driven system, thus, 
capable of effectively administering the grant of innovation certificates. 
IV. Examination of Patent Application 
Another shortcoming of the existing Iranian law lies in its provisions governing 
examination of patent applications. The examination of patent applications to decide 
whether the invention and its specifications satisfy the law is important for the 
diffusion of new technologies. There are basically two distinct approaches regarding 
the examination of patents; pure registration or minimal examination and substantive 
examination. 
(a) Registration 
Iran grants patents upon registration and doing only procedural examination of 
documents and fees without making adequate inquiry about the patentability of the 
invention. The law states that such a patent "shall in no way constitute proof of utility 
or novelty or genuineness of the invention, and likewise the said document shall in no 
way constitute a proof that the applicant or his principal is the real inventor, or that 
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the description of the invention or its drawings are correct"'O. In other words, patents 
are granted at the risk of the patentee and without any guarantee as to their validity. 
Naraghi in his article about intellectual property in Iran has recognised two main 
advantages of such a system for Iran. First, it is the most economical method for the 
registration of patents. Second, no one knows better than an inventor that his invention 
"has reality" and whether his invention is novel or not. " 
The above reasoning misses the overriding purpose of a patent law in a 
developing country, namely, to enable the country to develop its own technological 
base. A serious disadvantage of the minimum examination of inventions is that there 
is no assurance of the validity of an Iranian patent. The validity of such a patent is 
difficult to ascertain until the patent holder is forced to defend the patent against an 
allegation in court that he has infringed another's patent. This certainly discourages 
investment in the commercialisation of patented technology. The grant of such patents 
will not help the growth of indigenous research and development and will not create 
a suitable environment for the innovative talents to flourish. As Professor Cornish 
states: "if the patent system is to provide a useful incentive for the making and 
commercial introduction of major inventions, it must give sound rights of clear scope. 
The current movement to strengthen the examination procedures of patent offices 
should accordingly be pressed ahead". " 
It is also unrealistic to believe that the minimal examination approach will 
attract many applications for patents and encourage the transfer of needed technology. 
This is partly because the purchaser of a technology which is covered fully or partly 
by patents generally is interested in obtaining a position that is not likely to be 
endangered by the invalidation of those patents. According to the Iranian Patent Act, 
80 See Iranian patent law, Art. 36. 
81 Sedarat A. & Naraghi M., The Evolution of Proprietorship Rights and Intellectual Property, 
1977, p. 82. (in Persian) 
82 Comish W. R., Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trade Marks and Allied Rights, 2nd 
ed. 1989, p. 82. 
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to invalidate a patented invention, it is sufficient for an interested party to prove that 
83 the invention is not novel in the world. This uncertainty would be worse for those 
small and medium-sized firms that lack other market powers to rely upon them for 
innovative activities. As a consequence, the validity of a patent and its value is very 
dependent on the type of examination procedure. 
Besides, the granting of invalid patents burdens patent documentation and 
decreases and weakens the informational function of patent protection. The latter is 
particularly true in the case of Iran. In an interview with the director of the Iranian 
patent office, it was revealed that the patent documents in Iran disclose little 
information, thus, are rarely used by Iranian firms and researchers. 84 Likewise, in the 
absence of sufficient examination, the patent system may be abused by the granting 
or upholding of patents for inventions that do not actually merit protection. This in 
turn may result either in discrediting genuine and valuable inventions in the 
country85' or in using such patents to take advantage of licensees who normally lack 
enough bargaining power in the first place. 86 
83 Iranian patent law, Articles 36-37. It should be noted that the present Iranian Patent Law would 
not also satisfy the TRIPS Agreement which requires transparency as to the administration of 
intellectual property laws of Members. See Article 63 of the TRIPS. The patent law proposed by 
this thesis would provide for such transparency through an enhanced administration, including 
thorough patent application research, and effective protection of patent rights on the basis of the 
TRIPS Agreement. See infra, Chapter Ten and Appendix Two. 
84 Interview with the Director of the Iranian Patent Office, supra, Chapter Three, note 57. 
85 In many developing countries including Iran, save a few people, even those who are involved with 
the industries have insufficient knowledge about the patent system. Thus, at the outset they use to 
attach a considerable importance to a registered invention. But sham inventors who just by 
fulfilling the easy requirements -in most cases by paying the legal fees- obtain patent grants, 
because they are not able to bring about any actual innovation, cause a distrustful environment in 
which even the genuine and actual inventions and innovations are distrusted. 
86 Kunz-Hallstein, supra, Chapter Four, note 71, p. 658. 
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(b) Substantive Examination of Inventions 
Under another approach, the patent is granted following a thorough examination of the 
prior art and applying strict requirements of patentability. Most industrialised countries 
have adopted the thorough examination. The examination as to substance indeed is 
very crucial for the acquisition of new foreign technology. However, to carry out a 
comprehensive examination and research, a competent system with qualified staff is 
required. Today, Iran has research facilities, data banks, and skilled scientists and 
engineers needed to conduct such an extensive examinations. 87 
Iran may adopt the principle of "deferred examination. " This is a system of 
examining procedure whereby patent applications are examined comprehensively at 
the request and payment of the applicant or a third party within a specific period of 
time. Under such a system, economically immaterial inventions are granted patents 
without the burden of excessive fees and comprehensive examination but more 
precious technologies would be subject to a substantive examination. 
In this regard it has been recommended that Iran to ratify the Patent Cooperation 
Treaty (PCT) which has provided a universal network procedure to facilitate a 
thorough research and examination of patent applications. 88 
87 Interview in Teheran by the author with the authorities of Organization of Scientific and Industrial 
Research, Scientific and Information Services Centre of Ministry of Jahad Sazandegi, Research and 
Training Department of Ministry of Industry, and the Iranian Patent Office, January 1995. 
88 See Fasih Mamani M., The Patent Cooperation Treaty, University of Kent, 1989. The (PCT) to 
which about 40 countries are parties, is designed to achieve greater uniformity and less cost in the 
international patent filing process, and in the examination of prior art. Under the (PCT), a single 
patent examination is performed for all relevant prior art, and the result is reported to each member 
country in which the patent applicant desires to file an application. PCT was done at Washington 
on June 19,1970, amended on September 28,1979, and modified on February 3,1884. For the 
text, see WIPO Pub. No. 274(E), ISBN 92-805-0356-1, WIPO, 1994. 
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(c) Disclosure Requirement 
Due to the importance of sufficient disclosure of patent information most statutes in 
return for granting patent monopoly to the inventor, require adequate disclosure of the 
invention in a clear and complete manner so that a person skilled in the relevant 
technology can manufacture the patented product if he can legally do so. The 
disclosure of patented technology accelerates the erosion of the value of monopoly 
rights and stimulates "inventing around" behaviour by local entrepreneurs. " As a 
consequence, some laws enacted to alleviate the insufficiency of disclosure necessitate 
stricter requirements such as the so called "enablement" requirement (the best methods 
of making or using the invention). In this regard, Section 112 of the American Patent 
Act reads: 
The specification shall contain a written description of the manner and the 
process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as 
to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is 
most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall setforth the best 
mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention. " 
Similar provisions are contained in the U. K patents Act of 1977. India's Patent 
Act of 1970 also emphasised on Indian nationals possessing average skill in the art 
to be able to work the invention on the basis of the description. Such requirements 
assure that the public receives "quid pro quo" for the limited monopoly granted to the 
89 Evenson, supra, Chapter Four, note 130, p. 331. Evenson has divided inventors into three 
categories; (1) those who are pioneers and initiate technology field; (2) those who produce 
inventions for the major consumer and derivative factor markets; and; (3) those who adapt primary 
market inventions to secondary markets. Most inventors in non-industrial countries belong to the 
third category in which exclusively depend on disclosure effects. Ibid. 
90 35 U. S. C. § 112,1992. 
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inventor. 9' It is submitted that the stringent disclosure requirements can be effective 
to decrease and eliminate the need for additional cooperation of the patentee to 
provide necessary know-how for the successful working of the invention in the case 
of the compulsory licensing. 
In this regard, the Regulation of Iranian Patent Act requires that the 
specification of inventions must be "legible and written in such a way that, by reading 
it, people in position of information be enabled to understand its subject and 
novelty. , 92 The latter requirement seems very odd because one should not expect the 
"novelty" to be recognised from the specification of inventions. With regard to the 
huge number of new patent documents which are filed every year worldwide, 9' the 
question is whether the Iranian patent office can assess novelty of an invention from 
its specification in the absence of sufficient trained officers and an exhaustive research 
capability throughout the world. The former requirement namely, understanding of 
subject matters of invention by reading the specifications, does not mean that the 
disclosed information is sufficient for working the invention as well. 
Patent specification usually includes the description which may be accompanied 
by diagrams and drawings, and the claims. What the descriptions provide is to show 
how to work the invention and detailed claims. Such a disclosure must be sufficient 
for it to be performed by an appropriately skilled person. The legal requirement that 
descriptions should be "clear" in practice indeed is open to different interpretations 
some of which may be insufficient for the effective dissemination of technology. The 
weakness in the Iranian Patent Act is the absence of sanctions that must be applied 
in the event of insufficient disclosure. By contrast, under some patent laws failure to 
91 See Chisum D. S., Patents, 1992, vol. 2, at 7.01. The TRIPS mandates disclosure of issued patents, 
and it also requires explanations of the best mode for practising an invention known to the inventor 
at the time of filing. TRIPS Agreement, Art. 29(l). 
92 The Regulations of Iranian patent law, Art. 26. 
93 Between 1.500,000 to 2 000,000 patent documents are filed per anum, see the interview with Mr 
Jaiya, from WIPO, op. cit, note 39. 
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disclose the invention sufficiently is regarded as an abuse of monopoly right and the 
patent could be invalidated. 
94 
It is not surprising, thus, that patents granted in Iran are rarely mentioned as 
sources of technical information for research and development. This does not mean, 
however, that the Iranian authorities are not aware of the real value of patents' 
technical information. Several Iranian research centres have already attached 
importance to the information disclosed in patent documents. For instance, in a 
research centre belonging to the Ministry of Jahad Sazandegi, by now about 4 000,000 
foreign patents' specifications, have been bought from international organisations, and 
are kept and available as sources of technical information for further research 
activities. 9' Iranian Patent Act has failed to provide a legal framework within which 
the accumulation and dissemination of valuable technical information through 
disclosure of patent specifications can take place. 
94 For instance, under the UX patent law the specification of inventions which do not disclose the 
invention clearly and completely enough for them to be performed by a person skilled in the art, 
constitutes a breach of contract by the inventor and results in a loss of patent fights fight and 
revocation of the patent. The UX Patents Act of 1977, Article 72(c). 
95 Interview in Teheran by the author with Mr Taghavi the Director of Scientific and Information 
Services Centre of Ministry of Jahad Sazandegi, January 8,1995. 
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V. Working Requirement 
As discussed above, a patent is granted in return for the patentee's undertaking 
to exploit the technology within the country to give benefits to the local economy. 96 
The exploitation of patented inventions locally generates some benefits for the patent- 
granting country: it absorbs surplus labour and creates local income, the technology 
is learned and applied by nationals involved in manufacturing the product (learning 
by doing), technical know-how which is very vital for a more economic exploitation 
of the patented technology is transferred, national resources are used more efficiently, 
the country gains foreign exchange if the products are exported and saves foreign 
exchange by reduction of importation of the manufactured articles. Therefore, most 
national patent laws require that a patent must be applied commercially within a 
certain period of time within the country. This requirement is so important that most 
patent laws mandate a "compulsory licence" to local firms and provide for revocation 
of the patent or automatic lapse if a patent is deemed unworked. 9' 
(a) Patents in Technology Transfer 
The importance of the working requirement in patent law stems from the fact 
that foreign technology is transferred when a patent is exploited either by the patent 
holder himself or when the patent is licensed accompanied with the needed technical 
know-how in the patent granting country. There is no doubt about the importance of 
the actual utilization of patents for the economic and industrial development of 
developing countries. Such an important role when viewed with the facts that patent 
laws prevent nationals from making, using, selling and even importing the patented 
96 See Cornish, op. cit., note 82, p. 78-85. 
97 For instance see the U. K Patents Act of 1977, Article 48(3). 
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article and competing with patentees made most countries to devise appropriate 
requirements. The situation is exacerbated by the fact that more than 90 per cent of 
granted patents in Iran were owned by foreigners, mostly multinationals, and 99 per 
cent of these foreign patents were not used effectively in the country. 98 
With regards to patents granted to proprietors of foreign technology, therefore, 
the primary concern for a developing country like Iran should be to ensure that these 
patents are worked in the country. It is the actual working of patents that, among other 
things, will help to build a strong technological base in Iran. Other advanced 
developing countries also reasoned that, although patent systems may stimulate new 
inventions and innovations, but, in fact, the actual working of inventions makes the 
most positive impact on economic and industrial progress. 99 The actual utilization of 
inventions also leads to innovations and new related inventions and the financial 
power of a successful utilisation enables more research and further development of the 
patented product. " Iran also must have adequate controls over foreign patents to 
be sure that those technologies which are important to her economic development are 
worked in the country as quickly as possible to the maximum extent feasible. 
In short, intellectual property law in general and patent law in particular, 
should be viewed in developing countries as an instrument for economic and 
98 Interview with the Director of the Iranian Patent Office, op. cit., note 26; for the similar figure in 
other developing countries see UNCTAD, U. N. Doc. TD/B/AC. 1 1/19/REVI, p. 56. It is worthwhile 
to note that, compared to developing countries, the number of unused patents in the developed 
market economy countries, have been very few. Among different reasons for that is that foreign 
firms fail to utilise their patents in a developing country like Iran because the expense involved is 
about $100 for twenty years protection and they do not feel financial pressure as well to utilise 
their patented technology in the country. 
99 UNCTAD, Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on the Role of the Patent System 
in the Transfer of Technology, U. N. Doc. TD/B/C. 6/8 of 21 October 1975, p. 32. 
100 It is interesting to note that, a country like Spain which in the line with some developing countries 
enacted technology transfer regulations, in its recent law on patents has placed a great significance 
on the obligation to work of patents. The reasons that led the legislator to require such a measure 
was stated, among other things, the idea that the main objective of patent system is to promote 
technological and industrial progress in a country through the effective working of patents, 
therefore the working of the patented invention is an obligation for its holder to be fulfilled. See 
Casado Cervino, supra, Chapter Four, note 50, p. 334. 
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technological progress. The law must strike a proper balance between the monopoly 
rights to stimulate the creation of new technology and the dissemination of both new 
and old technological skills and knowledge. 
According to UNCTAD reports, unlike Iran, a number of developing countries 
have introduced changes in their patent system during the 1970s. Depending upon the 
degree of their development, the changes have generally tended to reinforce the 
provisions governing the actual working of patents and to prevent the use of 
intellectual property regimes as means to preserve import monopolies through 
introduction of stricter provisions for compulsory licences and revocation as remedies 
for non-use and through strong provisions against abuses in patent licensing 
agreements. 101 
For example, section 83 of the Patent Act (1970) of India accentuates that: (a) 
patents are granted to encourage inventions and to secure that the inventions are 
worked in India on a commercial scale and to the fullest extent that is reasonably 
practical without undue delay: and (b) they are not granted merely to enable patentees 
to enjoy a monopoly for the importation of patented article. Apart from India, between 
1970 and 1975, four other developing countries introduced changes in their patent 
legislations: Peru in 1970, Brazil and Colombia in 1971, and the Republic of Korea 
in 1973.102 Since December 1975, at least 10 developing countries, of which three 
(Mexico, Philippines, and Sri Lanka) are members of the Paris Union have introduced 
substantive changes in their industrial property legislations. 
These changes emphasised the working obligations of patentees, and they were 
recognized as significant steps towards adapting the patent system to the needs of 
101 See UNCTAD, U. N. TD/Code TOT/55, supra, Chapter Six, note 49, p. 23; UNCTAD, 
Examination of the Economic, Commercial and Developmental Aspects of Industrial Property 
in the Transfer of Technology to Developing Countries: Review of Recent Trends in Patents 
in Developing Countries, TD/B/C. 6/AC. 5/3,198 1, p. 3-12. See also Casado Cervino, Ibid., p. 339. 
102 UNCTAD, UN. Doc., TDIB/C. 6/AC. 2/2, op. cit., note 43. 
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economic development. "' it is interesting to note that, industrial countries 
themselves, at earlier stages of their own industrial growth had the same propositions. 
As a writer puts it, the United States of America during its first hundred years seems 
to have behaved as many developing countries do today: 
When the United States was still a relatively young and developing country ... it 
refused to respect international intellectual property rights on the grounds that 
it was freely entitled to foreign works to further its social and economic 
development. " 
However, the issue of actual working has been underestimated in Iran. By 
virtue of Iranian Patent Act only after 5 years have elapsed from the issuance of the 
letters-patent and the invention has not been actually worked that an interested party 
may bring a legal action to nullify the patent. Since importation of patented goods is 
one of the rights conferred upon the patentee a foreign patentee has at least 5 years 
exclusive right to import the patented goods to Iran. 105 There is no compulsory 
licensing provision in the patent law of Iran. In this regard it may be argued that if 
a foreign patentee gains significant revenues from the importation of patented articles 
to Iran there would be little incentive for him to transfer technical knowledge related 
to the patented technology to the country and manufacture locally. In other words, 
patent privileges may be used to secure export markets in other countries, in 
particular, in those countries which do not have sufficient legal safeguards to compel 
the patent holders to work their inventions in the country. 
103 See U. N. Doc. TD/B/C. 6/AC. 5/3, op. cit., note 101, p. 3. 
104 Office of Technology Assessment, Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of Electronics and 
Information, Washington D. C., 1986, p. 228; see also UNCTAD/ITP/TEC/18, supra, Chapter 
Three, note 14. 
105 Iranian patent law, Art. 37(4). 
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Moltilan v. Iran Rehabilitation Industries 
An interesting case which, among other things, reveals the insufficiency of the Iranian 
patent system concerning the actual working of patented technologies is Moltilan v. 
Iran Rehabilitation Industries. 'O' In 1975 Moltilan, a Swiss company was granted a 
patent for an instrument, called LUD., which is used for the prevention of unwanted 
pregnancy. Although there has been a sizable market and sufficient facilities for the 
production of the patented article in Iran, the company has imported the article to the 
country for more than 18 years. In 1990, following the declaration of government 
policy on population control, the defendant, an Iranian company, after investing two 
years in research and development succeeded to manufacture a high quality I. U. D. The 
Swiss company took an action against Rehabilitation Industries Company in the 
Iranian courts on the ground that its patent rights has been infringed by the defendant. 
Unfortunately, despite the fact that the plaintiff has not manufactured the patented 
article in Iran, the defendant was condemned as infringer of the patent rights and was 
ordered to stop manufacturing and marketing the I. U. D. 
This case also confirms the general statement in the earlier chapters that in Iran 
patents are obtained by foreign nationals mainly to secure a market in Iran and expand 
their exports and not for the working of the patented technology inside the country. 
Ninety-nine percent of patents granted to foreign nationals in Iran have not been 
worked locally. 107 
106 Moltilan Co. v. Iran Rehabilitation Industries Co. The case that was classified as 671/73,1995 at 
the Branch 24 of the Tehran Appeal Court, has been recently referred to the first court to do more 
investigation. More details of the case have not been disclosed yet. 
107 Interview with the Director of the Iranian Patent Office, op. cit, note 84. 
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VI. Compulsory Licensing 
In the event a patent holder retains full control of his patent and does not 
exploit it sufficiently, in most industrial and developing countries, he becomes subject 
to the national compulsory licensing scheme. Compulsory licensing as a protectionist 
policy'O' is designed to empower the patent granting country to grant a licence to 
anyone else to work the patent, whether the patentee is willing or not, in return of 
reasonable remuneration that is fixed by the competent authorities. For instance, the 
UX Patents Act grants compulsory licensing where: the patented invention is not 
being adequately worked within the U. K.; the demand for the invention is not being 
met; demand being met on unreasonable terms; demand being met by importation; 
working of other improvement inventions being hindered or commercial or industrial 
activities in the country being unfairly prejudiced by refusal to license the patented 
invention on reasonable terms or at all; and unacceptable licence conditions and 
unwarranted restrictions on unpatented materials. 109 
The BIRPI also has recommended adequate provisions for compulsory licences 
as of "exceptional importance" for developing countries"O. It may be argued that the 
patentee by blocking and non-using the patent does not bring economic benefit of the 
invention to the society, thus, the main ground for its protection is destroyed. 
Furthermore, where a patented invention cannot be worked without using an invention 
which has been patented by another person, compulsory licensing would offer a good 
solution. Likewise, on the ground of public interests, such as public health and interest 
of national economy compulsory licensing is justifiable. Lastly, compulsory licensing 
should be imposed where the working of the invention within the country is being 
108 Cornish, op. cit., note 82, p. 208. 
109 The U. K. Patent Act of 1977, Article 48(3). 
110 BIRPI Model Law, op. cit., note 41, p. 58. 
270 
prevented or hindered by the importation of the patented article. "' Some economists 
also have recognised compulsory licensing as the most important limitation of the 
patentee's exclusive monopoly and the most effective and flexible method for working 
the patented technology and enabling the States to control more of the serious 
restrictions in industry. 112 Compulsory licensing provisions will induce patent 
holders to work their technology themselves or to grant contractual licences on 
reasonable terms. Thus, the objective of actual working of the invention is 
accomplished. "' 
Despite these facts, the Iranian Patent Act has neither adopted this solution to 
encourage domestic use of patented inventions that are dominantly owned by foreign 
firms nor has devised any alternative legal instrument. 
VII. Restriction on Subject Matter 
The exclusion of some inventions from patentability in most developed and developing 
countries is decided based on different reasons. Among them are: 
(i) when granting a monopoly to an inventor costs more than its benefits to 
society. Foodstuffs, drugs and chemical substances usually are excluded based on that 
consideration. In other words, these types of inventions are excluded since, they are 
It is interesting to note that many countries apply the compulsory licensing and provide for 
revocation of the patent base on the public interests even in situations where the patentee has been 
exploiting his patent. In many cases, however, these provisions apply only to food and medicinal 
products. See UNCTAD, U. N., Doc. E/3861/Rev. 1, supra, Chapter Four, note 65, p. 25. 
112 For instance see Penrose, supra, Chapter Three, note 28, pp. 231 and 423. 
113 The Pans Convention and TRIPS because of their many reservations, have adversely affected the 
effectiveness of compulsory licensing provisions. See supra, Chapter Four, text accompanying note 
123, and note 29. 
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of vital importance for the people of the country and the grant of patents could have 
adverse effects on the general availability or the price of these commodities; 
GO if an invention is considered contrary to public morality, order, and 
public health; 
Gii) to protect infant indigenous industries from foreign firms with 
dominant market power and superior technology. Japan, for instance, 
applied such a restriction until Japanese pharmaceutical companies 
could compete with the pharmaceutical firms of industrialised 
countries; ' 14 
(iv) to control the development of the country; 
(V) special importance of a technology to national defence or energy 
supply, such as, nuclear materials, atomic energy, atomic weapons; 
(vi) inventions that lack technological nature, such as plant varieties and 
animal breeds. "' 
The Iranian Patent Act seems to have not taken into account the above 
mentioned considerations. In a general and ambiguous language, the Act excludes 
three categories of inventions from patentability. 1: Financial plans. 2: Any invention 
or improvement of an invention disturbing public order or contrary to morals or 
against public health. 3: Formulae and pharmaceutical compositions. "' In other 
words, other inventions whether products or process which are not covered by the 
114 Carter M., The Role of Patent System in Technology Transfer: The Japanese Experience, 26 
Col. J. Trans. L., 1987, pp. 130-164 at 147-148. 
115 Ibid. 
116 Iranian patent law, Art. 28. 
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above categories and fulfil other requirements of the law, such as novelty, are 
patentable in the country. 
The apparent broadness of this provision has left enough room for the patenting 
of products and processes of a wide range of inventions in various fields of industry 
and agriculture including essentially biological processes for the production of plants 
and animals and plant varieties. These matters even in the industrialised countries are 
not either available or are very restricted. The European Patent Convention contains 
provisions which exclude plant and animal varieties from patent protection and does 
not explicitly allow the patentability of microorganisms. "' Mexico to facilitate her 
trade relations with the United States has recently enacted to extend patent protection 
of biotechnological inventions only after 1997. "' 
From the practical point of view, as noted above, the sheer broadness of 
Articles 26 and 28 of the Iranian Patent Act have also provided an ambiguous 
environment in which even exclusion of formulae and pharmaceutical components, in 
a way that the law has put, has been a matter of controversy. 119 
It may be argued that the broad approach which has been adopted by the 
Iranian law could be useful when, other measures such as compulsory licences was 
actively available to prevent abusive practices. Compulsory licences, the exploitation 
by the Government or by third persons authorized by the Government can alleviate 
the disadvantages of such a policy. As was indicated above, the Iranian patent law 
contains no compulsory licences as well. Nevertheless to remove the existing 
uncertainty that would discourage research and industrial investment and at the same 
117 Article 53(b) of the European Patent Convention states: "European patents shall not be granted in 
respect of patents and animal varieties or essentially biotechnological processes for the production 
of plants and animals. the provision does not apply to microbiological processes or the products 
thereof. " 
118 Mexican Patent Law, June 27,199 1. World Intellectual Property Report, September 199 1, p. 326. 
119 See Abastra Co. Ltd. v. Industrial Patent Office of Iran, Branch 24, Supreme Court, 1995, Teheran. 
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time lead to court cases, the wordings of Article 28 must be improved. This has been 
suggested in the proposed law in the next chapter. 120 
VIII. Rights of Patentee 
(a) Assignment of Patent Rights 
The most important requirements for any type of transaction relating to patents in Iran 
are "authentic act" and registration with the patent office. "' Otherwise the 
transaction, be it assignment or licence, shall not be valid as against third parties. "' 
Furthermore, when a patent transaction is concluded abroad, the transaction shall be 
valid against third parties in Iran after its registration at the "Teheran Registration 
Office of Deeds". 123 
Of course the mandatory registration of patent transactions is desirable, 
necessary and important. The problem, however, is while assignments are not very 
common for the purpose of transfer of technology, they have been overemphasised by 
the law of Iran, as if the registration of inventions, without thorough investigation, and 
the registration of patent assignments like other type of tangible property are the main 
objectives of the Iranian Patent Act. It is in this regard that the designation of the 
Teheran Registration Office of Deeds for the implementation of the law makes sense. 
Furthermore, unlike other advanced developing countries, such a compulsory 
120 See also Appendix Two. 
121 Iranian patent law, Art. 40. 
122 Ibid. 
123 Ibid. 
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registration in Iran is not carried out to, among other things, inform the government 
about the grant of all assignments and licences and about the economic value of the 
patents involved. 
(b) Patent Licences 
Under the Iranian Patent Act, a patentee may license the right to use his invention, 
totally or in part, to another person. 124 Similar to the assignment agreements, licence 
agreements to be valid should only be registered at the patent office. Given the nature 
and objectives of the Iranian Patent Act, it is not surprising that a minimal and liberal 
approach to patent licensing agreements was adopted by the law. Indeed such 
agreements are too important to be left entirely as a matter between the parties. 
It is generally accepted that foreign industrial property rights, in general and 
patents in particular, are not utilised commonly in developing countries by the holders 
themselves but by domestic firms. Patent licence provisions, therefore, are stipulated 
in most enhanced patent laws to facilitate the utilization of patented inventions and 
establish a legal framework for the transfer of technology. It should be recalled that 
the main objectives of national patent systems among other things are: the 
encouragement of the indigenous innovative activities, industrial investment, scientific 
and technical research and development and the maximum exploitation of the 
inventions in the country. It is for the achievement of the above items that most well 
designed and enhanced patent laws usually facilitate the licensing agreements in the 
country. In the next chapter the thesis will suggest a comprehensive development of 
technology law which among other things deal effectively with the issue of technology 
licensing agreements in Iran. 
124 Ibid. Art. 39. 
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(c) Enforcement of the Iranian Patent Act 
In addition to the weaknesses of the law itself, sad to say, there has not been effective 
enforcement of the law as well. It has been revealed that before 1979, about 500 songs 
were registered as inventions in the country. "' Similarly, despite the explicit 
prohibition of granting patents to formulae and pharmaceutical compositions by the 
law 126 court proceedings in an undecided case, 127 disclosed that formulae and 
pharmaceutical compositions have been protected by the patent office during the last 
sixty years. The court reasoned that because the provision against such protection has 
not been implemented for the last sixty years the patent office has to register the 
plaintiff's application for the protection of pharmaceutical compounds. 128 
125 Supreme Council of Informatics of Iran, Rights of Creators of Software, Teheran, 1994, p. 276. 
(in Persian). 
126 Iranian patent law, Art. 27(3). 
127 Abastra Co. Ltd. v. Industrial Patent Office of Iran, Branch 24, Supreme Court, Teheran, 1995. 
128 Judgment number 1238 of Branch 24 of First Degree Civil Courts, 837/72. Abastra, a Swedish 
company, through its Iranian lawyer based on the priority right provided by the article 4 of the 
Paris Convention applied for a patent for a pharmaceutical product. The patent office rejected the 
application based on a provision of the patent law which explicitly prohibits grant of a patent to 
formulae and pharmaceutical compositions. The company petitioned the Iranian courts for an order 
requiring the patent office to comply with the procedure lay down in the law and register the 
invention. 
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IX. Conclusion 
In this chapter, the main features of patent law were examined in the context 
of its role in the transfer of technology. Some obstacles to the development of local 
technological capability and the legal devices to avoid the abuse of patent rights by 
foreign holders of patents were examined. By selecting the Iranian Patent Act as a 
case study, the intention was to show that, before the sixties almost all patent systems 
in developing countries had more or less the same shortcomings. They were a legacy 
of the colonial era and the developing countries did not have the required knowledge 
and experience of the workings of the patent law. As a result, the revision and 
adaptation of national patent laws as an instrument of their industrial and economic 
policy was among the first developmental activities of developing countries. 
The chapter analyzed many loopholes in the Iranian Patent Act such as, the 
absolute novelty criterion, insufficient disclosure, non-working etc. However, it should 
be born in mind that national patent law reforms alone will not be sufficient to 
achieve Iran's technological development goals. The patent law reform is only a part 
of a comprehensive law which deals with the legal elements that comprise the entire 
complex process of transfer and development of technology. In the next chapter, the 
thesis makes proposals for a unitary legal framework within which all industrial 
activities must take place in Iran and for the establishment of the institutions to 
administer and enforce the laws and provide the necessary balance between local and 
foreign interests. In the main, the legal framework will be concerned with the : 
-implementation of intellectual property law; 
-control of restrictive business practices; 
-monitoring the transfer of technology transactions; and 
-considering and awarding the innovation patents. 
277 
SECTION IV. 
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Chapter Ten 
CONCLUSION: PROPOSED DEVELOPMENT OF 
TECHNOLOGY LAW OF IRAN 
According to the thesis, patent laws of most developing countries are 
not the products of efforts to address their particular needs and circumstances: the 
privileges created by the Iranian patent system, for instance, have failed either to 
stimulate national inventive and innovative activities or to encourage rapid transfer, 
development and adaptation, through assimilation and widespread diffusion of 
imported technology. ' 
Developing countries as a group have not succeeded in securing an 
international legal framework responsive to their particular needs in the area of 
transfer and development of technology. Despite the space provided by the Paris 
Convention and the TRIPS Agreement for developing countries to fashion their 
national laws, they continue to seek to reform the international patent system instead 
of directing their attention to adopting appropriate domestic legal measures to 
encourage the transfer and promotion of technology. 
As a result, the current legal frameworks of developing countries do not yet 
provide effective institutional arrangements to resolve the conflicts that inevitably arise 
from the parallel enforcement of antitrust, intellectual property and transfer of 
technology laws by disparate government agencies with little coordination of purpose. 
Intellectual property rights are protected in a separate legal framework and 
organisation while other aspects such as the registration of transfer of technology 
See si4pra, Chapter Nine; Fasih Marnani M., Iran, GATT and Transfer of Technology Law, 
stipra, Chapter FoLir, note 148; see also Report of the World Bank Regarding New Industrial 
Direction of Iran, Teheran, Tadbeer, vol. 28,1992, p. 21. (in Persian). 
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agreements and control of restrictive business practices are dealt with by other 
independent organisations. ' 
The problem is a conceptual one. The government should be clear as to its 
technology development goals and conceive an appropriate Institutional framework 
which can then be embodied in effective legal instruments. This thesis does both for 
Iran, but many of the proposals can apply to most developing countries in the process 
of industrial development. 
The thesis proposes the enactment of a Development of Technology Law of 
Iran which would lay down rules for patent, transfer of technology agreements and 
protection of competition in Iran and, for the first time, would bring the three 
important areas of law under the supervision of a single independent agency of the 
government whose central purpose would be to develop a technological base in the 
country and advance industrial progress. In the post-TRIPS universe, such a 
technology -based legal framework is essential for developing countries to encourage 
technological innovations and competition and to prevent any abuse of a dominant 
position in the market. This represents a new approach to an old problem of 
developing countries. Hopefully, the impact in Iran would be the equivalent of the 
industrial revolution in Britain and Europe in the nineteenth century. 3 
The proposed new law (Appendix Two) is divided into four parts, Part One 
providing for the establishment of the Iranian Board for the Transfer and Promotion 
of Technology and describing the powers of its Director-General, Part Two, Three and 
Four detail the respective functions of the Patent, Transfer of Technology and 
Protection of Competition Offices and the powers of their Directors. 
2 Nigeria, for example has divided the functions between National Office of Industrial Property 
Act, 1977, which mainly deals with the transfer of technology transactions, and Patent Act of 
1970 which deals with the patent grants. In India and Colombia also the implementation of transfer 
of technology, patent and control of restrictive business practices laws are divided between 
different ministries and agencies. See, UNCTAD Compilation, supra, Chapter Two, note 25. 
3 It should be borne in mind that the effectiveness of all that proposed in this thesis will depend very 
much on the economic and monetary policies and goals pursued by the government. What has been 
done by this thesis is just an indispensable starting point. 
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1. Part One: Administration of Development of Technology Law 
(a) Introduction 
Legal reforms introducing better focused laws are not by themselves sufficient 
to extract maximum benefits from Iran's efforts to acquire foreign technology and 
provide incentives for the participation of local and foreign nationals in the 
development of a local technological base. In addition to the enactment of new rules 
of law, professionally staffed institutions must exist to apply intellectual property, 
transfer of technology and competition rules in a way so as to ensure the achievement 
of the common objective of promoting industrial development without prejudice to the 
overall economy and the acquired interests of local and foreign investors. There is 
obviously the need to establish a suitable institutional framework to coordinate the 
enforcement of the three laws, which are most involved in the movement of 
technology across and within a country's borders. The link between law and economic 
development is nowhere more conspicuous than in this process of technology 
exchange. 
The fact that the protection of intellectual property rights, transfer of 
technology and maintenance of competitive markets cannot cohabit without some give 
and take between the different sets of legal rules suggests that the responsibility for 
the administration of the three functions should fall within the purview of a single 
agency. The reasons to support a single all-embracing organisation encompassing the 
functions of the patent, transfer of technology and protection of competition offices 
may be summarised as follows: 
Patenting is a highly technical operation requiring the evaluation of the 
scientific and technological implications. While the legal implication is very important, 
protection of industrial property is not an end itself. As examined and submitted by 
this thesis, in developing countries, patent offices should shift their emphasis from 
merely providing legal protection for the applicant to using patenting as a means of 
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enhancing technological development in the country: Iran should strive to move in this 
direction; 
Distribution of the registration of patent rights and regulation between different 
organisations with different registries is to create an unnecessary dissipation of energy 
and hardship for users. 
Such an arrangement would enable the optimum use of scarce professional 
manpower. 
With the continuing technological self-reliance and technological development 
of the country, the scope of the statutory functions of the national transfer of 
technology office as an independent unit would diminish progressively. The country, 
therefore would rely more on: 
i) its local research findings and commercialise them as this is the key 
to the actual development of technology, and 
ii) its competitive market. 
The present dual patent licensing arrangement in most developing countries 
which have enacted transfer of technology law, is a confusing overlap. While licensing 
of patents is provided in the patent law, its duplication in the transfer of technology 
law must have been prompted by the fact that the machinery for coping with these in 
the registries were either inadequate or non-existent. 
If the patent office and the office for transfer of technology and for protection 
of competition were the offices of the same organization, it would be easier to find 
whether technology to be acquired already exists in the patents office, and the 
excessive restrictive clauses in the patented technology licensing agreement could be 
controlled more effectively. 
There are also circumstances in which a needed technology is patented in the 
country but is not worked due to the lack of capital or/and additional know-how. In 
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this regard, the Transfer of Technology Office would be actively prospecting for 
potential investors and technology suppliers, national or foreign, and helping them to 
utilise the patented technology. 
The present dual system in developing countries which have enacted transfer 
of technology law and antitrust law, is another confusing overlap. While controlling 
of RBPs is provided in antitrust law, its inclusion in the transfer of technology law 
must have been prompted by the fact that the machinery for controlling RBPs in the 
relevant offices was considered weak. 
While there are many precedents to resolve the conflicts between industrial 
property rights and competition rules and to share jurisdictional power over common 
areas of interest, none exist to resolve issues raised by conflicts between competition 
rules and transfer of technology objectives. In the resolution of the issues relating to 
competition rules and industrial property rights, the Courts such as the European Court 
of Justice have played the dominant role. 4 The thesis proposes a unique administrative 
arrangement for experts to deal with the conflicts on a routine basis. 
Independent opinions support this proposal: for example the Director of the 
Scientific and Research Organisation and the Director of the Industrial Property Office 
of Iran have recommended that patent registry office should be merged into the 
proposed transfer and promotion of technology organisation. ' 
4 For instance see Case 262/81, Coditel SA v. Cine-Vog Films 1982, E. C. R 3381,1 C. M. L. R. 49 
(1983), in which the Court has drawn a fundamental distinction between the existence of 
intellectual property rights and the exercise thereof. The Court also has developed the exhaustion 
doctrine of intellectual property rights. See case 192/73, Van Zuylen Freres v. HAG AG 1974 
E. C. R., 73. 
5 Moatarnedi M., supra, Chapter One, note 8 1; interview with the Director of Iranian Patent Office, 
supra, Chapter Three, note 57; interview with Sharifzadgan, supra, Chapter One, note 81; 
Mashaiekhi, supra, Chapter Eight, note 68; see also Abaspour M., Technology and Contemporary 
World, Sadra Pub. Teheran, 1990, p. 186 (in Persian). 
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According to a field research conducted by this writer in Iran, many Iranian- 
owned firms found that they would benefit from the proposed EBTPT's application of 
the rules. (See Appendix Three)' 
The proposal would not violate Iran's international obligations under the Paris 
Convention and the TRIPS agreement when the country becomes a member state of 
7 the WTO. 
In general, the proposed EBTPT's operations would not result in any conflict with 
technology suppliers, nor would they give rise to any restriction on the flow of 
technology to Iran. On the contrary, the proposed EBTPT' rules would provide more 
legal certainty and security for foreign investment in Iran. ' 
It is in the light of the above that the thesis proposes the creation of an Iranian 
Board for the Transfer and Promotion of Technology (MTPT). 
6A field study as to the proposed EBTDT was conducted by the writer in Iran. The Director of 
Twenty-five Iranian enterprises in the manufacturing sector (two automotive; ten rubber, glass, 
synthetic fibbers, petrochemical; and thirteen metal working, electrical, and non-electrical) were 
interviewed. See Appendix Three. Recently, the Iranian Chamber of Commerce, Mines and 
Industries which represents a considerable number of Iranian enterprises, stressed that, "although 
the protection of new inventions is necessary, such legal protection should not be used only for 
importation of the patented articles and to prevent the transfer and dissemination of technology in 
the country. Accordingly, the creation of a fair balance between the national and public interests, 
particularly in the post-TRIPS era, requires a sound and appropriate and responsive national legal 
framework. " A paper submitted by Mr Khamoshi, the head of the Iranian Chamber of Commerce, 
Mines and Industries, to National Seminar of Reviewing Industrial Property Rights in Iran and 
TRIPS in World Trade, Teheran, Dec. 16-17,1996. Stress added. 
7 It should be noted that, according to the TRIPS Agreement all developing countries obtain a 
five-year transition period during which they need not conform domestic laws to the proposed 
international minimum standards. For the Least-Developed Countries, this blanket exemption lasts 
ten years and may be extended as circumstances require. Nevertheless, one year after the 
Agreement takes effect, all member countries must forego patent regulations that discriminate 
against foreigners. See TRIPS Agreement, Articles 65-67. No rules of the IBTPT would 
discriminate against foreigners: the rules would require effective implementation of granted rights. 
8 See infra, IBTPT and Foreign Investment. 
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11. The Iranian Board for Transfer and Promotion of Technology 
(a) Governing Body for the IBTPT 
Given the importance of the subject matter of acquisition and promotion of 
technology, one of the most important questions is the authority that would govern and 
direct the EBTPT. It should be borne in mind that ministerial control of this type of 
corporation should be minimal and that the central objectives should be which 
governmental body has the closest connection with the IBTPT and therefore likely to 
give it the most attention, direction and assistance. 
The first socio-economic development plan of Iran' -as well as the views of 
many Iranian authorities and scholars- '0 has required the establishment of a Supreme 
Technology Council (STC) whose functions have the closest connections of all with 
the IBTPT. (Appendix One) 
9 See First Socio-Economic and Cultural Plan of Iran, Teheran, 1990, Article 4(8). The Plan was 
prepared by the planners and experts of Iran's Planning and Budget Organisation and was passed 
by the Parliament. 
10 Nasirzadeh GH. R. and Ghasemzadeh H., A Proposal for Comprehensive Technology-Related 
Socio-Economic Planning In Islamic Republic of Iran, in Technology and Development, 
Industrial Management Organisation, 1995, Teheran, pp. 26-48, (in Persian); A Report of Seminar 
on Global Economy and Our Industry, 1994, reprinted in Tadbeer Magazine, 1994, vol. 47, p. 
60-62, (in Persian); Supreme Research Institute for Planning and Development, Development of 
Iran and the Need for Management of Transfer of Technology, Teheran, Tadbeer Magazine, 
1992, vol. 23, p. 36-41; see also, Miremadi T., An Introduction to Planning of Technological 
Development, a paper submitted to First Seminar for Science, Technology and Development, 
held by Science and Industrial Research Centre of Iran, 1991, pp. 73-83, (in Persian); Industrial 
Management Organisation, Structure of Science and Technology in Iran, Teheran, 1994 (in 
Persian); Abaspour M., op. cit., note 6. For more details of the issue see Moatamedi M., op. cit., 
note 6. Dr. Moatamedi, who is the Director of Iran's Scientific and Industrial Research Centre, 
emphasised that: "Iran's development to be sustainable must be on the basis of technological 
development. In doing so, three elements are essential: national will, determination of technology 
goals, and an independent and strong organization to ensure implementation of the policies and 
decisions. " Ibid. 
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The main role of the STC is to prepare a medium and long term national 
technology plan. " The technology plan which would consist of important issues, 
such as the national technological priorities, would be expected to harmonise and 
converge all technology transfer, adaptation and development activities of the 
country. 12 Equally important is that the STC would be responsible for correcting and 
improving the national rules relating to the transfer and development of technology" 
as well as the organizational structure of the country's technology. 14 Further, the STC 
monitors the transfer of foreign technology to the country 15 and determines the 
priorities of foreign investments for national technological needs. " The STC is also 
responsible for encouraging the private sector to invest more in the transfer and 
development of technology. " The creation of a suitable environment for local 
innovative activities is another function of the STC. '8 Finally, the STC acts as a 
forum for achieving coordination between R&D centres and the industrial sector. 19 
In the light of the situation in Iran and the close relationship which the 
functions of the STC would have with the proposed IBTPT, it is believed that the 
latter should be governed by the STC. In fact, the EBTPT with the administrative 
arrangement that is proposed by this thesis, would act as the executive arm of the 
STC. Having close and structural links with the STC, the EBTPT would be aware of 
the technology and investment priorities of the country and would then facilitate an 
See Appendix One, Art. 2(a). The Appendix contains the proposed functions and composition of 
the STC provided on the basis of the First Socio-Economic and Cultural Plan of Iran and different 
sources mentioned in notes 3 and 10. 
12 See supra, Chapter Two, pp. 34-36. 
13 See Appendix One, Art. 2(d). 
14 Ibid. 
15 lbid, Art. 2(e). 
16 lbid, Art. 2(f). 
17 lbid, Art. 2(g). 
18 lbid, Art. 2(c). 
19 lbid, Art. 2(b). 
286 
ideal environment for the acquisition of those technologies that are needed but are not 
available in the country. While the STC itself would concentrate on the development 
of local technology, 'O the EBTPT would focus on the transfer and promotion of 
required foreign technology. The ultimate goal of the STC and EBTPT, however, 
would be the building of a sound technological base in the country. 
(b) Nature of the IBTPT 
The IBTPT would be a body corporate with perpetual succession and the power 
to sue and to be sued. The President shall appoint a Director General for the Board 
who would be a person experienced and specialized in industrial property, competition 
and transfer of technology matters. The Director General would be appointed for a 
period of four years. 21 
(c) Main Functions of IBTPT 
Through the IBTPT, the government would institute incentive structures to promote 
innovative activities and to reward risk-takers; implement the STC policies regarding 
the transfer and promotion of technology; introduce acceptable criteria for the 
technology agreements such as their effects on environment, export and use of national 
sources; and control and eliminate excessive and harmful restrictive business 
22 practices. In doing this, and so as to contribute to the technological base of the 
country, the IBTPT would have the following functions: 
20 It should be remembered that the development of indigenous technology covers a wide range of 
planning and training programs and coordinated actions of different authorities, while the transfer 
and promotion of technology is a part of national technological development and has a narrower 
scope. 
21 Appendix Two, Articles 1-5. 
22 The lesson learned from those countries that have made significant technological and Industrial 
progress is that government has an essential role in providing national setting which supports 
technology-based developments at the firm, industry and national level. See supra, Chapter Two, 
pp. 40-4 1. 
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(a) administering the law relating to patent rights to ensure rapid and 
coordinated development of patent rights and their effective application; 
(b) granting of patents, utility model, and innovation certificates; 
(c) establishment and maintenance of an Industrial Property Documentation 
Unit for the public in general and for research institutions in particular; 
(d) registering of agreements for the transfer of foreign technology to 
Iranian parties and ensuring the best contractual terms and conditions 
for Iranian parties entering into such contracts; 
(e) encouraging a more efficient process of identifying and selecting 
foreign technology and developing the negotiating skills of Iranians; 
(f) providing a more efficient process for the adaptation of imported 
technology; 
11 
(g) monitoring, on a continuous basis, of the execution of any contract 
registered pursuant to the Law; 
(h) removing obstacles to the absorption and dissemination of technology, 
through measures to prevent the incorporation of implicit or explicit 
contractual restrictions in contracts for transfer of technology; 
promoting competition in the market for goods and services. 
0) obtaining, analyzing and providing technological and related economic 
and commercial information; 
(k) formulating such policy as may be necessary to carry out the other 
functions of the IBTPT as may be conferred by the Law; 
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(1) recommending the desirability of signing, ratifying or withdrawing 
from international conventions and agreements on industrial property, 
competition and the transfer of technology. " 
(d) Authority of the IBTPT 
For the achievement of the above objectives, while there should be a political 
commitment regarding the effective acquisition, adaptation and diffusion of foreign 
technology, 24 the IBTPT would have to be politically independent and vested with 
sufficient authority. 25 Otherwise, it would be a passive organisation and inadequate 
to make any serious improvement in the technological development process. Although, 
under the Constitution of Iran 26 , the President and the Council of Ministers have the 
powers to enact the required legislation to establish the Board without referring to the 
Iranian Parliament, the thesis recommends that the proposed law be enacted by the 
whole Parliament in session so that all political factions can be involved in this 
sweeping exercise. 
The EBTPT Director-General would report to the STC and would have overall 
responsibility for the Patent, Transfer of Technology, and Protection of Competition 
Offices whose Directors would undertake the day to day functions of their respective 
offices. " 
23 Article 6. 
24 Nasirzadeh & Ghasemzadeh, op. cit., note 9, p. 47; Moatamedi, op. cit., note 4; United nations, 
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, Meeting of Ministers of Industry and 
Technology, 23-29 June 1992, Teheran, p. 175. 
25 Article 8. 
26 The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 2nd edition (with amendments), published by: 
Islamic Propagation Organisation, Teheran, 1990, Principle 127. 
27 Article 5. It should be noted that the President would be the head of the STC. See App. One, 
Article 3. 
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It is predictable that such an all-embracing legislation would be followed by 
a considerable amount of subsidiary legislation to deal with detailed matters of 
practice and procedure. Accordingly, it is necessary that for the exercise of his 
authority the Director-General be empowered to issue rules and regulations to govern 
the operations of the three Offices and to implement policies and guidelines relating 
to technology transfer, industrial property rights, and monopolies and restrictive 
28 agreements and arrangements. He would prescribe the forms and returns and other 
information and make all necessary inquiries, undertake all studies, publish reports and 
21 
provide information to the public. 
(e) Organisation 
In the light of the above functions, as a necessary institutional arrangement, the 
principal role of the EBTPT would be the management and the coordination of the 
work of its three operations Offices: the Patent, Transfer of Technology, and 
Protection of Competition Offices, in such a way as to assist the country in achieving 
its technological goals. Such a setting would make for better coordination and 
effectiveness than achieved by the present system in developing countries where there 
are three different offices, each supervised by different ministries. (Appendix Four) 
(i) Patent Office 
The Patent Office would be responsible for the grant of patents of all kind in the 
country. Properly designed patents would encourage inventive and innovative activities 
on the part of local and foreign nationals to build a local technological base by 
assuring satisfactory returns on their technological investments. The Patent Office, 
while having substantially the same powers as the existing patent office, goes further 
and establishes, for the first time, structural links with the institutions that handle the 
allied subjects of transfer of technology and antitrust. The proposed patent law 
28 Article 17. 
29 Ibid. 
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provides more opportunity for the protection of local innovative activities, while it 
satisfies the Paris Convention and the TRIPS requirements as well. 'O 
A patent grant, however, would not be made if there were an objection from 
either of the other two offices which would have to be informed of all intended grants. 
The patent grant might then be modified or refused altogether if so agreed with the 
office that object to the grant. " Where there were no agreement with the office that 
object to the grant, the Patent Office could request the intervention of the IIBTPT 
Director-General who would ultimately decide the unresolved issues regarding the 
particular grant in contention. 32 Thus, there would be a compulsory review of all 
intended patent grants by the Transfer of Technology Office and the Protection of 
Competition Office. This process would enable these two offices to record those 
granted patents in the country as well and take them into account in the fulfilment of 
13 their relevant functions. 
30 The TRIPS Agreement also allows member states to devise patent laws that exceed the 
requirements of prevailing international minimum standards. See TRIPS Agreement, Article I (I). 
This privilege is used by the proposed patent law to provide special incentives through untraditional 
patents to encourage private investment in sectors targeted for rapid development. See infra, Part 
Two. 
31 Needless to say that the Patent Office and other offices would fulfil their functions as the law 
requires and with the strict observance of relevant international conventions and arrangements that 
Iran has signed them. Accordingly, those patents granted based on the national and international 
laws would not be rejected or modified by the other two offices. Of course, if a granted patent 
were misused or were not worked properly in the country, the other offices could request for the 
rejection or modification of the patent. 
32 Article 21. 
33 For instance, the Transfer of Technology Office would be aware of all available patented 
technologies in the country, thus, it would direct and encourage interested local enterprises to work 
those patented technologies through licensing, and discourage importation of similar technology 
to the country. 
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(ii) Transfer of Technology Office 
The Transfer of Technology Office would be responsible for the registration, recording 
and monitoring of transfer of technology agreements which would, however, be 
subject to the scrutiny of the Patent Office and the Protection of Competition Office 
in the same way as patent grants. " 
(iii) The Protection of Competition Office 
The imposition and incorporation of restrictive practices does not always arise through 
the pressure and bargaining power of technology suppliers. A considerable number of 
these practices are imposed because there is no particular law and organisation to 
observe the transfer of technology agreements. Accordingly, the Protection of 
Competition Office of the IBTPT would be responsible for: 
-identifying, control and eliminating restrictive clauses of transfer of 
technology agreements; 
-ensuring competition in the market for goods and services; 
-taking action as necessary to prevent undertakings from behaving in manners 
that distort competition and from abusing a dominant position in the market; 
The above mentioned tasks, however, would be fulfilled in the context of the 
overall technology plan and its objectives as to the transfer and promotion of 
technology, and not competition per se. Such actions would not be taken until after 
consultations with the other two offices which could object if they so chose, in which 
case, the IBTPT Director-General would intervene to resolve the dispute with the 
Protection of Competition Office. His decisions would be binding on the three offices 
in all matters. " 
34 See Part III of the Appendix Two. 
35 Ibid, Part IV. 
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(iv) Techno-economic Information Centre 
The Techno-economic Information Centre would be associated with the Transfer of 
Technology Office to maintain continuously updated indexes of suppliers of 
technology and technology -related market information. This Centre would collect and 
maintain statistical data on the acquisition of foreign technology and development of 
indigenous technology and analyze technological and related economic and 
commercial information for the use of the public. 36 
(V) IBTPT Tribunal 
In Iran, industrial property cases have not been satisfactorily handled for various 
reasons. In order to ensure effective operation of industrial property cases as well as 
transfer of technology and competition cases, and for a better integration of the 
offices, an IBTPT Tribunal is proposed, hereafter named the Tribunal, presided over 
by the Directors and Assistant Directors of the IBTPT. 37 It would be part of the 
duties of the Directors and Assistant Directors of the IBTPT to sit upon the Tribunal 
when disputes arising from the decisions of the three offices needed to be heard and 
determined. " 
These Directors and Assistant Directors, in particular, should provide a 
valuable field of experienced legal practitioners for appointment to the Teheran Court 
which would have the exclusive jurisdiction in industrial property, transfer of 
36 Article 10. 
37 Article 11. 
38 It should be noted that the Director General, or his/her Assistant, on the basis of each case, would 
decide the composition of the Tribunal, such that, for instance, disputes arising from decisions of 
the Patent Office would be heard and resolved by the Directors or Assistant Directors of the other 
two offices. Needless to say such a procedure would be in respect of the objections received from 
outside the IBTDT. The internal unresolved objections of the offices, as mentioned above, would 
be settled by the Director General. 
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technology and competition matters. Appeals as against the Tribunal's decision would 
be directed to the Teheran Court. " 
(vi) Industrial Property Documentation Unit 
For a developing country like Iran, the surest hope of technological development lies, 
to a great extent, in adapting existing technology and inventions. This is hardly 
possible if potential researchers and investors are not aware of existing inventions in 
any particular area at a given time. 
It was observed by the present writer that few Iranian researchers and fewer 
Iranian research centres are aware that there are more than 4,000,000 patent records 
of foreign inventions in the information centre of the Ministry of Jahad Sazandegi and 
are accessible to the public. 
Accordingly, to make the Patent Office a working instrument for transfer, 
development and diffusion of technological knowledge, apart from its integration into 
the EBTPT, an Industrial Property Documentation Unit (IPDU) would be established 
to provide patent information in a way that would facilitate the transfer of technology 
and enable enterprises and R&D institutions to develop endogenous technology. In 
doing so, the IPDU would maintain records of local inventive efforts as well as 
current world patent specifications in different fields of technology on a continuous 
basis. " 
39 Article 12. 
40 Article 16. 
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Registers 
The Offices would have their own register. " The registers would at all convenient 
times be open to the inspection of the public, subject to such rules as were prescribed 
by the IBTPT. 42 
111. Further Practical Issues for the IBTPT 
Different questions may still arise as to the way EBTPT would work and implement 
its proposed functions. 
A. Technology and Investment Priorities 
A question may be how the EBTPT would work, given the technology and investment 
priorities of the country. 
As was noticed above, IBTPT would be an executive arm of the STC. Luckily 
enough, the Government has been requested to provide a 25 year development plan 
for the country, which has been named "Iran of 1400" . 
4' The technology plan of 
"Iran of 1400" would be an integral part of the overall plan. The STC would formulate 
and prepare the main lines of the country's technology development plan. 44 For the 
next 25 years of Iran's history, therefore, the STC would introduce the technology and 
41 Article 13. 
42 Article 15. 
43 The interview of the head of Planning and Budget Organization of Iran, April 1996, Teheran 
Newspapers. 
44 See Appendix One, Art. 2(a). 
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investment priorities for the country. Further, on the basis of the country's scientific 
and technological capabilities, the STC would specify those technologies that could 
be developed locally and those which should be acquired from other countries. This 
would give a clear vision and insight to the relevant institutions particularly to the 
IBTPT as to its functions and actions regarding the transfer and promotion of needed 
technologies. 
Being structurally linked to and members of the STC, the Director General and 
Directors of the IBTPT would be informed of the country's technology goals and 
priorities, and would discharge their functions on the basis of those priorities. This 
position would facilitate the decision-making process of the offices as to the transfer 
and development of technology agreements as well. Equally important is that, in such 
circumstances, the IBTPT would be able to be flexible enough to authorise those 
prioritised technology transfer agreements although they, for instance, include some 
restrictive clauses. Among its priorities the 113TPT would be concerned with the issue 
of foreign investment, discussed more fully in Section IV below. 
B. Effective Integration of the Offices 
Another possible question: how would the three proposed offices be effectively 
integrated? To answer this question it is worthwhile here to emphasise that these three 
offices are intended to handle three indispensable aspects of the transfer and 
promotion of technology. In other words, they have common ground and common 
objective. The supervision of these three offices by a single agency would provide 
effective integration of the offices. However, the system would have other particular 
involvements that would bring about further effective integration of those offices. 
Some points in this regard deserve to be mentioned here: 
(a) As previously stated, the three offices are structurally linked. Each would be aware 
of the other two offices' activities and decisions, and equally important, each would 
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have opportunity to raise its objection when necessary. In this regard, the proposed 
law requires that each office, before making any final decision, must inform the other 
offices of the intended decision. 
The IBTPT would be well advised to take appropriate measures to make this 
procedure as short as possible. For instance, the Director General would prepare a 
special form to be used by the offices for obtaining any comments or objections of the 
others. The form would contain a clause that requires the requested offices to reply 
within a specific period of time. No subsequent reply from the requested offices would 
mean no objection. 
b) As proposed by the thesis, the IBTPT Tribunal would be a forum in which the 
Directors and Assistant Directors would be involved in resolving disputes raised by 
third parties against decisions of the offices; 
c) The Directors and Assistant Directors of the IBTPT would have regular Board 
meeting with the General Director twice a month. The Board meetings would be a 
suitable forum for establishing of effective coordination and integration; 
d) the Director General would receive the offices' day-to-day work reports and 
supervise their operations specifically with a view to achieving greater efficiency and 
integration; 
e) The Directors of the Offices are members of the STC as well, so their awareness 
of the technology policies and objectives and the needs of the country would enable 
them to work towards the achievement of those objectives; 
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f) The work undertaken by each office would affect the other offices. Patents granted 
by the Patent Office, for instance, require that the Transfer of Technology and 
45 Competition Offices to follow up their effective utilization in the country . 
C. Settlement of Conflicts Between the Offices 
The question arises as to how conflicts from the parallel enforcement of patent, 
transfer of technology, and competition laws by the relevant offices would be settled. 
It should be noted that although the Protection of Competition Rules of the 
IBTPT condemn restraints of trade and declares such practices unlawful, and the 
Transfer of Technology Rules condemn the static aspect of exclusive rights, the rules 
recognize the existence of intellectual property rights and the law governing those 
rights as a partner in meeting common economic and technological objectives. Such 
a coexistence, however, will only be possible and beneficial if the exclusive rights are 
utilized for the original and basic purposes of patent law -namely, to promote 
innovation and transfer of technology, encourage the society to become more creative, 
reward the owner for the time, effort and investment he puts into technology which 
eventually benefits the country's economy- and do not go beyond these purposes or 
otherwise abused. 
There are, however, circumstances in which conflicts may arise between the 
proposed offices. For instance, a transfer of technology agreement that violates or 
limits the rights conferred to a patentee operating within the country may cause 
conflict between the Patent and Transfer of Technology Offices. Likewise, a conflict 
may arise between the Patent and Transfer of Technology Offices when a patentee 
45 The Transfer of Technology Office should take the granted patents into account in different ways: 
the period of technology licensing agreements should not exceed the term of the concerned patents; 
the office should not register those agreements that may violate a fight granted by the Patent 
Office; the office should facilitate the working of those useful patents in the country by giving 
required incentives, etc. The Competition Office also should prevent misuse of the granted rights. 
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does not disclose required information of the invention. Further, the registration of a 
transfer of technology contract that contains excessive clauses may raise disputes 
between the Competition and Transfer of Technology Offices. 46 
The new structural link that is recommended to be established between the 
patent, transfer of technology and competition laws in Iran, on one hand, would assure 
the effective implementation of the laws, and on the other hand would minimise 
possible conflict between them. As has been noted, the offices would have opportunity 
to review the works of other offices. Through such a process, potential conflict may 
be settled amicably by the offices. Failing this, the conflict would be resolved by the 
Director General. 
The question to be answered here is on what principles the conflicts may be 
resolved. It is submitted that the Director General., first, should examine whether the 
offices have implemented the related national law (rule of law). The second step to 
be taken by him/her is to establish whether the offices have violated the country's 
international obligations. When the Director General finds that the offices have 
complied with the above principles, but the conflict still remains, he/she has to resort 
to the main principle on which the conflicts between the offices could be resolved: the 
so called "development test principle". 
According to the development test principle, the country's technological and 
industrial development should be the criterion for resolving disputes. This principle 
requires, for instance, that a technology transfer contract that contains a restraint of 
trade whose nature resulting in a conflict between the Competition and the Transfer 
of Technology Offices may be regarded as legal and authorised by the Director 
General, on the ground that such a contract, despite its restrictions, is beneficial to the 
46 There might be other conflicts such as registration of those transfer of technology agreements in 
which the transferee is restricted excessively or is authorised to impose excessive clauses; when 
the Competition Office registers agreements and arrangements which may conflict with the Transfer 
of Technology Office's objectives. 
299 
technological development of the country . 
4' The principle is in conformity with the 
TRIPS Agreement as well. 
48 
This unique administrative arrangement, therefore, would provide a suitable 
forum for the General Director and the Directors of the IBTPT to deal with the 
conflicts and overlaps on a routine basis . 
4' For the first time in a developing country 
such a forum would be established to resolve issues raised by conflicts between 
competition rules and transfer of technology objectives. 'O 
111. Foreign Investment and the IBTPT 
The current Iranian foreign investment law, another vehicle for transfer and 
development of technology, has been seen to be controversial" and, since the time 
of the revolution, has no significance because foreign investments particularly in the 
47 Certain practices, in a transfer of technology contract, such as the use of local natural resources, 
the adaptation of technology transferred to local conditions, and research for latter purpose might 
also satisfy the Director General to authorise the contract and resolve the conflict between the 
offices. 
48 According to the TRIPS Agreement, Members are allowed to adopt measures "to prevent the abuse 
of intellectual property rights by right holders or the resort to practices which unreasonably restrain 
trade or adversely affect the international transfer of technology". See Article 8. See TRIPS 
Agreement, Articles 8 and 40. 
49 It should be recalled that the IBTPT Tribunal shall deal with complaints and objections of persons 
firms and companies, local or foreign, as to the offices' decisions. 
50 Although in some countnes there are many precedents existing for resolving the conflicts between Z: ' 
industrial property rights and competition rules, none exist to resolve issues raised by conflicts 
between competition rules and transfer of technology objectives. 
51 Chapter Eight, particularly the legal environment of foreign investment after the fall of Shah. 
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industrial sector have become a trickle. An important question, therefore, is whether 
the recommended Law would facilitate foreign investment in Iran. 
The experience of Iran indicates that having an encouraging foreign investment 
law does not necessarily lead to the transfer and development of foreign 
technology. 52 However, although direct foreign investment flows are explained 
usually by a variety of reasons, it is apparent that the mere existence of a regulatory 
framework for transfer and development of technology does not affect those flows and 
may even facilitate them as follows: 
The proposed Development of Technology Law recognizes the present Law 
Concerning the Attraction and Protection of Foreign Investment in Iran: thus, the 
foreign capital investment as well as profits will have legal protection. 
53 All rights, 
exemptions, facilities accorded to domestic capital and private enterprises also will 
54 
apply to foreign capital and firms. The repatriation of the profits and capital derived 
55 from the investment in the same currency as originally imported is also guaranteed. 
The patent rules proposed in this thesis would provide more legal certainty and 
security for investment in Iran with a view to facilitating transfer of technology and 
stimulating R&D activities. The rules contain numerous elements which, following the 
mainstream of trends in patent protection, substantially changed the previous 
legislation on the subject. For example, the scope of patentability includes all 
processes and products, including chemicals, alloys, pharmaceutical and biotechnology, 
while the term of protection would be 20 years. 56 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid, the Iranian Law of Investment, Article 1. 
54 Ibid, Article 3. 
55 Ibid., Article 4. 
56 The World Bank has recently concluded that the current outdated Iranian patent law is a deterrence 
to foreign investment in Iran. See op. cit., note 1. 
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The Law proposed here would introduce a predictable and effective licensing 
system for the first time in Iran with a view to commercialising new technology in the 
country; thus, foreign technology suppliers would be encouraged to invest in the 
country, through technology licensing agreements. Given the importance of licensing 
agreements to actual working of new technology in the country 57 , the Law would 
provide circumstances in which interests of the licensor, licensee and the country are 
all adequately secured. 
The Law mandates the provision of trade secret protection in the country for 
the first time. Such protection should therefore stimulate local innovation besides 
facilitating various forms of foreign investment. 58 
The direct protection of innovations in a way that would be introduced by the 
IBTPT would provide the right incentives to the private sector, national or foreign, to 
invest in innovative and technological activities and apply the results to the 
manufacturing of products competitive in the domestic and world markets. " 
The proposed competition rules contain special exceptions under which some 
restrictive clauses and practices might be acceptable when they are in the national 
interest or contribute to progress in the economic and technological development of 
the country. 
60 
The STC and IIBTPT would act as appropriate and meaningful forums for 
determining and implementing the priorities of foreign investments for national 
57 See supra, Chapter Seven, notes 2 and 3. 
58 See Part 11 of the Appendix Two, Article 69 (c). 
59 The Innovation Certificate would be an effective vehicle for industrial investment since it would 
encourage join investment of foreign and national enterprises for commercialization of useful and 
unpatented technologies for the first time in the country. See supra, Chapter Nine. 
60 Article 86. 
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technological needs, thus, necessary coordination would be created between the 
relevant national organizations to facilitate the required foreign investment. 61 
Accordingly, it is believed that the proposed Development of Technology Law 
would minimise the non-commercial risks of investing of foreign corporation in the 
country and concede their preferences to some degree so long as technology were 
transferred on terms which benefit the country. In doing so, the Law requires that the 
Transfer of Technology Office maintain a register of all foreign investments because 
of their connection with the ownership and exercise of industrial property rights and 
because of their potential for conflict with the competition rules and transfer of 
62 technology rules. The current Organization for Investment, Economic and Technical 
Assistance of Iran, thus, would fulfil its obligations regarding the foreign investors 
who their applications are registered by the I1BTPT. 
61 It should be borne in mind that the current foreign investment law of Iran is attached to the 
Ministry of economy and finance whose Minister shall be a member of the STC. This shall provide 
required coordination between the STC, IBTPT and the Organization for the attraction of foreign 
investment. See App. One Article 3. 
62 See infra, Part Three. 
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11. Part Two: Patent Grants 
Part Two of the proposed law establishes a substantially revised version 
of the existing Iranian patent system, a system which is out-dated and out of step with 
the social, economic and industrial developments in the country. " Fundamental 
changes in the existing law have been recommended to make the Iranian patent system 
an industrial development-driven system which is capable of effectively implementing 
policies for national technology development. Many provisions in the proposed law 
are virtually new and others represent significant revisions of the existing law aimed 
at clarifying obscure provisions in the old law. Equally important is that the proposed 
patent law is in conformity with the new standards provided by the TRIPS 
Agreement. 64 
(a) Criteria of Patentability 
The proposed law introduces three requirements for patentability of inventions, namely 
65 industrial application, novelty and inventive step. The existing Iranian patent law 
provides for the first and second requirements but only in a round about manner. 
However, there is no stipulation in the old law as to inventiveness which could 
actually give an advantage to local inventors if other amendments are made to the law 
63 For more details see supra, Chapter Nine. 
64 As was considered earlier, although the TRIPS Agreement has provided more stringent standards 
for the patent protection, it has established enhanced disclosure and patentability requirements, and 
it has to be enforced in such a way "to contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and 
to the transfer and dissemination of technology. " See Article 7 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
Accordingly, although Iran is not yet a member of the WTO, the proposed patent law shall respect 
foreign new technological inventions and take into account the TRIPS requirements. See supra, 
Chapter Four. 
65 Articles 23-26. 
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to clarify the status of many ideas which cannot properly be fitted into the definition 
of inventiveness. More importantly, the requirement of universal novelty required by 
the current law would negate any advantage derived from the requirement of 
inventiveness and the lower standards of originality. 
Therefore, the proposed draft of the new law, while adding inventiveness as 
a criterion for the award of a patent also gives precise and explicit definitions of the 
term inventiveness. This would help the understanding of the law and ease its 
application for people as well as for the competent office. On the other hand, in Iran, 
inventions which are new and industrially applicable but are obviously deducible from 
the state of the art by a person skilled in the relevant art would no longer secure 
exclusive rights. 
There has been great concern among those who wished to have their inventions 
patented in Iran about the timing of the disclosure of their inventions. Applicants for 
patents were uncertain if the disclosure of their inventions by a third party who had 
obtained the information directly or indirectly from the inventor during the preliminary 
proceedings for registration by the Patent Office would invalidate the novelty of the 
inventions. The proposed draft law would put an end to the obscurity of the current 
law and related regulations in this regard. The new law would allow a grace period 
of 12 months to patent applicants during which time any disclosure by parties other 
than the patent applicant would be ignored and not affect the patentability of the 
invention. 66 
66 Article 27. 
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(b) Restriction on Subject Matter 
The existing uncertainty in the eventual success of a patent application has in 
Iran contributed to a lack of interest in investment in research and development and, 
in many cases, has led to litigation in the courts. The proposed draft of the new rules 
governing patent grants is expected to overcome these problems and encourage local 
as well as foreign inventors to seek patent grants with greater confidence than hitherto. 
Prospective patent applicants would know exactly what categories of inventions would 
be excluded from patent grants in Iran. 67 
(c) Contents of the Description and Claims 
The thesis has shown that the current Iranian patent law has also failed in respect of 
the disclosure of information requirements under the law. Disclosure facilitates the 
wide dissemination of the working of the patented product or process and serves as 
a vehicle for the transfer of technology for further development within Iran. 
Otherwise, developing countries are constantly faced with having re-invent the wheel, 
so to speak, in order to build their industries. 
The proposed draft law, therefore, sets out in detail all the necessary 
requirements to satisfy the disclosure condition in the law. " An applicant is required 
by the draft law to describe correctly and fully the invention and its operation or use 
as contemplated by the inventor. The applicant must set out clearly the various steps 
in a process, or the method of constructing, making, compounding or using a machine, 
manufacture or composition of matter, in such full, clear, concise and exact terms as 
to enable any person skilled in the art or science to which it appertains, or with which 
67 Article 32. 
68 Article 27. 
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it is most closely connected, to make, construct, compound or use it. In the case of 
a machine, the applicant must explain the principle thereof and the best mode in which 
he has contemplated the application of the principle. Such an "enablement" 
requirement has long been applied by the patent law of the United States and recently 
by the TRIPS. 69 
In the case of a process, the applicant has to explain the necessary sequence, 
if any, of the various steps, so as to distinguish the invention from other inventions. 
He has, in particular, to indicate and claim unequivocally the part, improvement or 
combination that he claims as his invention. The specification should be supported by 
a claim or claims stating unambiguously and in explicit terms the things or 
combinations that the applicant regards as new and in which he claims an exclusive 
property or privilege. 'O The execution of the above mentioned requirements would 
make the Iranian patent system a valuable source of technological information. 
(d) Examination of Application 
One of the main functions of the patent law which is aimed at affording protection to 
patentees is to lend certainty and stability so that patentees can exploit their patents 
commercially with the secure feeling that under the law they have acquired distinct 
property rights. Unfortunately, under the current patent law, patents are granted upon 
mere registration and at the risk of the patentee and without any guarantee as to the 
validity of the patents. Such a shaky and vulnerable protection afforded by the law 
does not encourage the transfer and promotion of needed technology. The 
advancement of information technology and facilities rendered by some international 
69 Members shall require that an applicant for a patent "to indicate the best mode for carrying out the 
invention known to the inventor at the filing date. " See Article 29(l) of the TRIPS Agreement. 
70 Article 29. 
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organisations and conventions have made the comprehensive examination of 
applications feasible and the prospects more promising. At the same time, one can see 
a demand for considerable number of educated and skilled manpower to be employed 
in examining patent applications. The Organization of Scientific and Industrial 
Research in Iran has such a capability and has already expressed its agreement with 
the present author to implement such a procedure in Iran. 71 
The proposed draft patent law is aimed at establishing a comprehensive search 
procedure in the country. 
72 The Patent Office, therefore, at the request of the 
applicant or of another person or sua sponte would carry out a full examination of the 
application for an invention to ensure that it meets the conditions for granting a patent 
73 
as laid down by this law. In this regard, the thesis recommends that Iran should 
join the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT), in view of the advantages set out above. 74 
(f) Contents of the Exclusive Right in an Invention 
The proposed law enumerates the rights which are conferred on a patentee. 75 The 
patentee would have exclusive right in his invention comprising the making, and 
offering for sale the patented goods and putting on the market the subject matter of 
the invention, the intended use of the subject matter as well as the application of the 
patented method. The draft law, however, lists occasions that using patented inventions 
71 Interview in Teheran by the Author with Messrs Bitarafan, Salehi and Nourozi, from OSIRI, 
January 19,1995. 
72 Article 30. 
73 Ibid. 
74 See supra, Chapter 9, p. 260. 
75 Article 3 1. 
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76 by others would not be illegal. This provision is new to Iran and enables knowledge 
of the patent and its working to be embedded in the local technological base through 
utilization in experimental work, research and other non-commercial purposes. 
Accordingly, the proposed law contains a provision to the effect that a patent would 
not be extended to: use of the patented invention for non-commercial purposes 
reflecting private needs, where such use does not cause significant material prejudice 
to the owner of the patent; use of the invention for experimental or research and 
development purposes relating to the subject matter of the patented invention; 
extemporaneous preparation for individual cases in a pharmacy of a medicine in 
accordance with a medical prescription; use of a product covered by the patent after 
the product has been lawfully acquired under a license giving "the right of use of the 
subject invention, totally or in part, and in any manner. , 77 
As was discussed above, the undefined exclusive right of patent grants has led 
to patentees bypassing the law by imposing restrictive and harmful clauses in the 
transfer of technology agreements. Although the whole problem of restrictive and anti- 
competitive practices would be dealt with by the Competition Office, considerable 
collaboration must take place between the three offices of EBTPT on a day-to-day 
basis to protect the interest of the local economy. 
Thus, the proposed law invalidates any clause in a licensing contract which 
derogates from the rights under the new law. 78 
76 Article 32. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Article 40. 
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(e) Licensing and the Transfer of Rights 
The patent provisions in the broader law proposed in this thesis are intended 
to provide an appropriate legal framework for technology licensing agreements. Given 
the importance of licensing contracts to actual working of new technology in the 
country, the legal framework should provide circumstances in which interests of the 
licensor, licensee and the country are all adequately secured. With these objectives in 
mind, the draft law has stipulated some rights and responsibilities of patentees in the 
framework of the Patent regulations . 
7' As will be seen later, the draft law in terms 
of transfer of technology agreements also attempts to strike an equitable balance 
between licensor, licensee and the society. 
Non-voluntary Licences 
For the control and prevention of abusive use of patent monopolies, the so 
called "built-in safeguards" is introduced for the first time by the proposed patent 
law. " The non-working problem of patented technology which is a common practice 
among patent holders can be discouraged by some form of compulsory or non- 
voluntary licences. In passing, it should be said that the compulsory licensing scheme 
under the proposed law is not in contravention of the Paris Convention and the TRIPS 
Agreement. " 
79 Articles 33-37. 
80 Article 42. 
81 Under the TRIPS Agreement, as it was under Article 5A of the Paris Convention, the standard 
form of remedial action remains compulsory licensing, subject to some limitations that Article 31 
of the TRIPS has introduced. In principle, both the public-interest exception and measures to 
prevent abuse, respectively stipulated in Articles 8(l) and 8(2) of the TRIPS, would justify resort 
to compulsory licensing. See supra, Chapter Four, p. 117. 
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(g) Working of Patented Technology 
Although the existing law provides for invalidation of a patent if it has not been 
worked for a period of 5 years, it has not been effective because of the absence of a 
definition of the term "working of a patent". " The provision in the law requiring 
sufficiency of information in an application for a patent is also obscure" and, in any 
case, has not been enforced in practice. The proposed draft of the law strengthens both 
provisions by adding new provisions regarding the working of patented technology and 
patent disclosure. A patent grant may be revoked by court decision if the description 
attached to the patent is insufficient to enable a person skilled in the art to carry out 
the invention, the invention is not patentable in accordance with the provisions of this 
law and the patent has not been effectively worked for a period of four years after the 
grant. 84 Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement allows member states to impose 
compulsory licenses when, despite negotiations with the rights holders, the latter have 
failed to license the patented technology "on reasonable commercial terms and 
conditions. " 
Utility Model Certificate 
Iran by adopting a hybrid legal regime would modify the incentive structures 
of current patent system along the lines of historical models that many industrialised 
countries favoured at earlier stages of their economic development. The Paris 
Convention and the TRIPS Agreement have validated such devices as well. 
82 Iranian patent law, Article 37 (4). 
83 Ibid. 
84 Article 46-47. 
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Accordingly, the proposed law provides for the grant of a utility model 
certificate for any novel and industrially applicable three-dimensional object with a 
particular design and form, such as a tool, an instrument, a device, an apparatus, or 
part thereof, proposed as novel and industrially applicable and capable of providing 
a solution to a technical problem. " If the application for a utility model relates to a 
three-dimension object and complies with the requirement of the proposed law and its 
regulations, the Patent Office would grant a utility model certificate without prior 
examination of the novelty and industrial applicability of the utility model at the risk 
of the applicant. The term of a utility model certificate would be seven years from the 
day following the filing date of the application. In all other aspects, the corresponding 
provision of Part One of the new law would apply, mutatis mutandis, to utility model 
certificates. 86 
Certification of Local Innovations 
The introduction of some sort of certification of local innovations of existing 
technology is long over due. The proposed draft law provides for the issue of 
innovation certificates under conditions that are expected to encourage their 
exploitation within Iranian territory. The new Patent Office would have the primary 
responsibility to administer such certification. " 
In this part of the proposed law the patent principle is adapted to provide a 
new legal tool suited to Iran's economic and industrial position. This new legal tool 
is the innovation certificate which is aimed at extending the principle of protection of 
inventive ideas (inventions) per se to the protection of the commercial exploitation of 
innovative ideas (innovations). 
85 Articles 48-52. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Articles 53-59. 
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An innovation certificate, therefore, may be granted to any firms, whether 
foreigners or nationals, for their genuine endeavour to manufacture a new product or 
a product with a new feature which falls short of the absolute standard of novelty for 
a patent grant but which is not available in the ordinary course of trade from 
indigenous manufacture of the product in Iran at the time of making the application 
for protection. This definition shows that unlike conventional patents, innovation 
certificate protects more the structure of the market for the innovative product rather 
than the idea behind it. 
(i) Requirements for Innovation Certification 
A. Relative novelty: innovative object should be new in Iran : 
88 
The thesis has already examined 89 the merits of relative novelty requirement 
for developing economies like Iran. 90 It is suffice to say here that from almost one 
million patents granted worldwide annually, a bulk of them has never been introduce 
and worked in developing countries. Understandably, it may not be practical to patent 
and commercialise those new technologies in all countries. They also lose their 
absolute novelty after the lapse of priority period (12 months). In other words, they 
are not novel absolutely, so they are not patentable under the patent system of Iran 
which requires absolute novelty. Therefore, there is no legal protection for an Iranian 
firm to invest and commercialise those technologies independently or jointly with the 
technology holder. This situation is aggravated if the import policy of the country does 
not take into account the legitimate interests of the indigenous manufacturers. 
In sum, absolute novelty discourages local industrial investment for the 
acquisition and development of those valuable technologies that are new in the country 
but not worldwide. By contrast, the relative novelty in the context of innovation 
88 Ibid. 
89 See supra, Chapter Nine, p. 238. 
90 Ibid. 
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certificates would encourage investments for the introduction and working of 
technologies required for the production of local manufactures or provision of services. 
B. The innovative product should not be available in the ordinary course of trade from 
indigenous production 
This requirement dictates that the availability of a product which has been 
imported to Iran would not disqualify the grant of an innovation certificate. In other 
words, given the importance of the actual working of patented and unpatented 
technologies in the country, what is vital is the local production of the innovative 
products. This would complement the import substitution industrialisation programme 
of Iran without raising the specter of overprotection of inefficient local industries. " 
(ii) Grant 
When a new product is granted an innovation certificate, the product is protected by 
the law in favour of the holder of the innovation certificate for a prescribed period. 
(iii) Infringement 
Infringement of such monopoly rights, thus, takes place when any attempt is made to 
diminish the value of the innovation to which the innovation certificate relates. 
(iv) Term of Protection 
91 Adams J., Book Review (Antitrust and Direct Regulation of International Transfer of Technology 
Transactions, IIC 1984 33 Int'l. & Comp. L. Q., October (1984), pp. 1084-1086. 
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The period of the protection would be varied and decided by the Patent Office 
on a case by case basis taking into account such matters as the innovating firm, the 
market for the particular product and the manufacturing plans. 9' 
111. Part Three: Registration and Monitoring of Transfer of Technology 
Contracts 
(a) Registering, Recording and Monitoring of Technology and Industrial 
Property Licensing Agreements and Arrangements and Foreign Investments 
The registration of all agreements and arrangements involving the procurement 
of technology and know-how from foreign sources such as patent licensing agreements 
and technical assistance contracts would be mandatory under the legislation proposed 
in the thesis. 9' Such a requirement would enable the Transfer of Technology Office 
to collect detailed information on all such agreements and arrangements which can 
then be monitored as they are implemented for an evaluation to be made of their 
impact on the growth of a technological base in Iran. A fund of recorded experience 
is expected to be accumulated by the Transfer of Technology Office which would 
make it available to the public and enable that office to offer assistance to local and 
foreign investors in their negotiations to reach agreement on technology and know- 
how issues. 
Through such interaction between the Transfer of Technology Office and 
investors it may be possible to maintain an adequate data base and would also help 
in identifying those arrangements which yield the highest returns to the local economy. 
92 Article 53-59. 
93 Articles 60-6 1. 
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The systematic registration and analysis and assessment of all technology dealings will 
be a rich source of information to those engaged in research and development, 
including public and private agencies, who will as a result be in a better position to 
plan and program their own activities. 
(b) Registrable Agreements 
A feature of the proposed law is the inclusion of a list of transfer of technology 
agreements that are registrable provided they are approved by the Transfer of 
Technology Office. Such approval cannot be refused except as provided under the law. 
The law also contains a list of agreements that would not be subject to obligatory 
registration. 94 
The office should have a special form regarding registration of technology 
transfer agreements. Accordingly the proposed law requires that the procedure for 
preparing, drafting and making available such a special form would be laid down by 
decision of the Director General. 
95 
(c) Evaluation Criteria 
The evaluation and registration of transfer of technology agreements under the new 
law would include consideration of technical, economic, financial and legal issues of 
these transactions. " The question arises as to which aspect of technology control 
would reign supreme? What is important is that no arrangement or agreement between 
94 Article 62. 
95 Article 17. 
96 Articles 70. 
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foreign investors and local interests (public or private) would impede local 
technological development and would block the flow of technology into the country. 
However, the overall decision of approval of any arrangement or agreement would be 
on the case by case basis. " 
Parties to Transactions 
Some developing countries have focused their laws on agreements involving private 
parties only but the state and state agencies are actively involved in Iran. Some 
technology suppliers can be local enterprises owned by foreign nationals. The 
proposed law, then, would apply to: 
- transactions between private parties (natural and juristic), at least one 
party being resident, domiciled in or is an Iranian national; 
- transactions between the Iranian state or an agency thereof and a 
foreign party (natural or juristic); 
- transactions between a locally established foreign-owned enterprise 
and the Iranian state or an agency thereof or a private party. " 
(f) Rights and Responsibilities of the Parties 
As far as transfer and promotion of technology is concerned given the insufficiency 
of the Iranian classical law of contracts to govem the relationship between parties with 
an unequal level of development, " an appropriate legal framework for this purpose, 
97 See Ibid, and Part Four, Exceptional Cases. 
98 Article 63. 
99 See supra, Chapter Seven, p. 185. 
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thus, should be established to encourage the parties to reach a satisfactory agreement 
based on good faith and on fair and honest business practices. In this regard the 
proposed draft of the Development of Technology Law mandates certain specific 
clauses in all transfer of technology agreements. 100 In addition to compliance with 
the rules of general contract law, parties to a transfer of technology agreement are 
committed by the proposed law: 
- To perform an effective transfer of technology; 
- To supply all information necessary for the processing and execution of the 
contract. 
- To maintain absolute secrecy or confidentiality with regard to the technical 
information disclosed during the period of validity of the contract, unless the 
said information is in the public domain or other party has give its express 
content; 
- To choose, by common consent, the applicable law to govern their 
contractual relations but mandatory rules of the national legal system cannot 
be avoided by contract. 10' 
Before the registration of any transfer of technology agreements, the Director of the 
Transfer of Technology Office would give notice to the Directors of the other two 
Offices, stating the terms and conditions of the agreement and that he proposes to 
make such registration. 102 It is recommended that within a specified period of time, 
the other two offices should inform the Transfer of Technology Office, in writing, any 
objections or representations they have with respect to the proposed agreement. In this 
case the Transfer of Technology Office would register the agreement only after any 
loo Article 68. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Article 7 1. 
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differences, objections or representations have been resolved or after receiving the 
approval of the Director General where an agreement cannot be reached. 'O' 
A certificate of registration issued under this Law would produce legal effect 
between the contracting parties or in relation to third parties. The certificate also 
would give right to the transferee to pay in Iran to the credit of the transferrer outside 
Iran and use available tax exemptions. 
A designated department of the Transfer of Technology Office would be 
responsible to monitor compliance with the conditions for registration of transfer of 
technology agreements. For this purpose, the department may enter into arrangements 
with appropriate government offices which have supervision over the technology 
recipient to avoid duplication and for a more effective supervision of the applicant 
firm. '04 
103 Ibid. 
104 Article 72. 
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IV. Part Four: Competition Rules 
Controlling/Eliminating Restrictive Contractual Clauses and Restrictive 
Business Practices 
The First Five-Year Development Plan of the Republic saw Iran moving away from 
state monopolies, state subsidies, and price controls. 'O' Currently, Iran is in the 
process of dismantling trade barriers and committing itself to free markets and the 
globalisation of the world economy. The government's intention to become a member 
of the WTO" is evidence of Iran's determination to become more active in the 
international trade and economy. 
The membership of the WTO requires that the government pursues, inter alia, 
a policy of law reform aimed at eliminating restrictive business practices. Iranian 
markets would be opened gradually to foreign direct investments which would be 
accompanied by technology exchange on a much greater scale than hitherto. In the 
absence of any specific binding international competition law, Iran has to fall back on 
its own laws to devise ways to maintain competition in its internal markets free of 
distortion by the conduct of foreign undertakings and to prevent concentrations of 
market power. 
Although the repression of abuse of economic power is engraved in the Iranian 
Constitution, 'O' Iran has not enacted an antitrust law as such and no regulations exist 
105 See supra, Chapter One p. 26. 
106 This decision was announced by the Minister of Industries of Iran, see International Ettelaat, 
London, No. 233, April 21,1995, p. 1; see also Financial Times, 31 October 1996; Ettelaat, No. 
20905,2 November 1996, p. 2. 
107 The Constitution, Principle 3 (6), Principles 81 and 153. It should be noted that, the above 
principles are broad sweeping constitutional prohibition of all attempts to monopolise power. They 
should be enforced through the issuance of regulations promulgated by the Iranian Parliament or 
the executive upon delegation from the legislature. The President Legal Deputy has called for a 
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to enforce the constitutional requirement. The present thesis proposes such a law but 
in the context of the overall objective of developing a strong technological base in the 
country. In this respect, the TRIPS Agreement has allowed the developing countries 
to pick and choose among differing regulatory frameworks with a view to fashioning 
a set of anti -competitive practices that reflects their own needs and national 
development strategies. "' 
Reflecting the argument in the thesis, the proposed competition rules would be 
administered and enforced together with industrial property and transfer of technology 
laws within a single body, the EBTPT, which would coordinate the work of the 
Protection of Competition Office with the work of the Patent Office and the Transfer 
of Technology Office and have ultimate responsibility. The Competition Office, in 
close relation with the other Offices, would be responsible to control and eliminate 
those restrictive clauses that may have adverse affect on the economic and 
technological development of the country. Through such interaction between the three 
Offices it may be possible to eliminate those restrictive practices that go beyond 
legitimate industrial property rights and are detrimental to the industrial progress of 
the country. 
national competition law, see Bahman, vol. 17,1995; see also Competition Law, published by the 
Organization of Budget and Planning of Iran, 1995. 
108 Article 40(l) of TRIPS allows action against licensing practices that restrain competition or impede 
the transfer and dissemination of technology. Article 40(2) specifically authorising measures to 
regulate "exclusive grant back provisions, conditions preventing challenges to validity and coercive 
package licensing. " The TRIPS Agreement has also empowered developing countries to adopt 
appropriate measures to deal with abusive practices that "adversely affect the international transfer 
of technology. " See Article 8(2) of the TRIPS. See also supra, Chapter Four, pp. 116-119. 
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A. Elimination / Control of Restrictive Clauses of Technology Transfer 
Agreements 
(i) A General Provision 
The proposed Development of Technology Law contains a general provision stating 
that in contracts on transfers of technology, patents and other items of industrial 
property rights shall not be enforceable if agreements involving such rights contain 
restrictive business clauses which could lead to restricting business, development and 
self-management functions of local firms and the use and development of social, 
economic and technological resources, or which have a harmful effect on the 
economic development and competition in the country. 
(ii) Unacceptable Clauses in Technology Transfer Agreements 
Although a general provision on restrictive clauses standing alone would bring about 
a high degree of flexibility in the administration of transfer of technology agreements, 
it would leave a great deal of uncertainty about acceptable and unacceptable clauses 
and also present the competent office with excessive discretionary power which is not 
always satisfactory. The proposed law, therefore, includes an illustrative list of 
unacceptable clauses of a restrictive nature in addition to the general provision against 
unsatisfactory restrictive business clauses. 'O' 
Such an illustrative list would capture the bulk of the objectionable restrictive 
clauses and help to expedite the approval and registration of transfer of technology 
agreements. This would be a great advantage to Iranian government administrators 
who would be dealing with these issues for the first time. Iran is a relative newcomer 
109 Article 75. This approach is what matured competition laws such as the European Union 
has adopted. See Article 85 of the European Economic Community. 
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especially to administer antitrust institutions. The illustrative list would form the basis 
for the interpretation of particular cases, and determination of the acceptability of 
those practices that are not listed. Among the restrictions"O that are included in the 
illustrative list are: tied-purchase, fixing of price, continuing payments after expiration 
of industrial property rights; grant back clauses; restrictions on research; restriction on 
adaptation; restrictions on scope, volume and price; no competition clause; export 
restriction; compulsory use of trademark, "' 
(iii) Catch-all Provision 
In formulating the list of objectionable clauses, the thesis intentionally rejected the 
exhaustive list and adopted the illustrative list instead. Given the dynamism of 
commercial relationships, the inherent rigidity of the exhaustive list may result in still 
unknown practices falling outside the scope of the exhaustive list. The illustrative list, 
is open ended and is not limited to known practices. To bring more certainty to the 
illustrative list the proposed law has provided a catch-all provision. Similar to the 
European Economic Community competition law, 112 it has provided that the 
restriction provisions in the new law would apply also to other clauses having 
equivalent or similar objects or effects to those listed as unacceptable. "' 
Exceptional Cases 
It may be recalled that the thesis attached great significance to the criterion for 
rejection of a restrictive clause. If Iran adopts the "competition approach" she would 
face the problem of shortages of foreign technology. Pursuant to the competition 
approach, she has to declare invalid any agreements that contain restrictive clauses, 
110 For the harmful effects of these restrictive clauses for a developing country like Iran see 
supra, Chapter Five, p. 124. 
III Article 85. 
112 See EEC Competition Law, Article 85(l). 
113 Article 85(l). 
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though those agreements offer more advantages to the country. By contrast, the 
"development approach" permits those contractual clauses that are anti -competition but 
at the same time the contract as a whole has beneficial effects for the country. 
Therefore, the yardstick is development rather than competition. 
The possibility of allowing such contracts should be provided by the law. In 
cases where substantial benefits would accrue to the Iranian economy, such as in 
export-oriented ventures, labour-intensive industries, those that would promote regional 
dispersal of industries or which involve substantial use of local raw materials. These 
contracts may be allowed when feasible under such regulations to be determined by 
the Protection of Competition Office. 114 This approach is consistent with the TRIPS 
Agreement that has empowered developing countries to adopt appropriate measures 
to deal with abusive licensing practices that "adversely affect the international transfer 
of technology. " 115 
114 Article 86. 
115 See Article 8(2) of the TRIPS Agreement. 
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B. Control of Agreements Between Competitors 
In the absence of international accord on rules against anti -competitive behaviour in 
international business transactions, the thesis affirms Iran's right to regulate the terms 
of horizontal and vertical agreements between foreign competitors in the market to 
supply technology to the country as well. But unlike the current dual system of 
eliminating business practices in developing countries, the proposed Competition 
Office would deal with such restrictive practices as well. "' 
Although the mere recital of the general and broad objectives of the 
competition law may be sufficient for their administration within the common law 
system, it is probably inappropriate in the case of Iran which has the civil law system. 
While the former system is workable because of the power of the courts to refine the 
applications of the law through judicial interpretation and to even make new law, ' 17 
the latter system requires all legal obligations to be ideally spelled out in specific 
provisions in law passed by the legislative bodies. "' Iranian Courts do not also have 
the vast resources in terms of expertise to administer a broadly phrased law which 
depends on judicial interpretation to apply in the practical world. Moreover, the 
weakness in a less comprehensive law is that it encourages litigation because of the 
need to resort to the courts for a secure decision. For example, huge amounts of 
resources are employed in the US and the European Community for the interpretation 
and enforcement of competition rules. 
116 Articles 87 and 89. 
117 For instance see the United States antitrust law. Areeda P. and Kaplow L., Antitrust Analysis, 
Boston, 4th ed., 1988. 
118 It may be recalled that the Iranian Civil Code contains abstracts provisions that regulate all aspects 
of a person's legal relationships from birth to death. For more details see Shaygan, S. A., Civil 
Law, 3rd edition, Teheran, 1945, (in Persian); Katouzian, N., Introduction to the Science of Law, 
4th edition, Teheran. (in Persian) 
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The thesis, therefore, concludes that the competition rules of the proposed 
Development of Technology Law should be spelled out in sufficient detail to make 
the administration of the law simpler and to provide adequate information to local 
and foreign undertakings to make investment decisions with relative confidence. 
Articles 87 and 91 of the proposed Law have stipulated a series of specifically 
prohibited restrictive business practices agreements and arrangements. These specific 
prohibitions would apply to any agreement between rival or potentially rival firms, 
regardless of whether such agreements are written or oral, formal or informal, legally 
enforceable or not, without regard to the location of its execution which have the 
intent or effect of: the fixing of prices or other terms of sale, including in international 
trade; collusive tendering; market or customer allocation; restraints on production or 
sales, including by quota; concerted refusals to purchase and to supply; and collective 
denial of access to an arrangement, or association, which is crucial to competition. "9 
(a) Scope of Application 
In order to be effective, the scope of application of the competition rules includes all 
firms, partnerships, corporations, companies, associations and other judicial persons 
in regard to all their commercial agreements, actions or transactions regarding goods, 
services or intellectual property. 
For both theoretical and practical reasons, similar to other competition 
laws"' the scope of application of the competition rules would not include the acts 
of the Iranian government itself, or to those of local governments, or to acts of 
119 Article 87. 
120 Treaty of Rome, Article 90. 
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enterprises or natural persons which are compelled or supervised by the State or by 
local governments or branches of government acting wIthin their delegated power. "' 
C. Control of Abuse of Dominant Position 
The agreements and practices cited above can be characterised as vertical and 
horizontal agreements among competitors. In addition to those restrictive business 
practices, it is necessary that the competition rules restrain the acts of dominant firms 
which may unilaterally restrict competition as well. In this regard, the standards of 
"monopolization" 122 or "attempted monopolization" 123 are too vague for 
application in Iran. Instead the European term "abuse of a dominant position" 124 
which adopted also by the UNCTAD Code on restrictive business practices 125 can 
be effectively applied to the Iranian legal system. 
The term "abuse of dominant position" must however be clearly defined. The 
competition rules of the proposed Law refers "dominant position" to a situation where 
an enterprise, either by itself or acting together with a few other enterprises, is in a 
position to control the relevant market for a particular good or service or group of 
goods or services. "' Such a definition suggests that even a 50% market share of 
121 Article 87. The present writer believes that state agencies which are engaged in commercial 
activities should be subject to the competition rules as private undertakings. This view is generally 
not accepted by the government authorities in Iran and parts of Europe. 
122 Sherman Act, section 2. 
123 Ibid. 
124 Treaty of Rome, Art. 86. 
125 See supra, Chapter Six, p. 167. 
126 Article 82. 
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individual firms or firms acting in concert together can be adopted as a benchmark for 
a dominant position subject to rebuttal by any defendant. "' 
Equally important is the concept of what constitutes an "abuse" of a dominant 
position. Certain of such acts and behaviour that are included in the competition rules 
of the proposed Law, are limiting production, markets or technical development to the 
prejudice of consumers; applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with 
other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; dumping to 
eliminate competitors; tying obligations which have no connection with the subject of 
such contracts; misuse of intellectual property right to impede either import 
transactions or sales on the national market; and mergers, takeovers, joint ventures and 
other acquisition of control which impede effective competition in the relevant 
market. 128 
IV. Enforcement Mechanisms 
The proposed administrative arrangement of the IBTPT requires that, the Competition 
Office should review, eliminate or authorise restrictive clauses of transfer of 
technology contracts. The Transfer of Technology Office would notify the Patent and 
Competition Offices its intention for registration of a technology transfer contract. The 
latter, particularly is requested to inform the other offices about the restrictive clauses 
of the agreement. Through such procedure those restrictive clauses that go 
beyond 
127 The United States' courts have elaborated their own benchmark for monopoly power. In their view, 
90% market share represents monopoly power, 60% market share might represent monopoly power, 
and 30% market share was insufficient. United 
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148, F. 2d 416 
(2d Cir. 1945). 
128 Article 89. 
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legitimate intellectual property rights and are detrimental to the industrial progress of 
the country would be eliminated. 
Regarding other agreements and arrangements, the proposed law sets out the 
procedure of notification of those practices which are not prohibited outright, and 
hence the possibility exists for their authorization. "' All agreements or arrangements 
not notified could be made subject to the full sanctions of the law, rather than mere 
revision, if later discovered and deemed to be illegal. 130 Any authorization of the 
restrictive business practices under the competition rules is made by the Director of 
the Competition Office after differences, objections or representations, if any, of the 
Patent and Transfer of technology offices have been resolved or after receiving the 
approval of the IBTPT Director General where an agreement cannot be reached with 
the other two offices of IBTPT. 131 
The Protection of Competition Office must review all authorizations every year 
in order to extend, suspend or subject an extension to the fulfilment of conditions and 
obligations. The Office may withdraw those authorizations where the circumstances 
of their authorizations have ceased to exist; the enterprises have failed to meet the 
conditions and obligations stipulated for the granting of the authorization; or 
information provided in seeking the authorization was false or misleading. "' 
All enterprises or individuals, whether public or private that engage in activities 
enumerated in the Articles (87) and (89), without prejudice to any civil and criminal 
liability, would be guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a 
129 Article 91. 
130 Article 94. 
131 Article 95. 
132 Article 96. 
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term not exceeding five years or to a fine not exceeding hundred million Toman or 
to both. "' 
It should be noted that the staff of the Protection of Competition Office is 
granted sufficient legal power to obtain required information and documents for 
discharging their duties. 134 In the same way, the staff must observe the 
confidentiality requirements of their functions. 135 
133 Article 98. 
134 Article 17. 
135 Ibid. 
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APPENDIX ONE 
LAW FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF SUPREME TECHNOLOGY COUNCIL 
nlP TRANI 
Main Functions of the Council 
Article 1: By referring to articles 2 and 4 of the First Socio-economic 
Development of Iran, in order to institute an appropriate organisation 
for the adaptation of technology development policies with the 
economic, social and cultural policies of the country, and for following 
up the implementation of the technology policies, the Supreme 
Technology Council (Council) under auspices of the President shall be 
established. 
Article 2: The Council shall have the following tasks: 
(a) formulate a coordinated set policies for the 
preparation and implementation of a national 
technology plan for the transfer and development 
of technology as an integral part of the country's 
national development plan; 
(b) act as a forum for coordination and cooperation 
between all productive sectors and research and 
development centres; 
(c) promote and encourage inventive and innovative 
activities that have industrial applications and 
also technical improvements and the 
dissemination of technological knowledge in the 
industrial production sector; 
(d) correct and improve the rules relating to the 
transfer and development of technology and 
technology organizational structure of the 
country. 
(e) monitor the transfer of foreign technology to the 
country 
The proposed Law for Supreme Technology Council 
Law has been prepared on the basis of the first socio- 
economic development plan of the country and the relevant suggestions 
and studies by different government 
and private sources. See supra, 
Chapter Ten, note 10. 
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determine the priorities of foreign investments 
regarding the national technological needs. 
(g) encourage the private sector to invest more in 
the transfer and development of technology. 
(h) pay due attention to the environment in the 
process of technological development of the 
country; 
direct activities of national R&D centres in order 
to use local raw materials for manufacture of 
export goods or those goods capable to substitute 
importing goods; 
planning for training of required experts and 
technology managers as the main factor of 
technology development; 
(k) disseminate technology culture in the country; 
Composition of the Council 
Article 3: Members of the Council shall consist of: 
(a) The President; 
(b) Ministers of the following Ministries- 
Industry, 
Justice, 
(iii) Economic Affairs, 
(iv) Trade, 
(v) Jahad Sazandegi 
(vi) Works 
(vii) Environment 
(c) The head of the Organisation of Scientific and 
Industrial Researches; 
(d) The governor of Central Bank 
(e) One representative of the universities in Iran to 
be appointed by the Ministry of education after 
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due consultation; 
One representative of the polytechnic and 
colleges of technology in Iran to be appointed by 
the Ministry of education after due consultation; 
(g) One representative of Iranian Chamber of 
Commerce, Industries and Mines; 
(e) The head and Directors of the executive body of 
the Council; 
Article 4: The President shall be the head of the Council. Meetings of the Council 
shall be convened by the Industry Minister twice a year and 
extraordinarily if so required by him/her or a majority of the members 
of the Board. 
Article 5: The Industry Ministry, within six months, shall prepare and submit to 
the Parliament its proposal for the establishment of required 
organisations to administer the executive tasks of the Council. 
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APPENDIX TWO 
Islamic Republic of Iran 
DEVELOPMENT OF TECHNOLOGY ACT 1995 
In the name of almighty the most compassionate, the merciful, 
an Act to provide for the appointment and functions of a Board for the Transfer and 
Development of Technology with powers to grant patents, register and monitor 
transfer and promotion of technology agreements and control/eliminate restrictive 
business practices in accordance with the following. 
The Parliament of the Islamic Republic of Iran hereby enacts the Development of 
Technology Law as follows: 
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PART ONE: THE BOARD FOR TRANSFER AND DEVELOPMENT OF 
TECHNOLOGY 
Iranian Board for Transfer and Development of Technology 
Article 1: There is hereby established a private law body with the name "Iranian 
Board for Transfer and Development of Technology", hereinafter 
referred to as the Board, with headquarters in Teheran. 
Article 2: The President shall appoint an officer to be known as the Director 
General of Technology (in this Act referred to as "the Director 
General") to head the Board for the purposes of carrying out the 
functions assigned or transferred to him by this Act. 
Article 3: An appointment of a person to hold office as the Director General shall 
be for a term not exceeding five years, but previous appointment to that 
office shall not affect eligibility for re-appointment. 
Article 4: The Director General may be dismissed only by the President of the 
Republic. 
Article 5: The Director-General shall be the Chairman of the Board and shall 
report to the STC. 
Functions of the Board 
Article 6: The Board shall contribute to the technological development of the 
country by performing the following tasks: 
(a) administering the law relating to patent rights to 
ensure rapid and coordinated development of 
patent rights and their effective application; 
granting of patents, utility model certificates and 
innovation patents; 
(c) establishment and maintenance of a Patent 
Information service to the Public in general and 
research institutions in particular; 
(d) registering and recording of agreements for the 
transfer of foreign technology to Iranian parties 
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and ensuring the best contractual terms and 
conditions for Iranian parties entering into such 
contracts; 
(e) encouraging a more efficient process of 
identifying and selecting foreign technology and 
developing the negotiation skill of Iranians; 
providing a more efficient process for the 
adaptation of imported the technology; 
(g) monitoring, in a continuous basis, of the 
execution of any contract registered pursuant to 
the Act; 
(h) removing obstacles to the absorption and 
dissemination of technology through measures to 
prevent the incorporation of implicit or explicit 
contractual restrictions in contracts for transfer 
of technology; 
promoting competition in the market for goods 
and services. 
o taming, ana yzing an provi ing tec no ogica 
and related economic and commercial 
information; 
formulating such policy as may be necessary to 
carry out the other functions of the EBTDT as 
may be conferred by the Act; 
recommending the desirability of signing, 
ratifying or withdrawing from international 
conventions and agreements on industrial 
property and the transfer of technology. 
publishing an industrial property bulletin and 
other publications to provide and disseminate 
information relating to patents, innovations and 
transfer of technology. 
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Organisation of the Board 
Article 7: The Board consisting of three Offices, to be known as the Patent 
Office, the Transfer of Technology Office and the Protection of 
Competition Office for fulfilling the purposes of this Act as will be 
specified in the following Parts 2,3 and 4. 
Article 8: The each such Office shall be headed by politically an independent 
officer with special knowledge and experience of matters related to 
intellectual property, competition and transfer and development of 
technology. 
Article 9: The Director-General shall appoint the Directors of the Offices in 
accordance with the conditions of public service in force at the time of 
appointment. 
Techno-economic Information Center 
Article 10: There shall be established a Techno-economic Information Center to 
maintain continiously updated indexes of suppliers of technology and 
technology-related market information. This Centre also will collect and 
maintain statistical data on the acquisition of foreign technology and 
development of indigenous technology and analyze technological and 
related economic and commercial information for the use of the public. 
IBTDT Tribunal 
Article 11: There shall be established a body to be known as the IBTDT Tribunal 
which shall be charged with the duty of hearing and determining 
disputes arising from applications for the registration of patents, utility 
models and innovation certificates and objections received as to the 
decisions of the three offices. 
Article 12: The Tribunal shall consist of one or more Directors and Assistant 
Directors as may be determined by the Director General of the IBTDT. 
An appeal shall lie from the Tribunal decision to the Teheran Court. 
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IBTDT Registers 
Article 13: There shall be established for the purpose of this Act, the following 
registers: 
(a) register of patents; 
(b) register of utility model and innovation 
cetificates; 
(c) register of transfer of technology agreements; 
(d) register of notified agreements and arrangements 
for clearance. 
Article 14: The registers shall be kept under the control and management 
of the IBTDT. 
Article 15: The registers shall at all convinient times be 
inspection of the public, subject to such rules 
prescribed by the IBTDT. 
Industrial Property Documentation Unit 
Article 16: 
Regulations 
open to the 
as may be 
There shall be established an Industrial Property Documentation Unit 
(IPDU) which shall be charged with the responsibility of rendering and 
disseminating information on local and international inventive efforts 
in different fields of technology on a continuous basis. 
Article 17: The Director General may make regulations generally for the purpose 
of this Act, and in particular, without prejudice to the generality of the 
forgoing provisions, making regulations: 
(a) prescribing regulations required for the 
implementation of policies and guidelines 
regarding technology transfer, industrial property 
rights and monopolies and restrictive agreements 
and arrangements; 
(b) prescribing the forms and returns and other 
informtion required under this Act; 
(c) prescribing the procedure for obtaining any 
information required under this Act; 
(d) Prescribing the form of keeping of the registers 
required under this Act and the making of 
enteries therein; 
(e) prescribing any fees payable under this Act. 
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Penalties for False Returns and Obstructions 
Article 18: Any person who: 
(a) fails to furnish required notice pursuant to Article (14) 
above within 45 days of the notice; or 
(b) knowingly or recklessly makes any statement in the 
returns which is false in a material particular; or 
(c) wilfully obstructs any employee of the Board acting in 
the execution of his duties under this Act and any 
subsidiary legislation made hereunder, or 
(d) without reasonable cause fails to give him any 
information or other assistance which such employee 
may reasonably require of him for the purposes of the 
performance: 
shall be guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to a fine 
of to 200,000 Toman or imprisonment for six months or to both 
such fine and imprisonment. 
Confidentiality 
Article 19: Any person appointed or employed for the due adminstration of this 
Act who communicates to any other person (not being authorised to 
receive such communications) any document, drawing, photograph, 
plan, model or other information whatsoever which to his knowledge 
describes, represents or illustrates- 
(a) any existing or proposed machinery, plant, installation 
or other structure whatsoever, or any patent, process or 
any design submitted by any person to the any of the 
Offices for or in connection with any application for 
registration; 
(b) information obtained from enterprises containing 
legitimate business secrets; 
(c) the identity of persons who provide information to the 
Protection of Competition Office and who need 
confidentiality to protect themselves against economic 
retaliation; 
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(d) the deliberations of government in regard to current or 
still uncompleted matters. 
under this Act shall be guilty of an offence and liable on 
conviction to a fine of to 500,000 Toman or imprisonment for 
two years or to both such fine and imprisonment. 
PART TWO 
INVENTION AND TECHNICAL INNOVATION PROTECTION RULES 
PATENT GRANTS 
Article 20: 
Article 21: 
The Director of the Patent Office shall have the general authority to 
grant patents which may be made under terms and conditions of this 
Act. 
Before granting a patent, the Director of the Patent Office shall give 
notice to the Director of the Transfer of Technology and the Director 
of the Competition Office - 
(a) stating that he proposes to make such grant; 
(b) stating the terms and conditions of the grant; and 
(c) specifying the time within which objections or 
representations with respect to the proposed grant may 
be made, 
and shall make the grant only after any differences, objections 
or representations have been resolved or after receiving the 
approval of the Director General where an agreement cannot be 
reached. 
Article 22: A patent grant shall be in writing and, unless previously revoked in 
accordance with any term in the patent grant, shall continue in force for 
such period as specified below. 
Patentable Inventions 
Article 23: Patentable inventions are inventions that are new, the result of an 
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Novelty 
Article 24: 
inventive step and susceptible of industrial application with the 
meaning of this Law shall be patentable. 
An invention is new if it does not form part of the state of the art. The 
state of the art means the body of technical knowledge that has been 
made public by oral or written description, by use or by any other 
means or dissemination of information both within the country and 
abroad, before the date of the filing of the patent application or the 
priority date validly claimed in respect thereof. 
Inventive Step 
Article 25: Inventive step means the creative process the results of which are not 
obviously deducible from the state of the art by a person skilled in the 
relevant art. 
Industrial Application 
Article 26: Industrial application means the possibility of any product or process 
being produced or used, as the case may be, in industry, understood as 
including agriculture, mining, manufacturing industries and 
construction. 
Disclosure With no Effects on Patentability 
Article 27: The disclosure of information related to an invention shall have no 
effect on its patentability if the disclosure is made no earlier than 12 
months before the filing date or the priority date, as appropriate, of the 
application by: 
(a) the inventor; 
(b) the Patent Office; 
(c) a person who obtained the information directly or 
indirectly from the inventor. 
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Exceptions to Patentability 
Article 28: The following shall not be patentable for the purposes of this Act: 
(a) theoretical and scientific principles; 
(b) discoveries that consist in making known or revealing 
something that already existed in nature; 
(c) schemes, plane, rules and methods for carrying out 
mental processes, playing games and doing business; 
computer programs; 
(e) methods of presenting information; 
(f) aesthetic creations and artistic or literary works; 
(g) methods of surgical, therapeutic, or diagnostic treatment 
applicable to the human body and to animals; 
(h) juxtaposition of known inventions or mixtures of known 
products, or alteration of the form, dimensions and 
materials thereof, except where in reality they are so 
combined or merged that they cannot function 
separately, or where their characteristic qualities or 
functions have been so modified as to produce and 
industrial result not obvious to a person skilled in the 
art; 
essentially biological process for obtaining or 
reproducing plants, animals or varieties thereof, 
including genetic processes or those relating to material 
capable of self-duplication, either by itself or in any 
other indirect manner, when they consist simply in 
selecting or isolating available biological material and 
allowing it to act under natural conditions; 
0) plant spices and animal species and breeds; 
(k) biological material as found in nature; 
(1) genetic material; 
inventions relating to the living matter composing the 
human body. 
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Contents of the Description and Claims 
Article 29: An applicant shall in the specification of his invention: 
(a) correctly and fully describe the invention and its 
operation or use as contemplated by the inventor; 
(b) set out clearly the various steps in a process, or the 
method of constructing, making, compounding or using 
a machine, manufacture or composition of matter, in 
such full, clear, concise and exact terms as to enable 
any person skilled in the art or science to which it 
appertains, or with which it is most closely connected, 
to make, construct, compound or use it; 
(c) in the case of a machine, explain the principle thereof 
and the best mode in which he has contemplated the 
application of the principle; 
(d) in the case of a process, explain the necessary sequence, 
if any, of the various steps, so as to distinguish the 
invention from other inventions; 
(e) particularly indicate and distinctly claim the part, 
improvement or combination that he claims as his 
invention; and 
the specification shall end with a claim and claims 
stating distinctly and in explicit terms the things or 
combinations that the applicant regards as new and in 
which he claims an exclusive property or privilege. 
Examination of Patent Applications 
Article 30: 1 The Patent Office shall carry out a full examination of 
the application for an invention to ensure that it meets 
the conditions for granting a patent laid down by this 
Law. 
2: The full examination of an application for an invention 
shall be carried out by the Patent Office at the request 
of the applicant or of another person or may be 
carried out ex officio. 
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3: The person filing the request for full examination shall 
be required, on submitting the request, to pay an 
administrative fee in accordance with the relevant 
statutory provisions. 
4: Where no request for full examination has been duly 
filed or where the Patent Office has not carried out a 
sua sponte examination within three years, the Patent 
Office shall terminate the procedure concerning the 
application. 
Exclusive Right 
Article 31: When the patent is granted, the exclusive right in an invention shall 
comprise the making, offering for sale, putting on the market of the 
subject matter of the invention, the intended use of the subject matter 
of the invention as well as the application of the patented method. 
Limitation of Rights Under the Patents 
Article 32: The effect of a patent 
shall not extended to: 
(a) use of the patented invention for non-commercial 
purposes with a view to private needs, where such use 
does not cause significant material prejudice to the 
owner of the patent; 
(b) use of the invention for experimental or research and 
development purposes relating to the subject matter of 
the patented invention; 
(c) extemporaneous preparation for individual cases in a 
pharmacy of a medicine in accordance with a medical 
prescription; 
(d) use of a product covered by the patent after the product 
has been lawfully put on the market in the territory of 
the country; 
(e) use of the patented invention on board any foreign land 
vehicle, vessel or aircraft which temporarily or 
accidentally enters the territory, waters or airspace of the 
country, provided that the patented invention is used 
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exclusively for the needs of such means of transport. 
Licensing and the Transfer of Rights 
Article 33: A patentee may grant to another person, by written agreement, 
exclusive, non-exclusive, full or limited licence to work the patent. 
Unless otherwise provided, the grant of a licence shall not prevent the 
owner of the patent or registration from granting other licences, or from 
working the patent at the same time himself. 
Article 34: The licence shall be registered in the Transfer of Technology Office 
and shall be of no effect against third parties until registration is 
effected and the prescribed fees paid. 
Article 35: In the absence of any agreement to the contrary, the licensee shall be 
entitled to do any where in Iran in relation to the patent any act that 
the patent confers upon the patentee. 
Article 36: In the absence of any provision to the contrary, in a contract for a 
licence, a licence shall not be assignable by the licensee and the 
licensee shall not be entitled to grant further licences. 
Article 37: The person to whom a licence has been granted and registered with the 
Transfer of Technology Office shall, unless otherwise stipulated, be 
entitled to institute legal proceedings in defense of the patent rights as 
if he were the actual owner thereof. 
Article 38: The working of the patent by the person to whom a licence has been 
granted and registered with the Transfer of Technology Office shall be 
considered done by the patent owner, except in the case of compulsory 
licences. 
Article 39: Where, before the expiration of the licence contract, any of the 
following events occur with respect to a patent on which the contract 
is based, that is to say - 
(a) the patent is declared invalid; 
(b) the patent is revoked; or 
(c) the patent has lapsed the licensee shall, from the date of 
the event, cease to make any payment directly relating 
to the patent. 
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Invalid Clauses in Licence Contracts 
Article 40: Any clause in a contract for a licence is null and void in so far as it 
imposes on the licensee in the industrial and commercial field 
restrictions which do not derive from the rights conferred by the patent 
or are from the rights conferred by the patent or are necessary for the 
safeguarding of those rights. 
Article 41: The following shall not be deemed to constitute restrictions for the 
purpose of the above provision: 
(a) limitations concerning the scope, extent, territory or duration 
of the exploitation of the patent or the quality or quantity of the 
product in connection with which the patent may be exploited; 
and 
(b) limitations justified by the interest of the licensor in the 
technically efficient exploitation of the subject of the patent. 
Non-voluntary Licences 
Article 42: At any time after the expiration of a period of four years from the date 
of the grant of a patent, any person interested may, in accordance with 
the rules of this Law, request the Patent Office for grant of a non- 
voluntary licence to work the patented invention provided that at least 
one of the following conditions is met: 
(a) the patented invention, being capable of being worked 
in Iran, has not been so worked. Freely available 
importation of the patented article or substance shall not 
satisfy the working requirement; 
(b) insufficient working of the invention to satisfy the needs 
of the national market, unless the patent owner gives 
valid reasons thereof; 
(c) the working of the patented invention in Iran is being 
hindered, prevented or otherwise prejudiced by 
importation of the patented article; and 
(d) where the refusal of the patentee to grant licences on 
reasonable terms, the establishment or development of 
industrial or commercial activities in Iran is unfairly and 
substantially prejudiced. 
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(e) where an invention protected by a patent in Iran cannot 
be worked without infringing the rights derived from a 
patent granted on an earlier application or benefiting 
from an earlier foreign priority. 
Article 43: 
Article 44: 
Article 45: 
A non-voluntary licence shall be non-exclusive and entitles the licensee 
to do any act conferred to the patentee except importation and granting 
further licences. 
For certain patented products and processes which will be recognised 
by the General Director as vital for the defence or the economy of Iran 
or for public health, non-voluntary licences may be granted before the 
expiration of the four year period mentioned above. 
A non-voluntary licence shall only be granted subject to the payment 
of adequate royalties commensurate with the extent to which the 
invention is worked. 
Nullification of Patent 
Article 46: The patent shall be revoked by the if: 
(a) the description attached to the patent is insufficient to 
enable a person skilled in the art to carry out the 
invention; 
(b) the invention is not patentable in accordance with the 
provisions of this Law; 
(c) the patent has not been effectively worked for a period 
of four years after the grant. 
Definition of "Working of a Patented Invention" 
Article 47: For the purpose of Act, reference to the working of a patented 
invention are to be considered as reference to - 
the manufacture of a patented article or substance; or 
(b) the application of a patented method or process of 
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manufacture; or 
(c) the use in manufacture of a patented machine, by an 
effective and serious establishment existing in Iran on a 
scale which is sufficient and reasonable in the 
circumstances. 
Utility Model Certificate 
Article 48: The Patent Office shall grant a utility model certificate for any novel 
and industrially applicable three-dimensional object with a particular 
design and form, such as a tool, an instrument, a device, an apparatus, 
or part thereof, proposed as novel and industrially applicable and 
capable of providing a solution to a technical problem. 
Article 49: 
Article 50: 
Any person who files a patent application may request, up to the date 
of issue of the patent, the conversion of his patent application into an 
application for a utility model certificate. 
The requirements for filing the application, the relevant supporting 
documentation and all other pertinent details of utility model certificate 
shall be determined by decision of the Patent Office. 
Article 51: If the application for a utility model relates to a three-dimension object 
and complies with the requirement of the above Article, the Patent 
Office grant a utility model certificate without prior examination of the 
novelty and industrial applicability of the utility model at the 
responsibility of the applicant. 
Article 52: The term of a utility model certificate shall be seven years from the 
day following the filing date of the application. In all other aspects, the 
corresponding provision of Part I shall apply, mutatis mutandis, to 
utility model certificates. 
Innovation Certificate 
Article 53: The Patent Office shall grant an Innovation Certificate for an 
innovation which has not been manufactured in Iran on the day of the 
grant. 
ArCicle 54: An innovation shall be understood to mean the set of facts related to 
an immediately utilizable innovation and the first production thereof. 
A r! Lic I -e5 
5 -. An Innovation Certificate confers monopoly right to make, use and sell 
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the innovation which is not available in the ordinary course of trade 
from indigenous production for a prescribed period. 
Article 56:. The period of the protection shall be varied. The Patent Office on the 
basis of the innovating firm, the market and the project shall decide 
proper term for innovation patents. 
Article 57:, 
Article 58:, 
Article 59:. 
The grant of an Innovation Certificate is not contestable except on 
grounds of fraud. 
No fees are payable to keep the Innovation Certificate in force. 
The Patent Office shall have the power to introduce the needed 
regulations to govern procedures for filing and processing applications 
for Innovation Certificates and other pertinent details. 
PART THREE 
TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY RULES 
Registration and Evaluation of the Transfer of Technology Agreements 
Article 60:. The Director of the Transfer of Technology Office shall have general 
authority to scrutinise every agreement relating to transfer of 
technology before registration thereof under terms and conditions of 
this Act. 
The Scope of the Transfer of Technology Rules 
Article 61:. The Transfer of Technology Rules of this Act shall cover all 
agreements, arrangements, contracts or related instruments whose 
purpose is: 
(a) the assignment, sale and licensing agreement of 
industrial property rights relating to the right to use or 
exploit patents, utility models and innovation certificates 
or authorising the use of trade marks or trade name; 
(b) the communication of know-how, that is, the provision 
of technical knowledge, not protected by patents, and 
which may be represented in diagrams, guides, formulae 
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and instructions, provided that they have not become 
common knowledge; 
(c) the provision of technical assistance, technical 
consultancy and services; 
(d) industrial collaboration agreements involving the 
provision of engineering services; 
(e) the supply of machinery and plant 
Article 62: Agreements with the following subject matter shall not be subject to 
obligatory registeration: 
(a) isolated use of foreign mechanics and technicians for the 
installation and repair of factories or plant; 
(b) urgent technical assistance or repairs, provided that they 
are caff ied out in respect of an earlier registered 
agreement; 
(c) advice, drawings or similar services usually 
accompaning machinery or equipment provided that they 
do not entail any special surcharge for the recipient; 
Parties to Transfer of Technology Agreements 
Article 63:. The Transfer of Technology Rules of this Act shall apply to: 
(a) transactions between private independent parties, at least 
one of which is resident, domiciled or is an Iranian 
national; 
(b) transactions between a local public entity or State- 
owned enterprise and a foreign company; 
(c) transactions between locally established foreign-owned 
enterprise and a local entity- public or private. 
Application for Registration of Transfer of TechnologY Agreements 
Article 64: As from the commencement of this Act, every transfer of technology 
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agreement of foreign origin which is to produce effects in Iran shall be 
registered with the Transfer of Technology Office in the prescribed 
manner not later than sixty days from the execution or conclusion 
thereof. 
Article 65:. The party responsible for registering the technology transfer agreement 
may either submit a copy of the agreement or complete the special 
form referred to in Article ... 
Article 66-. 
_ 
The procedure for preparing, drafting and making available the special 
form regarding technology transfer agreements shall be laid down by 
decision of the Director General. 
Existing Contracts 
Article 67:, Every transfer of technology agreement which on the date of the 
coming into force of this Act had been entered into by any person in 
Iran with another person outside Iran and which still has effect on the 
commencement of this Act shall be registered with the Transfer of 
Technology Office in the prescribed manner not later than six months 
after the commencement of this Act. 
Rights and Responsibilities of the Parties 
Article 68:, Every agreement mentioned in Article (59) of this Act shall contain at 
least clauses dealing with the following: 
(a) Identification of the contracting parties, with an express 
indication of the place of constitution or nationality as 
the case may be, their domicile and the name of the 
legal representative of each party; 
(b) Identification of the specific object of the agreement and 
of the products to be prepared thereunder, where 
applicable; 
(c) the contractual value, analyzed by each of the services 
covered by the contract; 
(d) The definite period of validity; and 
(e) To choose, by common consent, the applicable law to 
govern their contractual relations but mandatory rules of 
the national legal system cannot be avoided by contract. 
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Migations of the Paries 
Article 69:. In addition to the stipulations of the agreement, at least the following 
shall constitute rights and obligations of the contracting parties: 
(a) To perform an effective transfer of technology; 
(b) To ensure that the prices of the transfer are no less 
favourable than the valuable consideration normally 
required for such transfer to other licensees or by other 
similar suppliers in similar circumstances; 
(c) To maintain absolute secrecy or confidentiality with 
regard to the technical information disclosed during the 
period of validity of the agreement, unless the said 
information is in the public domain or other party has 
give its express content; 
(d) To supply all information necessary for the processing 
and execution of the agreement; 
(e) To remit the accrued royalties in the amount, within the 
time-limit and under the conditions authorized; and 
To retain and pay to the Iranian treasury the taxes 
applicable to the authorised royalties; 
Evaluation of Technology Transfer Agreements 
Article 70:. For the purposes of evaluation of transfer of technology agreements, 
the Transfer of Technology Office shall appraise the Economic, 
technical and legal aspects of the agreements, in awat that no 
arrangement or agreement between foreign investors and local interests 
(public or private) impede local technological development and block 
the flow of technology into the country. 
Registration of Technology Transfer Agreements Office 
Article 71:. Before the registeration of any transfer of technology agreements, the 
Director of the Transfer of Technology Office shall give notice to the 
Directors of the other two Offices - 
(a) stating that he proposes to make such registeration; 
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(b) stating the terms and conditions of the agreement; and 
(c) specifying the time within which objections or 
representations with respect to the proposed agreement 
may be made, and shall register the agreement only after 
any differences, objections or representations have been 
resolved or after receiving the approval of the Director 
General where an agreement cannot be reached. 
Effects of Registration 
Article 72:. No payment shall be made in Iran to the credit of any person outside 
Iran by or on the authority of the Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Affairs, the Central Bank and any licensed Bank in the country in 
respect of any payments due under a agreement mentioned in Article 
(59) of this Act, unless a certificate of registration issued under this Act 
is presented by the party or parties concerned together with a copy of 
the agreement certified by the Transfer of Technology Office. 
Article 73:. Any agreement mentioned in Article (59) or amendment thereto or 
extension thereof which has not been approved by the Technology 
Transfer Director shall produce no legal effect between the contracting 
parties or in relation to third parties and consequently no recourse may 
be had to it before any authority for commercial, tax, exchange or other 
purposes and performance thereof may not be claimed before national 
courts. 
Compliance with Conditions 
Article 74:. The Transfer of Technology Director shall monitor compliance with the 
conditions for registration of transfer of technology agreements. For 
this purpose, it may enter into arrangements with appropriate 
government offices which have supervision over the technology 
recipient to avoid duplication and for a more effective supervision of 
the applicant firm. 
Cancellation of the Registration 
Article 75: Where the Director of the Transfer of Technology Office is satisfied 
that any agreement has subsequent to the reg'stration thereof, has been 
amended or modified in contravention of the provisions of this Act, he 
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shall give notice in writing to the parties concerned of his intention to 
cancel the certificate of registration. The provision of Article (79) of 
this Act relating to reconsideration shall apply to any such notice as if 
it were a notice of reject an application for registration. 
Article 76 Where no reconsideration application is lodged as provided under 
Article (77), the Technology Transfer Director shall with the approval 
of the Director General cancel the certificate of the party concerned. 
Reconsideration 
Article 77:. 
Article 78:. 
Article 79:. 
Article 80:. 
Any interested party shall have the right to a hearing his objection to 
the proposal of the Technology Transfer Director for the rejection of 
an application for registration. Such a request for reconsideration shall 
be filed with the Board's Tribunal within 30 days after the date of 
notice of intention to reject the application. 
The request shall be in writing stating clearly and concisely the reasons 
therefor, and shall whenever relevant, be accompanied by evidence. 
Where a request is allowed the Director General shall cause the 
Technology Transfer Director to issue a certificate of registration in 
that behalf. Where a request is disallowed, the interested party shall 
have a right to appeal to the Branch one of Teheran First Class Civil 
Courts, within 15 days of the rejection of the request. 
The Transfer of Technology Office shall systematically identify 
technologies available on the world market for the various branches of 
industry, with a view to access to the most favourable and appropriate 
alternative solutions. 
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PART FOUR 
COMPETITION RULES 
Elimination or Control of Restrictive Business Practices and Prevention of Abuses 
of Dominant Power 
04jectives of Competition Rules 
Article 81:, The objectives of the Competition Rules are: 
(a) to identify and control restrictive practices in the 
transfer of technology agreements; 
(b) to repress abuse of economic power referred to in 
Principles 3 (6), 81 and 153 of the Constitution, 
(c) to maintain and encourage competition in Iran in order 
to promote the efficiency of economy, development, 
transfer and diffusion of technology, 
(d) to ensure that small-sized enterprises have an equitable 
opportunity to participate in the Iranian economy, 
(e) to expand opportunities for Iranian participation in 
world markets while at the same time recognizing the 
role of foreign competition in Iran, 
to provide consumers with competitive prices and 
product choices, 
(g) to promote innovations, 
(h) to control or eliminate restrictive agreements or 
arrangements among enterprises, or acquisition and 
abuse of dominant positions of market power in Iran. 
Definitions 
Article 82:. For the purpose of these Regulations the following definitions shall 
apply: 
EnteEprises "Enterprises" means firms, partnerships, corporations, companies, 
associations and otherjudicial persons, irrespective of whether created 
or controlled by private persons or by the state, which engage in 
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commercial activities, and includes their branches, subsidiaries, 
affiliates or other entities directly or indirectly controlled by them. 
Dominant Position 
"Dominant position of market power" refers to a situation where 
an enterprise, either by itself or acting together with a few other 
enterprises, is in a position to control the relevant market for a 
particular good or service or group of goods or services. 
Relevant Market 
"Relevant market" refers to the line of commerce in which 
competition has been restrained and to the geographic area 
involved, defined to include all reasonably substitutable 
products or services, and all nearby competitors, to which 
consumers could turn in the near term if the restraint or abuse 
raised prices by a not insignificant amount. 
Scope of Application 
Article 83:. The scope of application of these rules include all enterprises as 
defined above, in regard to all their commercial agreements, actions or 
transactions regarding goods, services or intellectual property. 
Article 84:. The scope of application of these rules does not apply to the sovereign 
acts of the state itself, or to those of local governments, or to acts of 
enterprises or natural persons which are compelled or supervised by the 
State or by local governments or branches of government acting within 
their delegated power. 
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1. Control or Eliminating Restrictive Business Practices of Technology 
Transfer Agreements 
Article 85: Contracts on transfers of technology, patents and other items of 
industrial property rights shall not be enforceable if agreements 
involving such rights contain restrictive business clauses specifically 
the following clauses: 
(a) those that oblige the recipient to purchase capital goods, 
intermediate products, raw materials or other forms of 
technology from the technology holder or from a 
particular source; in exceptional cases the recipient may 
accept such conditions governing the purchase of capital 
goods, intermediate products or raw materials at prices 
consonant with current world market prices; 
(b) those by which the undertaking selling the technology 
reserves the right to fix the sale price or resale price of 
products incorporating that technology; 
(c) those which requires payments for patents and other 
industrial property rights after their expiration, 
termination or invalidation; 
(d) those which require the recipient to transfer or grant 
back to the supplying party, or any other enterprise 
designated by the supplying party, inventions or 
improvements as are obtained through the use of the 
technology and patents, on an exclusive basis; 
(e) those which require technology recipient not to contest 
the validity of any of the patents and other types of 
protection for inventions involved in the transfer; 
those which restrict the recipient either in undertaking 
research and development directed to absorb and adapt 
the transferred technology to local conditions or in 
initiating research and development programmes in 
connection with new products, process and equipment; 
(g) those which prevent the recipient of technology from 
adapting the imported technology to local conditions or 
introducing innovation in it; 
(h) those which limit the scope, volume of production or the 
sale or resale prices of the products manufactured by the 
technology recipient; 
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(i) those which prohibit the use of competing technology; 
those which restrict directly or indirectly the export of 
the products manufactured by the technology recipient 
under the agreement, except to countries in which the 
technology supplier himself produces such products or 
in which he has granted an exclusive right to 
manufacture such products; 
(k) those which require that the technology recipient use of 
technology supplier trade marks on the products; 
those other clauses having equivalent or similar objects 
or effects. 
Exceptional Cases 
Article 86:. Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions, in any cases where the Board 
is satisfied that substantial benefits will accrue to the Iranian economy, 
such as in export-oriented ventures, labour-intensive industries, those 
that would promote regional dispersal of industries or which involve 
substantial use of local raw materials, the agreement may be allowed 
when feasible under such regulations to be proposed by Competition 
Office and determined by the Director General. 
11. Control of Agreements Between Competitors 
Article 87:. The following agreement between rival or potentially rival firms, 
regardless of whether such agreements are written or oral, formal or 
informal shall be prohibited: 
(a) Agreements fixing prices or other terms of sale, 
including in international trade; 
(b) Collusive tendering; 
(c) Market or customer allocation; 
(d) Restraints on production or sales, including by quota; 
(e) Concerted refusals to purchase; 
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(f) Concerted refusal to supply; 
(g) Collective denial of access to an arrangement, or 
association, which is crucial to competition. 
(h) Agreements to otherwise restrain or injure competition 
and having or being likely to have adverse effect on the 
economic development (including technological 
development) of the country. 
Authorization 
Article 88:. Practices falling with Article (87), when properly notified in advance, 
and when made by firms subject to effective competition, may be 
authorised when the l1BDT concludes that the agreement as a whole 
will produce net public benefit. Cooperation in research and 
development, and agreement and arrangement relates to the export of 
products from Iran are examples for such an authorization. 
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111. Control of Abuse of Dominant Position 
Article 89:. The following acts or behaviour constitute abuse of dominant position 
of market power and shall be prohibited: 
(a) Limiting production, markets or technical development 
to the prejudice of consumers; 
applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions 
with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a 
competitive disadvantage; 
(c) Predatory acts against competitors, such as using below- 
cost pricing to eliminate competitors; 
(d) Making the conclusion of agreements subject to 
acceptance by the other parties of supplementary 
obligations which by their nature or according to 
commercial usage, have no connection with the subject 
of such agreements; 
(e) Misuse of intellectual property right to impede either 
import transactions or sales on the national market; and 
Mergers, takeovers, joint ventures, or other acquisition 
of control which create or increase the power of one or 
more enterprises to the extent that imped effective 
competition in the relevant market. 
Authorization 
Article 90:. The Competition Office may authorise acts, practices or transactions 
not absolutely prohibited by this Act, if they are notified, as described 
in Article (89), before being put into effect, if: 
(a) all relevant facts are truthfully disclosed; 
(b) affected parties have an opportunity to be heard; 
(c) it is determined that the proposed conduct, as altered or 
regulated if necessary, will be consistent with the 
objectives of the law. 
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Nqtirication 
Article 91: When practices fall within the scope of Articles (87) and (89) and are 
not prohibited outright, and hence the possibility exists for their 
authorization, enterprises shall be required to notify the practices to the 
Competition Office, providing full details of the agreements or 
arrangements. 
Article 92: Notification could be made to the Competition Office by all the parties 
concerned, or by one or more of the parties acting on behalf of the 
others, or by any persons properly authorised to act on their behalf. 
Article 93: Enterprises shall be allowed to seek authorization for their agreements 
and arrangements falling within the scope of Articles (87) and (89) that 
existing on the date of the coming into force of this Act. They shall be 
notified within two months after the date of coming into force of this 
Act. 
Article 94: All agreements or arrangements not notified could be made subject to 
the full sanctions of this Act, rather than mere revision, if later 
discovered and deemed illegal. 
Action by the Competition Office 
Article 95: Before the authorization of any restrictive business practices, the 
Director of the Competition Office shall give notice to the Director of 
the Transfer of Technology Office - 
(a) stating that he proposes to make such an authorization; 
stating the terms and conditions of the authorization; 
and 
(c) specifying the time within which objections or 
representations with respect to the proposed 
authorization may be made, and shall make the 
authorization only after any differences, objections or 
representations have been resolved or after receiving the 
approval of the Director General where an agreement 
cannot be reached. 
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Review af Allithnirizations 
Aj: ficle 96: The Competition Office shall review granted authorization every 12 
month in order to extend, suspend or subject an extension to the 
fulfilment of conditions and obligations. 
Cancellation of Authorizations 
Article 97:. The granted shall be withdrawn if it comes to the attention of the 
Competition Office that: 
(a) the circumstances justifying the granting of the 
authorization have ceased to exist; 
(b) The enterprises have failed to meet the conditions and 
obligations stipulated for the granting of the 
authorization; 
(C) Information provided in seeking the authorization was 
false or misleading. 
, 
qnnvtinnr. 
Article 98:, All enterprises or individuals, whether public or private that engage in 
activities enumerated in the Articles (87) and (89), without prejudice 
to any civil and criminal liability, shall be guilty of an indictable 
offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years 
or to a fine not exceeding hundred million Toman or to both. 
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APPENDIX THREE 
FINDINGS FROM A FIELD STUDY REGARDING THE IBTPT 
A field study as to the IBTPT was conducted by the writer in Iran in 1994. By 
way of the attached questionnaire, data were obtained from twenty-five Iranian 
enterprises in the manufacturing sector (two automotive; ten rubber, glass, synthetic 
fibbers, petrochemical; and thirteen metal working, electrical, and non-electrical. The 
results are as follows: 
A. Patents 
Twenty out of the twenty five enterprises maintained that, they agree and support the 
national patent system as proposed by the Law, because: 
- in the event of transferring their valuable technology to Iranian parties, 
foreign enterprises had attached importance to the strong protection of their 
patents; 
- the proposed patent rules would protect new technologies, and require 
sufficient disclosure and working of new technologies in the country; 
- the system would bring certainty and confidence as to the protection of 
national inventions. Four enterprises asserted that they had new inventions, but 
due to the inadequacy of the current patent system, they had to either abandon 
their registration or register them in European countries, particularly in 
Germany; 
- the system is necessary and timely in view of the integration of Iran's 
economy to the international economy and the World Trade Organisation. The 
proposed patent system has taken into account the new standards of the TRIPS 
and will encourage transfer and dissemination of foreign technology; 
- the integration of the patent system 
in the EBTPT is logical and necessary, 
and will make the system more effective. 
Five enterprises opposed any patent system: three of them assumed that the patent 
system would protect foreigners more than local enterprises; the other two enterprises 
were not aware of the patent system. They, however, asserted that a national law to 
protect local innovative activities and industrial investment is very necessary for the 
country. 
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B. Innovation and Utility Model Certificates 
Twenty three out of the twenty five enterprises supported protection of the 
innovation certificates and utility model certificates as proposed by the Law. They 
asserted that such protection will encourage innovative activities and industrial 
investment. Five enterprises, mostly pharmaceutical enterprises, emphasised that they 
were not active enough in research and development and introducing new products 
because, in the absence of an effective legal protection, the products would be either 
copied by other enterprises or similar products would be imported from other 
countries. 
Two out of the twenty five enterprises were against any market regulation. 
C. Registration and Monitoring of the Transfer of Technology Agreements 
Nineteen out of the twenty five enterprises that were questioned supported the 
registration and monitoring of the transfer of technology agreements as proposed by 
the Law, because: 
- the present foreign exchange control situation in the country and particularly 
the remittance of foreign companies is not appropriate for the industrial 
development of the country. The current system has encouraged more the 
importation of finished goods than the transfer of technology and manufacture 
of required goods. Thus, the proposed EBTPT was welcomed by national 
entrepreneurs as likely on the one hand to encourage transfer of technology 
agreements and on the other hand to facilitates the reimbursement of required 
foreign currency. 
- there is no responsible government agency in the country to monitor the 
transfer and promotion of technology and to report to the public; 
- the technological information that would be provided by the relevant office 
would be very useful for local enterprises; 
- the rules would strengthen bargaining power of local enterprises vis-a-vis 
foreign technology suppliers; 
- the flexibility of the transfer of technology rules 
is beneficial and would be 
an effective instrument for the transfer and promotion of valuable technology 
to Iran. 
Six out of the twenty five enterprises were opposed to the registration of transfer of 
technology agreements because in their opinion transfer of foreign technology is not 
needed or they believed in an absolute deregulation of the economy. 
Nevertheless, even those enterprises that were in agreement with the 
registration and monitoring of the transfer of technology agreement asserted that with 
the continuing technological self-reliance and technological development of the 
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country, the scope of the statutory functions of the national transfer of technology 
office should be diminished. In that case, the system should be liberalised and focus 
more on the inventive and innovative activities and on free competition. This is of 
course, one of the reasons for the unique administrative arrangement proposed by the 
Law. 
C. Competition 
Twenty three out of the twenty-five enterprises that were questioned, 
maintained that the protection of competition in Iran is essential. They emphasised that 
the competition law is needed not only for the control of foreign monopolies in the 
country: the local, government and semi-government monopolies should be controlled 
as well -a view shared by this author. Further, they emphasised that the patent system 
in Iran cannot be an instrument for the technological development unless the granted 
rights are checked and controlled by the competition rules. 
Two out of the twenty-five enterprises opposed any regulation of the market. 
In this sense they maintain that the absolute liberalisation and deregulation of the 
economy can provide a real competitive market. 
D. The IBTPT 
Twenty three out of the twenty-five enterprises that were questioned admitted 
that the IBTPT is a workable and useful organisation. They answered that the 
supervision of the Supreme Technology Council would give required insight and 
direction to the EBTPT. The IBTPT, thus, would work on the basis and with regard 
to the overall national development programme and implement the technological 
policies and priorities of the country. Furthermore, the corporate relationship of the 
Transfer of Technology Office to the other two offices in the framework of EBTPT, 
was acknowledged by them, as a wise and clear solution for the effective 
administration of the patent, transfer of technology and protection of competition rules. 
Moreover, they believed the IBTPT as a centre would provide worthwhile services and 
contribution to the technological development of the country. 
One out of the twenty-five enterprises, however, felt the IBTPT to be 
unworkable mainly due to the uncoordinated functioning of the 
different ministries in 
Iran. 
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QUESTIONNAIRE (PRIVATE ENTERPRISES) 
Dear Sir/Madam 
Please find the enclosed copy of the proposed Law for Development of 
Technology in Iran. The Law would lay down rules for granting patents, for 
registering transfer of technology agreements, and for protecting of competition in 
Iran, and would bring these three laws under the supervision of a single independent 
agency of the government. 
In sum the Law would: 
provide protection for conventional patents as well as for industrial development 
patents; 
require for the registration and monitoring of the international transfer of technology 
contracts with Iranian enterprises; and 
protect competition in Iran. 
I- Please answer the following questions: 
1.1 Name of your Enterprise. 
1.2 Main business activities. 
1.3 registered address. 
1.4 Number of employees. 
2. Please outline your views regarding the following aspects of the proposed Law: 
A. The new patent system; 
B. The protection of industrial development patent in Iran (innovation certificates and 
utility model certificates) as proposed by the Law; 
C. The registration and monitoring by the proposed 113TPT of international transfer 
of technology agreements conclude with Iranian enterprises; 
D. The protection of competition in Iran by the proposed I1BTPT; 
3. Give your views with regard to the proposal that the above mentioned rules to be 
administered in a unitary legal framework such as the EBTPT; 
APPEINDIX Fouiz 
Organisational Chart of the Proposed IBTPT 
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